Arion et al v. Sato
Filing
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ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS, DOC. NO. 11 . Signed by JUDGE J. MICHAEL SEABRIGHT on 2/6/2014. Excerpt of conclusion: ~ Any outstanding restraining orders are hereby dissolved. The Clerk of Court is to close the case file. (afc)CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
MANUEL ARION and AISHA ARION, )
)
Petitioners,
)
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vs.
)
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CLIFF SATO,
)
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Respondent.
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________________________________ )
CIVIL NO. 13-00464 JMS/KSC
ORDER GRANTING
RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS, DOC. NO. 11
ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS,
DOC. NO. 11
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 21, 2013, Petitioners Manuel Arion and Aisha Arion (“the
Arions”) filed a petition for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and preliminary
injunction in the District Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, alleging that
Cliff Sato, a mail carrier with the United States Postal Service, (“Sato”), verbally
and physically harassed the Arions while delivering their mail. On August 21,
2013, an ex parte TRO issued. On September 13, 2013, Sato removed the case to
this court.
Currently before the court is Sato’s Motion to Dismiss and/or for
Summary Judgment arguing that Sato is immune from suit under the Supremacy
Clause for acts performed during the exercise of his federal duties in delivering the
mail. The Arions neither filed an Opposition nor appeared at the February 3, 2014
hearing. Based on the following, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss.
II. BACKGROUND
A.
Factual Background
Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(g), the material facts set forth in Sato’s
Concise Statement of Facts (“CSF”) are deemed admitted due to the Arions’ failure
to file an Opposition.1 As such, the court relies on those facts in reviewing the
Motion.
Sato is a mail carrier for the United States Postal Service (“USPS”).
Doc. No. 12, Resp’t CSF ¶ 1. Postal regulations require customers to provide
unobstructed access to their mailboxes. Id. ¶ 5; Doc. No. 11-4, Resp’t Ex. B,
USPS Domestic Mail Manual, §§ 508.3.2.6 and 508.3.1.4; 39 C.F.R. § 111.1
(incorporating by reference the USPS Domestic Mail Manual into the Code of
Federal Regulations). The Regulations further provide that “[c]ustomers must
keep the approach to their mailboxes clear of obstructions to allow a safe access for
delivery.” Doc. No. 11-4, Resp’t Ex. B, USPS Domestic Mail Manual,
§ 508.3.1.4. If a mail carrier is impeded from reaching the mailbox, “the
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Because the jurisdictional question involved in the 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is
intertwined with the merits of the case, the court will treat the Motion to Dismiss as a motion for
summary judgment under Rule 56. See supra at 5. Thus, under Local Rule 56.1(g), Sato’s CSF
is “deemed admitted.”
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postmaster may withdraw delivery service.” Id.
The Arions live along Sato’s regular route, and Sato has been their
mail carrier for the last ten years. Doc. No. 12, Resp’t CSF ¶¶ 1-2. The Arions
have repeatedly blocked access to their mailbox with vehicles, trash cans, and large
pieces of rubbish. Id. ¶ 6. Leading up to the date of incident, USPS had withheld
the Arions’ mail for ten days due to obstruction of their mailbox. Id. ¶ 9.
On August 20, 2013, the date of incident, the Arions’ mailbox was
blocked, and Manuel Arion (“Mr. Arion”) was sitting outside of his home. Id.
¶ 10. According to Sato, when Sato attempted to deliver the mail, Mr. Arion
approached Sato and yelled at him. Id. Sato explained that he was just doing his
job and could not deliver the mail when the Arions blocked their mailbox. Id.
There was no physical contact between the two men, and Sato did not threaten
Arion. Id.
On August 21, 2013, the Arions filed a Petition in the District Court
of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, seeking an ex parte TRO and preliminary
injunction against Sato. Doc. No. 1, Ex. A. Pursuant to Hawaii Revised Statutes
(“HRS”) § 604-10.5 prohibiting harassment, the Arions sought an order enjoining
Sato from contacting, threatening, physically harassing, or telephoning the Arions
and from entering or visiting the Arions’ residence and place of employment. Id.
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That same day, the court issued the TRO. Id.
B.
Procedural Background
On September 13, 2013, Sato removed the case to federal court. Doc.
No. 1. On October 21, 2013, Magistrate Judge Kevin S.C. Chang held a Rule 16
Scheduling Conference, at which the Arions failed to appear. Doc. No. 10. On
November 13, 2013, Sato filed the instant Motion. Doc. No. 11. On November
14, 2013, the court sent notice to the Arions of the due date for their Opposition,
January 6, 2014, and the hearing date, February 3, 2014. Doc. No. 13. The notice
also informed the Arions of their obligation to file an opposition to a motion for
summary judgment. Id. The Arions did not file an Opposition. A hearing was
held on February 3, 2014.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) authorizes a court to dismiss
claims over which it lacks proper subject matter jurisdiction. The court may
determine jurisdiction on a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Rule
12(b)(1) so long as “the jurisdictional issue is [not] inextricable from the merits of
a case.” Kingman Reef Atoll Invs., L.L.C. v. United States, 541 F.3d 1189, 1195
(9th Cir. 2008). But where the jurisdictional question is intertwined with the
merits of the case, the court will treat the motion to dismiss for lack of subject
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matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) as a motion for summary judgment under
Rule 56. See Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983). In
this case, the jurisdictional issue and the merits of the case are intertwined.
The moving party “should prevail [on a motion to dismiss] only if the
material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to
prevail as a matter of law.” Casumpang v. Int’l Longshoremen’s &
Warehousemen’s Union, 269 F.3d 1042, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation and
quotation signals omitted); Tosco Corp. v. Cmtys. for a Better Env’t, 236 F.3d 495,
499 (9th Cir. 2001).
IV. DISCUSSION
Sato contends that this case should be dismissed based upon
Supremacy Clause immunity because the Arions’ allegations of harassment arise
from the exercise of Sato’s official duties as a federal employee. The court agrees.
Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause,2 states may not impede federal
officials in the exercise of their duties to carry out federal laws. McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 436 (1819). As a general rule, Supremacy Clause
2
“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.” U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2.
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immunity shields federal officers from state laws or prosecution under state law for
actions taken in the course of their official duties so long as the actions were
reasonably necessary for the performance of those duties. See In re Neagle, 135
U.S. 1, 75 (1890) (granting habeas relief to federal officer charged with murder);
Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276, 284 (1899) (holding that governor of federal eating
house was not bound by state law requiring the establishment to post notice of its
oleomargarine use); Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, 57 (1920) (holding that
federal postal employee did not have to obtain state driver’s license to operate
government mail truck); Clifton v. Cox, 549 F.2d 722, 726-27 (9th Cir. 1977)
(holding that Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs agent was immune for a
killing that occurred in the line of duty and noting that “acts done in connection
with a mandatory duty apply with equal force to discretionary acts”); Smith v.
Cromer, 159 F.3d 875, 879 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that “where the state court
lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties, the federal court acquires
none upon removal”).
These cases amply demonstrate that the United States government, not
the states, retains control over federal agents performing their official duties. See
Van Brocklin v. Anderson, 117 U.S. 151 (1886). “The sovereignty of a state
. . . does not extend to those means which are employed by congress to carry into
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execution powers conferred on that body by the people of the United States.” Id.
Accordingly, federal agents have Supremacy Clause immunity from state law
where they are performing their official duties, and both state and federal courts
lack jurisdiction to enforce such state laws.
In this case, the Arions have in place a state court TRO that prohibits
Sato from, among other things, entering or visiting the Arions’ residence. The
state court lacked jurisdiction to issue the TRO and this court lacks jurisdiction to
enforce it.
In a 12(b)(1) action, the moving party “should prevail only if the
material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to
prevail as a matter of law.” Casumpang, 269 F.3d at 1060-61. Here, the material
facts are undisputed, and Sato is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Sato is a
federal employee who had a duty to deliver mail. Doc. No. 12, Resp’t CSF ¶ 1.
Further, the incident at issue arose while Sato was delivering the mail. Id. ¶¶ 8, 10.
Finally, no physical contact occurred, and Sato and Mr. Arion simply exchanged
words regarding Sato’s attempts to deliver the mail. See Doc. No. 11-12, Resp’t
Ex. J. Thus, Sato’s interaction with Mr. Arion was “reasonably necessary” to
perform his duty to deliver the mail, and enforcement of HRS § 604-10.5(a)
against Sato would improperly and directly interfere with the performance of his
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federal duties. Accordingly, the court finds that Supremacy Clause immunity
applies and that the court lacks jurisdiction over the Petition.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the court GRANTS Respondent’s
Motion to Dismiss. Any outstanding restraining orders are hereby dissolved. The
Clerk of Court is to close the case file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, February 6, 2014.
/s/ J. Michael Seabright
J. Michael Seabright
United States District Judge
Arion v. Sato, Civ. No. 13-00464 JMS/KSC, Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss,
Doc. No. 11
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