Wegesend et al v. Envision Lending Group, Inc. et al

Filing 39

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION. Signed by JUDGE DERRICK K. WATSON on 4/30/2014. ~ The Court hereby dismisses the Wegesends complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case. (ecs, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAI`I
WILLIAM PAUL KULANI
WEGESEND and BARBARA JEAN
WEGESEND,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
ENVISION LENDING GROUP, INC.;
et al.

CIVIL NO. 13-00493 DKW-KSC

ORDER DISMISSING
COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF
SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION

Defendants.

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
This matter is nearly identical in relevant part to two other cases in
this district, brought by the same counsel, which have recently been dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Dicion v. Mann Mortgage, LLC, 2014 WL
1366151 (D. Haw. April 4, 2014); Pascua v. Option One Mortgage Corp., 2014
WL 806226 (D. Haw. Feb. 28, 2014). The result here is no different—because the
Wegesends lack standing and have not satisfied the amount in controversy
requirement, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, mandating dismissal of
the complaint.

BACKGROUND
The Wegesends have two mortgages on their primary residence.
Although they have been making payments on these mortgages for years, they now
allege an uncertainty regarding whom to pay.   They assert a single cause of action
that they refer to as “quiet title,” seeking declaratory relief so that they can “be
certain that the roughly $150,000.00 they have already paid toward their
Mortgages have been sent to the correct parties,” Complaint ¶ 30, and to clarify “to
whom they are required to send mortgage payments,” Complaint ¶ 21.
Defendants, the mortgagees and loan servicers on the Wegesends’
mortgages, move to dismiss.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although Defendants’ motions are filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8,
12(b)(6), 12(d), and 54(b), the Court “must determine that [it] ha[s] jurisdiction
before proceeding to the merits.” Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007).
Thus, the Court is “obligated to consider sua sponte whether [it] ha[s] subject
matter jurisdiction.” Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1116 (9th Cir.
2004). “If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction,
the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
A suit brought by a plaintiff without Article III standing is not a “case
or controversy,” and an Article III federal court therefore lacks subject matter
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jurisdiction over the suit. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102
(1998). In order to establish standing, three requirements must be met:
First and foremost, there must be alleged (and ultimately
proved) an injury in fact—a harm suffered by the plaintiff that
is concrete and actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical. Second, there must be causation—a fairly
traceable connection between the plaintiff’s injury and the
complained-of conduct of the defendant. And third, there must
be redressability—a likelihood that the requested relief will
redress the alleged injury. This triad of injury in fact,
causation, and redressability constitutes the core of Article III’s
case-or-controversy requirement, and the party invoking federal
jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing its existence.
Id. at 102–04 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). See Takhar v.
Kessler, 76 F.3d 995, 1000 (9th Cir. 1996) (“A plaintiff has the burden of
establishing the elements required for standing.”).
Even where a plaintiff has standing, subject matter jurisdiction must
also be established. Jurisdiction founded on diversity (the basis for jurisdiction
alleged by the Wegesends here) “requires that the parties be in complete diversity
and the amount in controversy exceed $75,000.” Matheson v. Progressive
Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332. Where, as here, declaratory or injunctive relief is sought, it is “‘well
established that the amount in controversy is measured by the value of the object of
the litigation.’” Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 347 (1977)). The object
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of the litigation is “the value of the right to be protected or the extent of the injury
to be prevented.” Jackson v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 538 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1976); see
also Ridder Bros., Inc. v. Blethen, 142 F.2d 395, 399 (9th Cir. 1944) (stating that
the “required amount [in controversy is] the value of the particular and limited
thing sought to be accomplished by the action”).
“[T]he party asserting diversity jurisdiction bears the burden of
proof.” Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1986).
DISCUSSION
The Wegesends lack standing and have failed to satisfy the amount in
controversy requirement necessary to establish diversity jurisdiction. Accordingly,
the Court dismisses the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
First, the Wegesends have not alleged an injury in fact to sufficiently
establish standing. Although the Wegesends assert their general concern that they
could have made or might make mortgage payments to a wrong party without the
Court’s assistance in ascertaining to whom they should pay, the Wegesends do not
allege that any Defendant has actually initiated foreclosure proceedings or that
more than one party has actually demanded payment on the same loan—
allegations necessary to show actual injury. Consequently, as Judge Seabright
concluded in Dicion:
Absent such factual allegations, the potential for multiple
liability or foreclosure is no more than mere speculation and
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falls far short of constituting an Article III injury-in-fact. Thus,
Plaintiff's injury is no more than his own uncertainty regarding
which Defendant is entitled to his mortgage payments. Such a
subjective uncertainty is neither sufficiently concrete nor
particularized to constitute an injury-in-fact.
2014 WL 1366151, at *4 (internal citations omitted); see also Pascua, 2014 WL
806226, at *4 (“At most, the injury-in-fact that Pascua suffers is the ‘uncertainty’
he says he has regarding what entity he is supposed to pay. It is not clear that this
subjective feeling of uncertainty is sufficiently concrete and particularized to
constitute an injury-in-fact. It is also not clear that Pascua’s purported injury, such
as it is, is caused by Defendants’ conduct rather than by Pascua’s own apparent
inability to discern the nature of his obligations.” (internal citation omitted)).
Indeed, the Defendants agree that there is no dispute as to the roles of each
Defendant entity, and there is nothing to even suggest that the Wegesends would
be subject to additional liability, as they apparently fear. Having alleged no injury
in fact, and the Court declining to allow the Wegesends to manufacture one,
Plaintiffs lack standing, depriving the Court of subject matter jurisdiction. Steel
Co., 523 U.S. at 102.1

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The Court also adopts the same reasoning and conclusion reached by Judge Seabright in Dicion
for the second and third requirements of standing:
Furthermore, in the absence of a demand for payment from multiple
Defendants, Plaintiff’s uncertainty is not fairly traceable to any challenged
action of the Defendants. Nor is Plaintiff's uncertainty likely to be
redressed by a favorable decision.

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Second, the Court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the
amount in controversy requirement to establish diversity jurisdiction has not been
satisfied. The Wegesends allege that “[t]he matter in controversy is $848,000.00,
which is the current market value of the Subject Property.” Complaint ¶ 4.
However, as Judge Mollway discussed in Pascua:
Here, the matter Pascua says he wants to accomplish does not
implicate the entire debt or the value of the property. Although
he styles his claim as one to “quiet title,” Pascua does not allege
that he holds title to the property free and clear of any debt
obligation. Nor does Pascua seek to enjoin a foreclosure. In
either such situation, the full debt or the property itself would
be the object of the litigation, because the claimant would be
trying to prevent paying the debt or losing the property.
Pascua, by contrast, asks for a declaration to prevent him from
feeling uncertainty as to whom to pay. He is not actually being
asked to pay his acknowledged debt more than once. The
amount in controversy is therefore the subjective value to
Pascua of freeing him from that risk. Courts are often
disinclined to speculate as to the monetary value of something
so vague and amorphous as a feeling of uncertainty.
In any event, it is implausible to suggest that the subjective
value to Pascua of such a declaration is greater than $75,000.
Pascua’s primary fear appears to be that he will accidentally
pay the wrong party $41,139.92, which is the amount Wells
Fargo is currently requesting he pay to avert foreclosure. The
harm to Pascua of his fear that he might lose a second payment
of $41,139.92 cannot plausibly be worth in excess of $75,000.
2014 WL 806226, at *5 (internal citations omitted).

2014 WL 1366151, at *5 (alterations, quotation marks, and citation omitted). 

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Similarly here, the Wegesends ask for a declaration to clarify their
alleged confusion as to whom to pay. Therefore, the object of the litigation is not
the value of the property, but is instead the value in relieving the Wegesends’
uncertainty. Dicion, 2014 WL 1366151, at *6. However, the Wegesends have not
even attempted to prove what the value of that uncertainty is and the Court will not
speculate. Even if it could be quantified, the account statement attached to the
complaint suggests that the amount the Wegesends actually owe (and thus could
theoretically double- or even triple-pay based on their alleged uncertainty) is only a
few thousand dollars, less than what was at issue in Dicion and far less than what
was at issue in Pascua. See Complaint Ex. F (2013 Account Statement from
Security National Mortgage Company listing amount due as $5,795.43). In short,
“because the true purpose of this action is neither to quiet title in favor of Plaintiff
and against all Defendants, nor to stop an imminent foreclosure sale, simply
requesting such relief cannot transform the object of litigation to the subject
property.” Dicion, 2014 WL 1366151, at *6 n.6.
Finally, the Court notes that even if the Court had subject matter
jurisdiction, “Plaintiffs’ contention that they do not know to whom their debt is
owed is not a basis to ‘quiet title.’” Klohs v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 901
F.Supp.2d 1253, 1261 n.4 (D. Haw. 2012).

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CONCLUSION
The Court hereby dismisses the Wegesends’ complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: HONOLULU, HAWAI‘I, April 30, 2014.

Wegesend v. Envision Lending Group, Inc., et al.; CV 13-00493 DKW/KSC;
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION
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