Debeikes v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. et al

Filing 168

ORDER AFFIRMING THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC.'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO RULE 11, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO 28 § U.S.C. 1927 re [160 ], 162 - Signed by JUDGE ALAN C KAY on 2/1/2016. (emt, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
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Matthew J. Debeikes,
Plaintiff,
v.
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. and
Association of Flight
Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO,
Defendants.

Civil No. 13-00504 ACK-RLP

ORDER AFFIRMING THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC.’S MOTION FOR
SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO RULE 11, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FEES AND
COSTS PURSUANT TO 28 § U.S.C. 1927
For the reasons set forth below, the Court AFFIRMS
Magistrate Judge Puglisi’s December 21, 2015 Order Granting in
Part and Denying in Part Defendant Hawaiian Airlines, Inc’s
Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to FRCP Rule 11, or in the
Alternative, Fees and Costs Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, ECF No.
160 (the “Order for Sanctions”).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Matthew Debeikes (“Plaintiff” or “Debeikes”)
filed his initial Complaint in this action on October 3, 2013
against Defendant Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. (“Hawaiian Airlines”)
and Defendant Association of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO
(“AFA”) (collectively, “Defendants”).

1

Compl., ECF No. 1.

The

Complaint alleged that Defendants forced Plaintiff into early
retirement on May 29, 2013.

Id. ¶¶ 9, 14, ECF No. 1.

Specifically, the Complaint contended that Hawaiian Airlines
violated the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) governing
the terms and conditions of Debeikes’ employment with the
company, and that AFA breached its duty to fairly represent
Plaintiff as one of its bargaining unit members.1

Id. ¶¶ 11, 12.

The Complaint also alleged that Plaintiff “exhausted contractual
and internal remedies” before filing his claim, and “[i]n the
alternative” that Defendants’ actions excused his failure to
exhaust the remedies.

Id. ¶ 13.

On October 30, 2014, both Defendants moved for summary
judgment.

AFA filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (“MSJ”) as to

Plaintiff’s claim that it breached the union’s DFR, ECF No. 51,
and Hawaiian Airlines filed a MSJ as to all of Plaintiff’s
claims, ECF No. 54.
On February 17, 2015, the Court granted Defendants’
MSJs as to all of Plaintiff’s claims.

1

ECF No. 75-1.

In the 64

As explained in the Court’s February 17, 2015 Order
Granting the Motions for Summary Judgment of Defendants Hawaiian
Airlines, Inc. and Association of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO
(“February SJ Order”), Debeikes’ Complaint pleaded a “hybrid §
301/fair representation” claim. February SJ Order at 21, ECF No.
75-1. Such a claim exempts from federally-mandated arbitration
those claims alleging both that (1) a plaintiff’s employer
violated a CBA, and (2) his union breached its duty of fair
representation (“DFR”) in challenging the CBA violation. See
DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 165 (1983).
2

page February SJ Order, the Court concluded that none of
Plaintiff’s claims, as presented in the Complaint, was viable.
First, the Court found that Plaintiff’s allegations of
“constructive discharge,” related to Hawaiian Airlines’
“refus[al] to abide by the CBA,” were preempted by his breach of
CBA claim.

In addition, the Court found that the claim of

constructive discharge was unsupported on the merits.
February SJ Order at 28-30, ECF No. 75-1.

See

Second, the Court

concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s breach
of CBA claim against Hawaiian Airlines, given that Debeikes had
retired and filed suit without exhausting the CBA’s grievance
procedures and no exception to the exhaustion requirement
applied.

Id. at 34, 39.2

Third, the Court concluded that it

must dismiss Plaintiff’s breach of DFR claim against AFA because
his breach of CBA claim was not viable, consistent with Bliesner

2

Within this discussion, the Court considered and rejected
Plaintiff’s claim that AFA’s failure to inform him of the status
of the relevant grievance proceedings constituted an exception to
the exhaustion requirement. Id. at 37-39. Unbeknownst to
Plaintiff at the time his original Complaint was filed, AFA had
filed a grievance challenging Hawaiian Airlines’ refusal to
provide investigatory documents related to the sexual harassment
claims against Plaintiff. Id. at 7, 14, 33. The grievance “was
what the union refers to as a ‘MEC grievance,’ a form of
prospective class action grievance filed on behalf of all members
to challenge Hawaiian Airlines’ misinterpretation or
misapplication of the CBA terms.” Id. at 14. The Court
determined, inter alia, that AFA’s decision not to disclose the
pending grievance to Plaintiff was not arbitrary, discriminatory,
or in bad faith, and as such, did not excuse Plaintiff’s failure
to exhaust the grievance procedures. Id. at 39.
3

v. Commc’n Workers of Am., 464 F.3d 910, 913 (9th Cir. 2006).
See id.

In the alternative, the Court also concluded that none

of Plaintiff’s factual allegations stated a viable breach of DFR
claim.

Id. at 40-63.
The February SJ Order dismissed Plaintiff’s claims

without prejudice and granted Debeikes 30-days’ leave to file an
Amended Complaint.

Id. at 64.

On March 11, 2015, Debeikes filed

his First Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”), again purporting to
bring a hybrid § 301/fair representation claim against AFA and
Hawaiian Airlines while also claiming “constructive discharge.”
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8-14, ECF No. 80.

Specifically, the Amended

Complaint alleged that Hawaiian Airlines “constructively
discharged Plaintiff without ‘just cause’” when it “predetermined
to Terminate Plaintiff in violation of the CBA’s due process
requirement of a fair hearing.”

Id. ¶13.

Relatedly, Plaintiff

alleged that Hawaiian Airlines “informed Plaintiff that he would
be terminated” if he attended his scheduled disciplinary hearing.
Id.

Plaintiff further alleged that AFA was aware that Hawaiian

Airlines “predetermined to [t]erminate” him and that it “failed
to investigate or process” any related grievance.

Id.

Unlike

the original Complaint, the Amended Complaint did not include an
allegation that Plaintiff had exhausted his contractual remedies
or that his failure to exhaust was excused.
Defendants Hawaiian Airlines and AFA filed separate

4

motions to dismiss, or in the alternative, grant summary judgment
based on Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.

See ECF. Nos. 85, 94.

Hawaiian Airlines also filed a “Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to
FRCP Rule 11” related to the Amended Complaint.

ECF No. 97.

Magistrate Judge Puglisi denied Hawaiian Airlines’ motion for
sanctions, granting the company leave to “file a second motion
seeking Rule 11 sanctions after the district court issues its
decision on the pending motions to dismiss or for summary
judgment.”

See Order Denying Without Prejudice Defendant

Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.’s Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to FRCP
Rule 11 at 2-3, ECF No. 141.
On March 31, 2015, the parties attended a Final
Pretrial Conference with Magistrate Judge Puglisi.

As

memorialized in the conference minutes, the Magistrate Judge set
a continued trial date, and Plaintiff requested to re-open
discovery.

He was expressly “advised to file [a] Motion for

Additional Discovery.”
No. 91.

Minutes of Conf. of Mar. 31, 2015, ECF

Plaintiff did not, however, proceed to file such a

motion.
Plaintiff filed Oppositions to Defendants’ motions to
dismiss, or in the alternative grant summary judgment on May 7,
2015.

See ECF. No. 104, 105.

Neither of Plaintiff’s Oppositions

raised any issue related to discovery.
On May 11, 2015, the Court issued a Minute Order

5

observing that Defendants’ motions to dismiss, or in the
alternative, grant summary judgment were filed after the
dispositive motions deadline had passed.

The parties were

therefore “encouraged to stipulate to an extension of the
dispositive motions deadline.”

If such an agreement was not

possible, the parties were “directed to seek a conference
regarding such extension with Judge Puglisi prior to the hearing
scheduled for May 28, 2015 on Defendants’ motions.”

ECF No. 107.

The parties did not reach an agreement as to a
stipulation to extend the dispositive motions deadline.

Instead,

the parties attended a telephonic status conference with
Magistrate Judge Puglisi on May 27, 2015, after which Magistrate
Judge Puglisi issued an order extending the dispositive motions
deadline, nunc pro tunc, to April 15, 2015.
Defendants’ motions to be considered timely.
May 27, 2015, ECF No. 116.

This allowed
Minutes of Conf. of

Magistrate Judge Puglisi’s Minutes

also reflect that Plaintiff’s counsel raised at the May 27, 2015
status conference that “he would like to depose the declarants
who submitted declarations in support of the Motion to Dismiss
or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment.”

Id.

Plaintiff’s counsel raised the same request the next
day at the Court’s scheduled hearing on Defendants’ summary
judgment motions.

He made an oral motion to continue the hearing

and read the minutes of the May 27, 2015 conference into the

6

record.

The Court granted Plaintiff’s oral motion to continue

the hearing, in order to allow Plaintiff time to file a written
motion to reopen discovery.

See Minutes of Hearing of May 28,

2015, ECF No. 117.
Plaintiff filed his Motion to Reopen Discovery on June
16, 2015.

ECF No. 121.

Magistrate Judge Puglisi denied

Plaintiff’s motion in its entirety on July 17, 2015, for the
reasons explained in his Order Denying Plaintiff Matthew J.
Debeikes’ Motion to Reopen Discovery.

ECF No. 126.

Plaintiff

appealed Magistrate Judge Puglisi’s order on July 27, 2015, ECF
No. 127, and the Court set a hearing on Plaintiff’s appeal for
September 3, 2015, ECF No. 130.
The Court denied Plaintiff’s appeal on October 9, 2015,
for the reasons set forth at length in its Order Affirming the
Magistrate Judge’s Order Denying Plaintiff Matthew J. Debeikes’
Motion to Reopen Discovery.

ECF No. 139.

The Court subsequently

heard oral arguments on Defendants’ motions to dismiss, or in the
alternative grant summary judgment on October 22, 2015.
On October 28, 2015, the Court issued its 69 page Order
Granting Summary Judgment as to the Motions to Dismiss or in the
Alternative for Summary Judgment of Defendants Hawaiian Airlines,
Inc. and Association of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO (“October
SJ Order”).

October SJ Order, ECF No. 143.

The Court first

addressed Plaintiff’s claims against Hawaiian Airlines.

7

In this

respect, the Court noted that it was unclear whether Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint alleged a constructive discharge claim
independent from the breach of CBA claim, because the
constructive discharge claim was based on a violation of the
CBA’s “supposed ‘due process requirement of a fair hearing.’”
Id. at 49-50 (quoting Am. Compl. ¶ 14, ECF No. 80).

The Court

concluded that if an independent claim had been alleged, it was
preempted by Plaintiff’s breach of CBA claim, as the Court
similarly determined in its February SJ Order.

Id. at 51-54.

In

the alternative, the Court concluded that even if not preempted,
a constructive discharge claim failed based on the merits,
concluding that Plaintiff had voluntarily retired after admitting
to allegations of sexual harassment and that Plaintiff could not
prove coercion based on relevant legal authority.

Id. at 54-58.

As with the February SJ Order, the Court also determined that it
lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s breach of CBA claim based on
his failure to exhaust contractual remedies.

Id. at 32-49.

The

Court noted that the Amended Complaint failed to make any
allegation regarding exhaustion or that an exception to the
Id. at 34.

exhaustion requirement applied.

Notwithstanding, the

Court evaluated each exception and concluded that none applied.
Id.

Finally, the Court addressed Plaintiff’s claims against AFA.

Id. at 58.

As with the February SJ Order, the Court noted that

under Bliesner, 464 F. 3d at 913-14, Plaintiff’s claim that AFA

8

breached its DFR could not go forward following the Court’s
determination that “his breach of CBA claim is not viable.”
at 58.

Id.

However, the Court also determined, in the alternative,

that Plaintiff’s allegations failed to demonstrate a viable
breach of duty of fair representation claim against AFA.

Id. at

59-67.
Following the Court’s October SJ Order, Defendant
Hawiian Airlines filed a renewed Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to
FRCP Rule 11 or in the Alternative, Fees and Costs Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1927 on November 12, 2015.

ECF No. 146.

Defendant AFA

filed a Statement of No Position on November 19, 2015.
148.

ECF No.

Plaintiff filed his Opposition to the Motion on November

26, 2015.

ECF. No. 151.

Defendant Hawaiian Airlines filed its

Reply on December 10, 2015.

ECF No. 157.

The Order for

Sanctions, issued on December 21, 2015, granted in part and
denied in part Defendant Hawaiian Airlines’ motion.
The instant appeal followed.

Plaintiff filed his

Appeal and Request to the District Court to Reconsider a Pretrial
Matter Determined by the Magistrate Judge (“Appeal”) on January
4, 2016.

ECF No. 162.

Hawaiian Airlines filed an Opposition

thereto on January 19, 2016 (“Opposition”), ECF No. 165, and AFA
filed a Statement of No Position on January 20, 2016, ECF No.
166.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

9

Under Local Rule 74.1, any party may appeal from a
magistrate judge’s order determining a non-dispositive pretrial
matter.

The district judge shall consider the appeal and shall

set aside any portion of the magistrate judge’s order found to be
clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

See Local Rule 74.1; see

also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).
The legal threshold for appealing a magistrate judge’s
ruling is high.

Under the “clearly erroneous” standard, such a

ruling must be accepted unless, after reviewing the entire
record, the Court is “left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.”

Ass’n of Apartment Owners of

Imperial Plaza v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., Civ. No. 11-00758 ACKKSC, 2013 WL 2156469 * 2 (D. Haw. May 16, 2013) (citing U.S. v.
Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1260 (9th Cir. 2009) (further citation
omitted)).
A district judge may not simply substitute his judgment
for that of the magistrate judge.

Grimes v. City & Cnty. of San

Francisco, 951 F.2d 236, 241 (9th Cir. 1991).

Instead, the scope

of review is limited to determining whether the magistrate judge
reached a decision that falls within “the permissible choices” he
could have made.

The magistrate judge’s findings pass the clear

error standard if they are not “illogical or implausible” and
have “support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in
the record.”

Ass’n of Apartment Owners of Imperial Plaza, 2013

10

WL 2156469 at * 2 (citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
For the reasons explained below, the Court concludes
that Magistrate Judge Puglisi’s Order is not clearly erroneous or
contrary to law.

Accordingly, the Court AFFIRMS the Order for

Sanctions in its entirety.
The Order for Sanctions granted Hawaiian Airlines’
request for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule
11 (“Rule 11”) based on Plaintiff’s filing of the Amended
Complaint.

Order for Sanctions at 15, ECF No. 160.

As a result

of Plaintiff’s frivolous filing, Magistrate Judge Puglisi ordered
Plaintiff’s counsel to pay $5000.003 to Hawaiian Airlines for
“part of the attorneys’ fees and costs . . . incurred in
responding to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint.”
18.4

Id. at 16,

The Order for Sanctions denied Hawaiian Airlines’ request

for sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which was based on

3

Hawaiian Airlines failed to provide information regarding
the amount of fees and costs, but Magistrate Judge Puglisi
determined that “the amount of attorneys’ fees incurred is
significant considering the seven months of litigation that
followed the filing of the First Amended Complaint.” Id. at 16.
Magistrate Judge Puglisi considered that a $5000.00 sanction
would serve the purpose of deterring “future similar conduct.”
Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4)). The parties have not
challenged the amount of the sanctions award.
4

Magistrate Judge Puglisi ordered that the sanctions be paid
by Plaintiff’s counsel, based on his determination that the legal
claims in the Amended Complaint were frivolous. Id. at 16 n.2
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(5)(A)).
11

Plaintiff’s counsel’s dilatory conduct in relation to his
discovery requests, because it determined that Hawaiian Airlines
failed to “meet the bad faith standard necessary for imposition”
of such sanctions.

Id. at 17.

The instant Appeal only relates to the imposition of
sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, as the parties have not appealed
from the Order for Sanctions’ denial of sanctions under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927.

With respect to the Rule 11 sanctions, the Order for

Sanctions concluded that the Amended Complaint was frivolous
because 1) the claims against Hawaiian Airlines lacked an
adequate factual and legal basis, and 2) Plaintiff’s counsel
failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry prior to filing the
Amended Complaint.

The Court will discuss these two conclusions

in turn in relation to two possible claims raised by Plaintiff
against Hawaiian Airlines: constructive discharge and breach of
the CBA.5

Prior to this discussion, however, the Court addresses

the proper standard for the imposition of sanctions in the

5

Magistrate Judge Puglisi considered the claims raised
against Hawaiian Airlines and concluded that both were frivolous.
Because AFA did not request sanctions, Magistrate Judge Puglisi
did not separately consider the claims raised against AFA.
Without specifically addressing the frivolity thereof, the Court
notes that “‘the mere existence of one non-frivolous claim’ in a
complaint does not immunize it from Rule 11 sanctions.” Holgate,
425 F.3d at 677 (quoting Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929
F.2d 1358, 1364 (9th Cir. 1990)). Moreover, pursuant to
Bliesner, 464 F. 3d at 913-14, Plaintiff’s claim that AFA
breached its DFR could not go forward following the Court’s
determination regarding the breach of CBA claim, as noted above.
12

instant case.
I.

The Standard for Rule 11 Sanctions
Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provides, inter alia, that “[b]y presenting to the court a
pleading, written motion, or other paper . . . an attorney . . .
certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under
the circumstances” the motion or other paper is not frivolous,
legally unwarranted, or brought for an improper purpose.
Civ. P. 11(b).

Fed. R.

For frivolous and legally unwarranted filings,

the rule provides that an attorney or unrepresented party must
certify that “the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions
are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for
establishing new law[.]”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2).

If the court

finds a violation of Rule 11(b), “the court may impose an
appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that
violated the rule or is responsible for the violation.”

Fed. R.

Civ. P. 11(c).
As the Supreme Court has noted, “Rule 11 imposes a duty
on attorneys to certify that they have conducted a reasonable
inquiry and have determined that any papers filed with the court
are well grounded in fact, legally tenable, and not interposed
for any improper purpose.”

Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496
13

U.S. 384, 393 (1990).

The “central purpose of Rule 11 is to

deter baseless filings in district court and thus . . .
streamline the administration and procedure of the federal
courts.”

Id.

However, Rule 11 sanctions are “an extraordinary

remedy, one to be exercised with extreme caution.”

Operating

Eng’rs Pension Trust v. A-C Co., 859 F.2d 1336, 1345 (9th Cir.
1988).

They should not “be construed so as to conflict with the

primary duty of an attorney to represent his or her client
zealously” and are “reserve[d] . . . for the rare and exceptional
case where the action is clearly frivolous, legally unreasonable
or without legal foundation, or brought for an improper purpose.”
Id. at 1344.
In the Appeal, Plaintiff’s counsel repeatedly argues
that his filing of the Amended Complaint did not involve “any
improper purpose” and that he was acting “without any improper
motive.”

See, e.g., Appeal at 16, 26, 27, ECF. No. 162.

However, as Hawaiian Airlines contends, a showing of “improper
motive” is not required for a Rule 11 sanctions claim.
Opposition at 16, ECF Dkt. 165.

Indeed, a motion for sanctions

can be imposed if “either a) the paper is filed for an improper
purpose, or b) the paper is ‘frivolous.’”
1362.

Townsend, 929 F.2d at

Either of these grounds “is sufficient to sustain a

sanction[.]” Id.; see also Zaldivar v. City of L.A., 780 F.2d
823, 831 (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming the district court’s

14

conclusion “that Rule 11 sanctions shall be assessed if the paper
filed in district court and signed by an attorney or an
unrepresented party is frivolous, legally unreasonable, or
without factual foundation, even though the paper was not filed
in subjective bad faith”), abrogated on other grounds by Cooter,
496 U.S. 384.

Magistrate Judge Puglisi’s Order for Sanctions

based its granting of sanctions on the frivolousness ground.
Thus, Plaintiff’s counsel’s claim that he did not act with an
improper purpose is of no moment.
In its Motion for Sanctions, Hawaiian Airlines argued
that Rule 11 sanctions were warranted because Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint was frivolous.

Where, as here, “a complaint is the

primary focus of Rule 11 proceedings, a district court must
conduct a two-prong inquiry to determine (1) whether the
complaint is legally or factually baseless from an objective
perspective, and (2) if the attorney has conducted a reasonable
and competent inquiry before signing and filing it.”

Holgate v.

Baldwin, 425 F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Christian v.
Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1119, 1127 (9th Cir 2002)).

Under this

standard, a “frivolous” filing is one that “is both baseless and
made without a reasonable and competent inquiry.”

Id. (quoting

In re Keegan Mgmt. Co., Sec. Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 434 (9th Cir.
1996)).
II.

The Order for Sanctions’ Conclusion that the Amended
Complaint Lacked an Adequate Factual and Legal Basis
15

Was Not Clearly Erroneous
The Order for Sanctions first considered whether the
claims raised in the Amended Complaint against Hawaiian Airlines
were “legally or factually baseless from an objective
perspective.”

Order for Sanctions at 10, ECF. No. 60; see also

Holgate, 425 F.3d at 676.

In this respect, the Order for

Sanctions concluded that both claims brought by Plaintiff against
Hawaiian Airlines were baseless.

The Court agrees, and considers

the claims against Hawaiian Airlines raised in the Amended
Complaint in turn.
A. Constructive Discharge Claim
At the outset, the Court notes that it is unclear from
the Amended Complaint whether Plaintiff intended to allege a
constructive discharge claim separate from his breach of CBA
claim.

The Amended Complaint “indicates that this is not the

case” because Plaintiff alleged “he was injured ‘[a]s a result of
Plaintiff’s [constructive] discharge by Defendant employer, in
violation of plaintiff’s rights under the collective bargaining
agreement.’”

October SJ Order at 49-50, ECF No. 143 (alterations

in original) (quoting Am. Compl. ¶ 14, ECF No. 80).

Assuming

that Plaintiff did intend to raise a separate constructive
discharge claim, as the Court held in its October SJ Order, any
such claim was clearly preempted by Plaintiff’s breach of CBA
claim.

As the Court explained in both its October SJ Order and

16

its February SJ Order, where a constructive discharge claim or
other state law claim depends on the interpretation of the CBA,
the claim is preempted.

See id. at 51-54; February SJ Order at

27-28, ECF No. 75-1; see also Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471
U.S. 202, 220 (1995); Evangelista v. Inlandboatmen’s Union of the
Pacific, 777 F.2d 1390, 1401 (9th Cir. 1985); Carter v. Smith
Food King, 765 F.2d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 1985).
On Appeal, Plaintiff argues that the “predetermined
termination” claim raised in the Amended Complaint was not
preempted because “[Hawaiian Airlines] telling Debeikes that he
would be terminated prior to any witness being heard or document
received was in complete bad faith and does not involve in any
way [Hawaiian Airlines] interpretation of the CBA.”
17, ECF No. 162.

Appeal at

However, the plain language of the Amended

Complaint belies Plaintiff’s argument.

The Amended Complaint

specifically alleged that the fact that Hawaiian Airlines
informed Plaintiff “that he would be terminated if he went to the
hearing, meaning that before any witness testified or documentary
evidence was presented” resulted in Hawaiian Airlines’
“predetermin[ation] to Terminate Plaintiff in violation of the
CBA’s due process requirement of a fair hearing in accordance
with the CBA’s provisions set forth in Article 23.”
13 (emphasis added).

Am. Comp. ¶

The Amended Complaint further alleged that

“[a]s a result of Plaintiff’s discharge by [Hawaiian Airlines],
17

in violation of plaintiff’s rights under the collective
bargaining agreement . . . plaintiff has suffered grievous and
extensive damages . . . .”

Id. ¶ 14 (emphasis added).

Thus, the

constructive discharge claim is wholly dependent on the breach of
the CBA claim, based on the plain language of the Amended
Complaint.

Moreover, Plaintiff fails to explain how a “bad

faith” allegation could proceed as an individual claim, or cite
to any support for this proposition.
As the Order for Sanctions additionally determined,
setting aside that Plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim was
preempted, the claim lacked an adequate factual and legal basis
based on the merits.

The Court’s conclusion that the claim

lacked merit was based on the lack of evidence that Debeikes was
deceived or coerced in relation to Hawaiian Airlines’ position as
to his employment status, as well as the undisputed facts that
Debeikes admitted he was guilty in relation to the harassment
allegations and chose to retire instead of availing himself of
the CBA’s grievance procedure and the disciplinary hearing.
October SJ Order at 54-58.

As the Order for Sanctions notes,

this was essentially the same determination reached by the Court
in its previous February MSJ Order.

See Order for Sanctions at

10, ECF No. 160; February MSJ Order at 30, ECF No. 75-1.
On Appeal, Plaintiff argues that the addition of facts
in the Amended Complaint that Hawaiian Airlines “determin[ed] to

18

terminate Plaintiff in the presence of his immediate supervisor
prior to any witness testifying or documents being presented was
coercive within the meaning of Morris v. McHugh.”
ECF. No. 162.

Appeal at 23,

Plaintiff notes that the February SJ Order cited

to Morris v. McHugh, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (D. Hawaii 2014), in
its coercion discussion.

Appeal at 23, ECF. No. 162.

However,

although citing to the relevant language in Morris, Plaintiff
ignores the fact that to prove coercion, “an employee must show
that the employer imposed the terms of his resignation, that he
had ‘no realistic alternative but to resign,’ and that such
resignation was the product of the company’s improper acts.”
February SJ Order at 29, ECF Dkt. 75-1 (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted) (citing Morris, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 1164); see also
October SJ Order at 56.

On the latter issue in particular,

Plaintiff’s coercion argument lacks an adequate legal and factual
basis because he admitted to the sexual harassment claim,
providing Hawaiian Airlines with a substantiated basis to
“believe that there were grounds for termination.”

Parker v. Bd.

of Regents of Tulsa Jr. College, 981 F.2d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir.
1992); see also February SJ Order at 29 n. 21, ECF. No. 75-1
(stating “this is not a case in which coercion occurred because
resignation was induced by a threat of disciplinary action that
the employer knew could not be substantiated”).

In addition,

Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that “he had ‘no realistic

19

alternative’ to retirement, given that the CBA’s grievance
procedures remained available to him.”

October SJ Order at 56,

ECF No. 143 (citing February SJ Order at 30, ECF No. 75).

Under

these circumstances, Plaintiff has failed to support his claim
that the presence of his supervisor during the alleged
“predetermined termination” resulted in coercion.6
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the
Order for Sanctions did not clearly err in determining that to
the extent a constructive discharge claim was alleged in the
Amended Complaint, such a claim lacked an adequate factual and
legal basis.
B. Breach of CBA Claim
Plaintiff’s breach of CBA claim in the Amended
Complaint alleged that Hawaiian Airlines “predetermined to
[t]erminate” him, and in doing so, violated the CBA’s due process
requirements.

Am. Compl. ¶ 13, ECF No. 80.

This claim was

legally and factually baseless, because as the Court concluded in
its October SJ Order, Plaintiff failed to exhaust his contractual
remedies and no exception to the exhaustion requirement applied.
October SJ Order at 32-49, ECF. No. 143; see also Jackson v. S.
California Gas Co., 881 F.2d 638, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); Soone v.

6

Notably, as discussed below, the Court’s February SJ Order
considered and rejected Plaintiff’s claim that the conversation
between Hawaiian Airlines and Plaintiff demonstrated coercion.
Infra at III.A.
20

Kyo-Ya Co., Ltd., 353 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1115 (D. Haw. 2005).

The

Court reached the same conclusion in its February SJ Order.
February SJ Order at 31-39, ECF No. 75-1.

Notably, although the

February SJ Order discussed the exhaustion requirement in detail,
as well as the possible exceptions, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
was void of any allegation that Plaintiff attempted to pursue
contractual remedies or that an exception to exhaustion may be
applicable in his case.

In and of itself, the Amended Complaint

is problematic in this regard.

See, e.g., Holgate, 425 F.3d at

676-77 (determining complaint lacked an adequate legal basis
where the complaint “on its face” failed to allege the
requirements of the relevant claim).
Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s failure to assert any
exceptions to the exhaustion requirement, an analysis of the
possible exceptions supports Magistrate Judge Puglisi’s
determination that the Amended Complaint lacked an adequate
factual and legal basis.

As the Court noted in both of its

summary judgment orders,
Three exceptions exist to excuse a plaintiff’s
failure to exhaust contractual remedies prior to
filing a breach of CBA claim, where: (1) the
employee’s use of the grievance procedure would be
“futile,” (2) the employer’s conduct repudiates
contractual remedies, or (3) the union’s actions
breach its DFR in handling the grievance. See
Vaca [v. Sipes], 386 U.S. [171,] 185 [(1967)];
Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco R.R. Co., 393
U.S. 324, 330 (1969); see also Carr [v. Pac.
Maritime Ass’n], 904 F.2d [1313,] 1317-21 [(9th
Cir. 1990)](examining and rejecting Plaintiff’s
21

invocation of all three exceptions).
October SJ Order at 33-34, ECF No. 143; see also February SJ
Order at 34, ECF No. 75-1.
On Appeal, with respect to the first two exceptions,
Plaintiff asserts that Hawaiian Airlines’ “predetermined
termination comments to Debeikes in front of his director
supervisor who remained silent” rendered a resort to the
grievance procedures futile and constituted a repudiation of the
contractual remedies.

Appeal at 10, ECF No. 162.

However, this

argument ignores the clearly established law on futility and
repudiation discussed in both of the Court’s summary judgment
orders.

For example, the futility exception is generally

inapplicable where, as here, “the plaintiff never puts his
futility theory to the test by filing a protest.”

Hawaii

Teamsters & Allied Workers, Local 996, IBT v. City Exp., Inc.,
751 F. Supp. 1426, 1432 (D. Haw. 1990) (citing LeBoutillier v.
Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 778 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).

Moreover,

as the Court noted in both of its summary judgment orders, “an
employee’s choice to retire prior to invoking CBA grievance
procedures also does not make resort to such processes ‘futile.’”
October SJ Order at 35, ECF No. 143 (citing February SJ Order at
35, n.24, ECF No. 75).

Plaintiff’s contention that the

“predetermined termination comments” demonstrated repudiation
also clearly fails, because as noted in both of the Court’s

22

summary judgment orders, repudiation is only an exception to the
exhaustion requirement where “the employer repudiates the
specific grievance procedures provided for in the CBA,”
including, for example, where the employer takes the position
that “the grievance procedures d[o] not govern the dispute.”
Sidhu v. Flecto Co., Inc., 279 F.3d 896, 899 (9th Cir. 2002); see
also October SJ Order at 36, ECF No. 143; February SJ Order at
36, ECF No. 75-1.

Plaintiff failed to provide any factual

allegations to support such a claim.
Finally, Plaintiff’s Appeal argues that his “newly
plead” claim that AFA “fail[ed] to pursue an[] individual 23(c)
grievance” constituted an exception to the exhaustion
requirement.

Appeal at 25, ECF No. 162.

However, an alleged

breach of the DFR will excuse exhaustion only where, inter alia,
the union wrongfully refuses to invoke the grievance process.
Carr, 904 F.2d at 1319.

Moreover, to demonstrate a breach of the

DFR, an employer must demonstrate that the union’s actions were
arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.

See Burkevich v. Air

Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 894 F.2d 346, 349 (9th Cir. 1990);
Nosie v. Ass’n of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO, 722 F. Supp. 2d
1181, 1196 (D. Haw. 2010).

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and his

allegations raised in connection with the Amended Complaint are
completely devoid of any such showing.

Further, Plaintiff’s

argument fails to acknowledge that the Court considered the fact

23

that AFA did not pursue an individual grievance in the February
SJ Order, and still concluded that Debeikes could not be
“excuse[d] from exhausting the contract’s grievance procedures
prior to the Court’s adjudication of his breach of CBA claim.”
February SJ Order at 33, ECF No. 75-1.7
Accordingly, based on 1) the Amended Complaint’s
failure to specifically allege exhaustion or an exception to
exhaustion and 2) Plaintiff’s failure to put forth any facts that
would support a conclusion that an exception to the exhaustion
requirement applied based on established legal authority, it was
not clearly erroneous or contrary to the law for Magistrate Judge
7

The February SJ Order noted:
[A] different form of grievance, termed a “LEC
grievance,” is governed by CBA §§ 23(A)-(B) and
allows for challenges against discipline issued to
individual employees. These grievances seek
retroactive remedies, including reinstatement and
backpay.
The declarations of Henton, Trumble, and Akau
state that AFA was willing and able to have filed
a LEC Grievance on behalf of Debeikes, had he
actually been issued discipline following the
hearing Hawaiian Airlines requested. Henton Decl.
¶ 36, ECF No. 52-1; Trumble Decl. 13, ECF No 55-2;
Akau Decl. ¶ 30, ECF No. 52-3. Because Debeikes
retired before the company’s disciplinary hearing,
they were unable to do so.

February SJ Order at 32-33 n.22, ECF No. 75-1.
As noted above, the February SJ Order also rejected
Plaintiff’s claim that the AFA’s actions in relation to the MEC
grievance constituted a valid exception to the exhaustion
requirement. Supra note 2.
24

Puglisi to determine that the Amended Complaint lacked an
adequate factual or legal basis to support Plaintiff’s breach of
CBA claim.
III. The Order for Sanctions’ Conclusion that Plaintiff’s
Counsel Failed to Conduct a Reasonable and Competent
Inquiry Was Not Clearly Erroneous
Turning to the second prong of the sanctions inquiry,
the Court must consider whether “an attorney, after conducting an
objectively reasonable inquiry into the facts and law, would have
found the [Amended] [C]omplaint to be well-founded.”
425 F.3d at 677.

Holgate,

“Such inquiry is that amount of examination

into the facts and legal research which is reasonable under the
circumstances of the case.”

Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 831.

Notably,

“the conclusion drawn from the research undertaken must itself be
defensible” and “[e]xtended research alone will not save a claim
that is without legal or factual merit from the penalty of
sanctions.”

Id.

“[P]rior to filing a complaint” an attorney

must “conduct a reasonable factual investigation” and must “also
perform adequate legal research that confirms whether the
theoretical underpinnings of the complaint are ‘warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law.’”

Christian, 286 F.3d

at 1127 (quoting Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.,
801 F.2d 1531, 1537 (9th Cir. 1986)).
The Order for Sanctions concluded that it was

25

unreasonable “for Plaintiff’s counsel to believe at the time the
First Amended Complaint was submitted that it stated a viable
claim against [Hawaiian Airlines]” with respect to its
constructive discharge and breach of CBA claims.
Sanctions at 15, ECF No. 160.

Order for

This conclusion was not clearly

erroneous or contrary to law.
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that the fact
that the Court granted Plaintiff permission to file an amended
complaint does not justify the deficiencies of Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint, contrary to Plaintiff’s apparent assertion.
See Appeal at 3-4, ECF No. 162.

As argued by Hawaiian Airlines,

Opposition at 22-23, ECF Dkt. 165, the Court’s allowance in this
regard does not excuse the filing of a frivolous Amended
Complaint.8
A. Constructive Discharge Claim
Magistrate Judge Puglisi did not clearly err in
determining that it was unreasonable for the Amended Complaint to
assert a constructive discharge claim, when the claim was clearly
preempted.

Id. at 14-15.

As the Order for Sanctions notes, the

8

The Court similarly rejects Plaintiff’s insinuation that
the Court’s comments during the May 28, 2015 hearing suggest that
the Amended Complaint was not frivolous. See Appeal at 12-13,
14, ECF No. 162. The Court’s statement that Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint added the fact that his supervisor was present at the
time of the alleged “predetermined termination” does not reflect
a determination that this fact would alter the viability of
Plaintiff’s claims.
26

Court’s February SJ Order applied clearly established law to
explain that a constructive discharge claim relying on a breach
of the CBA is preempted.

Although Plaintiff’s counsel was on

notice of this potential downfall, the Amended Complaint did not
put forth any allegation of constructive discharge independent
from the CBA claim.

As noted above, the plain language of the

Amended Complaint provided that the constructive discharge claim
relied on the CBA’s provisions.

See Am. Comp. ¶¶ 13, 14.

With

respect to the merits of the claim, Plaintiff also failed to cure
the deficiencies discussed in the Court’s February SJ Order, as
discussed above.

See supra II.A.

Plaintiff appears to argue that the presence of his
supervisor at the time Hawaiian Airlines “made the predetermined
terminations statements” provided additional support for his
claim of coercion.

Appeal at 4, 10-11, 23, ECF No. 162.

As the

Order for Sanctions noted, however, the Court’s February SJ Order
considered the allegation that Hawaiian Airlines informed him
“that he would have been terminated had he gone to the
disciplinary hearing.”

Order for Sanctions at 14 n.1, ECF No.

160 (quoting February SJ Order at 30, ECF No. 75-1).

The Court

concluded that this did not amount to coercion and that
notwithstanding, Debeikes could have still pursued the grievance
procedures instead of retiring.
at 30, ECF No. 75-1).

Id. (quoting February SJ Order

Moreover, as discussed above, the presence

27

of Plaintiff’s supervisor has no bearing on the factors necessary
to prove coercion in this context.
Morris, 997 F.2d 1144).

See supra II.A. (discussing

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to provide

valid legal support for his position that the presence of his
supervisor resulted in coercion.

See, e.g., Zaldivar, 780 F.2d

at 831 (“The pleader, at a minimum, must have a ‘good faith
argument’ for his or her view of what the law is, or should
be.”).
B. Breach of CBA Claim
With respect to the breach of CBA claim, Magistrate
Judge Puglisi points out that despite the Court’s February SJ
Order discussing the exhaustion requirement and the exceptions to
exhaustion, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint did not contain any
related allegations.

Order for Sanctions at 14, ECF No. 60.

The

Amended Complaint’s failure to contain such allegations supports
the conclusion that Plaintiff’s counsel failed to conduct a
reasonable legal inquiry prior to filing the Amended Complaint.
See Holgate, 425 F.3d at 677 (“Even the most cursory legal
inquiry would have revealed the required elements of the federal
claims asserted, elements that the Holgates’ complaint did not
allege.”).
Plaintiff’s argument that additional allegations in the
Amended Complaint supported an exception to the exhaustion
requirement based on his review of the caselaw, is also

28

unavailing.

As discussed above, Plaintiff’s counsel was on

notice, given the Court’s February SJ Order, of the necessary
requirements to demonstrate that a “futility” or “repudiation”
exception applied, yet Plaintiff failed to cure these issues in
the Amended Complaint.

See supra II.B.

With respect to the

third exception to the exhaustion requirement, Plaintiff argues
that the Amended Complaint’s “newly plead failure to pursue an[]
individual 23(c) grievance on behalf of Plaintiff was meant to be
an extension of the Vaca v. Sipes exception to exhaustion[.]”
Appeal at 25, ECF No. 162.

Pursuant to Vaca, a “wrongfully

discharged employee may bring an action against his employer in
the face of a defense based upon the failure to exhaust
contractual remedies, provided the employee can prove that the
union as bargaining agent breached its duty of fair
representation in its handling of the employee’s grievance.”
U.S. at 914.

386

However, as noted above and in both of the Court’s

orders, the deference given to a union with respect to its DFR is
significant, and Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint lacked allegations
that AFA’s actions were wrongful, arbitrary, discriminatory, or
in bad faith.

See supra II.B.

Plaintiff has failed to put forth

a “good faith argument” that the law should be expanded to apply
to his situation.
F.3d at 1127.

See Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 831; Christian, 286

Moreover, as discussed above, the Court’s February

Order considered the fact that AFA did not file an individual

29

grievance, thus Plaintiff’s argument that this claim was “new” is
unavailing.

See supra II.B.

Given this context, Magistrate Judge Puglisi’s
conclusion that Plaintiff’s counsel failed to conduct a
reasonable inquiry prior to filing the Amended Complaint was not
clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court AFFIRMS
Magistrate Judge Puglisi’s December 21, 2015 Order Granting in
Part and Denying in Part Defendant Hawaiian Airlines, Inc’s
Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to FRCP Rule 11, or in the
Alternative, Fees and Costs Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, ECF No.
160.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

Honolulu, Hawaii, February 1, 2016.

________________________________
Alan C. Kay
Sr. United States District Judge

Debeikes v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. et al., Civ. No. 13-00504 ACK-RLP, Order
Affirming the Magistrate Judge’s Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part
Defendant Hawaiian Airlines, Inc’s Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to FRCP Rule
11, or in the Alternative, Fees and Costs Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927

30