Algal Partners, L.P. v. Santos
Filing
41
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNT I OF THE COMPLAINT AND MOTION TO DISMISS, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON DEFENDANT JON FREEMAN ELEU SANTOS, AKA SIR JON FREEMAN ELEU SANTOS, AKA JON SANTOS 039;S COUNTERCLAIM FILED ON JANUARY 14, 2014; AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO DISMISS re 9 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; re 13 Motion to Dismiss; re 24 Motion to Dismiss -- Defendant' s Motion to Dismiss Complaint, filed January 31, 2014, and his Motion to Dismiss, filed February 18, 2014, are HEREBY DENIED. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Count I of the Complaint and Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternativ e, for Summary Judgment on Defendant Jon Freeman Eleu Santos, AKA Sir Jon Freeman Eleu Santos, AKA Jon Santos's Counterclaim Filed on January 14, 2014, filed January 22, 2014 is HEREBY GRANTED in its entirety. Defendant Jon Santos's Counter claim, filed January 14,2014, is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI on 04/23/2014. (eps)CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
ALGAL PARTNERS, L..P., a
)
Delaware limited partnership, )
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
vs.
)
)
JON FREEMAN ELEU SANTOS, AKA )
SIR JON FREEMAN ELEU SANTOS, )
AKA JON SANTOS,
)
)
)
Defendant.
_____________________________ )
CIVIL NO. 13-00562 LEK-BMK
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNT I OF THE COMPLAINT AND
MOTION TO DISMISS, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON DEFENDANT JON FREEMAN
ELEU SANTOS, AKA SIR JON FREEMAN ELEU SANTOS, AKA
JON SANTOS’S COUNTERCLAIM FILED ON JANUARY 14, 2014;
AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Before the Court are: (1) Plaintiff Algal Partners,
L.P.’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Count
I of the Complaint and Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative,
for Summary Judgment on Defendant Jon Freeman Eleu Santos, AKA
Sir Jon Freeman Eleu Santos, AKA Jon Santos’s Counterclaim Filed
on January 14, 2014 (“Plaintiff’s Motion”), filed January 22,
2014; [dkt. no. 9;] (2) pro se Defendant Jon Santos’s
(“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss Complaint, filed January 31, 2014
(“Defendant’s 1/31/14 Motion”); [dkt. no. 13;] and
(3) Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, filed February 18, 2014
(“Defendant’s 2/18/14 Motion,” collectively “Defendant’s
Motions”) [dkt. no. 24].
Defendant filed his memorandum in
opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion on February 18, 2014, and
Plaintiff filed its reply on February 20, 2014.
23.]
[Dkt. nos. 20,
Plaintiff filed its two memoranda in opposition to
Defendant’s Motions on March 17, 2014, and Defendant filed two
documents on that same day, which the Court construes as a
supplemental memorandum in support of Defendant’s Motions and a
supplemental memorandum in support of his opposition to
Plaintiff’s Motion.
[Dkt. nos. 30-33.]
The Court finds these matters suitable for disposition
without a hearing pursuant to Rule LR7.2(d) of the Local Rules of
Practice of the United States District Court for the District of
Hawai`i (“Local Rules”).
After careful consideration of the
motions, supporting and opposing memoranda, and the relevant
legal authority, Plaintiff’s Motion is HEREBY GRANTED and
Defendant’s Motions are HEREBY DENIED for the reasons set forth
below.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, a Delaware limited partnership, filed its
Complaint on October 28, 2013, asserting diversity jurisdiction
against Defendant, a Hawai`i resident, related to Defendant’s
claim of title to property that Plaintiff allegedly owns on and
near Kalanikahua Lane in Haiku, Maui (“the Property”).
[Complaint at ¶¶ 1-2, 11-17, 25-26.]
2
Plaintiff alleges that on
June 18, 2012, it listed the Property, comprised of two parcels
(“Parcel 1” and “Parcel 2”), for sale.
[Id. at ¶¶ 23-24.]
Subsequently, Defendant, who at one time did construction on the
Property, recorded or caused to be recorded a “Notice of
Ownership” of each Parcel (“Notice 1” and “Notice 2”) as
“representative and agent for the Hawaiian Kingdom Nation”.1
[Id. at ¶¶ 25-27.]
Plaintiff alleges that, on or about
September 20, 2013, it learned of the Notices when its agent
received certified copies of them from Defendant, along with a
two-page handwritten letter, entitled, “A message to you as owner
of the land.”
[Id. at ¶¶ 32-34.]
Plaintiff further alleges that, on or about October 14,
2013, a prospective buyer made an offer on the Property for the
asking price of $9.9 million, but subsequently, during
negotiations, Defendant’s Notices “proximately caused Prospective
Buyer to choose not to purchase the Haiku Property.”
¶¶ 24, 35-36.]
[Id. at
Plaintiff has not been able to find another buyer
and has incurred expenses to “counteract the effect of
Defendant’s slanderous publications” and to maintain the
1
Although Plaintiff alleges that Notice 1 was recorded on
or about June 18, 2012, there is no indication from the face of
the Notice that it was recorded on that date. Notice 1 was
signed twice by Defendant on August 7, 2013, notarized on August
7, 2013, and stamped as recorded by the Bureau of Conveyances on
August 8, 2013 as Document Number A-49680869. The same dates
appear on Notice 2, which was recorded as Document Number A49680868.
3
Property.
[Id. at ¶¶ 37-40.]
In preliminary title reports from
October 2013, Title Guaranty of Hawai`i, stated its belief that
Defendant’s Notices do not have any legal effect on Plaintiff’s
title to either parcel.
[Id. at ¶¶ 41-42 (citing id., Exhs. E, F
(reports)).]
The Complaint alleges the following claims: quiet title
(“Count I”); preliminary injunction/permanent injunction
(“Count II”); slander of title (“Count III”); and punitive
damages (“Count IV”).2
Plaintiff seeks the following relief:
quiet title as to the Property; preliminary and permanent
injunctive relief; special, general and punitive damages;
attorneys’ fees and costs; and any other appropriate relief.
In his Answer to Complaint and Counterclaim
(“Counterclaim”), filed January 14, 2014, Defendant appears to
allege that the Property belongs to the Hawaiian Kingdom of King
Kamehameha I (“the Kingdom”), and thus Defendant, as the
Kingdom’s representative, is the proper owner and is due all
rents on the Property.
[Dkt no. 8, at pgs. 22-23.]
2
The Court notes that Counts II and IV – the claims for
injunctive relief and punitive damages – are remedies and not
independent causes of action. See e.g., Billete v. Deutsche Bank
Nat’l Trust Co., Civil No. 13-00061 LEK-KSC, 2013 WL 2367834, at
*7 (D. Hawai`i May 29, 2013) (injunctive relief); Lee v. Gov’t
Emps. Ins. Co., 911 F. Supp. 2d 947, 971-72 (D. Hawai`i 2012)
(punitive damages). As such, the only claims that Plaintiff
makes are to quiet title and for slander of title.
4
DISCUSSION
I.
Defendant’s Motions
The Court first turns to Defendant’s Motions, which
challenge the Court’s jurisdiction.
All of Defendant’s filings
consist of short legal statements, interspersed with long
paragraphs of Hawaiian words and their apparent translations that
amount to un-punctuated narratives that appear to have little to
do with the Property or the specific facts of this case.
Since
Defendant is pro se, however, the Court construes his filings
liberally.
See Welsh v. Wilcox Mem’l Hosp., Civil No. 12-00609
LEK-KSC, 2012 WL 6047745, at *1 (D. Hawai`i Dec. 4, 2012) (“[P]ro
se litigants are held to less stringent standards than those of
their legal counterparts.” (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 757
(9th Cir. 2012)); see also, e.g., Ogeone v. United States, Civil
No. 13-00166 SOM/RLP, 2013 WL 3807798, at *3 (D. Hawai`i July 19,
2013) (“A pro se litigant’s filings must be read more liberally
than those drafted by counsel.” (citations omitted)).
Taken together, Defendant’s Motions appear to contend
that this Court does not have jurisdiction over the present case
because it concerns land belonging to a foreign sovereign, the
Kingdom, and seeks judgment against a foreign subject, Defendant.
These arguments against federal court jurisdiction have been
repeatedly rejected by this district court and others that have
5
considered them.
First, Defendant argues, by citing lengthy materials
authored by David Keanu Sai, Ph.D., that “the Hawaiian Kingdom
continues to exist and is under a prolonged and illegal
occupation by the United States.”
2/18/14 Motion, at 11.]
[Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s
This Court, however, does not have
jurisdiction to rule on this political question.
As this
district court explained,
Plaintiff’s claims raise nonjusticiable
political questions because they involve matters
that have been constitutionally committed to
Congress. Under Article IV, Section 3 of the
Constitution, “[n]ew States may be admitted by the
Congress into this Union[.]” U.S. Const. art. IV,
§ 3. By an act of Congress, Hawaii was admitted
to the Union in 1959. This court, therefore,
lacks jurisdiction to decide any issue regarding
the legality of Hawaii’s statehood including the
lawfulness of events leading to statehood. Thus,
as to Plaintiff’s claim challenging the lawfulness
of the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii in 1893,
the Intermediate Court of Appeals for the State of
Hawaii aptly stated, “Whatever may be said
regarding the lawfulness of the Provisional
Government in 1893, the Republic of Hawaii in
1894, and the Territory of Hawaii in 1898, the
State of Hawaii . . . is now, a lawful
government.” State v. Fergerstrom, 106 Hawai`i
43, 55, 101 P.3d 652, 664 (Haw. App. 2004).
Adjudication of Plaintiff’s claims would
essentially place this court in the shoes of
Congress. Thus, this court lacks jurisdiction
over said claims.
Williams v. United States, CIV. No. 08-00547 SOM-KSC, 2008 WL
5225870, at *3 (D. Hawai`i Dec. 15, 2008) (alterations in
Williams).
Moreover, courts have rejected these same arguments
6
made by Dr. Sai in other cases.
See e.g., Sai v. Clinton, 778 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C.) (“Plaintiff’s claims present this Court
with a nonjusticiable political question.”), aff'd sub nom. Sai
v. Obama, No. 11-5142, 2011 WL 4917030 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 26,
2011).
Since this Court does not have the jurisdiction to
adjudge foreign affairs constitutionally delegated to Congress,
it may not rule on whether the United States “[i]llegally
See Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s
usurp[ed] Hawaiian sovereignty.”
2/18/14 Motion at 8.
It does, however, have jurisdiction to
quiet title to land situated in the State of Hawai`i.
See United
States v. Byrne, 291 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The
federal district courts’ jurisdiction over actions concerning
real property is generally coterminous with the states’ political
boundaries.”).
Second, insofar, as this Court has jurisdiction to
resolve disputes between citizens of diverse states, see 28
U.S.C. § 1332, it has jurisdiction over Defendant.
“Federal
cases have also rejected claims based on the argument that a
person is a member of the Kingdom of Hawaii.”
Kupihea v. United
States, Civ. No. 09-00311 SOM/KSC, 2009 WL 2025316, at *2 (D.
Hawai`i July 10, 2009) (citations omitted).
Specifically,
the Ninth Circuit, this district court, and
Hawai`i state courts have all held that the laws
of the United States and the State of Hawai`i
apply to all individuals in this State. See
United States v. Lorenzo, 995 F.2d 1448, 1456 (9th
Cir. 1993) (holding that the Hawai`i district
7
court has jurisdiction over Hawai`i residents
claiming they are citizens of the Sovereign
Kingdom of Hawai`i); Kupihea v. United States,
2009 WL 2025316, at *2 (D. Haw. July 10, 2009)
(dismissing complaint seeking release from prison
on the basis that plaintiff is a member of the
Kingdom of Hawai`i); State v. French, 77 Hawai`i
222, 228, 883 P.2d 644, 649 (Haw. App. 1994)
(“[P]resently there is no factual (or legal) basis
for concluding that the [Hawaiian] Kingdom exists
as a state in accordance with recognized
attributes of a state’s sovereign nature.”)
(quotations omitted).
Moniz v. Hawaii, No. CIV. 13-00086 DKW, 2013 WL 2897788, at *2
(D. Hawai`i June 13, 2013) (alterations in Moniz); see also Rice
v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 524 (2000) (“The Constitution of the
United States, too, has become the heritage of all the citizens
of Hawaii.”).
Defendant admits the allegation that he is a
United States citizen and/or domiciliary of the State of Hawai`i.
[Answer at ¶ 3.]
Thus, whether or not Defendant maintains that
he is also a citizen of the Kingdom of Hawai`i, this Court has
jurisdiction over him.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s
Motions, arguing that this Court lacks jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s claims, are DENIED.
II.
Plaintiff’s Motion
Since this Court finds that it has jurisdiction to hear
Plaintiff’s claims, it now turns to the merits of Plaintiff’s
Motion.
A.
Partial Summary Judgment
On January 22, 2014, along with its Motion, Plaintiff
8
filed its Concise Statement of Facts in Support of Plaintiff’s
Motion (“Plaintiff’s CSOF”).
[Dkt. no. 10.]
Although Defendant
did file a memorandum in opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion, [dkt.
no. 20,] he did not file his own concise statement of facts.
According to Local Rule 56.1(g), “material facts set forth in the
moving party’s concise statement will be deemed admitted unless
controverted by a separate concise statement of the opposing
party.”
Thus, the material facts set forth in Plaintiff’s CSOF
are deemed admitted for the purposes of Plaintiff’s Motion.
Plaintiff argues that there is no genuine issue of
material fact that it owns the Property in fee simple, and that
Defendant has no interest in the Property, and thus Plaintiff is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its quiet title claim
against Defendant.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“The court shall
grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”).
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 669-1 governs quiet title actions in
Hawai`i, and states, in pertinent part, “[a]ction may be brought
by any person against another person who claims, or who may claim
adversely to the plaintiff, an estate or interest in real
property, for the purpose of determining the adverse claim.”
Plaintiff argues that it owns the Property outright and that
Defendant has no interest in the Property in spite of the
9
Notices.
The Hawai`i Supreme Court has explained the burdens in
a quiet title action:
In an action to quiet title, the burden is on
the plaintiff to prove title in and to the land in
dispute, and, absent such proof, it is unnecessary
for the defendant to make any showing. State v.
Zimring, 58 Haw. 106, 110, 566 P.2d 725, 729
(1977) (citations omitted). The plaintiff has the
burden to prove either that he has paper title to
the property or that he holds title by adverse
possession. Hustace v. Jones, 2 Haw. App. 234,
629 P.2d 1151 (1981); see also Harrison v. Davis,
22 Haw. 51, 54 (1914). While it is not necessary
for the plaintiff to have perfect title to
establish a prima facie case, he must at least
prove that he has a substantial interest in the
property and that his title is superior to that of
the defendants. Shilts v. Young, 643 P.2d 686,
689 (Alaska 1981). Accord Rohner v. Neville, 230
Or. 31, 35, 365 P.2d 614, 618 (1961), reh'g
denied, 230 Or. 31, 368 P.2d 391 (1962).
Maui Land & Pineapple Co. v. Infiesto, 76 Hawai`i 402, 407-08,
879 P.2d 507, 512-13 (1994).
A plaintiff may prove a substantial
interest in a property by offering a deed.
Recitals of fact in a deed purporting to
establish an interest in real property are
admissible to prove that such an interest existed
“unless the circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness.” See [Maui Land & Pineapple, 76
Hawai`i at] 406–07, 879 P.2d at 511–12; Haw. R.
Evid. 803(b)(15). For instance, in Maui Land &
Pineapple, the Supreme Court held that the circuit
court did not abuse its discretion in considering
a recital in a deed that a grantor of real
property was “lawfully seized in fee simple” and
that the property was “clear and free of all
encumbrances.” 76 Hawai`i at 406–07, 879 P.2d at
511–12 (internal quotation marks omitted).
10
Here, in the February 1912 Deed, S. Hakuole
and O.H. Hakuole declared that they were “lawfully
seized of the [Subject Property]” and that they
had “a good and lawful right to sell the same[.]”
Appellants do not address these statements, and
nothing in the record indicates that they are
untrustworthy; S. Hakuole and O.H. Hakuole share
the same last name as H.W. Hakuole, leading to a
reasonable inference that they inherited an
interest in the Subject Property. As Makila
claims paper title through mesne conveyances
arising from the February 1912 Deed, Makila has
made a prima facie showing that it has a
substantial interest in the Subject Property.
Makila Land Co., LLC v. Dizon, No. 30294, 2013 WL 1091721, at *23 (Hawai`i Ct. App. 2013) (some alterations in Makila Land).
To rebut a plaintiff’s showing of a substantial
interest in the property, the defendant must prove that its title
is superior to the plaintiff’s.
However, at summary judgment,
defendant need not prove perfect title.
Alexander & Baldwin,
Inc. v. Silva, 124 Hawai`i 476, 487, 248 P.3d 1207, 1218 (Ct.
App. 2011).
“[I]n an action to quiet title, only the relative
interests of the parties to the action may be considered.”
Omerod v. Heirs of Kaheananui, 116 Hawai`i 239, 268, 172 P.3d
983, 1012 (2007) (citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff has offered undisputed evidence that it
owns the Property in fee simple.
The Property is comprised of
two parcels of abutting land in Haiku, Maui, with a residence
(“the Haiku House”).
[Pltf.’s CSOF at ¶¶ 2-4, 6; id., Exh. A
(warranty deed describing parcels, including metes and bounds)
at 301-05.]
On October 18, 1989, First American Title Insurance
11
Company issued a Policy of Title Insurance on behalf of Alham,
Inc., insuring that Alham, Inc. had a fee simple estate in the
Property.
[Id. at ¶ 7; id., Exh. E (policy).]
On November 29, 1989, Alham, Inc. conveyed by warranty
deed all right, title and interest in the Property to Plaintiff,
covenanting that it “is seized of the said premises in fee
simple, and has good right to convey the same.”
id., Exh. A at 299.]
[Id. at ¶¶ 8-9;
Plaintiff recorded the deed with the Land
Court on December 19, 1989 as Liber Number 24018, page 298.
[Id., Exh. A.]
These facts alone are sufficient under Maui Land
& Pineapple and its progeny to prove a substantial interest in
the Property.
See, e.g., 76 Hawai`i at 406-08, 879 P.2d at 511-
13; Makila Land, 2013 WL 1091721, at *2-3.
In addition, to support its substantial interest,
Plaintiff provides undisputed evidence that: the Property is “a
cherished family retreat for members of Plaintiff’s [President’s]
family[;]” [Pltf.’s CSOF at ¶ 10;] Plaintiff has paid property
taxes every year since it acquired the Property; [id. at ¶ 11;]
no one (including Defendant) has ever asserted that the warranty
deed was invalid or that it did not convey title to Plaintiff;
[id. at ¶ 12;] and Title Guaranty of Hawaii prepared a
Preliminary Report on January 6, 2014 showing that Plaintiff is
the fee simple owner of the Property [id. at ¶¶ 13-14].
12
Similarly, there is no genuine issue of material fact
that Defendant’s alleged interest in the Property is inferior to
Plaintiff’s substantial interest.
is the Notices.
His sole claim to the Property
In both notices, which are identical except for
the land descriptions, Defendant claims “[a]ll Right, Title, and
Interest” in the Parcel “as a representative and agent for the
Hawaiian Kingdom Nation With his Executive Authority[.]”
¶¶ 16-17; id., Exhs. B (Notice 1), C (Notice 2).]
[Id. at
The Notices,
however, likely have no valid or enforceable effect on title, as
stated by Title Guaranty of Hawaii.
[Id. at ¶ 20; id., Exh. D
(preliminary report) at 2-3.]
Further, Defendant has admitted that he does not own
the Property.
On or about April 1, 2011, Defendant contacted
Plaintiff’s agent and stated that his company was interested in
renting the Haiku House on behalf of his company’s senior
executives.3
[Id. at ¶ 15.]
Further, Defendant addressed
Plaintiff as the “owner of the land” in the handwritten letter he
included with the certified copies of Notice 1 and Notice 2
received by Plaintiff on or about September 20, 2013.
18-19.]
[Id. at ¶¶
These facts, which are deemed admitted, show that
Defendant’s alleged interest in the Property is inferior to
Plaintiff’s, and that Defendant has no interest in the Property.
3
On or about April 12, 2011 he informed the agent that his
company would not rent the Haiku House. [Complaint at ¶ 22.]
13
These undisputed facts are consistent with Defendant’s
filings.
Although he clearly feels strongly about Hawai`i and
its history, Defendant does not state once, in the hundreds of
pages he has filed, a single connection between himself and the
Property that would give him a basis for a claim of a legally
recognizable interest in the Property.4
Even viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to Defendant, there is no
dispute that Defendant has no legal interest in the Property.
See Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 976 (9th Cir. 2013)
(holding that at summary judgment, the test is, “viewing the
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether
there are any genuine issues of material fact”) (citations and
quotation marks omitted)).
Since there is no genuine issue of material fact that
Plaintiff owns the Property in fee simple, and that Defendant has
no interest in the Property, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion
to the extent it seeks summary judgment as to Count I of the
4
The closest Defendant comes to stating an interest in any
specific land whatsoever (and that he is not claiming right to
all of the Hawaiian islands) is the following:
There are a few pieces Aina “Land” from Maui,
Lanai, Big Island, Oahu, and Kauai Ni`ihau that I
must take back and be recognized under my
principality, we need not all these Lands in
Hawaii just a few and the rest of these lands stay
as the way they are here in Hawaii.
[Def.’s 2/18/14 Motion, Exh. 1 at 8.]
14
Complaint.
B.
Dismissal of Defendant’s Counterclaim
In his Counterclaim, Defendant states, in part,
2. Property has been Established as under the
Hawaiian Kingdom of Kamehameha I.
Property was wrongfully Transferred.
Ownership and Title to property should be held in
the Name of Hawaiian Kingdom of King Kamehameha I
of Monarch
Defendant its Representative and Agent Jon Santos
Prays as Follows:
A. That Judgment he [sic] entered in Favor of
Defendant its Representative and Agent Jon Santos.
B. Defendant its Representative and Agents
Jon Santos Claims Ownership and Titles to its
Rightful Owner as Heir upon the Heavens as His
Principality of this Hawaiian Kingdom of King
Kamehameha I of Monarch.
C. That all Cash that resides as Rent Occupying of
this Property be Awarded to the Defendant who’s
has the Executive Power and Authority of the
Representative and Agent of this Hawaiian Kingdom
of King Kamehameha I as Monarch.
[Answer at pgs. 22-23.5]
Even construing this pleading
liberally, see Ogeone, 2013 WL 3807798, at *3, Defendant’s
argument is essentially the same as in his other filings:
that the Property actually belongs to the Kingdom and, more
particularly, to its agent – Defendant.
5
As discussed above,
The page numbers in the Court’s citation to the Answer
refer to the pages as they appear in the district court’s cm/ecf
system.
15
whether the Kingdom has a right to the Property is a
nonjusticiable political question, which this Court has no
jurisdiction to resolve.
See Williams, 2008 WL 5225870, at
*3; Sai, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 6.
For this reason, the Court
GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to the extent that it seeks
dismissal of Defendant’s Counterclaim for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
The Court FINDS that amendment of the
Counterclaim would be futile, and thus dismissal of
Defendant’s Counterclaim is WITH PREJUDICE.
See Cal. ex
rel. Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Neville Chem.
Co., 358 F.3d 661, 673 (9th Cir. 2004) (“denial of leave to
amend is appropriate if the amendment would be futile”
(internal quotations and citations omitted)).
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss Complaint, filed January 31, 2014, and his Motion to
Dismiss, filed February 18, 2014, are HEREBY DENIED.
Plaintiff’s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Count I of the Complaint
and Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary
Judgment on Defendant Jon Freeman Eleu Santos, AKA Sir Jon
Freeman Eleu Santos, AKA Jon Santos’s Counterclaim Filed on
January 14, 2014, filed January 22, 2014 is HEREBY GRANTED in its
entirety.
Defendant Jon Santos’s Counterclaim, filed January 14,
2014, is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
16
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, April 23, 2014.
/s/ Leslie E. Kobayashi
Leslie E. Kobayashi
United States District Judge
ALGAL PARTNERS, L.P. VS. JON FREEMAN ELEU SANTOS; CIVIL 13-00562
LEK-BMK; ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON COUNT I OF THE COMPLAINT AND MOTION TO DISMISS, OR IN
THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON DEFENDANT JON FREEMAN
ELEU SANTOS, AKA SIR JON FREEMAN ELEU SANTOS, AKA JON SANTOS’S
COUNTERCLAIM FILED ON JANUARY 14, 2014; AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS
17
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