Algal Partners, L.P. v. Santos

Filing 50

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FRCP RULE 54(B) CERTIFICATION. re 47 Signed by JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI on 06/19/2014. (eps)CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notif ications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
ALGAL PARTNERS, L.P., a
)
Delaware limited partnership, )
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
vs.
)
)
JON FREEMAN ELEU SANTOS, AKA )
SIR JON FREEMAN ELEU SANTOS, )
AKA JON SANTOS,
)
)
)
Defendant.
_____________________________ )

CIVIL NO. 13-00562 LEK-BMK

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR FRCP RULE 54(B) CERTIFICATION
Before the Court is Plaintiff Algal Partners L.P.’s
(“Plaintiff”) Motion for FRCP Rule 54(b) Certification
(“Motion”), filed on May 12, 2014.

[Dkt. no 47.]

The Court

finds this matter suitable for disposition without a hearing
pursuant to Rule LR7.2(d) of the Local Rules of Practice of the
United States District Court for the District of Hawai`i (“Local
Rules”).

After careful consideration of the Motion and the

relevant legal authority, the Court HEREBY DENIES the Motion for
the reasons set forth below.
BACKGROUND
The relevant factual background in this case is set
forth in this Court’s April 23, 2014 Order Granting Plaintiff’s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Count I of the Complaint
and Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary

Judgment on Defendant Jon Freeman Eleu Santos, AKA Sir
Jon Freeman Eleu Santos, AKA Jon Santos’s Counterclaim Filed on
January 14, 2014; and Denying Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss
(“4/23/14 Order”).

[Dkt. no. 41.1]

On October 28, 2013, Plaintiff filed its complaint
(“Complaint”), asserting claims for: quiet title to its property
in Haiku, Maui (“the Property” and “Count I”);
preliminary/permanent injunction (“Count II”); slander of title
(“Count III”); and punitive damages (“Count IV”).

On January 14,

2014, pro se Defendant Jon Freeman Eleu Santos (“Defendant”)
filed his counterclaim (“Counterclaim”).

[Dkt. no. 8.]

The

4/23/14 Order granted Plaintiff summary judgment on Count I, and
dismissed with prejudice the Counterclaim.
*6-7.

2014 WL 1653084, at

It also found that Counts II and IV were remedies and not

independent causes of action.

Id. at *2 n.2.

Thus, the only

remaining count from the Complaint is Count III, alleging slander
of title.
The instant Motion requests that this Court enter final
judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) as to Count I and the
Counterclaim.
DISCUSSION
Rule 54(b) provides, in relevant part:
When an action presents more than one claim

1

The 4/23/14 Order is also available at 2014 WL 1653084.
2

for relief – whether as a claim, counterclaim,
crossclaim, or third-party claim – or when
multiple parties are involved, the court may
direct entry of a final judgment as to one or
more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only
if the court expressly determines that there is no
just reason for delay.
The Ninth Circuit has explained the process by which a district
court may direct entry of final judgment as to one claim in a
multi-claim suit:
A district court must first determine that it
has rendered a “final judgment,” that is, a
judgment that is “‘an ultimate disposition of an
individual claim entered in the course of a
multiple claims action.’” Curtiss–Wright [Corp.
v. Gen. Elec. Co.], 446 U.S. [1,] 7, 100 S. Ct.
1460 [(1980)] (quoting [Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.]
Mackey, 351 U.S. [427,] 436, 76 S. Ct. 895
[(1956)]). Then it must determine whether there
is any just reason for delay. “It is left to the
sound judicial discretion of the district court to
determine the ‘appropriate time’ when each final
decision in a multiple claims action is ready for
appeal. This discretion is to be exercised ‘in
the interest of sound judicial administration.’”
Id. at 8, 100 S. Ct. 1460 (quoting Mackey, 351
U.S. at 437, 76 S. Ct. 895). Whether a final
decision on a claim is ready for appeal is a
different inquiry from the equities involved, for
consideration of judicial administrative interests
“is necessary to assure that application of the
Rule effectively ‘preserves the historic federal
policy against piecemeal appeals.’” Id. (quoting
Mackey, 351 U.S. at 438, 76 S. Ct. 895).
Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC, 422 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 2005)
(footnote omitted).
The Court should “consider such factors as whether the
claims under review were separable from the others remaining to
be adjudicated and whether the nature of the claims already
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determined was such that no appellate court would have to decide
the same issues more than once even if there were subsequent
appeals.”

Curtiss–Wright, 446 U.S. at 8.

In determining whether

to grant certification, courts must consider the judicial
administrative interest in avoiding “piecemeal appeals,” as well
as the other equities involved.

Id.; see also 10 Charles Alan

Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and
Procedure: Civil 3d § 2659 (1998) (“It is uneconomical for an
appellate court to review facts on an appeal following a Rule
54(b) certification that it is likely to be required to consider
again when another appeal is brought after the district court
renders its decision on the remaining claims or as to the
remaining parties.”).
Plaintiff argues that its quiet title and slander of
title claims are “separate and wholly distinct claims” that
depend on different facts and burdens of proof.
of Motion at 8-11.]

[Mem. in Supp.

Further, it argues that there is no just

reason for delay, in particular, because Defendant’s claim to the
Property is frivolous and has caused Plaintiff ongoing harm.
[Id. at 12-13.]
The Court first notes that it has “rendered a ‘final
judgment’ as to Count I and the Counterclaim.
P. 54(b).

See Fed. R. Civ.

It finds, however, that there is substantial factual

overlap between Count I and Count III.

4

The Court set forth the

burdens of proof for a quiet title action in the 4/23/14 Order.
2014 WL 1653084, at *4.

Plaintiff carries the burden of proving

its interest in the Property, and that its interest is greater
than Defendant’s interest.

Defendant’s sole claim to the

Property is through the “Notices of Ownership” (“the Notices”)
that he filed with the Bureau of Conveyances.

Id. at *6.

The ICA has held that, to prevail on common law slander
of title under Hawai`i law, a plaintiff must prove:
(1) ownership of or interest in the property by
the plaintiff; (2) falsity of the words published;
(3) malice of the defendant in publishing the
false statements; (4) publication to some person
other than the owner (5) publication in
disparagement of plaintiff’s property or the title
to it; and (6) special damages proximately
resulting from such publication.
Isobe v. Sakatani, 127 Hawai`i 368, 377-78, 279 P.3d 33, 42-43
(Ct. App. 2012).

Thus, elements (1), (2), (4), and (5) require

proof of similar facts as with the quiet title claim, related to
the ownership interests of the two parties and facts surrounding
the Notices.

While Plaintiff must provide additional evidence to

prove Defendant’s malice and special damages, the Court finds
that the two claims are sufficiently “closely related, factually
and legally” so as to make certification inefficient here.
Wood, 422 F.3d at 880.

See

Plaintiff’s “legal right to relief stems

largely from the same set of facts and would give rise to
successive appeals that would turn largely on identical, and
interrelated, facts.

This impacts the sound administration of
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justice.”

See id. (footnote omitted).
Further, this is not a complex case or one where there

is an “important or controlling legal issue that cuts across (and
cuts out or at least curtails) a number of claims.”
882 (footnote omitted).

See id. at

This “similarity of legal [and] factual

issues [] weigh[s] heavily against entry of judgment under [Rule
54(b)]. . . .”

See id. (some alterations in Wood) (citation and

quotation marks omitted).

The Court thus finds that final

judgment under Rule 54(b) in favor of Plaintiff is not “in the
interest of sound judicial administration,” and may result in
unnecessary piecemeal appeals.

See Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at

8; see also, e.g., Wheeler v. Hilo Med. Ctr., Inc., Civil No.
09-00533 JMS/KSC, 2010 WL 4273095 (D. Hawai`i Oct. 21, 2010)
(denying separate judgment where court found substantial factual
and legal overlap and that the case was not complex).
Finally, while it is sensitive to Plaintiff’s claims of
ongoing harm, the Court finds that this is not an “unusual case”
where judicial costs and risks are “‘outbalanced by pressing
needs of litigants for an early and separate judgment as to some
of the claims . . . .’”

Haldeman v. Golden, Civil No. 05-00810

DAE-KSC, 2010 WL 3946401, at *3 (D. Hawai`i Sept. 30, 2010)
(quoting Morrison–Knudsen Co., Inc. v. Archer, 655 F.2d 962, 965
(9th Cir. 1981)).

For all of these reasons, the Court DENIES the

Motion.

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CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion for
FRCP Rule 54(b) Certification, filed May 12, 2014, is HEREBY
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, June 19, 2014.

/s/ Leslie E. Kobayashi
Leslie E. Kobayashi
United States District Judge

ALGAL PARTNERS L.P. VS. JON FREEMAN ELEU SANTOS, ETC.; CIVIL NO.
13-00562 LEK-BMK; ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR FRCP RULE
54(B) CERTIFICATION

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