Garcia v. Hawaii Health Systems Corporation

Filing 25

ORDER Granting 9 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Complaint Filed January 29, 2014. Signed by JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI on 7/23/14. This Court DIRECTS the Clerks Office to close this case on August 13, 2014, unless Plaintiff files a motion for reconsideration of the instant Order. (gab, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
SHARON P. GARCIA, Pro Se,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
HAWAII HEALTH SYSTEMS
)
CORPORATION dba SAMUEL
)
MAHELONA HOSPITAL,
)
)
)
Defendant.
_____________________________ )

CIVIL 14-00044 LEK-KSC

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS COMPLAINT FILED JANUARY 29, 2014
On April 21, 2014, Defendant Hawaii Health Systems
Corporation, doing business as Samuel Mahelona Hospital
(“Defendant”),1 filed its Motion to Dismiss Complaint Filed
January 29, 2014 (“Motion”).

[Dkt. no. 9.]

Pro se Plaintiff

Sharon P. Garcia (“Plaintiff”) filed her memorandum in opposition
on June 23, 2014, and Defendant filed its reply on June 30, 2014.
[Dkt. nos. 21, 22.]

On May 28, 2014, this Court issued an

entering order finding this matter suitable for disposition
without a hearing pursuant to Rule LR7.2(d) of the Local Rules of
Practice of the United States District Court for the District of
Hawai`i (“Local Rules”).

[Dkt. no. 16.]

After careful

consideration of the Motion, supporting and opposing memoranda,
1

Plaintiff also refers to the Samuel Mahelona Hospital as
the Mahelona Medical Center. [Complaint at ¶ 4.] The Court will
refer to the entity as “Defendant” and the medical facility as
“Mahelona.”

and the relevant legal authority, Defendant’s Motion is HEREBY
GRANTED because the Eleventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution bars Plaintiff from bringing her federal claims
against Defendant.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this action on January 29, 2014
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (“ADA”).

[Complaint at ¶ 1.]

According

to the Complaint, Defendant is “the 4th largest public health
system provider in the United States,” and Mahelona is one of
fourteen facilities throughout Hawai`i that Defendant operates.
[Id. at ¶ 4.]
Plaintiff alleges that she is a person with a
disability for purposes of the ADA because she has been required
to use a wheelchair ever since an accident in 2008.

Plaintiff

was employed by Defendant as a Charge Registered Nurse III at
Mahelona until her termination.

Plaintiff alleges that, when

Defendant learned that she was in a wheelchair, it demanded that
she resign and terminated her when she refused.

[Id. at ¶¶ 3-5.]

According to the Complaint, Plaintiff was on leave with
pay from Mahelona from March 6, 2006 until Defendant sent her a
letter dated March 5, 2009 requesting that she report for work on
March 16, 2009.

[Id. at ¶ 6.]

Plaintiff inquired whether

Defendant would help her obtain a position where a “RN could work

2

in a wheelchair” if she could not return to her original
position.

[Id. at ¶ 7.]

Defendant informed Plaintiff that she

would have to go through the same recruitment process that all
applicants go through.

Plaintiff argues that, although she did

not specifically reference the ADA, her request to be reassigned
was a request for an accommodation under the ADA, and Defendant’s
refusal to help her secure another position constituted a refusal
to accommodate her disability.

[Id. at ¶¶ 7, 9.]

Plaintiff alleges that, in a letter dated April 1,
2011, Defendant asked Plaintiff to resign because she was unable
to perform the essential functions of the Registered Nurse III
position and because she was unable to perform cardiopulmonary
resuscitation (“CPR”).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant had many

other positions that she was qualified for, but Defendant would
not consider her for those positions and terminated her via
teleconference on April 18, 2011.

She therefore filed her Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) charge of
discrimination.2

[Id. at ¶ 10.]

Plaintiff contends that she is able to perform
“physical examinations, CPR, nursing care and treatment, but
would need help if certain scenarios arose thus an accommodation
that didn’t put any undue hardship on the Defendant would be

2

The Complaint states that she filed her EEOC charge on
February 7, 2012. [Complaint at pg. 14.]
3

simple.”

[Id. at ¶ 12.]

Plaintiff acknowledges that she is

unable to “transfer patients or toilet them,” but she argues
that, under the ADA, lifting patients is not an essential
function of a nursing position if such tasks only take minutes of
the nurse’s day, and the facility almost always accomplishes such
transfers with two or more personnel.

Thus, Plaintiff argues

that Defendant failed to consider a reasonable accommodation.
[Id.]

Plaintiff also emphasizes that, as a Charge Nurse, a

sizable portion of her duties involved processing paperwork, and
“there were days [when she] barely had time to do rounds.”

[Id.

at ¶ 15.]
Plaintiff argues that Defendant violated the ADA
because Defendant refused to grant her reasonable accommodations
for her disability and, when she filed her EEOC charge, Defendant
retaliated against her by “conspir[ing] to make false allegations
to the EEOC investigator and the to [sic] Plaintiff.”
¶ 18.]

[Id. at

She also alleges that Defendant intended to defame her

and ruin her professional reputation during the EEOC
investigation.

[Id.]

The Complaint prays for the following relief:
$300,000.00 in damages pursuant to “the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
II. section 1981[;]” compensatory and punitive damages; back pay
and front pay; attorneys’ fees and costs; and any other
appropriate relief, including injunctions and other damages.

4

[Id. at pgs. 13-14.]
In the instant Motion, Defendant argues that this Court
must dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)
or, in the alternative, under Rule 12(b)(6), because the State of
Hawaii’s (“the State”) Eleventh Amendment immunity bars ADA
claims in federal court.
STANDARD
This district court has observed that it is unclear
whether a motion to dismiss based on Eleventh Amendment immunity
is a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motion or a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
Monet v. Hawaii, Civ. No. 11–00211 SOM/RLP, 2011 WL 2446310, at
*3 (D. Hawai`i June 14, 2011).

The Court, however, need not

determine whether Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6) applies,
because, as in Monet, “whether the court examines Eleventh
Amendment immunity under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction
or under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim makes no
difference, as those standards are essentially the same for
purposes of this motion.”3

See id.

Under that common standard, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

3

There are differences between the standard applicable to
Rule 12(b)(1) motions and the standard applicable to Rule
12(b)(6) motions, see, e.g., Krakauer v. Indymac Mortg. Servs.,
Civ. No. 09–00518 ACK–BMK, 2013 WL 704861, at *2 (D. Hawai`i Feb.
26, 2013), but those differences are not relevant to the instant
Motion.
5

relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 554, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007)).

“A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955).

Id. (citing

“Threadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.”

Id. (citing Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (“Although for the purposes of a
motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in
the complaint as true, we ‘are not bound to accept as true a
legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation’” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
DISCUSSION
I.

Plaintiff’s ADA Claims
“Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination ‘against a

qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard
to . . . [the] privileges of employment.’”

Castle v. Eurofresh,

Inc., 731 F.3d 901, 906 (9th Cir. 2013) (alterations in Castle)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)).

“Title IV of the ADA precludes

retaliation against employees who seek to enforce their statutory
rights under the ADA.”

Head v. Glacier Nw. Inc., 413 F.3d 1053,

1064 n.54 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted); see also 42 U.S.C.
6

§ 12203(a).4
“It is well established that agencies of the state are
immune under the Eleventh Amendment from private damages or suits
for injunctive relief brought in federal court.”

Savage v.

Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003)
(citing Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,
100, 104 S. Ct. 900, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984)).

The United States

Supreme Court has held that Congress may not abrogate the states’
sovereign immunity from suits under Title I of the ADA.

See,

e.g., id. (citing Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett,
531 U.S. 356, 360, 121 S. Ct. 955, 148 L. Ed. 2d 866 (2001)).
As to ADA retaliation claims, the Ninth Circuit has
stated:
We recognize that Garrett arose in the
context of Title I, but we nevertheless conclude
that the Court’s holding necessarily applies to
claims brought under Title V of the ADA, at least
where, as here, the claims are predicated on
alleged violations of Title I. Title V prohibits
discrimination against an employee who opposes an
“act or practice made unlawful” by the substantive
provisions of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12203. There
is nothing in the ADA’s legislative findings
demonstrating a pattern of discrimination by
states against employees who oppose unlawful
employment discrimination against the disabled.
Absent a history of such evil by the states,

4

Section 12203(a) states: “No person shall discriminate
against any individual because such individual has opposed any
act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such
individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in
any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
chapter.”
7

Congress may not abrogate the states’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity from Title V claims. See
Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 967–68. . . .
Demshki v. Monteith, 255 F.3d 986, 988-89 (9th Cir. 2001).5
Plaintiff acknowledged in the Complaint that Defendant
is a “public health system provider,” and Mahelona is one of
fourteen facilities throughout Hawai`i that Defendant operates.
[Complaint at ¶ 4.]

Further, Haw. Rev. Stat. § 323F-2(a) states:

“There is established the Hawaii health systems corporation,
which shall be a public body corporate and politic and an
instrumentality and agency of the State.”

As such, it “enjoy[s]

the same sovereign immunity available to the State[.]”
Stat. § 323F-7(c)(11).

Haw. Rev.

Plaintiff has not identified, nor is this

Court aware of, any action that Defendant has taken which waived
its immunity in this case.

5

While Demshki refers to ADA retaliation claims as “Title
V” claims, cases such as Head and Zimmerman v. Oregon Department
of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169, 1172 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1999), refer to
such claims as “Title IV” claims. In Zimmerman, the Ninth
Circuit stated:
The ADA contains five titles: Employment (Title
I), Public Services (Title II), Public
Accommodations and Services Operated by Private
Entities (Title III), Telecommunications (Title
IV), and Miscellaneous Provisions (Title V).
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101–336, 104 Stat. 327, 327–28 (1990).
170 F.3d at 1172. The Ninth Circuit also noted that, “[a]s
codified, the telecommunications title is not a separate
subchapter.” Id. at 1172 n.1.
8

Thus, pursuant to Garrett and Demshki, the Eleventh
Amendment bars Plaintiff’s ADA Title I discrimination claim and
her ADA Title IV retaliation claim against Defendant.

This Court

must dismiss those claims because each fails to state a claim for
relief that is plausible on its face.
678.

See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

Further, this Court finds that dismissal with prejudice is

warranted because Plaintiff cannot save these claims by any
amendment.

See Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 573 F.3d 728, 737 (9th

Cir. 2009) (“Dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless
it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by any
amendment.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).
This court therefore GRANTS Defendant’s Motion as to
Plaintiff’s ADA discrimination claim and her ADA retaliation
claim.
II.

Those claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Plaintiff’s State Law Claims
Plaintiff’s Complaint also appears to allege state law

claims, including defamation.

[Complaint at ¶ 18.]

This district court recently explained that
“[a] federal court does not have authority to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining
state-law claims when the federal-law claims are
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Supplemental jurisdiction may only be invoked when
the district court has ‘a hook of original
jurisdiction on which to hang it.’” Parks v.
Watkins, Civ. No. 11–00594 HG–RLP, 2013 WL 431950,
at *3 (D. Haw. Jan. 31, 2013) (quoting Herman
Family Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d
802, 805–06 (9th Cir. 2001)).
Corless v. Cole, Civ. No. 13–00700 ACK–BMK, 2014 WL 2892362, at
9

*3 (D. Hawai`i June 25, 2014) (alteration in Corless).

Thus, if

Defendant’s Eleventh Amendment immunity from Plaintiff’s ADA
claims deprives this Court of subject matter jurisdiction over
those claims, this Court could not exercise supplemental
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) over Plaintiff’s
state law claims.
Even if Defendant’s Eleventh Amendment immunity is not
a matter of jurisdiction, this Court would have the discretion to
decide whether or not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s state law claims.

See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,

383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“The power [of supplemental
jurisdiction] need not be exercised in every case in which it is
found to exist.

It has consistently been recognized that pendent

jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s
right.”).

Thus, even if the decision whether to exercise

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims is discretionary,
this Court would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over Plaintiff’s state law claims because this Court has already
dismissed all of Plaintiff’s federal law claims with prejudice.
See, e.g. Soliven v. Yamashiro, Civ. No. 14–00244 SOM–KSC, 2014
WL 2938401, at *2 (D. Hawai`i June 30, 2014) (“This court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
state law claims, as the claims grounded in federal law have been
dismissed.”).

10

This Court therefore GRANTS Defendant’s Motion as to
all state law claims alleged in the Complaint.

The dismissal is

WITH PREJUDICE because, in light of the dismissal of Plaintiff’s
ADA claims with prejudice, any amendment of Plaintiff’s state law
claims would be futile.

See Johnson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 834

F.2d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that “courts have
discretion to deny leave to amend a complaint for futility”
(citation and quotation marks omitted)).

This Court, however,

emphasizes that it expresses no opinion on the issue of whether
Plaintiff’s state law claims would have merit if she brought them
in a state court.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss Complaint Filed January 29, 2014, which Defendant filed
on April 21, 2014, is HEREBY GRANTED.
HEREBY DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Plaintiff’s Complaint is

This Court DIRECTS the Clerk’s

Office to close this case on August 13, 2014, unless Plaintiff
files a motion for reconsideration of the instant Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, July 23, 2014.

/s/ Leslie E. Kobayashi
Leslie E. Kobayashi
United States District Judge

SHARON P. GARCIA VS. HAWAII HEALTH SYSTEM CORPORATION DBA SAMUEL
MAHELONA HOSPITAL; CIVIL 14-00044 LEK-KSC; ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT FILED JANUARY 29, 2014

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