Mather et al v. Territorial Savings Bank et al

Filing 54

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S RULE 60(b)(4) MOTION 52 . Signed by JUDGE DERRICK K. WATSON on 11/20/2014. (ecs, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAI`I

DIANE E. MATHER,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE
OF THE HANA2008 LIVING TRUST,
MATHER REAL ESTATE, LLC,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL NO. 14-00082 DKW-RLP

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
RULE 60(b)(4) MOTION

vs.
TERRITORIAL SAVINGS BANK, a
federal savings bank; FIRST
HAWAIIAN BANK, a regional
commercial bank; DOES 1-50
INCLUSIVE,
Defendants.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S RULE 60(b)(4) MOTION
On July 31, 2014, the Court dismissed Mather’s complaint and denied her
request for leave to amend. Now, over three months after the entry of that order
and judgment, Mather moves the Court to vacate the order as void under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b)(4). Because Mather has provided no basis to do so, the motion is
denied.
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides an “exception to
finality,” that “allows a party to seek relief from a final judgment . . . under a

limited set of circumstances.” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 528–29 (2005).
Specifically, Rule 60(b)(4)—the provision under which Mather brings the instant
motion—authorizes the Court to relieve a party from a final judgment if “the
judgment is void.”
“A void judgment is one so affected by a fundamental infirmity that the
infirmity may be raised even after the judgment becomes final.” United Student
Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 270 (2010). The list of such qualifying
infirmities is “exceedingly short.” Id. “A final judgment is ‘void’ for purposes of
Rule 60(b)(4) only if the court that considered it lacked jurisdiction, either as to the
subject matter of the dispute or over the parties to be bound, or acted in a manner
inconsistent with due process of law.” United States v. Berke, 170 F.3d 882, 883
(9th Cir. 1999); accord Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 271. “A judgment is not void, for
example, simply because it is or may have been erroneous. Similarly, a motion
under Rule 60(b)(4) is not a substitute for a timely appeal.” Espinosa, 559 U.S. at
270 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Motions for relief from
judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) are addressed to the
sound discretion of the district court.” Barber v. Hawaii, 42 F.3d 1185, 1198 (9th
Cir. 1994).
Mather demonstrates no reason for the Court to grant her post-judgment
relief under Rule 60(b) or any other rule. She argues that this Court misinterpreted
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the law related to the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to Mather’s
proposed amended complaint, which she was denied leave to file. An argument
over the application of law could have been an argument on appeal of the Court’s
order and judgment, but it is not a basis to void a judgment under Rule 60(b)(4).
Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 270.
Even if Mather’s arguments could qualify as the type necessary to provide a
basis for post-judgment relief, the Court is not persuaded. Mather argues that relief
is warranted because the Rooker–Feldman doctrine has been abolished. That is
simply not the case. Indeed, Mather’s complaint is precisely the type of case to
which the Supreme Court has held the doctrine applies. In the case cited by
Mather, the Supreme Court stated that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine is confined to
“cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting
district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). No matter how frequently or
vigorously she argues otherwise, this is such a case. Mather’s proposed amended
complaint consisted of claims that directly challenged the final judgment issued in
the state-court proceedings and were therefore barred by the Rooker–Feldman
doctrine. Mather could have appealed the Court’s order and judgment but
apparently chose not to do so.
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CONCLUSION
Mather’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion is hereby denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: November 20, 2014 at Honolulu, Hawai‘i.

Diane E. Mather v. Territorial Savings Bank, et al.; CV 14-00082 DKW/RLP;
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S RULE 60(b)(4) MOTION

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