Mather v. First Hawaiian Bank et al
Filing
52
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER re 51 - Signed by CHIEF JUDGE SUSAN OKI MOLLWAY on 9/18/2014. (emt, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Diane E. Mather served by first class mail at the address of record on September 18, 2014.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
DIANE E. MATHER, individually
and as trustee of the
HANA2008 LIVING TRUST and the
VIOLET BLACK TRUST,
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
FIRST HAWAIIAN BANK, a Hawaii )
corporation,
)
)
Defendant.
)
_____________________________ )
CIVIL NO. 14-00091 SOM/RLP
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RELIEF
FROM FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER
Before the court is a motion by Plaintiff Diane E.
Mather, proceeding pro se, seeking relief from an order filed by
this court denying her motion to file an amended complaint in the
form attached to that motion.
The motion for relief is denied.
Mather’s motion for relief is particularly puzzling
because Mather has failed to take advantage of opportunities
previously offered by the court for her to proceed with this
case.
By way of background, the court states that this case
involves a loan by Defendant First Hawaiian Bank to Mather for
$686,000 and a $20,000 line of credit.
When Mather defaulted on
these loans, First Hawaiian Bank filed a state-court action to
foreclose on the loans.
In August 2013, the state court granted
summary judgment in favor of First Hawaiian Bank, issued a decree
of foreclosure with respect to the mortgages securing the loans,
and certified its ruling as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the
Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure.
Mather did not appeal the final
judgment that the state court subsequently entered.
In January 2014, First Hawaiian Bank moved to confirm
the foreclosure sale of the security for the loans.
Just days
after filing her opposition to that motion in state court, Mather
filed the present action.
See Verified Complaint, ECF No. 1.
On June 24, 2014, the court dismissed the Complaint in
this action, ruling that the federal claims alleged in it were
barred by the applicable limitations period.
See ECF No. 28.
The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
state-law claims asserted in the Complaint.
Id.
The allegations
in the original Complaint gave the court concern that Mather
might be abusing the court process to delay and/or hinder the
state-court foreclosure proceedings by trying to appeal the state
court’s decisions to this court.
This court was also concerned
that Mather appeared to be asserting claims barred by the res
judicata and collateral estoppel doctrines.
Id.
The court
nevertheless granted Mather leave to file an amended complaint no
later than July 11, 2014.
Id.
Instead of filing an amended complaint, Mather filed a
motion for leave to file an amended complaint attached as an
exhibit to her motion.
See ECF No. 33.
2
On August 22, 2014, the court denied that motion.
ECF No. 48.
See
The court’s concerns that Mather might be abusing
the court process turned out to be well-founded.
The proposed
amended complaint was prolix, containing many irrelevant
allegations covering 69 pages.
The court therefore denied the
motion, ruling that the proposed amended complaint violated Rule
8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The court also
ruled that some of the claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine and barred by the res judicata and/or collateral
estoppel doctrines.
Id.
The court additionally noted that,
although Mather cited the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and
the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, she did not actually
state claims under those acts.
Id.
Notwithstanding its
continuing concerns, the court gave Mather leave to file another
motion seeking leave to file an amended complaint, requiring
Mather to attach any new proposed pleading to the motion.
Any
such motion was required to be filed by September 12, 2014.
The
court warned Mather that failure to timely file such a motion
would result in the automatic closure of this case.
Id.
Mather did not timely file a motion seeking leave to
file a new amended complaint.
Judgment against Mather was
therefore entered on September 15, 2014.
See ECF No. 50.
The following day, September 16, 2014, Mather filed the
present motion for relief from the court’s order of August 22,
3
2014, citing to Rule 60(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The court construes this motion as also seeking
relief from the judgment entered on September 15, 2014.
Rule 60(b)(4) provides that a court may relieve a party
from a final judgment if “the judgment is void.”
The Supreme
Court has held that a void judgment is “one so affected by a
fundamental infirmity that the infirmity may be raised even after
the judgment becomes final.”
United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v.
Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 271 (2010).
judgment is a legal nullity.”
In other words, “[a] void
A judgment is not considered void
“simply because it is or may have been erroneous.”
Id.
Instead,
Rule 60(b)(4) applies only “in the rare instance where a judgment
is premised either on a certain type of jurisdictional error or
on a violation of due process that deprives a party of notice or
the opportunity to be heard.”
Id.
Rule 60(b) motions are committed to the discretion of
the trial court.
See Barber v. Hawaii, 42 F.3d 1185, 1198 (9th
Cir. 1994) (“Motions for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) are addressed to the sound
discretion of the district court.”).
Whether under Rule 60(b)(4)
or any other subsection of Rule 60(b), or even under Rule 59(e)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Mather demonstrates no
reason for the court to grant her relief of any kind.
Having
failed to take advantage of the opportunity to file a timely
4
motion attaching a new amended complaint, she is in no position
to obtain post-judgment relief.
Even if the court reviews the merits of her motion for
post-judgment relief, the court is unpersuaded.
Mather argues
that relief is warranted because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine has
been abolished.
That is simply not the case.
Mather’s case is
the type of case that the Supreme Court has expressly noted the
doctrine applies to.
In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005), the Supreme Court
stated that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is confined to cases that
are brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused
by state-court judgments rendered before the commencement of
district court proceedings, and that invite district court review
and rejection of those state-court judgments.
Here, a final
judgment in the state-court foreclosure action was entered on
August 23, 2013, pursuant to the state court’s certification
that, under Rule 54(b) of the Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure,
its grant of summary judgment in favor of First Hawaiian Bank and
against Mather was a final order and judgment and that there was
no just reason for delay.
See ECF No. 21-1, 21-2.
Mather could
have appealed that order but chose not to do so.
Instead, about six months later, she came to federal
court, claiming, among other things, that First Hawaiian Bank had
lacked standing to foreclose on the loans (First Cause of
5
Action), and seeking to quiet title and prevent a slander of
title (Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action) as to the security
foreclosed on in state court, and to rescind the loans that were
foreclosed on in state court (Tenth Cause of Action).
No. 1.
See ECF
Mather reiterated these claims in her proposed amended
complaint.
See ECF No. 33-1.
These claims directly challenged
the final judgment issued in the state-court proceedings and were
therefore barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Mather also misunderstands the doctrines of issue and
claim preclusion.
When the court denied Mather’s motion to file
the proposed amended complaint, it did so in part because issues
raised in it either were or could have been raised in the statecourt foreclosure proceedings in which a final judgment had been
entered and not appealed.
See Dorrance v. Lee, 90 Haw. 143, 149,
976 P.2d 904, 910 (1999) (doctrine of collateral estoppel bars
relitigation of issue when: (1) issue decided in prior
adjudication is identical to issue presented in action in
question; (2) there is a final judgment on the merits; (3) issue
decided in prior adjudication was essential to final judgment;
and (4) party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was
party or in privity with party in prior adjudication); Morneau v.
Stark Enters., Ltd., 56 Haw. 420, 422-23, 539 P.2d 472, 474-75
(1975) (stating that the doctrine of res judicata “a bar to a new
action in any court between the same parties or their privies
6
concerning the same subject matter, and precludes the
relitigation, not only of the issues which were actually
litigated in the first action, but also of all grounds of claim
and defense which might have been properly litigated in the first
action but were not litigated or decided”).
Although Mather claims that this court violated her due
process rights, she fails to explain the manner in which that
occurred.
At most, she complains that this court examined the
state-court proceedings in denying her motion to file the
proposed amended complaint.
But it remains unclear why this
court should not have taken judicial notice of those proceedings,
including the grant of summary judgment in favor of First
Hawaiian Bank on its claim to foreclose on its loans to Mather,
the Rule 54(b) certification of that order as final, and the
final judgment entered by the state court as a result.
See ECF
Nos. 21-2, 21-2.
To the extent Mather argues that she should be allowed
to assert a RICO claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) and (c) without
leave of court, the court rejects that argument.
already given leave to file an amended complaint.
Mather was
Instead of
filing an amended complaint, she filed a motion asking for leave
to file a new complaint in the form attached to her motion.
the court examined the proposed amended complaint attached to
When
that motion, the court determined that Mather should not be
7
allowed to proceed with that particular proposed amended
complaint.
The nature of the proposed amended complaint was such
that it was clear that Mather was attempting to delay and/or
hinder the state-court foreclosure proceedings, or was attempting
to prevent First Hawaiian Bank from doing anything with the
foreclosed property.
The court nevertheless gave Mather leave to
file another motion seeking leave to file a different proposed
amended complaint.
Mather did not timely file such a motion.
Instead, she waited until after judgment had been entered to
state in a single sentence in the conclusion to her motion that
she should be allowed to file an amended complaint with a single
RICO claim.
This request did not comport with the court’s
earlier order telling Mather that, by September 12, 2014, she
could file a motion seeking leave to file an amended complaint
that she was to attach to the motion.
Mather did not submit
anything at all allowing the court to evaluate whether she was
stating a claim.
8
Under the circumstances presented here, the court
declines to reconsider its previous order or the subsequent
judgment.
Mather’s motion seeking such relief is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, September 18, 2014.
/s/ Susan Oki Mollway
Susan Oki Mollway
Chief United States District Judge
Mather, et al. v. First Hawaiian Bank, Civil No. 14-00091 SOM/RLP; ORDER
DENYING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER
9
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?