Teruya v. Shibuya et al

Filing 23

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION, NEW TRIAL, AND JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 18 , 21 . Signed by JUDGE DERRICK K. WATSON on 7/16/2014. (ecs, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registe red to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAI`I
JASON Y. TERUYA; U.S.
GOVERNMENT-DEPT. OF LABOR
OWCP/DLHWC;
DIRECTOR-ANTIONIO RIOS; and
BAE SYSTEMS/CORROSION
ENGINEERING,

CIVIL NO. 14-00105 DKW/RLP
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTIONS FOR
RECONSIDERATION, NEW
TRIAL, AND JUDGMENT AS A
MATTER OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
vs.
DR. NEIL SHIBUYA, M.D.; and
JEFFREY S. PORTNOY, ESQ.,
Defendants.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION,
NEW TRIAL, AND JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
On June 6, 2014, the Court dismissed this action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff pro se Jason Y. Teruya (“Teruya”) has since filed a
motion for reconsideration of that dismissal, together with a motion for new trial
(Dkt. No. 18), and a separate motion for judgment as a matter of law to defeat the
motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 21). Because none of Teruya’s arguments provide an
adequate basis for this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the Court still lacks

authority to adjudicate Teruya’s claims. Accordingly, Teruya’s new motions are
denied.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In the Ninth Circuit, a successful motion for reconsideration must
accomplish two goals. First, it must demonstrate some reason why the court should
reconsider its prior decision. Na Mamo O ‘Aha ‘Ino v. Galiher, 60 F. Supp. 2d
1058, 1059 (D. Haw. 1999). Second, a motion for reconsideration must set forth
facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior
decision. Id. Courts have established three grounds justifying reconsideration:
(1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence;
and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Mustafa v.
Clark County Sch. Dist., 157 F.3d 1169, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 1998).
Mere disagreement with a previous order is an insufficient basis for
reconsideration. See Leong v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 689 F. Supp. 1572 (D. Haw.
1988). Furthermore, reconsideration may not be based on evidence and legal
arguments that could have been presented at the time of the challenged decision.
See Kona Enter., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000); Hawaii
Stevedores, Inc. v. HT&T Co., 363 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1269 (D. Haw. 2005); All
Hawaii Tours, Corp. v. Polynesian Cultural Ctr., 116 F.R.D. 645, 649–50 (D. Haw.
2

1987), rev’d on other grounds, 855 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1988). “Whether or not to
grant reconsideration is committed to the sound discretion of the court.” Navajo
Nation v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation, 331 F.3d
1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003).
DISCUSSION
Teruya contends that the Court should reconsider its dismissal order
because the Court decided the matter without a hearing, and Teruya intended to
present evidence related to jurisdiction at the hearing. First of all, the rules of this
Court permit consideration of Defendant’s dismissal motions without a hearing.
LR7.2(d). Second, and more importantly, Teruya had ample opportunity to provide
in writing whatever information he wished to offer to establish this Court’s
jurisdiction at the time Defendants filed their motions to dismiss, as well as in
response to this Court’s March 5, 2014 Order to Show Cause (Dkt. No. 5), which
specifically inquired into this Court’s apparent lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
As part of his motion for reconsideration, Teruya has had yet another opportunity to
do the same. Notwithstanding these opportunities, nothing Teruya has submitted
suggests that this Court erred in granting dismissal, concluding that the Longshore
Act does not confer subject matter jurisdiction on this Court over Teruya’s claims.

3

Thompson v. Potashnick Constr. Co., 812 F.2d 574, 576 (9th Cir. 1987).
Accordingly, Teruya’s motion for reconsideration is denied.
Although no supporting arguments were made, Teruya also moves for a
new trial. However, no trial was conducted in this case from which a new trial
motion could even be filed. Further, as noted above, Teruya provides no new
information showing how the Longshore Act provides this Court with jurisdiction
over his claims. Teruya’s motion for a new trial is therefore denied.
Finally, following the combined motion for reconsideration and new
trial, Teruya also filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law to defeat
Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Although characterized as a new motion, the
substance of the motion indicates that it is merely a belated opposition brief (which
Teruya neglected to previously file) to Defendants’ motions to dismiss, which have
now been granted. The counter-arguments advanced by Teruya fail to provide any
grounds for the Court to question or revisit its conclusion that it lacks jurisdiction
here.

4

CONCLUSION
Teruya’s motion for reconsideration and new trial (Dkt. No. 18) and
motion for judgment as a matter of law (Dkt. No. 21) are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 16, 2014 at Honolulu, Hawai‘i.

Teruya v. Shibuya, et al.; CV 14-00105 DKW/RLP; ORDER DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION, NEW TRIAL, AND
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

5