Taylor et al v. United States Office of Personnel Management et al

Filing 78

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT re 58 - Signed by CHIEF JUDGE SUSAN OKI MOLLWAY on 6/10/2015. "MetLife's motion for summary judgment is granted. Accordin gly, Plaintiffs' "Motion to Compel the Office of Personnel Management to Release the Pay Records of James Patrick Taylor," ECF No. 69 , is denied as moot. This disposes of all claims and all parties in this action. Accordingly, th e Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of MetLife and to close this case." (emt, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Scarlett Taylor and Chanel Taylor served by first class mail at the address of record on June 10, 2015.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
SCARLETT A. TAYLOR, et al.,

)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
UNITED STATES OFFICE OF
)
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, et al., )
)
Defendants.
)
_____________________________ )

CIVIL NO. 14-00107 SOM/BMK
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT METROPOLITAN LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION.
Plaintiffs Scarlett Taylor and Chanel Taylor

(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) commenced this action to recover
life insurance benefits related to the death of James Taylor,
Scarlett Taylor’s ex-husband and Chanel Taylor’s father.
Plaintiffs contend that after James Taylor’s death, Defendant
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“MetLife”) erroneously paid
the insurance benefits to Elisa Taylor, James Taylor’s then-wife,
instead of to Scarlett Taylor and/or Chanel Taylor.
MetLife moves for summary judgment against Plaintiffs
as to all counts of the Complaint.

See ECF No. 58.

The court

grants MetLife’s motion.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND.
Scarlett Taylor was married to James Taylor until their

divorce on April 3, 1995.

See ECF No. 61, PageID # 1063.

Scarlett Taylor and James Taylor had one child, Chanel Taylor,

born on February 28, 1987.

See ECF No. 61, PageID # 1064.

Pursuant to the terms of the “Decree Granting Absolute Divorce
and Awarding Child Custody,” (the “Decree”), James Taylor was
required to maintain “a life insurance policy on his life in the
face amount of not less than $45,000.00 naming [Chanel Taylor] as
the only beneficiary thereunder.”

See ECF No. 58-4, PageID

# 662.
James Taylor was a federal employee, insured under a
group life insurance policy issued to the United States Civil
Service Commission by MetLife pursuant to the Federal Employees
Group Life Insurance Act.

See ECF No. 58-3, PageID # 633.

James Taylor died on January 1, 1997.
PageID # 7.

See ECF No. 1,

Plaintiffs allege that MetLife paid James Taylor’s

life insurance benefits to Elisa Taylor, his then-wife, on
January 2, 1997.

See ECF No. 62, PageID # 1320.

MetLife asserts

that it paid James Taylor’s life insurance benefits to Elisa
Taylor in February 1997.

See ECF No. 58-2, PageID # 630.

MetLife paid the benefits to Elisa Taylor pursuant to a
“Designation of Beneficiary” form, naming Elisa Taylor as the
sole beneficiary of James Taylor’s life insurance benefits.
ECF No. 58-1, PageID # 625; ECF No. 61-1, PageID # 1222.

See

The

“Designation of Beneficiary” form was executed on December 14,
1996.

See ECF No. 61-1, PageID # 1222.

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Plaintiffs allege that

James Taylor’s signature on the“Designation of Beneficiary” form
was forged.

See ECF No. 62, PageID # 1320.

On March 4, 2014, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in
this court against various Federal Defendants and MetLife.
ECF No. 1.

See

On January 2, 2015, this court dismissed Plaintiffs’

claims against the Federal Defendants.

See ECF No. 45.

Dismissal was based on Plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust
administrative remedies against the Federal Defendants before
filing suit in this court.
MetLife now seeks summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’
claims against it.
On May 26, 2015, Plaintiffs filed “Plaintiff’s 2nd
Opposition to Motion for Summary and Response to Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company Closing Brief in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment Filed May 18, 2015.”

See ECF No. 75.

Pursuant

to Local Rule 7.4, “[n]o further or supplemental briefing shall
be submitted without leave of court.”

Taylor’s second opposition

was filed without leave of court, and was therefore improper.
However, even if this court considers it, the court reaches the
same result on MetLife’s motion.
III.

STANDARD.
Summary judgment shall be granted when “the movant

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

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Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130,
1134 (9th Cir. 2000).

The movant must support his or her

position that a material fact is or is not genuinely disputed by
either “citing to particular parts of materials in the record,
including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including
those made for the purposes of the motion only), admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials” or “showing that the
materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a
genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce
admissible evidence to support the fact.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

One of the principal purposes of summary judgment is to identify
and dispose of factually unsupported claims and defenses.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).

Summary

judgment must be granted against a party that fails to
demonstrate facts to establish what will be an essential element
at trial.

See id. at 323.

A moving party without the ultimate

burden of persuasion at trial--usually, but not always, the
defendant--has both the initial burden of production and the
ultimate burden of persuasion on a motion for summary judgment.
Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102
(9th Cir. 2000).
The burden initially falls on the moving party to
identify for the court those “portions of the materials on file

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that it believes demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of
material fact.”

T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors

Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Celotex Corp.,
477 U.S. at 323).

“When the moving party has carried its burden

under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986) (footnote omitted).
The nonmoving party must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630.

T.W. Elec.

At least some “‘significant

probative evidence tending to support the complaint’” must be
produced.

Id. (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv.

Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290 (1968)); see also Addisu, 198 F.3d at 1134
(“A scintilla of evidence or evidence that is merely colorable or
not significantly probative does not present a genuine issue of
material fact.”).

“[I]f the factual context makes the non-moving

party’s claim implausible, that party must come forward with more
persuasive evidence than would otherwise be necessary to show
that there is a genuine issue for trial.”

Cal. Arch’l Bldg.

Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468
(9th Cir. 1987) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at
587); accord Addisu, 198 F.3d at 1134 (“There must be enough

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doubt for a ‘reasonable trier of fact’ to find for plaintiffs in
order to defeat the summary judgment motion.”).
All evidence and inferences must be construed in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Inc., 809 F.2d at 631.

T.W. Elec. Serv.,

Inferences may be drawn from underlying

facts not in dispute, as well as from disputed facts that the
judge is required to resolve in favor of the nonmoving party.
Id.

When “direct evidence” produced by the moving party

conflicts with “direct evidence” produced by the party opposing
summary judgment, “the judge must assume the truth of the
evidence set forth by the nonmoving party with respect to that
fact.”
IV.

Id.
ANALYSIS.
A.

Scarlett Taylor Lacks Standing to Assert Her
Claims Against MetLife.

MetLife argues that Scarlett Taylor lacks standing to
pursue claims against it for James Taylor’s life insurance
benefits because “Scarlett at no time has claimed that she
herself is a beneficiary and never has presented any
documentation to that effect.”

See ECF No. 58-1, PageID # 626.

In using the term “standing,” MetLife may be looking
only at the terms of the life insurance policy, and arguing
simply that Scarlett Taylor is not a beneficiary.

However, to

the extent MetLife’s reference to “standing” was intended to
raise a challenge to this court’s subject matter jurisdiction
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over Scarlett Taylor’s claims, such a challenge should have been
brought under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, rather than under Rule 56.

See United States v. Hays,

515 U.S. 737, 742 (1995) (“standing is perhaps the most important
of [the jurisdictional] doctrines” (alteration in original)).
The result, however, is unchanged, whether under Rule 12(b)(1),
or Rule 56.

This court is permitted to consider admissible

evidence outside the pleadings on a Rule 12(b)(1) challenge.

See

McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding
that district court may consider evidence outside of pleadings
when considering Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss).

The record is

clear that Scarlett Taylor has no claim to MetLife benefits.
Scarlett Taylor argues that she has standing based on
the Decree, entered in connection with her divorce from James
Taylor.

The Decree, however, requires that James Taylor name

Chanel Taylor as the “only beneficiary” of a life insurance
policy, undermining any claim that Scarlett Taylor herself is
entitled to relief as a “required beneficiary” of James Taylor’s
life insurance policy.

See id.

Scarlett Taylor also contends that James Taylor’s “life
insurance policy was ordered by a State of Hawaii Divorce Court
Decree to stand in lieu of child support and child care
maintenance for the named beneficiary, Plaintiff Chanel Taylor.”
See ECF No. 62, PageID # 1321.

The Decree itself does not

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establish that James Taylor’s life insurance benefits were to
stand “in lieu of child support.”

See ECF No. 62, PageID # 1321.

Even if the life insurance benefits were in lieu of child
support, that would not give Scarlett Taylor standing to assert
claims against MetLife, a nonparty to the Decree.
Scarlett Taylor may instead be asserting claims against
MetLife on Chanel Taylor’s behalf.

However, Chanel Taylor is

over the age of eighteen and can assert claims in her own right.
See ECF No. 1, PageID # 2.

Scarlett Taylor provides no evidence

that she has been named her daughter’s guardian by a court, has
her daughter’s power of attorney, or is an assignee of her
daughter’s claim.
Because Scarlett Taylor has no right to MetLife
benefits based on the policy issued to James Taylor, MetLife
prevails on Scarlett Taylor’s claims.
B.

Chanel Taylor’s Claims Are Time-Barred.

Chanel Taylor’s claims against MetLife are barred by
the statute of limitations in section 657-1 of Hawaii Revised
Statutes.

Section 657-1 requires that “[a]ctions for the

recovery of any debt founded upon any contract, obligation, or
liability” be “commenced within six years next after the cause of
action accrued, and not after.”
Because Chanel Taylor was under the age of eighteen at
the time James Taylor’s insurance benefits were paid out by

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MetLife, her claims were tolled under section 657-13 of Hawaii
Revised Statutes until she turned eighteen.

After she turned

eighteen on February 28, 2005, Chanel Taylor had six years,
pursuant to section 657-1, in which to bring her claims against
MetLife.

Because Chanel Taylor did not bring her claims until

March 4, 2014, far past her deadline of February 28, 2011, her
claims are time-barred pursuant to section 657-1.
C.

Even if Chanel Taylor’s Claims Are Not
Time-Barred, MetLife is Entitled to Summary
Judgment.

MetLife contends that it properly paid James Taylor’s
insurance benefits to Elisa Taylor pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8705,
which governs the order of payment of life insurance benefits
upon receipt of a death claim.
25.

See ECF No. 58-1, PageID #s 624-

According to 5 U.S.C. § 8705, “[the] amount of group life

insurance . . . shall be paid, on the establishment of a valid
claim . . . [f]irst, to the beneficiary or beneficiaries
designated by the employee in a signed and witnessed writing.”
Id.; see ECF No. 58-1, PageID # 624.

James Taylor’s policy also

states that “[p]ayment shall be made to the Beneficiary of record
of the Employee . . . immediately after receipt” of proof that an
employee died while insured under the policy.

See ECF No. 58-1,

PageID #s 624-25.
When MetLife paid James Taylor’s life insurance
benefits to Elisa Taylor after his death, it was acting in

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accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 8705, James Taylor’s beneficiary
designation form, and the terms of the policy.
Chanel Taylor argues that MetLife improperly paid the
insurance benefits to Elisa Taylor because James Taylor’s
signature on the beneficiary designation form was forged.
ECF No. 62, PageID # 1320.

Plaintiffs rely on the report of Reed

Hayes, a Certified Document Examiner.
# 166.

See

See ECF No. 27-7, PageID

Hayes concludes that the “author of the exemplary

signatures [provided for analysis by Plaintiffs] did not produce
the signature on the questioned [beneficiary designation form.]”
See ECF No. 27-7, PageID # 167.

Whether Hayes is correct does

not appear to have any impact on MetLife’s liability because
Chanel Taylor fails to demonstrate that MetLife was under any
duty to investigate or analyze the authenticity of the
beneficiary designation form.

She says that MetLife “failed in

[its] due diligence and fiduciary duties to verify the veracity
and authenticity of the Change of Beneficiary form,” and failed
to notify her of James Taylor’s change of beneficiary, but offers
no statutory or case authority to suggest that MetLife was
obligated to take the actions it allegedly failed to take.
V.

CONCLUSION.
MetLife’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Compel the Office of
Personnel Management to Release the Pay Records of James Patrick

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Taylor,” ECF No. 69, is denied as moot.
claims and all parties in this action.

This disposes of all
Accordingly, the Clerk of

the Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of MetLife and
to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, June 10, 2015.

/s/ Susan Oki Mollway
Susan Oki Mollway
Chief United States District Judge

Taylor, et al. v. United States Office of Personnel Management, et al., Civ.
No. 14-00107 SOM/BMK; ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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