Rideout v. Sakai et al

Filing 67

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 43 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Signed by JUDGE DERRICK K. WATSON on 5/18/2015. The Court hereby grants Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 43). The Clerk of Court is directed to close th e case. (ecs, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAI`I

CIVIL NO. 14-00185 DKW-BMK

MONTY V. RIDEOUT,
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
TED SAKAI, AL BEAVERS, MAX
OTANI, BERT MATSUOKA,
TOMMY JOHNSON, et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Proceeding pro se, Plaintiff Monty V. Rideout filed a Prisoner Civil Rights
Complaint (“Complaint”) on April 18, 2014 against Defendant Ted Sakai, Director
of the Department of Public Safety, as well as various members of the Hawaii
Paroling Authority: Defendants Max Otani, Bert Matsuoka, Tommy Johnson, and
Al Beavers (collectively “Defendants”).1 Dkt. No. 1. Rideout asserts violations of
his rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

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On August 19, 2014, this Court by Entering Order instructed Rideout to serve Defendants with
the Complaint and to provide proof of such service. Dkt. No. 14. To date, there is no evidence
in the record that Al Beavers was served nor any explanation by Rideout regarding this failure.
As such, the Complaint against Beavers is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 4(m).

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Constitution, based on circumstances surrounding his parole. Specifically,
Rideout alleges that his constitutional rights were violated when he was paroled in
December 1998, and the parole board failed to set a minimum term of parole.
Before this Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”)
(Dkt. No. 43). Because the issues raised by Rideout were previously litigated in a
state court action and because, in any event, Rideout has not established that
Defendants were personally involved in the alleged violations, Defendants’ Motion
is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
I.

State Court Action (SPP 13-1-001K)
On February 27, 2013, Rideout filed a Petition, pursuant to Rule 40 of the

Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure, in the Third Circuit for the State of Hawaiʻi
(“Circuit Court”): Rideout v. State of Hawaii, SPP 13-1-001K. Dkt. No. 43-4
(Exh. B). In the Petition, Rideout alleged, among other things, that the State of
Hawaiʻi violated his constitutional rights when he was paroled in December 1998,
and the parole board failed to set a minimum term of parole. Dkt No. 43-4 (Exh.
B).
On June 20, 2013, the Circuit Court denied Rideout’s Rule 40 Petition
because his claims were “patently frivolous and without a trace of support either in
the record or from other evidence submitted by [Rideout].” Dkt. No. 43-5 (Exh. C)
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at 6. The Circuit Court’s decision was affirmed on appeal to the Intermediate
Court of Appeals of the State of Hawaiʻi. Dkt. No. 43-6 (Exh. D).
II.

Federal Court Action (CV 14-00185 DKW-BMK)
On April 18, 2014, Rideout filed the instant Complaint in the United States

District Court for the District of Hawaiʻi, Rideout v. Sakai, et al., CV 14-00185
DKW-BMK, once again alleging that his constitutional rights were violated when
he was paroled in December 1998, and the parole board failed to set a minimum
term of parole. Dkt. No. 1. The named defendants included the following
individuals: Ted Sakai, Max Otani, Bert Matsuoka, and Tommy Johnson. Dkt.
No. 1 at 1-3.
According to Defendants, Defendant Ted Sakai served as the Director of the
Department of Public Safety (“DPS”), from December 1998 to December 2002
and from June 1, 2012 to December 30, 2014, and the Hawaiʻi Paroling Authority
(“HPA”), which is administratively attached to DPS. Declaration of Ted Sakai,
¶¶ 3-4. Defendant Max Otani served as the Field Service Branch Administrator at
HPA in 1998. Declaration of Max Otani, ¶ 3-4. Defendant Bert Matsuoka is the
current chairman of HPA. Declaration of Bert Matsuoka, ¶¶ 3 & 5. From 2001 to
2007, and again since 2010, Defendant Tommy Johnson served as the Paroles and
Pardons Administrator (“PPA”) at HPA. Declaration of Tommy Johnson, ¶¶ 3-5.

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The Complaint did not specifically allege how each Defendant was personally
involved in violating Defendant’s constitutional rights.
In his Complaint, Rideout requests monetary relief for illegal custody, loss
of wages, and loss of equity in property. Dkt. No. 1 at 10. Defendants moved for
summary judgment on all claims raised in Rideout’s Complaint. Dkt. No. 43.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court liberally construes Rideout’s filings because he is proceeding pro
se. See Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The Supreme
Court has instructed the federal courts to liberally construe the ‘inartful pleading’
of pro se litigants.”) (citing Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per
curiam)). “Pro se litigants must [nonetheless] follow the same rules of procedure
that govern other litigants.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987),
overruled on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir.
2012).
A party is entitled to summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A fact is ‘material’ when, under the
governing substantive law, it could affect the outcome of the case. A ‘genuine
issue’ of material fact arises if ‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Thrifty Oil Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat’l
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Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 322 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe
all evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n,
809 F.2d 626, 630–31 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, the moving party has the burden of
persuading the court as to the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex
Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party satisfies its burden,
the nonmoving party must set forth “‘significant probative evidence’” in support of
its position. T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630 (quoting First Nat’l Bank v. Cities
Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290 (1968)). “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is
genuinely disputed must support the assertion,” and can do so by either “citing to
particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that the materials cited
do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse
party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(1).
Rideout did not file a timely opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. His untimely opposition, filed on April 20, 2015 (Dkt. No. 55), did not
comply with Local Rule 56.1 and did not include a concise statement of facts.
[I]n a motion for summary judgment, “material facts set forth
in the moving party’s concise statement will be deemed
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admitted unless controverted by a separate concise statement
of the opposing party.” L.R. 56.1(g) (effective Dec. 1, 2009).
Thus, while this court is not permitted to grant an unopposed
motion for summary judgment as a matter of right, Siegel, 26
F.3d at 1494-95, it must deem all facts proffered in [the
defendant’s] concise statement as admitted by [the plaintiff].
Therefore, the court must determine whether the facts, as
asserted in [the defendant’s] concise statement, warrant a grant
of summary judgment.
Aga v. Winter, Civ. No. 08-00509 SOM/LEK, 2009 WL 4406086, at *2-3 (D.
Haw. Dec. 1, 2009) (some alterations in original). In the present matter, the facts
set forth in Defendants’ separate and concise statement of facts in support of their
motion is unopposed (Dkt. No. 44), and the facts contained therein are therefore
deemed admitted. L.R. 56.1(g).
DISCUSSION
Rideout alleges several claims against Defendants, all of which appear to
stem from him being released on parole in December 1998 and failing to receive a
minimum term of parole. Defendants assert that principles of res judicata, lack of
personal involvement, qualified immunity, and quasi-judicial immunity entitle
Defendants to summary judgment as a matter of law. Dkt. No. 43-1. The Court
concludes that collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, and the lack of personal
involvement by Defendants entitle Defendants to summary judgment. As a result,
the Court does not reach the issues of qualified immunity or quasi-judicial
immunity.
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I.

Issue Preclusion
Defendants assert that collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars Rideout’s

claims. Generally, issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, “preclude[s] relitigation
of both issues of law and issues of fact if those issues were conclusively
determined in a prior action.” Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1064 (9th Cir.
2010) (quoting United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 170-71 (1984)).
The preclusive effect in this Court of a Hawaiʻi state court decision is determined
by Hawaiʻi law. Pedrina v. Chun, 97 F.3d 1296, 1301 (9th Cir. 1996) (“In
determining whether a prior state court action bars a subsequent federal action, the
federal court must look to the res judicata principles of the state court in which the
judgment was rendered.”).
Under Hawaiʻi law, the party asserting issue preclusion must establish the
following:
(1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical to the one
presented in the action in question; (2) there is a final judgment on the
merits; (3) the issue decided in the prior adjudication was essential to
the final judgment; and (4) the party against whom issue preclusion is
asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication.
As to the fourth requirement, it is not necessary that the party
asserting issue preclusion in the second suit was a party in the first
suit.
Bremer v. Weeks, 104 Haw. 43, 54, 85 P.3d 150, 161 (2004) (citations and brackets
omitted). As set forth below, Defendants meet all four of these requirements.
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A.

Same Issues

First, for collateral estoppel to apply, the issue presented in this action must
be identical to an issue decided in a prior adjudication. In this case, the issue in
question, whether Rideout’s constitutional rights were violated when he was
paroled in December 1998, and the parole board failed to set a minimum term of
parole, is identical to an issue Rideout raised in the State court action. In his statecourt Petition, Rideout alleged that his constitutional rights were violated when he
was paroled in December 1998, and the parole board failed to set a minimum term
of parole. Thus, the first prong is satisfied.
B.

Final Judgment on the Merits

The second prong—whether there was a final judgment on the merits—is
also satisfied. The Circuit Court’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
Denying Rideout’s Rule 40 Petition Without a Hearing demonstrates that there was
an adjudication on the merits. Rideout appealed the Circuit Court’s decision to the
Intermediate Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Circuit Court’s decision. Under
Hawaiʻi law, when an appeal is taken, judgment becomes final when the appeal is
decided. See Kauhane v. Acutron Co., Inc., 71 Haw. 458, 464, 794 P.2d 276, 279
(1990) (“Plaintiff, however, withdrew his appeal and thereby foreclosed review by
this court. Once that appeal was withdrawn, the circuit court’s judgment became
final for res judicata purposes.”).
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C.

Issue Essential to the Final Judgment

With respect to the third prong, it is clear that the issue decided in the prior
adjudication was essential to the final judgment. As noted by the Circuit Court in
its Order, Rideout claimed in his Rule 40 petition that “HPA failed to set a
minimum length of the parole term pursuant to HRS Sec. 707-670(4).” Dkt. No.
43-5 (Exh. C) at 3. In its Conclusions of Law, the Circuit Court stated:
“[Rideout’s] claim that HPA failed to set a minimum length of the parole term
pursuant to HRS Sec. 707-670(4) is contrary to the evidence, pursuant to the
Notice and Order Fixing Minimum Term(s) of Imprisonment dated April 30, 1996
and given that [Rideout’s] Minimum Sentence was served on December 9, 1998,
as stated in [Rideout’s] Order of Parole dated November 17, 1998.” Dkt. No. 43-5
at 4-5 (COL ¶ 5).
D.

Privity

As to privity, under Hawaiʻi law, mutuality of interest is required only as to
the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted. Bremer, 104 Haw. at 54, 85
P.3d at 161. In other words, “[a]s to the fourth requirement, it is not necessary that
the party asserting issue preclusion in the second suit was a party in the first suit.”
Id. Here, Rideout was a party in the State court action and is a party in the instant
case. Moreover, Defendants, in any event, may properly stand in the shoes of the
State in the instant case, as the Court concludes that the relationship between the
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Defendants and the State of Hawaiʻi in the instant case is sufficiently close enough.
See Matter of Hebert M. Dowsett Trust, 7 Haw. App. 640, 646, 791 P.2d 398, 402,
(1990). Accordingly, the privity requirement is met.
II.

No Personal Involvement or Supervisor Liability
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the additional basis that the

Complaint fails to make specific allegations demonstrating that Defendants were
personally involved in the alleged deprivation of Rideout’s civil rights.
“To sustain an action under section 1983, a plaintiff must show ‘(1) that the
conduct complained of was committed by a person under color of state law; and
(2) that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory
right.’” Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 556 U.S. 1256 (2009). A person
deprives another of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if
that person does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or
omits to perform an act that he or she is legally required to do that causes the
deprivation of which plaintiff complains. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633
(9th Cir. 1988). “Liability under [section] 1983 must be based on the personal
involvement of the defendant.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th
Cir. 1998).

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In addition, “a supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of his
subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of
the violations and failed to act to prevent them. There is no respondeat superior
liability under section 1983.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) .
Thus, under section 1983, when the named defendant holds a supervisory position,
the causal link between the defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must
be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979).
Viewing the asserted facts and allegations in the light most favorable to
Rideout, the Court determines that Rideout has failed to set forth any facts
supporting his claim that Defendants participated in any violation of his
constitutional rights. Rideout fails to allege any personal involvement by
Defendants for decisions relating to individual parolees, including the setting of
minimum sentences and the granting of parole. Specifically, Rideout has not
established that Defendants were personally involved in allegedly failing to set a
minimum term of parole in December 1998. Rideout merely alleges that at the
time he was paroled in December 1998, Al Beavers was Chairman of HPA, Ted
Sakai was the Director of DPS, and Max Otani was Administrator of HPA. These
bare allegations fall far short of what is required for finding liability under section
1983. Moreover, the declarations of Defendants further support that they did not

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have any personal involvement in decisions relating to Rideout’s parole or the
setting of any minimum sentences for Rideout.
CONCLUSION
The Court hereby grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt.
No. 43). The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 18, 2015 at Honolulu, Hawai‘i.

Rideout v. Sakai, et al.; CV 14-00185 DKW-BMK; ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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