Husted, Jr. v. Roman Catholic Church in the State of Hawaii

Filing 168

ORDER GRANTING THE SOUTHDOWN INSTITUTE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT re 155 - Signed by JUDGE SUSAN OKI MOLLWAY on 4/7/2016. "Because Husted identifies no genuine issue of fact as to whether Southdown treated Spielman before or during the alleged abuse of Husted, Southdown is entitled to summary judgment on all claims asserted against it." The court understands the difficulty of obtaining evidence from many decades ago. Accordingly, if Husted timely discovers some evidence that Southdown treated Spielman before or during the alleged sexual abuse at issue in this case, Husted may move for reconsideration of this order." (emt, )CERTIFICATE OF SE RVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
DAVID HUSTED, JR.,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE )
STATE OF HAWAII, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
_____________________________ )

CIVIL NO. 14-00192 SOM/KJM
ORDER GRANTING THE SOUTHDOWN
INSTITUTE’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ORDER GRANTING THE SOUTHDOWN INSTITUTE’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION.
In the Complaint filed on April 11, 2014, Plaintiff

David Husted, Jr., alleges that between 1979 to 1982, while he
was a minor, he was sexually abused by Father James A. Spielman
of The Diocese of Buffalo, New York.

The legislature of Hawaii

has reopened the statute of limitation for such claims, and no
party is arguing at this time that the present action is timebarred.
In addition to suing Spielman, Husted sues The Diocese
of Buffalo, the Roman Catholic Church in the State of Hawaii,
Southern Tier Catholic School Archbishop Walsh Academy, and The
Southdown Institute.

Before the court is Southdown’s motion for

summary judgment on all claims asserted against it.

Husted

claims that Southdown negligently treated Spielman for a psychosexual disorder before the alleged abuse, and claims that
Southdown is legally responsible for having allowed Spielman to

go back to work as a priest, giving Spielman the opportunity to
sexually abuse Husted.
Southdown argues that the only admissible evidence
shows that it did not treat Spielman until after the period in
which Husted was allegedly abused.

Southdown also argues that

this court lacks personal jurisdiction over it.

This court

determines that Southdown is entitled to summary judgment because
Husted fails to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether
Southdown treated Husted before the alleged abuse of Husted
ended.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND.
The Complaint alleges that Husted was sexually abused

from 1979 to 1982 by Spielman while Spielman, an ordained Roman
Catholic priest, was on the faculty of Archbishop Walsh High
School and Husted was a teenaged student there.
PageID #s 2, 3-4, 9.

ECF No. 1,

Husted says that Spielman abused and

molested him “at churches, rectories, schools and retreat
centers,” and that some of the abuse occurred in Hawaii, where
Spielman allegedly accompanied Husted in or around 1982.

Id.,

PageID #s 12-13.
According to Husted, Spielman was treated by Southdown,
an organization in Ontario, Canada, that provides support for
members of the clergy with addiction and mental health issues.
Id., PageID #s 4, 10.

Husted alleges that “sometime between 1970

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and 1993 Perpetrator Spielman was assigned to The Southdown
Institute in Ontario, Canada specifically to address his issues
with addiction and mental health relating to the sexual abuse of
minors.”

Id., PageID # 10.

Plaintiff contends that Southdown

“knew and/or should have known the Perpetrator was not fit to
serve in ministry involving interactions with children yet
released him back into ministry.”

Id., PageID # 5.

Southdown did not have a records retention policy until
2000.

See Affidavit of Dorothy Heiderscheit, ECF No. 156-1,

PageID # 1465.

Since then, Southdown has maintained patient

records for a fourteen-year period after patients cease treatment
at Southdown.
seven years.

Id.
Id.

Southdown only keeps accounting records for
Southdown’s admission that it did not keep old

records comports with the opinion of Husted’s alleged expert, who
opines that records about Husted’s treatment are missing.

See

Aff. of Thomas P. Doyle ¶ 14, ECF No. 160-3, PageID # 1587
(“Spielman’s file should contain various reports from Southdown
but it does not.”). There is no evidence in the record
establishing that, before discarding Spielman’s records,
Southdown had reason to think that it should maintain or was
required to maintain the records.

No evidence suggests that

Southdown knew or should have known that the Hawaii legislature
would reopen the limitations period for the type of claims Husted
asserts.

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For an individual whose treatment at Southdown ended
more than fourteen years before Southdown had reason to retain
records, Southdown’s only record of the individual’s treatment is
a one-page summary showing that individual’s name and dates of
treatment, and the identity of the person who referred the
individual for treatment.

Id., PageID #s 1465-66.

Southdown’s

one-page summary of Spielman’s attendance indicates that Spielman
was treated at Southdown from December 26, 1989, to May 25, 1990,
and was “Reactivated” on August 18, 1993.
# 1469.

ECF No. 156-3, PageID

Thus, according to Southdown’s normal business records,

Spielman was treated at Southdown after Spielman allegedly
sexually abused Husted from 1979 to 1982.
In contending that Spielman may have been treated at
Southdown prior to the abuse, Husted relies on a log of allegedly
privileged documents.

That privilege log lists as a document

withheld during discovery a letter dated June 5, 1972, that
pertained to “Personal Private Medical Information.”
160-2, PageID # 1575.

ECF No.

It also describes other documents dated

after 1982 that Husted says might reference pre-1982 treatment of
Spielmen at Southdown for a sexual disorder.

Husted’s attorney

asserts in her declaration that Spielman had a “long history of
entering into and out of treatment facilities and medical
treatment for psycho-sexual disorders including pedophilia.”
No. 160-1, PageID # 1569.

4

ECF

On August 3, 2015, the Magistrate Judge held a
discovery conference regarding The Diocese of Buffalo’s privilege
log.

Ultimately, he ordered The Diocese of Buffalo “to produce

documents which describe or refer to Fr. James A. Spielman having
problems with or treatment for pedophilia prior to Plaintiff
Husted’s alleged abuse from 1979 to 1982 regardless of when the
document itself was created.”

ECF No. 132, PageID #s 1355-56.

The Diocese of Buffalo has represented to the court that none of
the documents on the privilege log fell into that category.
In the eight months since the Magistrate Judge’s order,
Husted has apparently not obtained any document from The Diocese
of Buffalo showing or even suggesting that Spielman was treated
at Southdown prior to the period from 1979 to 1982 during which
Husted was allegedly abused.

The record contains no evidence

that The Diocese of Buffalo has violated the court order
regarding production of documents indicating that Spielman was
treated at Southdown.
At the hearing on the present motion, counsel for The
Diocese of Buffalo confirmed that none of the documents on the
privilege log fell within the court order.

Counsel also

specifically addressed the letter dated June 5, 1972, a date
preceding the start of the abuse Husted allegedly suffered.
According to counsel, that letter did not come from Southdown and
does not mention or relate to treatment of Spielman at Southdown.

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Husted offers Thomas P. Doyle, who was ordained as a
Catholic priest and has worked on sex abuse cases involving
clergy, as an expert witness.

Doyle notes that Southdown’s

records should include more about Spielman than has been
produced.

As noted earlier in this order, this is not a

revelation, as Southdown itself says Spielman’s file was
discarded given its age.

Nothing in Doyle’s affidavit indicates

that Spielman was treated at Southdown prior to or even during
the period of alleged abuse.

See ECF No. 160-3.

At most, Doyle

says that he has reviewed a document produced by the Diocese of
Buffalo that shows that “Spielman was accused of sexually abusing
a minor boy for a four-year period in the ‘70s.”

Id. ¶ 13.

Doyle says that The Diocese of Buffalo settled with the boy
(whose initials were reportedly “T.G.”) “shortly after the abuse
was reported.”

However, Doyle does not indicate that he has seen

any evidence that the abuse was reported before or during
Spielman’s alleged abuse of Husted between 1979 and 1982.

Doyle

points to a note “to the bishop, dated March 15, 1991, [that]
reveals that Spielman was at Southdown Institute at that time.”
This court reads the reference to “at that time” to mean 1991,
not the “four-year period in the ‘70s” during which T.G. was
reportedly abused.

Id.

Although Husted describes Southdown as a treatment
facility near The Diocese of Buffalo that treated clergy with

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psycho-sexual disorders, Husted’s counsel referred at the hearing
to the existence of three treatment facilities used by the Roman
Catholic Church to treat priests with sexual disorders.

Co-

counsel similarly acknowledged at the hearing that there “may be”
treatment facilities other than Southdown.

There is no

admissible evidence in the record suggesting treatment of a
priest within The Diocese of Buffalo for a sex-related disorder
would necessarily have been at Southdown, or that, even if
Southdown did treat a priest, that the treatment was necessarily
for a psycho-sexual disorder.

This court notes that Paragraph

2.3 of the Complaint describes Southdown as having been
“established in the 1980s to help the needs of religious and
clergy with addictions and mental health issues.”

ECF No. 1.

Husted’s “Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts”
repeats that description at Paragraph 5.
III.

ECF No. 160-4.

STANDARD.
The burden initially falls on the moving party to

identify for the court those “portions of the materials on file
that it believes demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of
material fact.”

T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors

Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Celotex Corp.,
477 U.S. at 323).

“When the moving party has carried its burden

under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”

7

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986) (footnote omitted).
The nonmoving party must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630.

T.W. Elec.

At least some “‘significant

probative evidence tending to support the complaint’” must be
produced.

Id. (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv.

Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290 (1968)).

See Addisu, 198 F.3d at 1134 (“A

scintilla of evidence or evidence that is merely colorable or not
significantly probative does not present a genuine issue of
material fact.”).

“[I]f the factual context makes the non-moving

party’s claim implausible, that party must come forward with more
persuasive evidence than would otherwise be necessary to show
that there is a genuine issue for trial.”

Cal. Arch’l Bldg.

Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468
(9th Cir. 1987) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at
587).

Accord Addisu, 198 F.3d at 1134 (“There must be enough

doubt for a ‘reasonable trier of fact’ to find for plaintiffs in
order to defeat the summary judgment motion.”).
All evidence and inferences must be construed in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Inc., 809 F.2d at 631.

T.W. Elec. Serv.,

Inferences may be drawn from underlying

facts not in dispute, as well as from disputed facts that the
judge is required to resolve in favor of the nonmoving party.

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Id.

When “direct evidence” produced by the moving party

conflicts with “direct evidence” produced by the party opposing
summary judgment, “the judge must assume the truth of the
evidence set forth by the nonmoving party with respect to that
fact.”
IV.

Id.
ANALYSIS.
Southdown’s motion for summary judgment argues first,

that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over it, and second,
that Southdown is not legally responsible for any of Husted’s
alleged injuries because the only admissible evidence indicates
that Southdown treated Husted only after the alleged abuse had
ended.

The court grants the motion on the second ground.
A.

Southdown May Have Waived Its Personal
Jurisdiction Defense.

The Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution protects a defendant’s “liberty interest in not
being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he
has established no meaningful ‘contacts, ties, or relations.’”
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985)
(quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
The Due Process Clause requires Southdown to have had “certain
minimum contacts with [Hawaii] such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.”

Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.

To have had

the required minimum contacts, Southdown must have acted and had
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a connection with Hawaii in a manner that should have led it to
“reasonably anticipate being haled into court” in Hawaii.

See

Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297
(1980)).
functions.

The “minimum contacts” requirement performs two
“It protects the defendant against the burdens of

litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum.

And it acts to

ensure that the States[,] through their courts, do not reach out
beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal
sovereigns in a federal system.”

World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S.

at 292.
In the present case, the minimum contacts necessary for
exercising personal jurisdiction over Southdown may well have
been lacking.

Even if that is so, Southdown may have waived any

personal defense.
be waived is clear.

That an objection to personal jurisdiction may
See Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des

Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982); Bel-Rey Co. V.
Chemrite (Pty) Ltd., 181 F.3d 435, 443 (9th Cir. 1999).

As the

Supreme Court noted in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at
704, “the requirement of personal jurisdiction may be
intentionally waived, or for various reasons a defendant may be
estopped from raising the issue.”
Although Southdown raised personal jurisdiction as a
defense in its December 2014 Answer, ECF No. 63, PageID # 680, it

10

asked this court to rule on the merits of the claims against it
when it filed a motion for summary judgment on May 5, 2015.
ECF No. 84.

See

This motion was filed after a denial of an earlier

motion to dismiss.

Neither motion argued a lack of personal

jurisdiction over Southdown.

See ECF Nos. 37 and 84.

That is,

Southdown affirmatively sought judgment on the merits via its
motion of May 5, 2015.

Although Southdown later withdrew that

motion in light of mediation proceedings, that motion was renewed
on February 2, 2016, at which time the personal jurisdiction
argument was added.
Southdown appears to have been actively participating
in discovery.

Given its delay until February 2016 in raising the

issue of personal jurisdiction, Southdown arguably waived the
defense.

See In re Texas E. Transmission Corp. PCB Contamination

Ins. Coverage Litig., 15 F.3d 1230, 1236 (3d Cir. 1994) (“a party
is deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction if the party
actually litigates the underlying merits or demonstrates a
willingness to engage in extensive litigation in the forum”);
Bel-Ray Co. v. Chemrite (Pty) Ltd., 181 F.3d 435, 443 (3d Cir.
1999) (concluding that defendants submitted to jurisdiction of
court by filing motion for summary judgment with respect to
counterclaims; ruling that personal jurisdiction defense waived
by waiting to raise it until after the summary judgment motion
was denied).

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However, this court is cognizant that the Ninth Circuit
has not made statements equivalent to those made in the Third
Circuit cases cited above.

This court therefore refrains from

ruling on the issue of whether Southdown may pursue its personal
jurisdiction defense.

This court’s ruling on the second ground

raised by the present motion resolves the claims against
Southdown.
B.

Southdown is Entitled to Summary Judgment On the
Merits.

Husted’s Complaint asserts nine claims against
Southdown: (1) offensive physical contact/childhood sexual
assault; (2) imminent battery; (3) gross negligence;
(4) negligent supervision/failure to warn; (5) negligent
hiring/retention; (6) fraud; (7) negligent infliction of
emotional distress; (8) intentional infliction of emotional
distress; (9) premises liability; (10) punitive damages.
No. 1, PageID # 16-33.

ECF

Each of these claims is premised on the

argument that Southdown should be held legally responsible
because it inadequately treated Spielman and then allowed him to
continue working, which gave Spielman the opportunity to injure
Husted.
Southdown seeks summary judgment with respect to each
claim, arguing that the record contains no evidence that it
treated Spielman before or during the alleged sexual abuse of
Husted.

Southdown’s one-page summary of Spielman’s treatment at
12

Southdown indicates that he was treated at Southdown from
December 26, 1989, to May 25, 1990, and “Reactivated” on August
18, 1993.

ECF No. 156-3, PageID # 1469.

This is the only

admissible evidence concerning when Spielman received treatment
at Southdown.
1979 and 1982.

Husted alleges that Spielman abused him between
Southdown cannot be legally responsible for abuse

occurring before Southdown treated Spielman.

Accordingly, the

court grants summary judgment in favor of Southdown.
In so ruling, the court is giving no weight to a
statement in Husted’s lead attorney’s declaration that “Spielman
was treated for his psycho-sexual disorders including pedophilia
as early as the 1970s at Southdown.”

ECF No. 160-1, PageID 1571.

This statement made under penalty of perjury purports to be
“stated of [counsel’s] own personal knowledge.”
PageID # 1568.

ECF No. 160-1,

However, at the hearing on the present motion,

counsel conceded that the basis of her “personal knowledge” was
what she has learned as Husted’s attorney.

That is, her

knowledge was gained in connection with this litigation.
Counsel’s knowledge of whether Southdown treated Spielman for a
psycho-sexual disorder in the 1970s is no more “personal” than
this court’s (or an appellate court’s) knowledge might be.
Counsel is relying on the statements of others, not on her
personal observations of Spielman’s or Southdown’s actions in the
1970s.

Clearly counsel could not testify at trial as to whether

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Spielman was treated at Southdown prior to or during Husted’s
alleged abuse.
Husted also relies on the privilege log produced to
Husted by The Diocese of Buffalo, arguing that the log suggests
that Spielman may have been treated at Southdown in 1972.
ECF No. 160-1, PageID # 1569.

See

As noted earlier, the privilege

log identifies a letter dated June 5, 1972, pertaining to
“Personal Private Medical Information.”
# 1575.

ECF No. 160-2, PageID

It has similar entries for documents dated after the

alleged abuse had ended.

Id.

Husted’s attorney says in her

declaration that Spielman had a “long history of entering into
and out of treatment facilities and medical treatment for psychosexual disorders including pedophilia.”
# 1569.

ECF No. 160-1, PageID

Even if this is so, it does not follow that the 1972

document (or any other document in the log) contains evidence
that Southdown was among those facilities.
In asking this court to draw an inference that the 1972
document incriminates Southdown, Husted is ignoring the August
2015 order concerning the privilege log that required The Diocese
of Buffalo to produce “documents which describe or refer to Fr.
James A. Spielman having problems with or treatment for
pedophilia prior to Plaintiff Husted’s alleged abuse from 1979 to
1982 regardless of when the document itself was created.”
No. 132, PageID #s 1355-56.

ECF

Counsel for The Diocese of Buffalo

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represented at the hearing that none of the documents referenced
in the privilege log pertained to Spielman’s treatment at
Southdown.
Southdown met its initial burden on the present motion
for summary judgment of demonstrating that it is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law because it did not treat Spielman
prior to or during Husted’s alleged abuse.
At the hearing on the present motion, Husted also
argued that this court should consider what Husted called
“circumstantial” evidence that Spielman had been treated at
Southdown in the 1970s.

What Husted pointed to, however, was

mere speculation, not circumstantial evidence at all.

Husted’s

own Complaint alleges that Southdown was not even established
until the 1980s.

The court is not, of course, relying on the

Complaint as evidence.

Indeed, Southdown might conceivably be a

successor to an earlier entity and may have assumed its
predecessor’s liabilities.

The court points to the Complaint

only by way of noting that Husted’s own allegations fly in the
face of Husted’s argument that the privilege log establishes that
Southdown treated Spielman during the 1970s.
Because Husted fails to raise a genuine issue of fact
as to whether Spielman was treated at Southdown at any time
relevant to Husted’s claims of sexual abuse.

15

Southdown is

entitled to summary judgment with respect to all claims asserted
against it in the Complaint.
C.

The Court Denies Husted’s Rule 56(d) Request.

Husted urges this court to allow further discovery
before ruling on the present motion.

A party requesting a

continuance under Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure bears the burden of (1) filing a timely application
that specifically identifies relevant information;
(2) demonstrating that there is some basis to believe that the
information sought exists; and (3) establishing that such
information is essential to resist the summary judgment motion.
See Emp’rs Teamsters Local Nos. 175 & 505 Pension Trust Fund v.
Clorox Co., 353 F.3d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation
omitted); accord Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 966 n.3
(9th Cir. 2009) (“Rule 56([d]) requires a party seeking
postponement of a summary judgment motion to show how additional
discovery would preclude summary judgment and why it cannot
immediately provide specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue
of material fact.” (punctuation, quotation marks, and citation
omitted)).
Additionally, the party seeking a Rule 56(d)
continuance must demonstrate that it diligently pursued
discovery.

See Pfingston v. Ronan Eng’g Co., 284 F.3d 999, 1005

(9th April 6, 2016Cir. 2002) (“The failure to conduct discovery

16

diligently is grounds for the denial of a Rule 56(f) motion.”);
Mackey v. Pioneer Nat’l Bank, 867 F.2d 520, 524 (9th Cir. 1989)
(“A movant cannot complain if it fails diligently to pursue
discovery before summary judgment.”); Conkle v. Jeong, 73 F.3d
909, 914 (9th Cir. 1995) (“the district court does not abuse its
discretion by denying further discovery if the movant has failed
diligently to pursue discovery in the past”).
Husted does not demonstrate entitlement to a Rule 56(d)
continuance.

Husted’s attorney’s declaration does not

specifically identify relevant information reasonably believed to
exist that is essential to resist the summary judgment motion.
At most, she says that discovery requests were served on March
30, 2015, but that Defendants have not produced requested
documents.

See ECF No. 160-1, PageID # 1571.

She does not say

which documents she is waiting for or why she thinks documents
relevant to this motion exist.

Nor does she demonstrate

diligence in pursuing discovery.

Instead, she speculates that

references in the privilege log to “Personal Private Medical
Information” might be references to treatment at Southdown.

The

Magistrate Judge ordered that documents listed on the privilege
log be turned over to Husted if they related to such treatment.
This court has no basis for assuming that The Diocese of Buffalo
is ignoring the court order.

17

Husted says that it would serve the interests of
justice for the court to hold the motion in abeyance until the
close of discovery or to deny the motion and allow a jury to
decide when Southdown treated Spielman.

While this court agrees

that a person who establishes that he was abused by clergy is
entitled to be compensated, that cannot mean that whenever a
party is sued that party must automatically proceed to trial.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
trial is not warranted if there are no genuine issues of material
fact to be tried.

Husted fails to show how he could possibly

meet his burden at trial of showing by a preponderance of the
evidence that Southdown acted wrongfully at a time relevant to
Husted’s claims against Southdown.
At most, Husted asks for more time to conduct discovery
to determine whether Spielman might have sought treatment at
Southdown for a sexual disorder prior to the alleged abuse at
issue in this case.

But Husted, having had ample opportunity to

at least provide a basis for believing such evidence exists,
fails to provide such a basis.

Husted cannot simply come into

court and ask for a continuance of the present motion without
either providing some reason for this court to suspect that The
Diocese of Buffalo has violated the Magistrate Judge’s order or
satisfying the requirements of Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.

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V.

CONCLUSION.
Because Husted identifies no genuine issue of fact as

to whether Southdown treated Spielman before or during the
alleged abuse of Husted, Southdown is entitled to summary
judgment on all claims asserted against it.
The court understands the difficulty of obtaining
evidence from many decades ago.

Accordingly, if Husted timely

discovers some evidence that Southdown treated Spielman before or
during the alleged sexual abuse at issue in this case, Husted may
move for reconsideration of this order.

The court cannot, of

course, say in advance that in that event claims against
Southdown may proceed to trial.

At this point, this court makes

no comment on what the future may bring or on whether the claims
against Southdown will be legally cognizable if supported by such
new evidence.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, April 7, 2016.
/s/ Susan Oki Mollway
Susan Oki Mollway
United States District Judge

Husted v. Roman Catholic Church in the State of Hawaii, et al., Civ. No. 1400192 SOM/KJM; ORDER GRANTING THE SOUTHDOWN INSTITUTE’S MOTION TO FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

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