Husted, Jr. v. Roman Catholic Church in the State of Hawaii
Filing
58
ORDER DENYING THE SOUTHDOWN INSTITUTE'S MOTION TO DISMISS re 39 - Signed by CHIEF JUDGE SUSAN OKI MOLLWAY on 12/9/2014. (emt, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
DAVID HUSTED, JR.,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE )
STATE OF HAWAII, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
_____________________________ )
CIVIL NO. 14-00192 SOM/BMK
ORDER DENYING THE SOUTHDOWN
INSTITUTE’S MOTION TO DISMISS
ORDER DENYING THE SOUTHDOWN INSTITUTE’S MOTION TO DISMISS
I.
INTRODUCTION.
Defendant The Southdown Institute (“Southdown”) moves
to dismiss the claims asserted against it in Plaintiff David
Husted, Jr.’s Complaint filed on April 11, 2014.
The motion to
dismiss is denied.
II.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND.
Husted alleges that he was sexually abused from 1979 to
1982 by Defendant James A. Spielman while Husted was a student at
Archbishop Walsh High School.
ECF No. 1, PageID # 2, 3-4.
According to Husted, Spielman was treated by Southdown, an
organization in Ontario, Canada, that provides support for
members of the clergy with addiction and mental health issues.
Id., PageID # 4.
Husted alleges that “sometime between 1970 and
1993 Perpetrator Spielman was assigned to The Southdown Institute
in Ontario, Canada specifically to address his issues with
addiction and mental health relating to the sexual abuse of
minors.”
Id., PageID # 10.
Plaintiff contends that Southdown
“knew and/or should have known the Perpetrator was not fit to
serve in ministry involving
interactions with children yet released him back into ministry.”
Id., PageID # 5.
Husted’s Complaint asserts the following claims against
Southdown: (1) offensive physical contact/childhood sexual
assault; (2) imminent battery; (3) gross negligence; (4)
negligent supervision/failure to warn; (5) negligent
hiring/retention; (6) fraud; (7) negligent infliction of
emotional distress; (8) intentional infliction of emotional
distress; (9) premises liability; (10) punitive damages.
Id.,
PageID # 16-33.
Southdown now seeks dismissal of the claims against it
in Husted’s Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
See ECF No. 39.
Southdown argues that
Husted’s Complaint shows that Spielman could not have been
assigned to Southdown until after 1983, by which time the alleged
abuse had ceased.
Id., PageID # 252-53.
On that basis,
Southdown contends that “Plaintiff has failed to allege that
Defendant Southdown either could have prevented Defendant
Spielman’s alleged abuse of Plaintiff prior to or between 1979
and 1982 or that Defendant Southdown’s acts or omissions prior to
or between 1979 and 1982 proximately caused Plaintiff’s damages.”
2
Id., PageID # 253.
III.
STANDARD.
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the court’s review is generally limited to the
contents of the complaint.
Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors,
266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001); Campanelli v. Bockrath, 100
F.3d 1476, 1479 (9th Cir. 1996).
If matters outside the
pleadings are considered, the Rule 12(b)(6) motion is treated as
one for summary judgment.
See Keams v. Tempe Tech. Inst., Inc.,
110 F.3d 44, 46 (9th Cir. 1997); Anderson v. Angelone, 86 F.3d
932, 934 (9th Cir. 1996).
Courts may “consider certain
materials--documents attached to the complaint, documents
incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of
judicial notice--without converting the motion to dismiss into a
motion for summary judgment.”
United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d
903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003).
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, all allegations
of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Fed’n of African Am.
Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir.
1996).
However, conclusory allegations of law, unwarranted
deductions of fact, and unreasonable inferences are insufficient
to defeat a motion to dismiss.
Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988; Syntex
Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 1996).
3
Additionally, the court need not accept as true allegations that
contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or
allegations contradicting the exhibits attached to the complaint.
Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988.
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on either:
(1) lack of a cognizable legal theory, or (2) insufficient facts
under a cognizable legal theory.
Balistreri v. Pacifica Police
Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Robertson v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th Cir.
1984)).
“[T]o survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,
factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true even if doubtful in fact.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (“[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not
require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than
an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”).
“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s
obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to
relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
4
not do.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
The complaint must “state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Id. at 570.
“A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678.
IV.
ANALYSIS.
Southdown’s motion to dismiss is based on illogical
conclusions regarding the allegations in Husted’s Complaint.
Southdown treats Husted’s allegation that he was abused by
Spielman from 1979 to 1982 in New York as estopping Husted from
claiming that Spielman might have been in Ontario, where
Southdown is located, at any point during that time period.
ECF No. 39, PageID # 253, 255-56.
See
Southdown argues that Spielman
could not be said to have been at Southdown until after that
period.
Id.
This conclusion is flawed.
Southdown assumes that
Husted’s allegations that he was abused by Spielman in New York
from 1979 to 1982 require that Spielman have been in New York
every day of that time period.
Nowhere does Husted allege that
Spielman was continuously in New York from 1979 to 1982.
Husted’s allegations of abuse in New York from 1979 to 1982 do
not suggest to a reasonable reader that he is thereby stating
that Spielman never traveled out of New York during that time
5
period or that Spielman did nothing else during that time period.
Nor does Southdown explain how Husted’s Complaint
demonstrates that Spielman could not have been at Southdown
between 1970 and 1979, before the alleged abuse.
If Southdown is
relying on Husted’s allegation that Spielman was transferred
between parishes prior to 1979, Southdown’s reliance on such an
allegation as justifying dismissal of Husted’s claims against it
suffers from the same infirmity as its argument addressed above.
The mere allegation that Spielman was transferred to different
parishes prior to 1979 in no way precludes treatment at Southdown
between 1970 and 1979.
Southdown also points to Husted’s allegation that
several students reported abuse by Spielman to teachers and staff
at Archbishop Walsh High School from 1979 through 1983, but that
“nothing was done.”
ECF No. 1, PageID # 13.
According to
Southdown, Husted’s Complaint therefore establishes that Spielman
could not have been at Southdown until after 1983.
Southdown’s conclusion is unwarranted.
Id.
Again,
First, Husted does not
allege that Archbishop Walsh High School was the party that
referred Spielman to Southdown.
Instead, Husted’s Complaint
states that Southdown treated Spielman “at the request of the
Buffalo and/or Honolulu Diocese,” both parties to this case.
No. 1, PageID # 4.
ECF
Second, Husted’s allegation that “nothing was
done” in no way undermines his allegation that Spielman was
6
treated at Southdown sometime between 1970 and 1993, and it
certainly does not demonstrate that Husted’s claims against
Southdown must be dismissed because they are “implausible.”
For the first time in its reply memorandum, Southdown
contends that Husted’s claims against it must be dismissed
because it was in 1989 that it treated Spielman, after the
alleged abuse had stopped.
ECF No. 57, PageID # 635.
This
argument may be disregarded pursuant to Local Rule 7.4 because it
was raised for the first time in a reply memorandum.
However,
even assuming the court considers it, the arguments do not
support dismissal of Husted’s claims against Southdown.
In
reviewing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the court treats all allegations of material
fact by the plaintiff as true.
Fed’n of African Am. Contractors
v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 1996).
Thus,
for the purposes of this motion, the court assumes the truth of
Husted’s allegation that Spielman was treated by Southdown
sometime between 1970 and 1993.
Southdown’s contention that it
treated Spielman in 1989 is in no way at odds with that
allegation and, in any event, may not trump Husted’s allegation
on this motion to dismiss.
Southdown does not demonstrate that
Husted’s allegation regarding the timing of Spielman’s treatment
is unreasonable or implausible.
At most, Southdown presents a
factual dispute that does not affect whether it is entitled to
7
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
The court also declines to consider the materials
attached to Southdown’s reply memorandum, including a declaration
from the Chief Executive Officer of Southdown.
Under Rule
12(b)(6), the court’s review is generally limited to the contents
of the complaint.
Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d
979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001); Campanelli v. Bockrath, 100 F.3d 1476,
1479 (9th Cir. 1996).
None of the materials attached to
Southdown’s reply are of the kind that are excepted from this
rule.
See United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir.
2003) (“A court may . . . consider certain materials--documents
attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in
the complaint, or matters of judicial notice--without converting
the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.”).
If
this court considered the materials attached to Southdown’s
reply, the court would be allowing Southdown to convert its own
motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion at the close of
the briefing.
Husted would not have an automatic right to file a
memorandum responding to Southdown’s newly raised evidence.
would be patently unfair to Husted.
V.
CONCLUSION.
Southdown’s motion to dismiss is denied.
8
This
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, December 9, 2014.
/s/ Susan Oki Mollway
Susan Oki Mollway
Chief United States District Judge
Husted v. Roman Catholic Church in the State of Hawaii, et al., Civ. No. 1400192 SOM/BMK; ORDER DENYING THE SOUTHDOWN INSTITUTE’S MOTION TO DISMISS
9
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?