AhQuin v. State of Hawaii
Filing
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ORDER OF REMAND. Signed by JUDGE J. MICHAEL SEABRIGHT on 6/13/2014. ~ This action is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii ~ (afc)CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE< /center>Participants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
KAWIKA K. AH QUIN,
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Petitioner/Plaintiff,
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vs.
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STATE OF HAWAII,
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Respondent/Defendant. )
_____________________________ )
CIV. NO. 14-00230 JMS/KSC
ORDER OF REMAND
ORDER OF REMAND
On May 15, 2014, Defendant State of Hawaii removed this action
from the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii (“state circuit court”)
asserting federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441(a). See
Notice of Removal, Doc. No. 1. For the following reasons, the court REMANDS
this action to the state circuit court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 16, 2014, Petitioner/Plaintiff Kawika K. Ah Quin, a prisoner
confined at the Saguaro Correctional Center (“SCC”) in Eloy, Arizona, filed a
special prisoner proceeding under Rule 40(2)(3) of the Hawaii Rules of Penal
Procedure (“HRPP”) in the state circuit court. See Compl., Doc. No. 1-1. Plaintiff
named the State of Hawaii as Respondent/Defendant, verified his claims under
penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, and alleged that he is “one of
many Undersigned Petitioners-Plaintiffs in ‘Petition To Change And Correct The
Conditions of Confinement Of AD. SEG. At S.C.C.’” Id. Plaintiff’s entire
statement of a claim is: “That I am amongst numerous Hawai`i Prisoners that are
victims of CCA-Saguaro Correctional Centers (SCC) unconstitutional
Administrative Segregations (“Ad. Seg.”) Conditions of Confinement.” Id.
On April 21, 2014, the state circuit court determined that Plaintiff was
not challenging his conviction or sentence, but rather, was challenging the
conditions of confinement at SCC. The state circuit court directed the state court
clerk to process Plaintiff’s documents as a civil proceeding under Civ. No. 14-10986-04 KKS, and serve Defendant.
On or about May 9, 2014, Plaintiff and eighteen other SCC inmates
submitted the previously referenced “Petition To Change And Correct The
Conditions of Confinement of Administrative Segregation at CCA-Saguaro
Correctional Center.” Pet., Doc. No. 8-11. This document details the injuries
Plaintiff and the other inmates allegedly suffered while incarcerated in the SCC
Administrative Segregation Unit. Plaintiff also submitted a “Conditions of
Confinement Comparison,” comparing conditions in SCC’s Administrative
Segregation Unit with conditions in SCC’s general population. Doc. No. 8-12.
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On May 15, 2014, Defendant removed Plaintiff’s initiating documents
to this court. See Doc. Nos. 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 1-4. On May 20, 2014, Defendant
moved to stay all proceedings in this action until the court screened Plaintiff’s
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Doc. No. 6. The court granted
Defendant’s motion on May 21, 2014. Doc. No. 7. On May 21, 2014, the state
circuit court transmitted all documents from state Civ. No. 14-1-0986-04 KKS to
this court. See Doc. Nos. 8, 8-1 to 8-24.
II. REMOVAL JURISDICTION
The removal statute is strictly construed against removal, and the
party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing that removal is proper.
Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th
Cir. 2009). Removal is only proper when the district court has original
jurisdiction; that is, the removed claims must “aris[e] under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. An action “arises under”
federal law when “federal law creates the cause of action.” Merrell Dow Pharm.
Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986); see also Cook Inlet Region, Inc. v.
Rude, 690 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2012). “Federal jurisdiction must be rejected
if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus v. Miles,
Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). Additionally, the
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well-pleaded complaint rule “provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a
federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded
complaint.” Dennis v. Hart, 724 F.3d 1249, 1252 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Hunter
v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009); Caterpillar Inc. v.
Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
While a plaintiff may defeat removal by choosing not to plead any
federal claims, Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 399, “a plaintiff may not defeat
removal by omitting to plead necessary federal questions in a complaint.”
Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal.,
463 U.S. 1, 22 (1983); Easton v. Crossland Mortg. Corp., 114 F.3d 979, 981 (9th
Cir. 1997) (stating that a plaintiff “may not avoid federal jurisdiction by omitting
from his complaint federal law essential to his or her claim or by casting in state
law terms a claim that can be made only under federal law”). Conversely, a state
law claim is not transformed into a federal cause of action merely because a
complaint references federal law. Easton, 114 F.3d at 982.
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff does not assert that his challenge to the conditions of
confinement at SCC arise under the United States Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States. He does not cite to the United States Constitution or to federal
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law in his Complaint/Petition. Rather, Plaintiff states that the conditions of
confinement at SCC are “unconstitutional” and names only the State of Hawaii as
Defendant/Respondent, suggesting he refers to the Hawaii State Constitution,
rather than to the United States Constitution.
Plaintiff’s constitutional claims are not created exclusively under the
United States Constitution or federal law, nor are they preempted by federal law.
That is, rights created under the Hawaii Constitution are complementary to, and
may be more protective than, those granted under the federal constitution. Cf.
State v. Aplaca, 74 Haw. 54, 67 n.2, 837 P.2d 1298, 1305 n.2 (1992) (explaining
that Hawaii defendants are “clearly afforded greater protection of their right to
effective assistance of counsel” under the Hawaii Constitution than under the
United States Constitution as enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984)). There is, therefore, no reason why Plaintiff cannot tailor his Complaint to
allege only state constitutional claims. Plaintiff is master of his own complaint; he
may choose where to file it and to forgo a federal cause of action. While Plaintiff
refers to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 in attesting to the veracity of his declaration, this simple
reference does not transform his claims into a federal cause of action. See Easton,
114 F.3d at 982. Plaintiff has pled neither any federal claims nor any necessary
federal questions.
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Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and his filings must be afforded liberal
construction. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627
F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that “we continue to construe pro se filings
liberally”). As a pro se litigant, the court “affords [plaintiff] the benefit of any
doubt.” Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 342. That benefit presupposes that Plaintiff intended
to file a suit in the Hawaii state court under Hawaii state law. Further, this court
may not “supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey
v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Nor
should courts “infer in one cause of action when a complaint clearly states a claim
under a different cause of action;” instead, courts should review a complaint as it is
pled. Bogovich v. Sandoval, 189 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff is
“master to decide what law he will rely upon.” Id. This court will not infer a
federal cause of action where none is apparent on the face of the Complaint.
Federal question jurisdiction is presumed absent unless the party
seeking removal shows that the plaintiff has either alleged: (1) a federal claim,
(2) a state cause of action that requires resolution of a substantial issue of federal
law, or (3) a state cause of action that Congress has transformed into an inherently
federal claim by completely preempting the field. See Homesales, Inc. v. Frierson,
2009 WL 365663, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2009) (citations omitted). Defendant’s
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documents fail to show that removal is proper. Based on its review of the
Complaint, this court determines sua sponte that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over Plaintiff’s claims and that the case should be remanded. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c); see also Watkins v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 720 F.3d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir.
2013) (“[I]t is well established that district courts may address questions of subject
matter jurisdiction sua sponte.”) (citation omitted). If Plaintiff later attempts to
assert federal claims, Defendants may again remove this action to the federal court.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3).
IV. CONCLUSION
This action is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of the First Circuit,
State of Hawaii.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, June 13, 2014.
/s/ J. Michael Seabright
J. Michael Seabright
United States District Judge
Ah Quin v. State of Hawaii, No.1:14-cv-00230 JMS/DMP, ORDER OF REMAND;
C:\Users\npassamaneck\AppData\Local\Temp\notes843E20\AhQuin 14-230 jms (rmd).wpd
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