Miles v. Maui Police Department, County of Maui et al

Filing 25

ORDER REMANDING ACTION TO STATE COURT. Signed by JUDGE ALAN C KAY on 11/18/2014. Excerpt of conclusion: "[T]he instant case is remanded to the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, State of Hawaii, because this Court lack s subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, this Court need not examine the merits of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment." Motion terminated: MOTION for Summary Judgment 17 . (afc) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII

MARVIN KALANI MILES,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MAUI POLICE CHIEF GARY YABUTA,
MAUI POLICE DEPARTMENT, and
COUNTY OF MAUI
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civ. No. 14-00278 ACK-BMK

ORDER REMANDING ACTION TO STATE COURT
For the reasons discussed below, the instant case is
remanded to the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, State of
Hawaii, because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
Accordingly, this Court need not examine the merits of
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
BACKGROUND
On May 30, 2014, Plaintiff Marvin Kalani Miles
(“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Maui Police Chief Gary
Yabuta, Maui Police Department, and the County of Maui
(collectively “Defendants”) in the Circuit Court of the Second
Circuit, State of Hawaii.1/ (Doc. No. 1-1.) On June 17, 2014,
Defendants removed the case to this Court, purportedly under 28
1/

Plaintiff appears in this action pro se although his
Complaint was drafted and filed by an attorney.
1

U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441(b). (Doc. No. 1.)
Plaintiff’s Complaint contains four causes of action.
In the First Cause of Action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
terminated his employment with the Maui Police Department because
of his activities on behalf of the State of Hawaii Organization
of Police Officers Union, in violation of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 158. (Compl. ¶ 18.) In the
Second and Third Causes of Action, Plaintiff asserts that
Defendants violated Part I of Chapter 378 of the Hawaii Revised
Statutes. (Id. ¶¶ 20 & 22.) Finally, in the Fourth Cause of
Action, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants through general and specific
orders, policy manuals and/or rules and
regulations gave promises of specific
treatment in specific situations. Plaintiff
reasonably relied upon such promises of
specific treatment. Plaintiff’s termination
was in breach of Defendants’ promises of
specific treatment.
(Id. ¶ 24.)
On August 29, 2014, Defendants filed the instant
Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”), along with a Concise
Statements of Facts and exhibits attached thereto. (Doc. Nos. 17
& 18.) Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to Defendants’
Motion.
The Court finds this matter suitable for disposition
without a hearing pursuant to D. Haw. Local Rule 7.2(d).
DISCUSSION
2

Citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946), the Ninth Circuit has held
“that there are two exceptions to the general rule that one looks
to the allegations in the complaint to determine if there is
federal jurisdiction.” Ballou v. Vancouver Police Officers’
Guild, 389 Fed. Appx. 681, 682 (9th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).2/
The exception relevant to this case provides that “‘a suit may
sometimes be dismissed for want of jurisdiction where the alleged
claim under the Constitution or federal statutes . . . is wholly
insubstantial and frivolous.’” Id. (quoting Bell, 327 U.S. at
682-83); cf. Albingia v. Versicherungs A.G. v. Schenker Int’l
Inc., 344 F.3d 931, 935 (9th Cir. 2003), amended by 350 F.3d 916
(9th Cir. 2003) (holding that removal prior to discovery was
proper because the federal claim was not insubstantial or
frivolous).
It is evident from the face of the Complaint that
Plaintiff’s NLRA claim (First Cause of Action) is insubstantial
and frivolous because the NLRA does not apply to local
governments or their employees, and Plaintiff pleaded that he was
employed as a police officer with the Maui Police Department, a
department within the Maui County government. See Ballou, 389
Fed. Appx. at 682 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(2)-(3) (providing that

2/

Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3(b) permits the citation of
unpublished dispositions and orders of the Ninth Circuit issued
on or after January 1, 2007.
3

the term “employer” does not include “any State or political
subdivision thereof” and that the term “employee” does not
include “any other person who is not an employer as herein
defined”); Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Div. 1285, Amalgamated
Transit Union, AFL-CIO-CLC, 457 U.S. 15, 23 (1982) (holding that
“labor relations between local governments and their employees
are the subject of a longstanding statutory exemption from the
National Labor Relations Act”); and N.A.A.C.P., Detroit Branch v.
Detroit Police Officers Ass’n (DPOA), 821 F.2d 328, 331-32 (6th
Cir. 1987) (“Public employees of the political subdivisions of a
state are not governed by the federal labor laws.”)). Because
Plaintiff’s NLRA claim is the sole federal claim in the
Complaint3/ and because this claim is wholly insubstantial and
frivolous, the Court concludes that it lacks subject matter

3/

Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action appears to bring a
Hawaii common law claim. However, this cause of action could be
construed as containing a claim under the Labor Management
Relations Act (“LMRA”). To the extent Plaintiff asserts a LMRA
claim, the Court finds that this claim is wholly insubstantial
and frivolous because, like the NLRA, the LMRA does not apply to
local governments or their employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 142(3)
(incorporating by reference 29 U.S.C. § 152, the definitions
section of the National Labor Relations Act); Pacific Mar. Ass’n
v. Local 63, Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 198
F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the LMRA does not
apply to public sector unions); Richards v. Ohio Civil Serv.
Employees Ass’n, 205 Fed. Appx. 347, 354 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding
that “the LMRA expressly excludes public employers - and by
association, public employees - from its coverage”). Thus, the
LMRA cannot provide a basis for this Court’s subject matter
jurisdiction.
4

jurisdiction over this case.4/ Ballou, 389 Fed. Appx. at 682;
see also Parks v. Watkins, Civ. No. 11-00594 HG-RLP, 2013 WL
431950, at *3 (D. Haw. Jan. 31, 2013) (“A federal court does not
have authority to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
remaining state-law claims when the federal-law claims are
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Supplemental
jurisdiction may only be invoked when the district court has ‘a
hook of original jurisdiction on which to hang it.’”) (quoting
Herman Family Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 805-06
(9th Cir. 2001)).
Where a case has been removed from state court, 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c) directs that “[i]f at any time before final
judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” Id. (emphasis added).
Thus, this Court, lacking subject matter jurisdiction, is
required under § 1447(c) to remand the instant case to state
court. As a result, this Court need not examine the merits of
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the instant case is remanded
to the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, State of Hawaii,
because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

4/

The Court notes that there is no diversity jurisdiction in
this case.
5

Accordingly, this Court need not examine the merits of
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

Honolulu, Hawai#i, November 18, 2014.

________________________________
Alan C. Kay
Senior United States District Judge

Miles v. Maui County et al., Civ. No. 14-00278 ACK-BMK: ORDER REMANDING ACTION
TO STATE COURT

6