Iinuma v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING, LP FKA COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS SERVICING, LP et al
Filing
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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 11 MOTION AND DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION. Signed by JUDGE DERRICK K. WATSON on 10/20/2014. ~ The Court hereby grants Defendants' motion and dismisses Iinuma 39;s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case. (ecs, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAI`I
WALLACE IINUMA, as Successor
Trustee of the Glenn Y. Kimura
Revocable Living Trust, dated July 2,
2004,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CIVIL NO. 14-00295 DKW-KSC
ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION AND
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT
FOR LACK OF SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDICTION
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION AND DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
As in several other recent cases filed by Iinuma’s counsel in this Court,
Iinuma lacks standing to bring this suit and has not satisfied the amount in
controversy requirement. See Remigio v. Parton, 2014 WL 4639463 (D. Haw.
Sept. 15, 2014); Parton v. Colorado Fed. Sav. Bank, 2014 WL 4639461 (D. Haw.
Sept. 14, 2014); Deshaw v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Sys., Inc., 2014 WL
3420771 (D. Haw. July 10, 2014); Dimitrion v. Morgan Stanley Credit Corp., 2014
WL 2439631 (D. Haw. May 29, 2014); Toledo v. Bank of New York Mellon, et al.,
CV 13-00539 DKW-KSC, Dkt. No. 45 (D. Haw. May 2, 2014); Broyles v. Bank of
America, et al., 2014 WL 1745097 (D. Haw. April 30, 2014); Moore v. Deutsche
Bank Nat’l Trust Comp., et al., 2014 WL 1745076 (D. Haw. April 30, 2014);
Wegesend v. Envision Lending Group, et al., 2014 WL 1745340 (D. Haw. April
30, 2014); Dicion v. Mann Mortgage, LLC, 2014 WL 1366151 (D. Haw. April 4,
2014); Pascua v. Option One Mortgage Corp., 2014 WL 806226 (D. Haw. Feb.
28, 2014). Consequently, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, mandating
dismissal of the complaint.
BACKGROUND
Glenn Kimura took out a mortgage on his primary residence while he was
still living. He later transferred the property into his living trust. Although Kimura
made some payments on the loan secured by the mortgage, he eventually defaulted
on the loan. After Kimura’s passing, Iinuma became the successor trustee to the
Glenn Y. Kimura Revocable Living Trust. Iinuma now asserts an uncertainty
regarding whom to pay on the mortgage. Iinuma contends that he “is able and
willing to pay the mortgagee/lender each month and has a duty to do so, but he is
unable to ascertain which entity, if any, is the mortgagee/lender,” and that he “has
the right to negotiate with the owner of his mortgage to obtain a modification if it
is actually owed.” He asserts that neither of the named defendants is the
mortgagee or lender. Complaint ¶¶ 1, 8–16, 23.
Iinuma asserts a single cause of action for “quiet title,” seeking a declaration
of “what is the interest (if any) of the Defendants and Plaintiff in the Subject
Property and in the Mortgage therein.” Complaint at 10, prayer for relief ¶ a.
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Defendants (the previous and current servicers of the loan) move to dismiss
the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Iinuma did not oppose the
motion.1
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendants’ motion is filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6). The Court “must determine that [it] ha[s] jurisdiction before proceeding
to the merits.” Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007). Pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1), a defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. In a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the
plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction exists.
Robinson v. United States, 586 F.3d 683, 685 (9th Cir. 2009). “If the court
determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must
dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Rule 12(b)(6) permits a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. Pursuant to Ashcroft v. Iqbal, “[t]o survive a motion
to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 555 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007)). “[T]he tenet
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Defendants’ September 22, 2014 motion (Dkt. No. 11) was set for hearing on October 31, 2014
(see Dkt. No. 13). Pursuant to L.R. 7.4, any opposition to the motion was therefore due on or
before October 10, 2014. No opposition or other response, however, was filed.
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that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. Accordingly, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
A suit brought by a plaintiff without Article III standing is not a “case or
controversy,” and an Article III federal court therefore lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over the suit. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102
(1998). In order to establish standing, three requirements must be met:
First and foremost, there must be alleged (and ultimately proved) an
injury in fact—a harm suffered by the plaintiff that is concrete and
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there
must be causation—a fairly traceable connection between the
plaintiff’s injury and the complained-of conduct of the defendant.
And third, there must be redressability—a likelihood that the
requested relief will redress the alleged injury. This triad of injury in
fact, causation, and redressability constitutes the core of Article III’s
case-or-controversy requirement, and the party invoking federal
jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing its existence.
Id. at 102–04 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). See Takhar v.
Kessler, 76 F.3d 995, 1000 (9th Cir. 1996) (“A plaintiff has the burden of
establishing the elements required for standing.”).
Even where a plaintiff has standing, subject matter jurisdiction must also be
established. Jurisdiction founded on diversity (the basis for jurisdiction alleged by
Iinuma here) “requires that the parties be in complete diversity and the amount in
controversy exceed $75,000.” Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319
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F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); see 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Where, as
here, declaratory or injunctive relief is sought, it is “‘well established that the
amount in controversy is measured by the value of the object of the litigation.’”
Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Hunt v. Wash.
State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 347 (1977)). The object of the
litigation is “the value of the right to be protected or the extent of the injury to be
prevented.” Jackson v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 538 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1976); see also
Ridder Bros., Inc. v. Blethen, 142 F.2d 395, 399 (9th Cir. 1944) (stating that the
“required amount [in controversy is] the value of the particular and limited thing
sought to be accomplished by the action”).
“[T]he party asserting diversity jurisdiction bears the burden of proof.” Lew
v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1986).
DISCUSSION
Iinuma lacks standing and has failed to satisfy the amount in controversy
requirement necessary to establish diversity jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court
grants Defendants’ motion and dismisses the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
First, Iinuma has not alleged an injury-in-fact to sufficiently establish
standing. Although Iinuma asserts his general concern that he might make
payments to the wrong lender or mortgagee without the Court’s assistance in
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ascertaining to whom he should pay, Complaint ¶ 1, Iinuma does not allege that
any defendant or any other entity has actually initiated foreclosure proceedings or
that more than one party has actually demanded concurrent payment on the same
loan—allegations necessary to show actual injury. Consequently, as Judge
Seabright concluded in Dicion:
Absent such factual allegations, the potential for multiple liability or
foreclosure is no more than mere speculation and falls far short of
constituting an Article III injury-in-fact. Thus, Plaintiff's injury is no
more than his own uncertainty regarding which Defendant is entitled
to his mortgage payments. Such a subjective uncertainty is neither
sufficiently concrete nor particularized to constitute an injury-in-fact.
2014 WL 1366151, at *4 (internal citations omitted); see also Pascua, 2014 WL
806226, at *4 (“At most, the injury-in-fact that Pascua suffers is the ‘uncertainty’
he says he has regarding what entity he is supposed to pay. It is not clear that this
subjective feeling of uncertainty is sufficiently concrete and particularized to
constitute an injury-in-fact. It is also not clear that Pascua’s purported injury, such
as it is, is caused by Defendants’ conduct rather than by Pascua’s own apparent
inability to discern the nature of his obligations.” (internal citation omitted)).
Indeed, there is nothing to even suggest that Iinuma is dealing with the wrong
entities, as he apparently fears. Having alleged no injury-in-fact, and the Court
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declining to allow Iinuma to manufacture one, Iinuma lacks standing, depriving the
Court of subject matter jurisdiction. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102.2
Second, the Court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the amount
in controversy requirement necessary to establish diversity jurisdiction has not
been satisfied. Iinuma alleges that “the amount in controversy is $303,000, the
value of the disputed Mortgage. In the alternative, the amount in controversy is
$350,000, the value of the Subject Property.” Complaint ¶ 5. However, as Judge
Mollway discussed in Pascua:
Here, the matter Pascua says he wants to accomplish does not
implicate the entire debt or the value of the property. Although he
styles his claim as one to “quiet title,” Pascua does not allege that he
holds title to the property free and clear of any debt obligation. Nor
does Pascua seek to enjoin a foreclosure. In either such situation, the
full debt or the property itself would be the object of the litigation,
because the claimant would be trying to prevent paying the debt or
losing the property. Pascua, by contrast, asks for a declaration to
prevent him from feeling uncertainty as to whom to pay. He is not
actually being asked to pay his acknowledged debt more than once.
The amount in controversy is therefore the subjective value to Pascua
of freeing him from that risk. Courts are often disinclined to speculate
as to the monetary value of something so vague and amorphous as a
feeling of uncertainty.
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The Court also adopts the same reasoning and conclusion reached by Judge Seabright in Dicion
for the second and third requirements of standing:
Furthermore, in the absence of a demand for payment from multiple Defendants,
Plaintiff’s uncertainty is not fairly traceable to any challenged action of the
Defendants. Nor is Plaintiff's uncertainty likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision.
2014 WL 1366151, at *5 (alterations, quotation marks, and citation omitted).
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2014 WL 806226, at *5 (internal citations omitted).
Similarly here, Iinuma asks for a declaration to clarify his alleged confusion
as to whom to pay. Therefore, the object of the litigation is not the value of the
property, but is instead the value in relieving Iinuma’s uncertainty. Dicion, 2014
WL 1366151, at *6. However, Iinuma has not even attempted to prove what the
value of that uncertainty is and the Court will not speculate. In short, “because the
true purpose of this action is neither to quiet title in favor of Plaintiff and against
all Defendants, nor to stop an imminent foreclosure sale, simply requesting such
relief cannot transform the object of litigation to the subject property [or the value
of the mortgage].” Dicion, 2014 WL 1366151, at *6 n.6.
Finally, the Court notes that Iinuma seeks a declaration to remove all clouds
on the title of the property. However, even if the Court had subject matter
jurisdiction, “Plaintiff[’s] contention that they do not know to whom their debt is
owed is not a basis to ‘quiet title.’” Klohs v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 901
F.Supp.2d 1253, 1261 n.4 (D. Haw. 2012).
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CONCLUSION
The Court hereby grants Defendants’ motion and dismisses Iinuma’s
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Clerk of Court is directed to
close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: October 20, 2014 at Honolulu, Hawai‘i.
Iinuma v. Bank of America, N.A., et al.; CV 14-00295 DKW/KSC; ORDER
GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION AND DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
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