Shayefar v Kaleleiki, Jr. et al
Filing
23
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS THE PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 12(b) (ECF NO. 15 ). Signed by JUDGE HELEN GILLMOR on 10/7/2014. (ecs, )CERTIF ICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on 10/8/2014 the date of this docket entry Modified on 10/7/2014 (ecs, ).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
Samuel Houpo Kaleleiki, Jr.;
)
Von-Alan Hinano Kaleleiki;
)
Sarah-Therece K. Kaleleiki;
)
John Does 1-50; Jane Does 1-50; )
Doe Corporations 1-50; Doe
)
Partnerships 1-50; Doe Entities )
1-50; Doe Governmental Units 1- )
50;
)
)
Defendants.
)
)
Mehrdad Shayefar; Gina
Shayefar;
Civ. No. 14-00322 HG-KSC
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS THE PLAINTIFFS’
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, RULE 12(b) (ECF NO. 15)
Plaintiffs filed a Complaint alleging that two of the
Defendants entered the Plaintiffs’ Maui property in December 2013
and have refused to leave.
Plaintiffs claim the Defendants have
obstructed access to the property and interfered with the water
supply.
The Complaint alleges that all three Defendants have
claimed title to the property without a legal basis.
Plaintiffs
assert state law claims and seek declaratory and injunctive
relief, a writ of possession, and damages.
The Defendants, appearing pro se, filed a motion to dismiss
1
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and improper venue.
The
Defendants also move to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 15) is DENIED.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 14, 2014, Plaintiffs Mehrdad Shayefar and Gina
Shayefar filed a Complaint.
(ECF No. 1).
On August 14, 2014, Defendants Samuel Houpo Kaleleiki, Jr.,
Von-Alan Hinano Kaleleiki, and Sarah-Therece K. Kaleleiki filed
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT WITH
PREJUDICE PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE
12(b).
(ECF No. 15).
On September 3, 2014, Plaintiffs filed PLAINTIFFS’
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS SAMUEL HOUPO KALELEIKI,
JR., VON-ALAN HINANO KELELEIKI, AND SARAH-THERECE K. KALELEIKI’S
MOTION TO DISMISS THE PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE
PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 12(b) FILED ON
AUGUST 14, 2014.
(ECF No. 17).
The Defendants did not file a Reply.
On October 6, 2014, a hearing was held on the Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss.
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BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Mehrdad and Gina Shayefar assert that they are
citizens of California.
(Complaint at ¶ 1, ECF No. 1).
The
Plaintiffs claim they are the sole owners of an undeveloped lot
(“Lot 32”) in the Ukumehame agricultural subdivision located in
Maui.
(Id. at ¶¶ 1, 11-12).
The Complaint states that on
January 10, 2008, Plaintiffs recorded a warranty deed for Lot 32
with the State of Hawaii Bureau of Conveyances.
(Id. at ¶ 11).
The Complaint asserts that all three Defendants, Samuel
Houpo Kaleleiki, Jr., Von-Alan Hinano Kaleleiki, and SarahTherece K. Kaleleiki, are citizens of Hawaii.
(Id. at ¶¶ 3-5).
The Complaint alleges that in December 2013, Defendants Samuel
Houpo Kaleleiki, Jr. (“Defendant Samuel Kaleleiki, Jr.”) and VonAlan Hinano Kaleleiki (“Defendant Von-Alan Kaleleiki”) entered
the Ukumehame subdivision and Lot 32 by force.
45).
(Id. at ¶¶ 16,
The Complaint claims that Defendants Samuel Kaleleiki, Jr.
and Von-Alan Kaleleiki have obstructed a subdivision road and
access to the subdivision’s common facilities, including the
water supply.
(Id. at ¶¶ 18, 24, 26, 30).
Plaintiffs allege
that Defendants Samuel Kaleleiki, Jr. and Von-Alan Kaleleiki
remain on their property and have threatened to use force and
violence when requested to vacate the property and to remove the
obstructions.
(Id. at ¶¶ 17, 21, 29, 31).
The Complaint asserts that on February 4, 2014, Defendant
3
Samuel Kaleleiki, Jr. recorded a quitclaim deed for the property
with the State of Hawaii Bureau of Conveyances.
(Id. at ¶ 34).
Plaintiffs allege that the quitclaim deed attempts to convey
Defendant Samuel Kaleleiki, Jr.’s “right, title and interest” in
the Ukumehame property, including Lot 32, to Defendants Von-Alan
Kaleleiki and Sarah-Therece K. Kaleleiki.
(Id. at ¶ 35).
The
Complaint asserts that the Defendants have published their
alleged claims of title and interest in the Ukumehame property to
prospective buyers.
(Id. at ¶ 80).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.
They have no jurisdiction without specific constitutional or
statutory authorization.
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs.,
Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005).
A party invoking the federal
court’s jurisdiction has the burden of proving the actual
existence of subject matter jurisdiction.
Thompson v. McCombe,
99 F.3d 352, 353 (9th Cir. 1996).
A challenge to the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction may
be “facial or factual.”
Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d
1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004).
In a facial attack, the party
challenging jurisdiction argues that the allegations contained in
a complaint are insufficient “on their face” to invoke federal
4
jurisdiction.
Id.
A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction is
treated as a facial attack when a defendant “introduce[s] no
evidence contesting any of the allegations” of the complaint.
Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2009).
A facial challenge mirrors a traditional motion to dismiss
analysis.
The Court must take all allegations contained in the
pleading “to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in [its]
favor.”
Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004).
In a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of
the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke
federal jurisdiction.
Id.
The moving party may bring a factual
challenge to subject matter jurisdiction by submitting affidavits
or any other evidence properly before the Court.
The nonmoving
party must then present affidavits or any other evidence
necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing subject matter
jurisdiction.
Colwell v. Dept’ of Health & Human Servs., 558
F.3d 1112, 1121 (9th Cir. 2009).
The Court “need not presume the
truthfulness of the plaintiffs’ allegations” when deciding a
factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction.
U.S. ex rel.
Meyer v. Horizon Health Corp., 565 F.3d 1195, 1200 n.2 (9th Cir.
2009).
Failure to State a Claim
The Court must dismiss a complaint as a matter of law
5
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) where it
fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Rule
(8)(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.”
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss, the Court must presume all allegations of material
fact to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the non-moving party.
Pareto v. F.D.I.C., 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th
Cir. 1998).
Conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are
insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.
Id. at 699.
The
Court need not accept as true allegations that contradict matters
properly subject to judicial notice or allegations contradicting
the exhibits attached to the complaint.
Sprewell v. Golden State
Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).
In Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, the United States Supreme
Court addressed the pleading standards under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in the anti-trust context.
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
The Supreme Court stated that Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” and
that “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level.”
Id. at 555.
Most recently, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court
6
clarified that the principles announced in Twombly are applicable
in all civil cases.
129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009).
The Court stated
that “the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require
‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me-accusation.”
at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Id.
To survive a motion
to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Id. (citing
The plausibility standard is not akin
to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Id. (quoting
Where a complaint pleads facts that
are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
‘entitlement to relief.’”
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 557).
The complaint “must contain sufficient allegations of
underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing
party to defend itself effectively” and “must plausibly suggest
an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require
7
the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery
and continued litigation.”
AE ex. rel Hernandez v. Cnty. of
Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations
omitted).
ANALYSIS
I.
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred on federal courts
either through federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331 or through diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1332.
Peralta v. Hispanic Bus., Inc., 419 F.3d 1064,
1068 (9th Cir. 2005).
A.
Federal Question Jurisdiction
A plaintiff properly invokes federal question jurisdiction
by pleading a colorable claim arising under the Constitution or
laws of the United States.
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500,
514 (2006); Provincial Gov't of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc.,
582 F.3d 1083, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 2009).
Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not contain allegations of a
violation arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States.
Plaintiffs reference the federal Declaratory
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, et seq., in the Complaint.
(Complaint at ¶ 54, ECF No. 1).
The Declaratory Judgment Act
8
does not by itself confer federal subject matter jurisdiction.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Liberatore, 408 F.3d 1158, 1161 (9th
Cir. 2005).
A court must have a basis for federal subject matter
jurisdiction independent of the Act to entertain an action under
the Declaratory Judgment Act.
Guaranty Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Gates,
916 F.2d 508, 511 (9th Cir. 1990).
The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction based on federal
question jurisdiction.
B.
Diversity Jurisdiction
The basis of diversity jurisdiction is found at Title 28
U.S.C. § 1332.
Section 1332(a)(1) states that “[t]he district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$75,000 ... and is between citizens of different States.”
28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
A natural person’s state citizenship is determined by his
state of domicile.
1986).
Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir.
A person’s domicile is his permanent home, where he
resides with the intention to remain, or to which he intends to
return.
Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th
Cir. 2001).
Section 1332(a) requires complete diversity.
Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996).
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Caterpillar
In a case with multiple
plaintiffs and multiple defendants, the presence in the action of
a single plaintiff from the same State as a single defendant
deprives the district court of original diversity jurisdiction
over the entire action.
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs.,
Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553 (2005).
The burden of establishing that diversity jurisdiction
exists rests on the party asserting it.
Hertz Corp. v. Friend,
559 U.S. 77, 96-97 (2010).
The Complaint contains allegations that provide the Court
with subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of diversity.
(Complaint at ¶¶ 7-8, ECF No. 1).
The Complaint states that
Plaintiffs Mehrdad and Gina Shayefar are both citizens of
California.
(Id. at ¶ 1).
The Complaint alleges that each of
the three Defendants, Samuel Houpo Kaleleiki, Jr., Von-Alan
Hinano Kaleleiki, and Sarah-Therece K. Kaleleiki, are citizens of
Hawaii.
(Id. at ¶¶ 3-5).
The Complaint asserts that the amount
(Id. at ¶ 8).
in controversy exceeds $75,000.
The Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss presents a facial
challenge to the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
The
Defendants have not introduced any evidence to contest the
allegations in the Plaintiffs’ Complaint.
F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2009).
Doe v. Holy See, 557
Plaintiffs’ allegations must be
taken as true in considering Defendants’ facial attack on the
Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
10
Wolfe v. Strankman, 392
F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004).
There is complete diversity
between the parties based on the allegations in the Complaint.
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the
Plaintiffs’ Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction is DENIED.
II.
VENUE
Venue refers to the specific geographic location of the
federal district court that has subject matter jurisdiction to
adjudicate a civil action.
28 U.S.C. § 1390(a).
Venue is proper
in a judicial district in which any defendant is a resident of
the State in which the district is located.
1391(b)(1).
28 U.S.C. §
Venue is also proper in a judicial district in which
a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim
occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject
of the action is situated.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).
Here, venue is proper in the District of Hawaii.
Defendants reside in the District of Hawaii.
1391(b)(1).
All three
28 U.S.C. §
Venue is also proper because the events giving rise
to the action and the subject property are located in the
District of Hawaii.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).
The Defendants argue that venue is improper because the
action should have been filed in state court.
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Defendants’
argument is a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, not
venue.
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction based on
diversity, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for improper venue is DENIED.
III. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
The Defendants assert that the Plaintiffs have failed to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The Defendants
do not provide specific challenges to the causes of action
outlined in Plaintiffs’ Complaint.
The Court construes the pleading liberally because the
Defendants are proceeding pro se.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007).
Count I:
Forcible Entry and Detainer
Count I is labeled “forcible entry and detainer.”
be more properly entitled “trespass.”
It should
Forcible entry and
detainer is defined as “[t]he act of violently taking and keeping
possession of lands and tenements without legal authority.”
Black’s Law Dictionary, 674 (10th ed. 2014).
An action of
forcible entry and detainer is a statutory proceeding, providing
a statutory remedy for possession.
Entry and Detainer § 3.
35A Am. Jur. 2d Forcible
A forcible entry and detainer action is
a creature of the legislature and did not exist at common law.
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Id. at § 2.
The Plaintiffs concede there is no forcible entry and
detainer statute in Hawaii.
The case the Plaintiffs look to in
support of their action is an action for trespass.
Rego v.
Bergstrom Music Co., Ltd., 26 Haw. 407, 1922 WL 2085, *1 (Haw.
1922).
Here, the Court construes Plaintiffs allegations in Count I
as a cause of action for trespass.
A trespass occurs when a person “intentionally (a) enters
land in the possession of the other, or causes a thing or third
person to do so, or (b) remains on the land, or (c) fails to
remove from the land a thing which he is under a duty to remove.”
Freeland v. Cnty. of Maui, Civ. No. 11-00617ACK-KSC, 2013 WL
6528831, *23 (D. Haw. Dec. 11, 2013) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 158)).
Plaintiffs’ Complaint contains sufficient factual
allegations to state a claim for trespass against Defendants
Samuel Houpo Kaleleiki, Jr. (“Defendant Samuel Kaleleiki, Jr.”)
and Von-Alan Hinano Kaleleiki (“Defendant Von-Alan Kaleleiki”).
The Complaint asserts that Defendants Samuel Kaleleiki, Jr. and
Von-Alan Kaleleiki entered land owned by Plaintiffs by force and
without authorization in December 2013.
44-45, ECF No. 1).
(Complaint at ¶¶ 16-17,
Plaintiffs allege Defendants Samuel
Kaleleiki, Jr. and Von-Alan Kaleleiki have placed physical
13
obstructions in the subdivision’s common areas and caused damage.
(Id. at 18-20, 24).
Plaintiffs assert they have asked Defendants
Samuel Kaleleiki, Jr. and Von-Alan Kaleleiki to leave their
property and to remove the obstructions to their land, but the
Defendants have refused.
(Id. at ¶¶ 17, 22, 25).
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count I is DENIED.
Plaintiffs
have stated a claim for trespass against Defendants Samuel
Kaleleiki, Jr. and Von-Alan Kaleleiki.
Count II:
Quiet Title
Hawaii Revised Statute § 669-1(a) provides a cause of action
for quiet title.
The statute states that an “[a]ction may be
brought by any person against another person who claims, or who
may claim adversely to the plaintiff, an estate or interest in
real property, for the purpose of determining the adverse claim.”
H.R.S. § 669-1(a).
Plaintiffs allege that they are the sole owners of Lot 32 in
the Ukumehame agricultural subdivision located on Maui.
(Complaint at ¶ 11-12, ECF No. 1).
Plaintiffs assert that they
recorded a warranty deed for Lot 32, dated January 10, 2008, in
the State of Hawaii Bureau of Conveyances, as Document No. 2008004218.
(Id. at ¶ 11).
Plaintiffs allege the Defendants have adversely claimed an
interest in land in the Ukumehame subdivision that includes Lot
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32 and common areas.
(Id. at ¶¶ 34-35).
Plaintiffs assert that
on February 4, 2014, Defendant Samuel Kaleleiki, Jr. recorded a
quitclaim deed in the State of Hawaii Bureau of Conveyances as
Document No. A-51480946.
(Id. at ¶ 34; Ex. B, Defendant’s
Quitclaim Deed, ECF No. 1).
The Complaint alleges Defendant
Samuel Kaleleiki, Jr. attempted to convey his interest in Lot 32
to Defendants Von-Alan Kaleleiki and Sarah-Therece K. Kaleleiki,
pursuant to the quitclaim deed.
(Id.)
The Complaint asserts
that Defendants Samuel Kaleleiki, Jr., Von-Alan Kaleleiki, and
Sarah-Therece K. Kaleleiki claim interest in the subject property
without a legal basis.
(Id. at ¶ 52).
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count II for quiet title is
DENIED.
Plaintiffs have stated a claim for quiet title against
Defendants Samuel Kaleleiki, Jr., Von-Alan Kaleleiki, and SarahTherece K. Kaleleiki.
Count III:
Conversion
Conversion is a common law cause of action.
The Supreme
Court of the Territory of Hawaii explained conversion as:
[A]ny distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over
another’s personal property in denial of or
inconsistent with his rights therein, such as a
tortious taking of another’s chattels, or any wrongful
exercise or assumption of authority, personally or by
procurement, over another’s goods, depriving him of the
possession permanently or for an indefinite time.
Tsuru v. Bayer, 25 Haw. 693, 696, 1920 WL 830, at *2 (Haw.
15
1920).
The elements of a conversion claim have been enumerated
as: (1) a taking from the owner without his consent; (2) an
unwarranted assumption of ownership; (3) an illegal use or abuse
of the chattel; and, (4) a wrongful detention after demand.
Freddy Nobriga Enterprises v. State of Hawaii, Dep’t of Hawaiian
Homelands, 295 P.3d 993, 999 (Haw. App. 2013) (quoting Tsuru, 25
Haw. at 696).
Plaintiffs’ Complaint sufficiently states a claim for
conversion.
First, the Complaint asserts that Plaintiffs own the
Ukumehame potable water system as a result of their membership in
the Homeowners’ and Water Associations.
(Complaint at ¶¶ 12-13,
15, 56-57, ECF No. 1). The Complaint alleges that since December
2013, Defendants Samuel Kaleleiki, Jr. and Von-Alan Kaleleiki
have taken potable water from the Ukumehame subdivision without
consent.
(Id. at ¶ 58).
Second, the Complaint states that Defendants Samuel
Kaleleiki, Jr. and Von-Alan Kaleleiki assumed ownership of the
water when they tapped into, diverted, and consumed water from
the Ukumehame subdivision.
(Id. at ¶¶ 26, 56-58).
Plaintiffs claim that Defendants Samuel Kaleleiki, Jr. and
Von-Alan Kaleleiki have interfered with the subdivision’s potable
water by obstructing the employees of Pural Water Specialty Co.
from accessing the water system.
(Id. at ¶¶ 30-33).
The
Complaint asserts that Defendants Samuel Kaleleiki, Jr. and Von-
16
Alan Kaleleiki made threats of physical violence to Pural Water
Specialty Co.’s employees when they attempted to treat and
maintain the water system.
(Id.)
Third, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants Samuel Kaleleiki,
Jr. and Von-Alan Kaleleiki illegally took the chattel of potable
water.
(Id. at ¶ 58).
Water rights are often considered real
property interests, not personal property.
California v. Kinder
Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 2013 WL 314825, *17 (S.D. Cal. Jan.
25, 2013) (citing Locke v. Yorba Irrigation Co., 217 P.2d 425,
429 (Cal. 1950)).
Water transforms into personal property that
is subject to conversion when, as alleged here, it is reduced to
possession and control within pipes and made potable.
Strawberry
Water Co. v. Paulsen, 207 P.3d 654, 660 (Az. App. 2008).
Fourth, the Complaint asserts that Defendants Samuel
Kaleleiki, Jr. and Von-Alan Kaleleiki have continued to divert
and possess water despite the Plaintiffs’ demands.
(Complaint at
¶¶ 25, 29, ECF No. 1).
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count III for conversion is
DENIED.
Plaintiffs have stated a claim for conversion against
Defendants Samuel Kaleleiki, Jr. and Von-Alan Kaleleiki.
Count IV:
Ejectment
Under Hawaii law, a claim for ejectment requires the
plaintiff to demonstrate that he has ownership and title to the
17
property occupied by the defendant.
Kondaur Capital Corp. v.
Matsuyoshi, 2014 WL 895025, *6, (Haw. App. Mar. 7, 2014) (citing
State by Price v. Magoon, 858 P.2d 712, 718-19 (Haw. 1993)).
A
plaintiff must recover upon the strength of his own title and not
upon any weakness in the defendant’s title.
Fong Hing v. O.
Yamaoka, 31 Haw. 436, 1930 WL 2890, at *1 (Haw. 1930).
The Complaint asserts that Plaintiffs have ownership and
title to Lot 32 and the common areas in the Ukumehame
agricultural subdivision.
(Complaint at ¶¶ 61-63, ECF No. 1).
Plaintiffs claim that they have superior title, and deny the
Defendants have a legal basis for title to the property.
¶¶ 64-66).
(Id. at
The Complaint alleges that Defendants Samuel
Kaleleiki, Jr. and Von-Alan Kaleleiki continue to occupy the
Ukumehame property despite requests from the Plaintiffs to leave.
(Id. at ¶¶ 22, 25, 64-66).
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count IV for ejectment is
DENIED.
Plaintiffs have stated a claim for ejectment against
Defendants Samuel Kaleleiki, Jr. and Von-Alan Kaleleiki.
Count V:
Preliminary Injunction/Permanent Injunction
Count V is labeled Preliminary Injunction/Permanent
Injunction.
It is a request for a form of relief and not a cause
of action.
A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish:
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(1) that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) that he is
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his favor; and
(4) that an injunction is in the public interest.
Winter v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
A plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must demonstrate:
(1) that he has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy at equity
is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be
disserved by a permanent injunction.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
Plaintiffs may be entitled to a preliminary injunction or a
permanent injunction.
Plaintiffs may be entitled to an
injunction that orders the removal of Defendants and any
obstructions from the disputed property and enjoins the
Defendants from entering or recording further interest in the
subject property, if the Plaintiffs are able to prove the merits
of their claims.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count V for preliminary
injunction/ permanent injunction is DENIED.
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Count VI:
Slander of Title
Under Hawaii law, the following elements are required to
establish a claim for slander of title: (1) ownership of or
interest in the property by the plaintiff; (2) falsity of the
words published; (3) malice of the defendant in publishing the
false statements; (4) publication to some person other than the
owner; (5) publication in disparagement of plaintiff’s property
or the title to it; and (6) special damages proximately resulting
from such publication.
Isobe v. Sakatani, 279 P.3d 33, 42-43
(Haw. App. 2012).
Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled a cause of action for
slander of title.
First, the Complaint states that Plaintiffs
own Lot 32 and have interest in the common areas of the Ukumehame
subdivision.
(Complaint at ¶¶ 11-15, ECF No. 1).
Second, Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants’ claims that
they have title to Lot 32 and the Ukumehame subdivision common
areas are false.
(Id. at ¶¶ 78, 81).
Third, the Complaint alleges that the Defendants acted with
malice when they published the false claims.
(Id. at ¶ 82).
Fourth, the Complaint states that the Defendants published
their false claims to third parties by recording a quitclaim
deed.
Recordation of an unfounded claim of interest in the
plaintiff’s real property constitutes a publication for a slander
of title claim.
Seeley v. Seymour, 237 Cal.App.3d 844, 857 (Cal.
20
App. 1987).
Plaintiffs also assert that the Defendants have published
false claims about having title to the property to prospective
buyers.
(Complaint at ¶¶ 80, ECF No. 1).
Plaintiffs do not
provide sufficient facts about the content of the communications
to prospective buyers and do not identify how the statements were
made.
Velasco v. Security Nat. Mort. Co., CV No. 10-00239 DAE-
KSC, 2011 WL 2117008, at *8 (D. Haw. May 24, 2011) (dismissing a
claim for slander of title claim where the complaint failed to
provide sufficient facts about the defendant’s alleged false
publication).
Fifth, Plaintiffs allege the Defendants’ publication of
false claims has disparaged the Plaintiffs’ title to the
property.
(Complaint at ¶¶ 37, 83, ECF No. 1).
Sixth, the Complaint asserts that the Defendants’ false
publication has resulted in special damages to the Plaintiffs and
has required the Plaintiffs to incur expenses to negate and
counteract the Defendants’ false claims.
(Id. at ¶¶ 37-39, 84).
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count VI for slander of title
is DENIED.
Plaintiffs have stated a claim for slander of title
against Defendants Samuel Kaleleiki, Jr., Von-Alan Kaleleiki, and
Sarah-Therece K. Kaleleiki.
21
Count VII:
Punitive Damages
Count VII requests a form of relief and does not state a
cause of action.
Under Hawaii law, punitive damages are available in tort
actions.
1989).
Masaki v. Gen. Motors Corp., 780 P.2d 566, 571 (Haw.
The Hawaii Supreme Court has explained that in order to
be entitled to punitive damages:
The plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant has acted wantonly or
oppressively or with such malice as implies a spirit of
mischief or criminal indifference to civil obligations,
or where there has been some wilful misconduct or that
entire want of care which would raise the presumption
of a conscious indifference to consequences.
Id. at 575; Sheehan v. Grove Farm Co., Inc., 163 P.3d 179,
194-95 (Haw. App. 2005).
The Complaint states facts in support of the request for
punitive damages.
The Complaint alleges that the Defendants have
acted intentionally, wantonly, oppressively, and with malice.
(Complaint at ¶¶ 86-87, ECF No. 1).
The Complaint contains
allegations that the Defendants knew or should of known that they
do not have title or ownership of the Ukumehame property.
at ¶¶ 45, 78).
(Id.
Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants Samuel
Kaleleiki, Jr. and Von-Alan Kaleleiki have obstructed access to
subdivision common areas with boulders and caused damage
throughout the subdivision.
(Id. at ¶¶ 18-20, 24, 30).
The
Complaint alleges the Defendants Samuel Kaleleiki, Jr. and Von22
Alan Kaleleiki have used force and threatened to use force and
physical violence when they were asked to leave the property.
(Id. at 31-32, 45).
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count VII for punitive damages
is DENIED.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 15) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
Honolulu, Hawaii, October 7, 2014.
/s/ Helen Gillmor
Helen Gillmor
United States District Judge
Mehrdad Shayefar; Gina Shayefar v. Samuel Houpo Kaleleiki, Jr.;
Von-Alan Hinano Kaleleiki; Sarah-Therece K. Kaleleiki; John Does
1-50; Jane Does 1-50; Doe Corporations 1-50; Doe Partnerships 150; Doe Entities 1-50; Doe Governmental Units 1-50; Civ. No. 1400322 HG-KSC; ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS THE
PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 12(b) (ECF NO. 15)
23
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