Mather v. First Hawaiian Bank et al

Filing 48

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 17 MOTION FOR ORDER DECLARING PLAINTIFF DIANE E. MATHER A VEXATIOUS LITIGANT; PREFILING ORDER; ORDER DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFF'S 33 MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST DAVID Y. NAKASHIMA UNDER AUTHORITY F.R. CIV.P.RULE 11(1)(A); APPENDIX A-C. Signed by JUDGE KEVIN S.C. CHANG on 12/2/2014. ~ (1) GRANTS Defendants' Motion; (2) ISSUES a Pre-filing Order as set forth above; and (3) DENIES as moot Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 11 Sanct ions against David Nakashima. (ecs, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
DIANE E. MATHER,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
FIRST HAWAIIAN BANK;
)
JONATHAN W.Y. LAI; EDWIN )
C. NACINO,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)
_________________________ )

CIVIL NO. 14-00384 HG-KSC
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR ORDER DECLARING
PLAINTIFF DIANE E. MATHER
A VEXATIOUS LITIGANT; PREFILING ORDER; ORDER
DENYING AS MOOT
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
SANCTIONS AGAINST DAVID Y.
NAKASHIMA UNDER AUTHORITY
F.R.CIV.P.RULE 11(1)(A)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR ORDER DECLARING
PLAINTIFF DIANE E. MATHER A VEXATIOUS LITIGANT;
PRE-FILING ORDER; ORDER DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST DAVID Y. NAKASHIMA
UNDER AUTHORITY F.R.CIV.P.RULE 11(1)(A)
Before the Court is Defendants First Hawaiian
Bank (“FHB”) and Jonathan Lai’s (collectively
“Defendants”) Motion for Order Declaring Plaintiff
Diane E. Mather (“Plaintiff”) a Vexatious Litigant
(“Motion”), filed October 3, 2014.

Plaintiff filed an

Opposition on November 7, 2014, and Defendants filed
their Rely on November 17, 2014.
This matter came on for hearing on December 1,
2014.

Plaintiff appeared pro se and Thomas Berger,

Esq., appeared on behalf of Defendants.

After careful

consideration of the parties’ submissions, the
arguments presented at the hearing, the records of all
other cases involving Plaintiff in this district,1 and
the applicable law, the Court HEREBY GRANTS the Motion
for the reasons set forth below.
BACKGROUND
I.

Factual History Related to State Court Foreclosures
A.

FHB Loans
Between 2008 and 2010, Plaintiff obtained four

loans from FHB:
(1) On June 17, 2008, FHB loaned Plaintiff
$224,000.00, which was secured by a first mortgage on
the real property located at 92-1323 Panana Street,
#44, Kapolei, Hawaii 96707 (“Panana Street Mortgage”).
(2) On September 25, 2008, FHB loaned Plaintiff
$686,000.00, which was secured by a first mortgage on
the real property located at 1706 Dole Street,
Honolulu, Hawaii 96822 (“Dole Street Mortgage #1”).

1

The Court takes judicial notice of all of the
actions involving Plaintiff in this district.
2

(3) On November 5, 2008, FHB loaned Plaintiff an
additional $20,000.00 on the Dole Street property,
secured by a second mortgage (“Dole Street Mortgage
#2”).
(4) On February 28, 2010, FHB loaned Mather Real
Estate LLC $50,000.00, which was secured by a second
mortgage on the real property located at 1348 Wanaka
Street, Honolulu, Hawaii 96818 (“Wanaka Street
Mortgage”).
B.

Fraudulent Documents
In 2012, Plaintiff filed a number of fraudulent

documents in the Bureau of Conveyances of the State of
Hawaii (“Bureau”) and the Office of the Assistant
Registrar of the Land Court of the State of Hawaii
(“Land Court”), in an attempt to remove FHB’s liens
from the Dole Street, Wanaka Street, and Panana Street
properties.

Plaintiff also attempted to create false

security interests in FHB assets.
C.

FHB Special Proceeding
After learning of Plaintiff’s fraudulent

filings, FHB commenced a special proceeding in state
3

court on April 17, 2012, to expunge certain of
Plaintiff’s fraudulent filings.

FHB prevailed and

obtained an order for expungement and judgment for
expungement.
D.

State Court Foreclosure Actions
1.

Dole Street

On December 6, 2012, FHB commenced a
foreclosure action in state court, Civil No. 1-12-3080,
with respect to the two mortgages on the Dole Street
property.

FHB prevailed and the property was sold at

public auction on January 14, 2014.
2.

Panana Street

On January 15, 2013, FHB commenced an action in
state court, Civil No. 13-1-0111-01, to foreclose on
the Panana Street mortgage.

FHB prevailed against

Plaintiff, but a written order has yet to issue because
FHB is engaged in ongoing settlement discussions with
the other defendants in the case.
3.

Wanaka Street

On January 25, 2013, FHB initiated an action in
state court to foreclose on the Wanaka Street mortgage,
4

Civil No. 13-1-0214-01.

FHB prevailed and the sale of

the property to FHB was confirmed on March 24, 2014.
Territorial Savings Bank (“TSB”), which held a first
mortgage on the Wanaka Street property, also commenced
a foreclosure action, Civil No. 12-1-3307 ECN, and
obtained a separate foreclosure order.
II. Procedural History
Plaintiff commenced this action on August 28,
2014,2 challenging the Wanaka Street foreclosure
proceedings.

On September 19, 2014, Defendants

responded by filing a Motion to Dismiss “Verified
Complaint and Claim Under Authority of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983” [Doc. 1] For Lack of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction and For Failure to State a Claim.

Doc.

No. 11.
On September 22, 2014, Defendant The Honorable
Edwin Nacino filed a Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice
Verified Complaint and Claim Under Authority of 42
U.S.C. § 1983, Filed on August 28, 2014.

2

Doc. No. 13.

The Complaint was entered on August 29, 2014,
but was file stamped on August 28, 2014.
5

On October 3, 2014, Defendants filed the
instant Motion.
On October 6, 2014, Plaintiff filed two
documents: 1) “Motion to Strike Defendant Edwin C.
Nacino’s Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice Verified
Complaint and Claim Under Authority of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, Filed August 28, 2014, and; Response to
Defendant Edwin C. Nacino’s Motion to Dismiss With
Prejudice Verified Complaint and Claim Under Authority
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Filed August 28, 2014, and; Motion
for Declaratory Relief Under Authority of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201; Mandatory Judicial Notice of F.R.C.P. Rule
201,”

Doc. No. 19, and 2) “Response to Defendants’

First Hawaiian Bank and Jonathan W.Y. Lai’s Motion to
Dismiss Verified Complaint and Claim Under Authority of
42 U.S.C. § 1983; and; Motion For Injunctive and
Declaratory Relief Under Authority of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201.”

Doc. No. 20.

Senior U.S. District Judge

Helen Gillmor struck the foregoing documents for
failure to conform with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (“FRCP”).

Doc. No. 24.
6

On October 23, 2014, Plaintiff filed responses
to the motions to dismiss, along with a Motion for
Declaratory Relief Under Authority of 28 U.S.C. § 2201
and Motion For Preliminary Injunction.
26.

Doc. Nos. 25 &

Judge Gillmor struck the Motion for Declaratory

Relief because it contained no factual or legal
arguments in support of Plaintiff’s request.

Doc. No.

29.
On November 7, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Motion
for Sanctions Against David Y. Nakashima Under
Authority F.R.Civ.P.Rule 11(1)(A).3

Doc. No. 33.

On November 10, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Motion
for Declaratory Relief Under Authority of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201.

Doc. No. 35.
On November 18, 2014, Judge Gillmor issued an

Order Granting Defendants First Hawaiian Bank and
Jonathan W.Y. Lai’s Motion to Dismiss “Verified

3

This motion is set for hearing on December 22,
2014. Although the motion seeks sanctions against
David Nakashima, Plaintiff repeatedly misidentifies him
as Brian Nakashima throughout the motion. Moreover,
the subsection of FRCP 11 cited by Plaintiff does not
exist.
7

Complaint and Claim Under Authority of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983” (ECF No. 11); Granting Defendant The Honorable
Edwin Nacino’s Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice
Verified Complaint and Claim Under Authority of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 13); Denying Motion For
Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 26); and Denying Motion
for Declaratory Relief Under Authority of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201 (ECF No. 35) (“11/18/14 Order”).

Doc. No. 42.

Judge Gillmor is holding in abeyance the final order
dismissing this action until the disposition of this
Motion.

Doc. Nos. 39 & 42.
On November 28, 2014, Plaintiff filed a “Motion

for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Pursuant
F.R.Civ.P. Rule 52(a)” and a “Motion to Vacate Under
Authority of F.R.Civ.P. Rule 60(b)(4) This Courts
November 18, 2014 Orders.”

Doc. Nos. 45 & 46.

DISCUSSION
I.

Vexatious Litigant Motion
Defendants request that the Court issue a pre-

filing order that prohibits Plaintiff from filing
further complaints and pleadings related to the state
8

court foreclosure actions without first obtaining leave
of court.

Defendants characterize this and other

similar actions filed in this district as frivolous and
submit that a narrowly-tailored pre-filing order would
still permit Plaintiff to access the courts.

Plaintiff

contends that this Motion is an attempt to deprive her
of meaningful access to law and to deny her of her
constitutional rights.

Plaintiff believes that her

filings are not frivolous because she has suffered
injuries.
The Court has the inherent power under the All
Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), to enter pre-filing
orders against vexatious litigants.

Molski v.

Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1057 (9th Cir.
2007).

Under the appropriate circumstances, “courts

can ‘regulate the activities of abusive litigants by
imposing carefully tailored restrictions.’”

Ringgold-

Lockhart v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 761 F.3d 1057, 1061
(9th Cir. 2014) (quoting De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d
1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1990)).

One such form of

restriction is “enjoining litigants with lengthy
9

histories.”

Id.

(citation omitted).

Courts cannot

tolerate “[f]lagrant abuse of the judicial process . .
. because it enables one person to preempt the use of
judicial time that properly could be used to consider
the meritorious claims of other litigants.”

Molski,

500 F.3d at 1057 (alteration in original).
However, “pre-filing orders should rarely be
filed,” De Long, 912 F.2d at 1147, because “[t]he right
of access to the courts is a fundamental right
protected by the Constitution.”
F.3d at 1061 (citation omitted).

Ringgold-Lockhart, 761
“In light of the

seriousness of restricting litigants’ access to the
courts, pre-filing orders should be a remedy of last
resort.”

Id. at 1062.
Given the constitutional underpinnings of the

right to court access, courts must comply with the
following procedural and substantive requirements
before issuing pre-filing orders:
(1) give litigants notice and “an
opportunity to oppose the order before it
[is] entered”; (2) compile an adequate
record for appellate review, including “a
listing of all the cases and motions that
10

led the district court to conclude that a
vexatious litigant order was needed”; (3)
make substantive findings of frivolousness
or harassment; and (4) tailor the order
narrowly so as “to closely fit the
specific vice encountered.”
Id. (quoting De Long, 912 F.2d at 1147-48) (alteration
in original).

Factors (1) and (2) are procedural,

while factors (3) and (4) are substantive.

Id.

The

Ninth Circuit has found that these considerations
employed by the Second Circuit provide a helpful
framework in applying the substantive factors:
(1) the litigant’s history of litigation
and in particular whether it entailed
vexatious, harassing or duplicative
lawsuits; (2) the litigant’s motive in
pursuing the litigation, e.g., does the
litigant have an objective good faith
expectation of prevailing?; (3) whether
the litigant is represented by counsel;
(4) whether the litigant has caused
needless expense to other parties or has
posed an unnecessary burden on the courts
and their personnel; and (5) whether other
sanctions would be adequate to protect the
courts and other parties.
Id. (quoting Safir v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 24
(2d Cir. 1986)).
important.

The last factor is particularly

Id.

11

A.

Notice and Opportunity to be Heard
In the present case, the Court provided proper

notice to Plaintiff of the hearing on this Motion.
Doc. No. 21.

Moreover, Plaintiff was afforded, and

availed herself of, the opportunity to file a written
response and orally present her arguments at the
hearing.

Molski, 500 F.3d at 1058-59 (concluding that

the plaintiff had fair notice of the possibility that
he would be declared a vexatious litigant because the
defendants had filed a motion, served on the
plaintiff’s counsel, and the plaintiff had an
opportunity to oppose the motion in writing and at a
hearing).

The Court therefore concludes that the first

requirement is satisfied.
B.

Adequate Record for Review
The Ninth Circuit requires district courts to

create an adequate record for review.

To do so, courts

“should include a listing of all the cases and motions
that led the district court to conclude that a
vexatious litigant order was needed.”

Id. at 1059; see

also Ringgold-Lockhart, 761 F.3d at 1063 (deeming
12

adequate discussion of litigation history leading to
the district court’s order, appended list of 21
district court filings, including motions that
supported order, and citation to a prior case as well
as the subject case in the body of the order); Molski,
500 F.3d at 1059 (deeming adequate complete list of the
cases filed by the plaintiff in the Central District of
California, along with the complaints from many of
those cases, and outline/discussion of many (though not
all) cases filed by the plaintiff).

“At the least, the

record needs to show, in some manner, that the
litigant’s activities were numerous or abusive.”

De

Long, 912 F.2d at 1147.
Attached as Appendix A is a listing of all
cases in this district involving Plaintiff, along with
the subject matter and disposition of each case.4

All

but one of the listed cases have been dismissed or

4

The Court has not attached copies of the
complaints because they are voluminous. However, the
attached listing of all civil actions would enable a
reviewing court to easily access the complaints through
cm/ecf, if necessary.
13

remanded.

Plaintiff argues that the miscellaneous

cases should not be counted against her because they
were not complaints and they were mistakenly filed.
The Court finds it difficult to believe that anyone
could “mistakenly” commence six actions, particularly
when three were filed on January 27, 2013, and the
other three were not filed until February 7, 2013.
Moreover, the initiating documents titled “REQUESTED
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF A PRIVATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS”
are not excepted from consideration as part of the
frivolousness analysis merely because Plaintiff did not
title them “complaints”.

In any event, although the

miscellaneous cases (all of which were converted to
civil cases) are demonstrative of the duplicative and
baseless nature of Plaintiff’s filings,5 they alone were
not determinative of the Court’s frivolousness/
harassment finding.

5

Civil Nos. 13-00045 SOM-RLP and CV 13-00065 JMSRLP contain identical initiating documents. So too do
Civil Nos. 13-00049 LEK-RLP and 13-00069 LEK-KSC.
14

Appendix B, attached hereto, lists a sampling
of motions from Plaintiff’s cases, as well as the
disposition of those motions.

Appendix C is a sampling

of Plaintiff’s unintelligible and/or unfounded
assertions contained in her submissions.

The Court

believes that these appendices, when coupled with the
additional discussion below, provide a complete and
adequate record for review.
C.

Substantive Findings of Frivolousness or
Harassment
Before the district court may issue a pre-

filing order, it must make substantive findings as to
the frivolous or harassing nature of Plaintiff’s
actions.

Ringgold-Lockhart, 761 F.3d at 1064.

To

assess frivolousness, courts “must look at both the
number and content of the filings.”

Id.

numerical definition for frivolousness.

There is no
Id.

Rather,

courts “[must] make a finding that the number of
complaints was inordinate.”
original).

Id. (alteration in

Litigiousness alone is insufficient; a

“plaintiff’s claim must not only be numerous but also
15

be patently without merit.”

Id. (citing Molksi, 500

F.3d at 1059 (citation omitted)).
Alternatively, courts may make a finding that a
“litigant’s filings ‘show a pattern of harassment.’”
Id. (quoting De Long, 912 F.2d at 1148).

That a

litigant files particular types of actions repeatedly
does not alone amount to harassment.

Id.

The Court

must instead “discern whether the filing of several
similar types of actions constitutes an intent to
harass the defendant or the court.”

Id. (citations and

quotations omitted).
In considering this third requirement, the
Court will discuss the Second Circuit’s Safir factors.
1.

Frivolousness, Vexatiousness, Harassment,
and/or Duplication

Here, as reflected in the attached appendices,
Plaintiff’s actions and filings are numerous and
meritless, focusing largely on her discontentment with
the outcome of the foreclosure proceedings in state

16

court.6

All but one of the actions have been decided

against Plaintiff7 and, with the exception of motions

6

In Civil No. 14-00082 DKW-RLP and Civil No. 1400091 SOM-RLP, Magistrate Judge Richard Puglisi issued
Orders Denying Defendant First Hawaiian Bank’s Motion
for Order Declaring Plaintiff Diane E. Mather a
Vexatious Litigant. He concluded that, as of June
2014, Plaintiff’s filings were not sufficiently
numerous or frivolous to warrant a vexatious litigant
order. However, he left open the possibility that such
an order might be entered in the future if Plaintiff’s
subsequent filings were frivolous or harassing in
nature. This Court finds that a sufficient number of
frivolous and/or harassing filings have been submitted
by Plaintiff since June 2014 to justify the issuance of
a vexatious litigant order, as detailed in this Order
and the attached appendices. Specifically, three new
actions have been filed, five actions have been
dismissed, and a number of Plaintiff’s frivolous
motions have been denied or stricken.
7

The only case that has yet to be dismissed is
Civil No. 14-00429 SOM-RLP, but there is a pending
motion to dismiss. Because Plaintiff has reasserted
claims that she was previously told were not viable, it
is reasonable to expect that the aforementioned action,
like all of the others, will eventually be dismissed.
Civil No. 14-00429 SOM-RLP, Doc. No. 20 at 2 (“In Civil
No. 14-00091 SOM/RLP filed here in federal court,
Mather attempted to undo and unwind the state-court
orders and judgments, adding claims against David
Nakashima and Jonathan Lai, the attorneys who
represented First Hawaiian Bank in the foreclosure
proceedings. On September 15, 2014, final judgment was
entered in that federal case. On September 18, 2014,
Mather sought relief from that final judgment, asking
in part for leave to file another amended complaint
asserting a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1964. That motion
17

for extensions of time and a couple of motions to
amend, Plaintiff’s frivolous motions have been denied
or stricken.

Not only have Plaintiff’s filings been

numerous, particularly for a period of just under two
years,8 but they are patently without merit.

In this

case alone, Judge Gillmor struck three of Plaintiff’s
“motions” for failure to comply with the FRCP and due
to the absence of factual or legal arguments in support

was denied on September 18, 2014. Mather did not file
a timely appeal in the earlier case. Instead, on
September 26, 2014, Mather filed a new case, asserting
the claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1964 against First Hawaiian
Bank, Nakashima, and Lai that she had asked to be
allowed to file in the previous case. On November 5,
2014, Mather clarified that the new action involves the
same property, same loan, and same Defendants as the
earlier action.”).
8

Admittedly, the number of actions filed by
Plaintiff and/or removed by Plaintiff are less than
those deemed numerous by some other courts. RinggoldLockhart, 761 F.3d at 1065 (citing numbers found
“inordinate” by multiple circuit courts - 400 similar
cases, 35 actions filed in 30 jurisdictions, 50
frivolous cases, 600-700 cases). However, relative to
the size of this district and caseload, Plaintiff’s
filings are significant. Six of Plaintiff’s 16 actions
have been filed between February and September of this
year, and only 539 civil actions have been filed to
date in this district. Under the circumstances, and
based on the frivolousness of the filings, the number
of Plaintiff’s filings is inordinate.
18

of the relief sought.

Plaintiff’s actions are

essentially appeals of the state court foreclosure
actions and each of the orders dismissing these actions
have clearly articulated why the Court is without the
authority to review such actions.

Yet Plaintiff

persists with her misguided endeavor to obtain relief
to which she is not entitled.

The fact that Plaintiff

has filed 16 actions and a number of motions lacking
viable legal bases, between January 2013 and September
2014, establishes frivolousness.9

Shiraishi v. United

States, Civil No. 11-00471 LEK, 2011 WL 4625723, at *11
(D. Haw. Sept. 30, 2011) (finding frivolous the
plaintiff’s five civil actions, filed in a seven month
period, based on the fact that the plaintiff serially
filed lawsuits alleging the same claim because he was
dissatisfied with the rulings he had received); Maxwell
v. MOAB Inv. Grp., LLC, Case No. 14-cv-03095-WHO, 2014

9

Plaintiff accuses Defendants of attempting to
mislead the Court into perceiving her as vexatious.
The Court’s in-depth review of Plaintiff’s cases and
filings, not Defendants’ reference to the same, has
convinced the Court that she is vexatious.
19

WL 4757429, at **1-4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2014)
(deeming vexatious litigants who, “[b]etween April 2009
and July 2014, . . . brought four lawsuits in state
court, two in federal district court, and one adversary
proceeding in federal bankruptcy court, all aimed at
maintaining possession of the property.”).

Indeed,

even after facing repeated defeat and the dismissal and
closure of cases, Plaintiff has attempted to resurrect
her claims.
In Civil No. 14-00082 DKW-RLP, which was
dismissed on July 31, 2014, Plaintiff, on November 12,
2014, filed a motion to vacate the court’s order
granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss and denying
her motion to amend.

Typical of Plaintiff’s filings,

the motion was nonsensical and utterly lacked merit.
Following is an excerpt of the motion:
This Court has acted in contempt of
process by invoking the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine which has long been interred.
NOTE: Judge Derrik [sic] K. Watson has
contravened United States Supreme Court
precedent proving that the Rooker/Feldman
doctrine has been abolished. NOTE: A
question exists: Is Derrik [sic] K.
Watson’s dismissal in this instant case an
20

indication that Derrik [sic] K. Watson is
exacerbating over the United States
Supreme Court’s supervisory influence?
Civil No. 14-00082 DKW-RLP, Doc. No. 52 at ¶ 3.

The

motion to vacate was denied on November 21, 2014.
Doc. No. 54.

Id.,

A virtually identical version of the

foregoing motion to vacate was filed in Civil No. 1400091 SOM-RLP, following the dismissal of the case on
September 15, 2014.
No. 51.

Civil No. 14-00091 SOM-RLP, Doc.

After the denial of the motion, id., Doc. No.

52,10 Plaintiff filed two additional motions to vacate
orders that are currently awaiting disposition.
Doc. Nos. 53 & 54.

Id.,

In the present case, on November

28, 2014, Plaintiff filed a 1) Motion for Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law Pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. Rule
52(a) and 2) Motion to Vacate Under Authority of
F.R.Civ.P. Rule 60(b)(4) This Courts November 18, 2014

10

In the Order Denying Motion For Relief From
Final Judgment and Order, Chief U.S. District Judge
Susan Oki Mollway expressed concerns about Plaintiff’s
use of the judicial process to delay and hinder state
court foreclosure proceedings. Civil No. 14-00091 SOMRLP, Doc. No. 52 at 2.
21

Orders.11

The latter motion is substantially similar to

the FRCP 60(b)(4) motions already denied in Civil Nos.
14-00091 SOM-RLP and 14-00082 DKW-RLP.

The repeated

filing of the same meritless motions in the same and
different cases within this district further evidences
the frivolity of Plaintiff’s filings.
Denials of motions on the same bases by
multiple judges within this district seem only to fuel
Plaintiff’s vexatiousness, rather than convince her
that her cases and filings are exercises in futility.
To wit, Plaintiff has attempted to circumvent rulings
in dismissed cases by filing new frivolous actions.

In

Civil No. 14-00082 DKW-RLP, for example, Plaintiff
sought leave to amend her complaint to assert due
process claims.

Her request was denied because the

proposed due process claims would be barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Plaintiff responded by filing

Civil No. 14-00391 DKW-BMK, in which she asserted the

11

Plaintiff also filed the same motions in Civil
Nos. 14-00391 DKW-BMK and 14-00139 LEK-BMK on November
28, 2014, and November 21, 2014, respectively.
22

very due process claims she was disallowed from raising
in Civil No. 14-00082 DKW-RLP.

Plaintiff likewise

filed Civil No. 14-00429 SOM-RLP in response to adverse
rulings in Civil No. 14-00091 SOM-RLP.

Therefore, in

addition to repeatedly challenging dismissal orders
well after the termination of a case, Plaintiff relies
on new civil actions to raise claims she was prohibited
from asserting in previously dismissed actions, and
which she was informed were futile.
Plaintiff’s actions can also be said to
constitute an intent to harass Defendants and/or the
Court.

The Court’s decision rests on both the repeated

filing of similar actions/documents and on the content
of Plaintiff’s filings within each action.

Plaintiff

has filed actions against state court judges simply
because she disagreed with their actions or rulings.
Moreover, her childish insults and unfounded
allegations against opposing counsel - calling Mr.
Nakashima a “[c]rybaby” and accusing him of “work[ing]
a fraud on this court regarding prior litigation,”
Opp’n at ¶¶ 2 & 10 - exemplify the harassing nature of
23

her filings.

Plaintiff further seeks Rule 11 sanctions

against Mr. Nakashima to “amend [his] bad behavior,”
accusing him of committing felony fraud by advancing
this Motion.

Plaintiff clearly harbors resentment

towards Defendants, defense counsel, and the judges who
presided over the foreclosure actions.

Plaintiff will

continue to misuse the judicial process to harass
entities and individuals until she attains the relief
she seeks.

Unfortunately, she will never be satisfied

because she has no legal basis for the relief sought.
Plaintiff’s pattern of circumventing rulings
and accusing judges in this district who have ruled
against her of misconduct also demonstrates an intent
to harass the Court.

There is no indication that

Plaintiff will ever recognize that litigation attacking
and/or challenging the state court foreclosure actions
has no place in federal court and she will continue to
harass Defendants, the defendants in the other actions,
and the Court with serial lawsuits and filings if she
is not restricted.

24

Even in the cases in which Plaintiff was a
defendant, her filings were frivolous and duplicative.
For example, Plaintiff improperly removed state court
actions to this district in Civil Nos. 13-00239 SOMBMK, 13-00294 JMS-RLP, and 13-00352 LEK-KSC.

All of

these cases were ultimately remanded to state court.
Characteristic of Plaintiff’s frivolity, she twice
removed the Wanaka Street foreclosure action to this
district.
LEK-KSC.

See Civil Nos. 13-00294 JMS-RLP and 13-00352
Civil No. 13-00294 JMS-RLP was remanded

because there was no basis for diversity or federal
question jurisdiction.
After the remand of the aforementioned action
to state court and the closure of the case on July 8,
2013, Plaintiff again removed the Wanaka Street
foreclosure action on July 17, 2013 (Civil No. 13-00352
LEK-KSC).

The notices of removal were identical in

Civil Nos. 13-00294 JMS-RLP and 13-00352 LEK-KSC, save
for Plaintiff’s dated signature.

While the Court

acknowledges that three removals are not numerous, they
were patently without merit because there was no legal
25

basis for removal, and Plaintiff re-removed the Wanaka
Street foreclosure action after she was informed that
jurisdiction was lacking.

Thus, even if the removals

standing alone would not warrant a finding of
frivolousness, the fact that they occurred in addition
to Plaintiff’s other frivolous filings certainly
bolsters the Court’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s
actions are frivolous.
The above examples, along with those contained
in the appendices, satisfy the “substantive
considerations” identified by the Ninth Circuit.

These

examples establish a pattern of frivolous and/or
harassing litigation that Plaintiff has initiated in
this Court.
2.

Plaintiff’s Motive

Although Plaintiff’s precise motive is unknown,
it appears that she is using the federal district court
in her bid to undo the state court foreclosures.

Based

on her filings, Plaintiff believes that she is entitled
to redress in federal court.

Given the many rulings

entered with respect to the same legal issues, however,
26

Plaintiff cannot possibly have an objective good faith
expectation of prevailing.

She may have a subjective

good faith expectation, but said expectation is not
grounded in reality, fact, or law.

Multiple well-

reasoned dismissal orders have issued, clearly setting
forth the absence of any legal bases for Plaintiff’s
claims, followed by orders detailing the reasons
Plaintiff is not entitled to relief from those
dismissal orders.

Plaintiff’s misplaced belief that

she is entitled to relief does not make it so.

Cf.

Civil No. 13-00294 JMS-RLP, Doc. No. 7 at 4 (“[M]erely
stating that the court has jurisdiction does not make
it so.”).
3.

Representation by Counsel

In considering this Motion, the Court takes
into account the fact that Plaintiff is proceeding pro
se.

While this factor weighs in favor of Plaintiff, it

is so heavily outweighed by the other factors that
Plaintiff’s pro se status will not preclude the entry
of a pre-filing order.

A litigant’s pro se status does

not exempt him or her from a vexatious designation.
27

In

a number of Plaintiff’s submissions, she notes that pro
se pleadings are held to less stringent standards
and/or that the court must liberally construe her
pleadings because she “is not law trained”.

The judges

in this district liberally construed Plaintiff’s
filings and pleadings, but nevertheless concluded that
they were without merit.

Although pro se parties are

generally afforded some leniency and concessions, they
are still expected to comply with all rules, statutes,
and orders.
4.

Local Rule 83.13.
Expense to Other Parties and Unnecessary
Burden on the Courts and Their Personnel

Plaintiff’s actions unquestionably caused
Defendants (as well as the defendants in the other
actions) to expend unnecessary time, resources, and
money to defend against her frivolous filings.

The

Court recognizes that it must protect and facilitate a
litigant’s right to access the courts.

However, the

Court must also consider the burden to Defendants.
would be inequitable to force Defendants to defend
against the same frivolous claims and motions.
28

It

Likewise, the Court and its personnel are unduly
burdened by having to adjudicate and re-adjudicate
Plaintiff’s frivolous claims and motions.

The Court

has expended a disproportionate amount of time
interpreting and addressing Plaintiff’s incoherent and
unintelligible submissions.

Further abuse of the

judicial process by Plaintiff will not be tolerated
because it unjustifiably monopolizes judicial time and
detracts from the due consideration owed to the
meritorious claims of other litigants.

Molski, 500

F.3d at 1057.
5.

Sufficiency of Alternative Sanctions to
Protect the Court and Other Parties

The Court has carefully considered whether
remedies other than a pre-filing order12 could control
Plaintiff’s behavior and concludes that lesser

12

For example, the Court considered sanctions
available under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11(c)(4), which “include nonmonetary directives; an
order to pay a penalty into court; or, if imposed on
motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order
directing payment to the movant of part or all of the
reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses directly
resulting from the violation.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
11(c)(4).
29

sanctions would be ineffective because Plaintiff has
not been deterred in the least by the many decision
issued against her.

She continues to file multiple

actions and motions raising the same arguments
considered and rejected in prior actions.

Under

different circumstances, the Court might first impose
monetary sanctions against Plaintiff for the expenses,
including attorneys’ fees, incurred by defense counsel
in connection with the defense of this and other cases.
However, based on its thorough review of all of the
cases filed in this district, and its familiarity with
Plaintiff and her antics, the Court finds that monetary
sanctions would not dissuade Plaintiff from filing
countless other non-meritorious actions and motions in
this district relating to the state court foreclosure
actions.13

The rather substantial filing fees have not

13

There is no question that nonmonetary directives
would be completely ineffective, as Plaintiff has
demonstrated that she is unable to comply with court
orders. In addition to ignoring the many rulings
against her, Plaintiff has failed to meet many
deadlines imposed by court orders. Whether
attributable to a lack of diligence or pure disregard,
Plaintiff has elected not to cure defects, even when
30

discouraged her, and Plaintiff’s prior and recent
filings suggest that she will likely continue to file
similar actions and motions due to her dissatisfaction
with the disposition of previously filed motions and
actions.

Notwithstanding the host of rulings against

her, Plaintiff shows no signs of slowing.

And in fact,

the frequency and number of Plaintiff’s filings (or at
least her submission of motions) appear to be
increasing.

Furthermore, at the hearing, Plaintiff

indicated that she will file appeals and she believes
that she will enjoy greater success on appeal.
Plaintiff insists that her pleadings have been wellpled and that she has been injured.
As discussed above, Plaintiff’s numerous
actions and filings have burdened the Court and
Defendants, and will continue to do so until a prefiling order issues.

Even then, the Court and its

personnel will be required to review proposed
submissions presented by Plaintiff.

A pre-filing order

presented with opportunities to do so.
31

is not a means for the Court to avoid Plaintiff’s
filings altogether.

Because the Court will narrowly

tailor the pre-filing order, as it must, Plaintiff’s
access to the Courts will merely be restricted, not
eliminated.

For these reasons, the Court finds that

the only appropriate sanction under the circumstances
is a pre-filing order.
In sum, the Court finds that the third De Long
requirement is satisfied because the Safir factors
weigh strongly in favor of limiting Plaintiff’s ability
to engage in future frivolous litigation related to the
state court foreclosure actions.
D.

Narrowly Tailored Vexatious Litigant Order
Inasmuch as the Court has determined that

Plaintiff is a vexatious litigant, based on its
evaluation of the De Long requirements and Safir
factors, the entry of a pre-filing order is appropriate
and necessary.

Defendants request an order requiring

Plaintiff to obtain leave of court before filing any
complaint or pleading that alleges misconduct by FHB,
Central Pacific Bank (“CPB”), Mortgage Electronic
32

Registration Systems (“MERS”), TSB, and/or any of their
agents or attorneys in connection with the Dole Street,
Panana Street, or Wanaka Street foreclosures, or the
underlying foreclosure in the CPB action.14

At the

hearing, Defendants requested that the pre-filing order
also include restrictions on actions against state and
federal court judges.

In view of the multiple actions

filed in this district, and Plaintiff’s pattern of
frivolous filings, the Court agrees15 and additionally
finds that it is necessary to include any state court
foreclosure proceedings involving Plaintiff and all

14

The CPB foreclosure action involved a real
property located at 98-854 Noelani Street, #67, Pearl
City, Hawaii 96782. Plaintiff challenged the CPB
foreclosure action in Civil No. 14-00139 LEK-BMK.
15

Plaintiff cries foul everytime an adverse ruling
issues against her, and accuses the judge who issues
the adverse ruling of misconduct. If Plaintiff is
permitted to file actions against all of the judges in
this district who rule against her, as did the
plaintiff in Shiraishi v. United States, Civil No. 1100741 LEK, the Court will be forced to designate cases
to out-of-district judges. Given the multiple actions
filed against state court judges, it is reasonable to
expect that Plaintiff may resort to filing actions
against the judges in this district based on her belief
that adverse rulings are tantamount to misconduct.
33

lenders or lenders’ agents/attorneys involved in said
proceedings because Plaintiff has demonstrated that she
will run to federal court each time she is dissatisfied
with the disposition of a state court foreclosure
action, even though she cannot challenge a state court
judgment here.
Because the actions and filings deemed
frivolous by this Court relate to Plaintiff’s
challenges to state court foreclosure proceedings, the
pre-filing order set forth below is appropriate and
narrowly tailored to address Plaintiff’s vexatious
conduct; that is, it “closely fit[s] the specific vice
encountered.”

Ringgold-Lockhart, 761 F.3d at 1061.

By imposing the foregoing parameters in the
pre-filing order, Plaintiff’s access to the courts will
not be restricted in full.

Plaintiff may still file

other civil actions unrelated to state court
foreclosure actions without leave of court, though she
is reminded of her obligation to comply with FRCP 11(b)
and all other applicable rules and statutes.

34

II. Pre-filing Order
The following order governs future filings by
Plaintiff:
(1) Plaintiff must obtain leave of court prior to
filing
(a) any complaint or pleading that
(i) pertains to state court foreclosure
proceedings involving Plaintiff, including
but not limited to the Dole Street, Panana
Street, Wanaka Street, Noelani Street, or
Nihipali Place16 properties; or
(ii) alleges misconduct related to said
state court foreclosures by lenders,
including but not limited to FHB, CPB,
MERS, TSB, their agents, and their
attorneys; or
(iii) alleges misconduct by state judges
who have presided/are presiding over said
state court foreclosure actions or federal
judges who have presided/are presiding
over actions related to said state court
foreclosure actions;
(b) any motions or amended or supplemental
pleadings in any of her pending (or terminated)

16

Plaintiff represented at the hearing that the
only state court foreclosure action involving her that
is currently pending pertains to the real property
located at 3645 Nihipali Place.
35

lawsuits in this district related to the state court
foreclosure proceedings.
(2) If Plaintiff wishes to file any of the abovereferenced documents, she must submit a proposed copy
of the document to the Clerk’s office.

Any such

document pertaining to real property must specifically
and particularly identify the real property at issue.
The Clerk’s office will lodge the document and submit
it to the appropriate judge, who will determine whether
to grant leave to file the document.
(3) When Plaintiff submits an initiating document,
i.e., a complaint, the Clerk’s office will hold the
filing fee pending a decision about whether leave will
be granted to file the document.
the filing fee will be processed.

If leave is granted,
If leave is denied,

the filing fee will be returned to Plaintiff.
III.

Rule 11 Sanction Motion
Given the granting of this Motion, Rule 11

sanctions are clearly not warranted against Mr.
Nakashima, as the fact that Defendants prevailed
establishes that Mr. Nakashima did not violate FRCP
36

11(b).

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s

Motion for Sanctions Against David Y. Nakashima Under
Authority F.R.Civ.P.Rule 11(1)(A), filed November 7,
2014, as MOOT.

The December 22, 2014 hearing on the

motion is HEREBY VACATED.
CONCLUSION
In accordance with the foregoing, the Court
HEREBY:
(1) GRANTS Defendants’ Motion;
(2) ISSUES a Pre-filing Order as set forth above;
and
(3) DENIES as moot Plaintiff’s Motion for Rule 11
Sanctions against David Nakashima.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

Honolulu, Hawaii, December 2, 2014.

_____________________________
Kevin S.C. Chang
United States Magistrate Judge

CV 14-00384 HG-KSC; MATHER V. FIRST HAWAIIAN BANK, ET AL; ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR ORDER DECLARING PLAINTIFF DIANE E. MATHER A VEXATIOUS
LITIGANT; PRE-FILING ORDER; ORDER DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
SANCTIONS AGAINST DAVID Y. NAKASHIMA UNDER AUTHORITY F.R.CIV.P.RULE 11(1)(A)

37

Civil No. 14-00384 HG-KSC Mather v. First Hawaiian Bank, et al. - APPENDIX A
Actions Involving Plaintiff in the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii
Case No.

Case Name

Date
Filed

Subject Matter

Disposition

CV13-00045-SOM-RLP
(formerly MC 13-00024
SOM-RLP)

Mather v. U.S.
Government et al.

1/25/13

Requested judicial review of a
private administrative process,
attaching loan documents related
to the Panana Street Mortgage
(same documents as CV 13-00065
JMS-RLP).

Judgment pursuant to the
Deficiency Order (failure to
pay the filing fee or file an
application to proceed in forma
pauperis).

CV13-00049 LEK-RLP
(formerly MC 13-00025
LEK-BMK)

Mather v. U.S.
Government et al.

1/25/13

Requested judicial review of a
private administrative process,
attaching loan documents related
to the Dole Street Mortgage #1
(same documents as CV 13-00069
LEK-KSC).

Dismissal without prejudice
(failure to comply with FRCP 8
and failure to pay the filing fee
or an application to proceed in
forma pauperis).

CV 13-00050 LEK-KSC
(formerly MC 13-00026
LEK-KSC)

Mather v. U.S.
Government et al.

1/25/13

Requested judicial review of a
private administrative process,
attaching loan documents related
to the Dole Street Mortgage #2.

Dismissal without prejudice
(failure to comply with FRCP 8
and failure to pay the filing fee
or an application to proceed in
forma pauperis).

1

CV 13-00065 JMS-RLP
(formerly MC 13-00034
JMS-BMK)

Mather v. First
Hawaiian Bank

2/7/13

Requested judicial review of a
private administrative process,
attaching loan documents related
to the Panana Street Mortgage
(same documents in CV 13-00045
SOM-RLP).

Order Dismissing Action for
failure to pay the filing fee or
file an application to proceed in
forma pauperis.

CV 13-00068 LEK-KSC
(formerly MC 13-00035
LEK-KSC)

Mather v. Bank of
Hawaii

2/7/13

Requested judicial review of a
private administrative process,
attaching loan documents related
to a Panana Street loan with Bank
of Hawaii.

Judgment pursuant to the
Deficiency Order (failure to
pay the filing fee or file an
application to proceed in forma
pauperis).

CV 13-00069 LEK-KSC
(formerly MC 13-00036
LEK-KSC)

Mather v. First
Hawaiian Bank

2/7/13

Requested judicial review of a
private administrative process,
attaching loan documents related
to the Dole Street Mortgage #1
(same documents as CV 13-00049
LEK-RLP).

Judgment pursuant to the
Deficiency Order (failure to
pay the filing fee or file an
application to proceed in forma
pauperis).

CV13-00239 SOM-BMK

Nazemi, et al. v.
Wrona, et al.

5/15/13

Removal of state court action.

Case remanded to state court
with findings that removal was
untimely and that diversity and
federal question jurisdiction
were lacking.

2

CV 13-00294 JMS-RLP

First Hawaiian
Bank v. Mather
Real Estate, LLC,
et al.

6/10/13

Removal of the Wanaka Street
Mortgage foreclosure action.

Case remanded to state court
because there was no basis for
diversity or federal question
jurisdiction.

CV 13-00352 LEK-KSC

First Hawaiian
Bank v. Mather
Real Estate, LLC,
et al.

7/17/13

Removal of the Wanaka Street
Mortgage foreclosure action (same
action as in CV 13-00294 JMSRLP).

Case remanded to state court
because there was no basis for
federal jurisdiction and
cautioning Plaintiff that
“multiple attempts to remove
the same action based on the
same grounds are improper. ”

CV 13-00436 LEK-KSC

Mather v.
Nakasone

8/30/13

Action alleging that the Honorable
Karen T. Nakasone, who presided
over Nazemi, et al. v. Wrona, et
al., the state court action that was
improperly removed by Plaintiff
then remanded (CV 13-00239
SOM-BMK), breached her
fiduciary duties and committed a
tort against Plaintiff by failing to
settle and close the case.

Dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction. The court initially
sua sponte dismissed the action
without prejudice with leave to
amend, but ultimately
dismissed with prejudice
because Plaintiff did not file an
amended complaint by the
provided deadline.

3

CV 14-00082 DKW-RLP

Mather, et al. v.
Territorial Savings
Bank, et al.

2/18/14

Action stemming from the
Wanaka Street property loans that
have since been foreclosed upon
in state court. Plaintiff asserted
the following claims: 1) lack of
standing to foreclose; 2) fraud in
the concealment; 3) fraud in the
inducement; 4) intentional
infliction of emotional distress;
5) quiet title; 6) slander of title;
7) declaratory relief; 8) violations
of the Truth in Lending Act
(“TILA”); 9) violations of the
Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act (“RESPA”); 10) violations of
the Consumer Protection Act
(“CPA”); 11) rescission; and
12) for an accounting.

4

Dismissal of action as timebarred, declination of
supplemental jurisdiction over
the state law claims, and denial
of request to amend because the
proposed Federal Debt
Collections Practices Act
(“FDCPA”), civil Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (“RICO”), and
due process claims would be
barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine.

CV14-00091 SOM-RLP

Mather v. First
Hawaiian Bank, et
al.

2/25/14

Action stemming from the Dole
Street property loans that have
since been foreclosed upon in state
court. Plaintiff asserted the
following claims: 1) lack of
standing to foreclose; 2) fraud in
the concealment; 3) fraud in the
inducement;
4) intentional infliction of
emotional distress;
5) quiet title;
6) slander of title;
7) declaratory relief; 8) violations
of the TILA; 9) violations of
RESPA; 10) rescission; and 11)
for an accounting.

5

Dismissal of action as timebarred, declination of
supplemental jurisdiction over
the state law claims, with leave
to amend. Rather than filing an
amended pleading, Plaintiff
filed a motion to amend. Said
motion was denied because the
69-page proposed amended
complaint violated FRCP 8,
included improper challenges
to the state court proceedings,
and the proposed claims were
futile under the law of the case
doctrine, Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, issue and claim
preclusion, among other
reasons. Plaintiff was granted
another opportunity to seek
leave to amend, but failed to do
so, which resulted in the
ultimate dismissal of the action.

CV 14-00139 LEK-BMK

Mather v. Central
Pacific Bank, et al.

4/10/14

Action stemming from loans
issued as to a property located at
98-854 Noelani Street, #67, Pearl
City, Hawaii 96782, that have
since been foreclosed upon in state
court. Plaintiff asserted the
following claims: 1) lack of
standing to foreclose; 2) fraud in
the concealment; 3) fraud in the
inducement; 4) intentional
infliction of emotional distress;
5) quiet title; 6) slander of title;
7) declaratory relief; 8) violations
of the TILA; 9) violations of
RESPA; 10) rescission; and
11) for an accounting.

Action dismissed for lack of
standing and failure to cure
defects in the pleadings after
having two opportunities to do
so.

CV 14-00384 HG-KSC
(instant action)

Mather v. First
Hawaiian Bank, et
al.

8/28/14

Action requesting that the district
court exercise appellate review of
the state court Wanaka Street
foreclosure order and judgment.

Action dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction
under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, and failure to state a
claim as to Defendant The
Honorable Edwin C. Nacino
because absolute judicial
immunity applies.

6

CV 14-00391 DKW-BMK

Mather v.
Territorial Savings
Bank, et al.

9/3/14

Action requesting that the district
court review TSB’s state court
foreclosure action regarding the
Wanaka Street property. These
claims were determined to be
futile in CV 14-00082 DKW-RLP
and Plaintiff’s request to amend to
add such claims was denied.

Action dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction
under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine and claims against
Judge Nacino failed because he
is protected by absolute judicial
immunity.

CV 14-00429 SOM-RLP

Mather v. First
Hawaiian Bank, et
al.

9/26/14

Action seeking to assert claims
under 18 U.S.C. § 1964 regarding
the Dole Street foreclosure, which
Plaintiff previously asserted in CV
14-00091 SOM-RLP. It was
determined that Plaintiff was
collaterally estopped from
asserting that FHB or its attorneys
violated RICO based on
misrepresentations FHB’s
attorneys allegedly made to the
state court in the foreclosure
proceedings because the state
court determined that FHB owned
the loans.

Pending disposition of the
defendants’ motion to dismiss.

7

Civil No. 14-00384 HG-KSC Mather v. First Hawaiian Bank, et al. - APPENDIX B
Sampling of Plaintiff’s Motions Practice
Case No.

Motions

Disposition

• Verified Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and Add Party
• Verified Motion to Compel Discovery From Defendant First Hawaiian
Bank
• Motion Under Authority of F.R.Civ.P R. 60(b)(4) for Vacation of This
Court’s August 22, 2014 Order of Dismissal
• Motion Under Authority of F.R.Civ. P. R. 60(b)(4) for Vacation of
This Court’s August 22, 2014 Order of Dismissal (challenging order
denying motion to amend/compel)
• Motion Under Authority of F.R.Civ. P. R. 60(b)(4) for Vacation of
This Court’s August 22, 2014 Order of Dismissal (challenging 6/24/14
order of dismissal)

• Denied (8/22/14)
• Denied (8/22/14)

CV 14-00082 DKW-RLP

• Verified Motion to Compel Discovery From Defendant First Hawaiian
Bank
• Motion Under Authority of F.R.Civ.P R. 60(b)(4) for Vacation of This
Court’s July 31, 2014 Order Granting Defendant First Hawaiian Bank’s
Motion to Dismiss and Denying Plaintiff Mather’s Motion to Amend
(identical to that filed and denied in CV 14-00091 SOM-RLP)

• Case dismissed prior
to disposition
• Denied (11/21/14)

CV 14-00139 LEK-BMK

• Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Verified Complaint
• Motion Under Authority of F.R.Civ.P R. 60(b)(4) for Vacation of This
Court’s October 31, 2014 Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss
• Motion for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Pursuant to
F.R.Civ.P. Rule 52(a)

• Granted (7/25/14)
• Denied (11/28/14)

CV14-00091 SOM-RLP

1

• Denied (9/18/14)
• Pending disposition

• Pending disposition

• Denied (11/28/14)

CV 14-00384 HG-KSC

CV 14-00391 DKW-BMK

• “Motion to Strike Defendant Edwin C. Nacino’s Motion to Dismiss
With Prejudice Verified Complaint and Claim Under Authority of 42
U.S.C. § 1983, Filed August 28, 2014, and; Response to Defendant
Edwin C. Nacino’s Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice Verified
Complaint and Claim Under Authority of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Filed
August 28, 2014, and; Motion for Declaratory Relief Under Authority
of 28 U.S.C. § 2201; Mandatory Judicial Notice of F.R.C.P. Rule 201”
• “Response to Defendants’ First Hawaiian Bank and Jonathan W.Y.
Lai’s Motion to Dismiss Verified Complaint and Claim Under
Authority of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and; Motion For Injunctive and
Declaratory Relief Under Authority of 28 U.S.C. § 2201.”
• Motion for Declaratory Relief Under Authority of 28 U.S.C. § 2201
• Motion for Preliminary Injunction
• Motion for Sanctions Against David Nakashima Under Authority
F.R.Civ.P.Rule 11(1)(A)
• Motion for Declaratory Relief Under Authority of 28 U.S.C. § 2201
• Motion for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Pursuant to
F.R.Civ.P. Rule 52(a)
• Motion to Vacate Under Authority of F.R.Civ.P. Rule 60(b)(4) This
Courts November 18, 2014 Orders

• Stricken (10/15/14)

• Motion for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Pursuant to
F.R.Civ.P. Rule 52(a)
• Motion to Vacate Under Authority of F.R.Civ.P. Rule 60(b)(4) This
Courts November 17, 2014 Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss

• pending

2

• Stricken (10/15/14)

• Stricken (10/29/14)
• Denied (11/18/14)
• Denied as moot
(12/1/14)
• Denied (11/18/14)
• pending
• pending

• pending

Civil No. 14-00384 HG-KSC Mather v. First Hawaiian Bank, et al. - APPENDIX C
Sampling of Excerpts From Plaintiff’s Filings
Case No.

Document

CV 13-00294 JMS-RLP

Excerpt

Denial of Order Remanding Action
to the First Circuit Court of the State
of Hawaii. Doc. No. 8.

2. Affiant grants the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII jurisdiction to hear this
action. . . .
....
5. Affiant states that if the UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII won’t answer the
question then a show cause hearing should result as to why the
Court will not answer a federal question; why a tort claim
should not issue for the federal judge to purge is contempt.
6. Affiant states that the only recourse remaining will be to take
this matter to the United States Court of Appeals; as it appears
that a United States Federal Judge is recusing a State Judge.
7. Affiant denies that Affiant is pro-se, and has clearly
demonstrated status as the Trustee of the DIANE ELIZABETH
MATHER TRUST. Falsely labeling Diane Elizabeth Mather
Trustee as Pro-se is slander and liable [sic]. Doc. No. 8 at 2-3.

CV14-00082 DKW-RLP

Verified Response in Opposition by
Unsworn Declaration to Defendant
First Hawaiian Bank’s Motion for
Order Declaring Plaintiff Diane E.
Mather a Vexatious Litigant. Doc.
No. 27

“I Diane Elizabeth Mather am in correct public capacity as a
beneficiary to the Original Jurisdiction, being of majority age,
competent to testify, a self-realized living woman, sui juris,
without obligation of vassalage or fealty upon the land, my ‘yes’
be ‘yes’, my ‘no’ be ‘no’.” Doc. No. 27 at 2.

1

CV 14-00091 SOM-RLP

• GROUNDS FOR VACATION: While it is recognized that a
Court has a duty to examine the pleadings of any case and
dismiss the case when it appears that the Court is in want of
jurisdiction, ironically, this Court lacked authority to dismiss
this instant case, to wit:

• Motion Under Authority of
F.R.Civ.P R. 60(b)(4) for
Vacation of This Court’s August
22, 2014 Order of Dismissal.
Doc. No. 51

1. This Court’s assertion that this Court is deprived of
jurisdiction by claim preclusion presumes facts not in
evidence, a violation of the Plaintiffs’ [sic] due process
rights and rights to equal protection of the laws. NOTE:
Susan Oki Mollway, in Judge Mollway’s order of dismissal
contravenes the F.R.E. by making the unverified and
undocumented claim that the exact same claims were
litigated in a Hawaii state court thus presuming facts not in
evidence depriving Judge Mollway of dismissing this instant
case on grounds of claim preclusion. Doc. No. 51 at 2.
• Motion Under Authority of
F.R.Civ. P. R. 60(b)(4) for
Vacation of This Court’s August
22, 2014 Order of Dismissal
(challenging order denying
motion to amend/compel). Doc.
No. 53

• Absent this proof, the underlying court never had threshold
jurisdiction to even consider the claim, worse yet, the entire
action was a violation of 18 USC 1962, racketeering and for
the Honorable Mollway to determine otherwise causes the
Honorable Mollway to be guilty in re 18 USC 3. (2) The
Honorable Mollway has misapplied law in a manner that
suggests intent to conspire to violate 18 USC 1962. The
Honorable Mollway is deemed to be highly intelligent, well
educated, trained, and seasoned in the law and therefore is
charged with the knowledge that a mortgage is not a lien on
the property but rather a lien on the promissory note with the
property as surety, ERGO before property can be taken by
foreclosure, the original promissory not upon which it is a
lien must be in evidence and in fact must be surrendered to
the mortgagor. Doc. No. 53 at 2.
2

(cont.)

• Motion Under Authority of
F.R.Civ. P. R. 60(b)(4) for
Vacation of This Court’s August
22, 2014 Order of Dismissal
(challenging 6/24/14 order of
dismissal). Doc. No. 54

• Absent this proof, a mortgage lien an in choate article and
proceeding to take property on an in choate article is per se
extortion in violation of 18 USC 1961. Doc. 54 at 2-3.

3

CV 14-00384 HG-KSC

• “Motion to Strike Defendant
Edwin C. Nacino’s Motion to
Dismiss With Prejudice Verified
Complaint and Claim Under
Authority of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
Filed August 28, 2014, and;
Response to Defendant Edwin C.
Nacino’s Motion to Dismiss With
Prejudice Verified Complaint and
Claim Under Authority of 42
U.S.C. § 1983, Filed August 28,
2014, and; Motion for
Declaratory Relief Under
Authority of 28 U.S.C. § 2201;
Mandatory Judicial Notice of
F.R.C.P. Rule 201”. Doc. No.
19.

• This court shall notice that this is a jurisdictional
challenge placing the burden of proving jurisdiction on
David M. Louie, Patricia Ohara and Robyn B. Chun to
show under what authority the state’s resources can be
placed in jeopardy to enter as counsel and defend on
behalf of employees acting outside the good faith scope of
their employment. Doc. No. 19 at 2.

• Motion for Declaratory Relief
Under Authority of 28 U.S.C. §
2201. Doc. No. 25

• This court’s determination that Diane E. Mather has been
deprived of property without due process of law warrants
vacation of the void judgment and damages to amend the bad
behavior of First Hawaiian Bank and Jonathan W.Y. Lai.
Doc. No. 25 at 6.

• Motion For Preliminary
Injunction. Doc. No. 26

• Diane E. Mather will suffer insult, degradation, and
deprivation of personhood by denial of this preliminary
injunction.

FIRST PROPOSITION: The Fair Debt Collections Practices
Act, 15 USC 1601 et seq. and common law authorities under
the Act articulate due process rights. Third party debt
collectors [sic] violation of alleged debtors due process rights
under the Act deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction
rendering judgments foreclosing the alleged debt void.
Approved________________
Not Approved_____________
Authority________________
Id. at 26-27.

2. Diane E. Mather is likely to prevail in this instant petition.
The record in the underlying case makes Diane E. Mather’s
averments undeniable. Doc. No. 26 at 1-2.
4

(cont.)

• Motion for Sanctions Against
David Nakashima Under
Authority F.R.Civ.P.Rule
11(1)(A). Doc. No. 33.

• 2. Nakashima has breached the duty found at F.R.Civ.P.
Rule 11 as even a cursory inquiry reveals that Nakashima
works a fraud on this Court as the records in the state court
actions filed by Central Pacific Bank, Territorial Savings
Bank and First Hawaiian Bank reveal evidence of fraud,
extortion, and racketeering. Nakashima also has actual
knowledge that Jonathan W.Y. Lai and First Hawaiian Bank
have committed numerous criminal acts including fraud, mail
fraud, and title fraud soiling the hands of both Nakashima,
Lai and First Hawaiian Bank. Doc. No. 33 at 2.

5