Davis v. Lowe's HIW, Inc. et al
Filing
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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS re: 14 . Signed by JUDGE ALAN C KAY on 2/17/2015. Excerpt of conclusion: "The Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff's Complai nt in its entirety. The Court DENIES Plaintiff leave to amend to assert claims against Lowe's for negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress or for punitive damages. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend to assert any other no n-futile claims appropriate under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must file any amended complaint within thirty days of the issuance of this Order or judgment will be entered against him and this action will be closed." ; Written order follows hearing held February 17, 2015 on defendant Lowe's Home Center, LLC's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Minutes of hearing: doc no. 20 . CERTIFICATE O F SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
KENNETH DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
LOWE’S HIW, INC., now known as
Lowe’s Home Centers, LLC,
Defendant.
) Civ. No. 14-00385 ACK-BMK
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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant
Lowe’s Home Centers’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The
Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Complaint. As
discussed herein, the Court DENIES Plaintiff leave to amend to
assert claims against Defendant for negligent or intentional
infliction of emotional distress or for punitive damages. The
Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend to assert any other
non-futile claims appropriate under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND1/
This case involves a wrongful termination claim brought
by Plaintiff Kenneth Davis against his former employer, Lowe’s
1/
The facts as recited in this Order are for the purpose of
disposing of the current motion and are not to be construed as
findings of fact that the parties may rely on in future
proceedings.
HIW, Inc. (“Lowe’s”). Plaintiff was hired by Lowe’s in March 2012
to work as a Project Exteriors Specialist at the Kailua-Kona
Lowe’s store. (Compl. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff alleges that he had no
disciplinary problems during his employment, but on or around
December 4, 2012, Plaintiff seriously injured his shoulder in a
work-related accident. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 18.) Plaintiff states that he
reported the injury to Lowe’s in a timely manner, and it was
found to be a compensable work injury. (Id. ¶¶ 16-17.) Plaintiff
states that he “kept [Lowe’s] apprised and updated on his status”
while he “rehabilitate[d]” his shoulder and sought treatment.
(Id. ¶¶ 18-19.)
During the week of May 20, 2013, at the request of
Lowe’s, Plaintiff met with the Human Resources Manager at the
Kailua-Kona store, Michelle, who “ordered Plaintiff to return to
work the next day to perform ‘installation’ work in the office.”
(Id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff explained to Michelle that he was in a
great deal of pain, that he was on pain medication, and that he
could not return to work. (Id. ¶¶ 23-24.) Plaintiff asked that a
decision on his return date be delayed until he received the
results of a further evaluation by his physician. (Id. ¶ 23.)
Plaintiff alleges that Lowe’s rejected this “request[] for
accommodation,” and told Plaintiff that he would no longer be
able to work in his former role as a Project Exteriors
Specialist. (Id. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff was instructed to return to
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work at 8:00 a.m. the next day to “do typing, answer phones,
write and move installation inventory[.]” (Id. ¶ 26.) Plaintiff
stated that he could not perform those duties because he was in a
great deal of pain and was on pain medication. The following day,
Lowe’s terminated Plaintiff’s employment. (Id. ¶¶ 27-28.)
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 28, 2014, Plaintiff filed his Complaint
against Lowe’s asserting a single cause of action for wrongful
termination in violation of public policy. (Compl. (Doc. No. 1.)
at ¶¶ 30-31.) Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief. (Id.
¶¶ 34-36.)
On September 30, 2014, Lowe’s filed its Answer, and on
October 21, 2014, Lowe’s filed an Amended Answer. (Doc. Nos. 8,
11.) On November 25, 2014, Lowe’s filed the instant Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings. (Doc. No. 14.) Plaintiff filed his
memorandum in opposition on January 26, 2015, (Doc. No. 17,) and
Lowe’s filed its reply on February 3, 2015. (Doc. No. 19.)
A hearing on the motion was held on February 17, 2015.
STANDARD
The standard for a motion for judgment on the pleadings
brought under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
is “functionally identical” to that governing a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion. United States ex rel. Caffaso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys.,
Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011). Under Rule 12(c),
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“[j]udgment on the pleadings is properly granted when, accepting
all factual allegations as true, there is no material fact in
dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir.
2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, review is
generally limited to the contents of the complaint. Sprewell v.
Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001);
Campanelli v. Bokrath, 100 F.3d 1476, 1479 (9th Cir. 1996). All
allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Fed’n of African
Am. Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir.
1996). Conclusory allegations of law, unwarranted deductions of
fact, and unreasonable inferences are insufficient to defeat a
motion to dismiss. Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988.
To survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
“factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true even if doubtful in fact.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (examining
Rule 12(b)(6)) (internal quotation marks omitted). While a
complaint need not have detailed factual allegations, “a
plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his
‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and
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conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555. The complaint must
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at
570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009). “Naked
assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” that suggest
only a “mere possibility of misconduct” are not enough to state a
claim for relief. Id. at 698. Additionally, “[t]hreadbare
recitals of elements of a cause of action supported by mere
conclusory statements” do not suffice. Id. at 679.
DISCUSSION
In the instant motion, Lowe’s seeks judgment as to
Plaintiff’s sole claim for termination in violation of public
policy. Lowe’s asserts that such a claim is barred because Hawaii
law already provides a statutory remedy for terminating an
employee solely because of a work-related injury.
In Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., the Hawaii Supreme
Court recognized an exception to the judicially created
“employment at-will” doctrine, holding that “an employer may be
held liable in tort where his discharge of an employee violates a
clear mandate of public policy.” 652 P.2d 625, 631 (Haw. 1982).
Subsequently, however, the Hawaii Supreme Court clarified that an
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independent Parnar claim (for discharge in violation of public
policy) cannot be maintained “where the public policy upon which
the claim is based is embodied in a statute . . . that itself
provides a sufficient remedy for its violation.” Ross v. Stouffer
Hotel Co. (Hawaii) Ltd., Inc., 879 P.2d 1037, 1047 (Haw. 1994).
In Ross, the plaintiff was terminated pursuant to a
company policy prohibiting persons related by marriage from
working in the same department. The employee sued his former
employer asserting, inter alia, a claim that his discharge was in
violation of the public policy prohibiting employment
discrimination based on marital status. The Hawaii Supreme Court
noted that Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-2(1) expressly makes unlawful
the discharge of an employee because of his or her marital status
and, thus, the legislature had already provided the means for
enforcing the public policy that the plaintiff sought to
vindicate through his Parnar claim. Id. at 1047. Thus, because a
legislative remedy was available, the Ross court upheld the grant
of summary judgment against the plaintiff as to his Parnar claim.
Id.
Here, the sole claim in Plaintiff’s Complaint is one
for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy based upon
his alleged work-injury related discharge. (See Compl. ¶¶ 29-31.)
Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that he injured his shoulder in a
“work-related accident,” that he reported the injury in a timely
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manner to Lowe’s, that the injury was found to be “a compensable
work injury,” and that Lowe’s terminated his employment after he
informed Human Resources that he was unable to work because of
his injury. (Id. ¶¶ 15-17, 28.) Plaintiff claims that his
discharge for a work-related injury violated public policy. The
Hawaii legislature has, however, already provided a statutory
remedy for such a claim.
Section 378-32 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes provides
that it “shall be unlawful for any employer to suspend,
discharge, or discriminate against any of the employer’s
employees . . . [s]olely because the employee has suffered a work
injury which arose out of and in the course of the employee’s
employment . . . .” Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-32; see also Haw. Rev.
Stat. § 378-35 (providing remedies for a violation of § 378-32).
Thus, the Hawaii legislature has already established a method by
which Plaintiff may vindicate his asserted public policy
interest. As such, under the reasoning of Ross, Plaintiff’s
Parnar claim cannot be maintained.
The Court notes that the Ross court established an
exception to the general rule that a Parnar claim cannot lie
where there is already a statutory remedy available.
Specifically, the court stated that a Parnar claim may be brought
where the legislative body specifically provides that a common
law claim exists even though a statutory remedy is also in place.
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Id. Here, as in Ross, however, no such provision has been made.
There is no language in the relevant statutes suggesting a
legislative intent to allow the common law Parnar claim to
continue to exist in addition to the claim created by Haw. Rev.
Stat. § 378-32.2/
Indeed, the Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals has
ruled on this very issue, concluding that plaintiffs may not
pursue claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy based upon a discharge for a work-related injury because
the Hawaii legislature has already established a remedy for such
discharges. See Takaki v. Allied Machinery Corp., 951 P.2d 507,
513 (Haw. App. 1998) (“[B]ecause the statutory provisions
evidencing our public policy against discharges for compensable
2/
Citing Villon v. Marriott Hotel Services, Inc., 306 P.3d
175 (Haw. 2013), Plaintiff attempts to argue that the Hawaii
Supreme Court requires an express exclusivity provision before a
Parnar claim may be deemed barred by the existence of a statutory
remedy. (See Opp’n at 4-5.) Villon involved an analysis of
whether a violation of one section of the Hawaii Revised Statutes
(requiring hotels to remit to service employees the entire amount
of service charges imposed on food and beverage service or
disclose to consumers that they were not doing so) may be
enforced through the remedies provided in a different section
setting forth wage and compensation laws. In answering that
question in the affirmative, the Villon court never addressed the
entirely different issue of whether a common law Parnar claim is
barred when a statutory remedy already exists. As discussed
above, the relevant Hawaii Supreme Court authority on that
particular issue is Ross, 879 P.2d at 1047. The Hawaii Supreme
Court did not state in Ross, nor has it stated in any subsequent
case, that a statute must contain an express exclusivity
provision in order for it to bar a Parnar claim premised upon the
same violation. Plaintiff’s arguments otherwise are therefore
unpersuasive.
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work injuries provide a remedy for such discharges, Takaki’s
Parnar claim cannot be maintained.”).
Plaintiff argues that this Court need not follow Takaki
because the Intermediate Court of Appeals in that case failed to
address whether the statutory provisions provided a “sufficient”
remedy for discharges as a result of work-related injuries.
(Opp’n at 5-8.) This argument is unpersuasive, however, as a
careful reading of Ross makes clear that the Hawaii Supreme Court
did not establish any requirement that a statutory remedy be
“sufficient,” as opposed to simply available. Quoting an earlier
case decided by this district court, the Hawaii Supreme Court in
Ross stated: “[i]f . . . the statutory or regulatory provisions
which evidence the public policy themselves provide a remedy for
wrongful discharge, provision of a further remedy under the
public policy exception is unnecessary.” 879 P.2d at 1047
(quoting Lapinad v. Pacific Oldsmobile-GMC, Inc., 679 F. Supp.
991, 993 (D. Haw. 1988)) (emphasis added). Thus, the Ross court
made clear that, so long as some statutory remedy is available,
any further remedy pursuant to a Parnar claim is unnecessary and,
therefore, unavailable.
Indeed, the Hawaii Supreme Court in Ross expressly
acknowledged that the relief available to Ross under Haw. Rev.
Stat. § 378-2 was limited to equitable relief, but concluded that
this limitation did not undermine the court’s conclusion that,
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because a statutory remedy was available, Ross could not bring a
common law claim of discharge in violation of public policy. Id.
The court stated: “While the addition of compensatory and
punitive damages might enhance the enforcement of the policy
against discrimination based on marital status, we do not believe
that the available statutory remedies, which are quite broad in
their own right, are insufficient to compensate Ross for his
employment discrimination claim.” Id. (citing Smith v. Chaney
Brooks Realty, Inc., 865 P.2d 170, 174 (Haw. App. 1994) (finding
no statutory bar to a Parnar claim where the statutory provision
provided no remedy at all for an employee terminated in
retaliation for seeking to enforce his rights under that
statute)). Here, as was the case with Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-2 in
Ross, Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-35 provides for equitable remedies
such as reinstatement with or without back pay. Thus, just as the
Court found in Ross and Takaki, the Court concludes that the
available statutory remedy here is sufficient to vindicate the
public policy Plaintiff seeks to enforce.
In sum, because the Hawaii legislature has already
provided a statutory remedial scheme for the unlawful employment
practice of which he complains, Plaintiff cannot bring his common
law Parnar claim. As the Takaki court stated, section 378-32 of
the Hawaii Revised Statutes already evidences a public policy
against terminating an employee solely because of a work injury,
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and section 378–35 provides a remedy for violations of that
policy. Id. at 507; see also Cambron v. Starwood Vacation
Ownership, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1141-42 (D. Haw. 2013)
(citing Takaki and holding that the plaintiff could not bring a
claim for termination in violation of public policy based upon
his work-related injury because Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 378-32 & 37835 already provide a remedy for such a claim). The Court
therefore GRANTS the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and
DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety.
Leave to Amend
The Court notes that Plaintiff seeks leave to amend his
Complaint to assert claims of negligent or intentional infliction
of emotional distress and punitive damages. (Opp’n at 11.) As
Lowe’s points out, however, any such amendment would be futile,
as neither claim against Lowe’s is permissible under Hawaii law.
With respect to negligent or intentional infliction of
emotional distress, both of these claims against Lowe’s are
barred by the exclusivity provision of Hawaii’s workers’
compensation statutes. Specifically, Hawaii Revised Statutes
section 386-5 states that the statutory remedies for a work
injury suffered by an employee set forth therein “shall exclude
all other liability of the employer to the employee[.]” Haw. Rev.
Stat. § 386-5. Hawaii courts have consistently held that section
386-5 bars claims for negligent and intentional infliction of
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emotional distress in the context employment suits, with only
narrow exceptions,3/ none of which apply here. See, e.g., Yang v.
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 284 P.3d 946, 954-56 (Haw. Ct. App.
2012); Luzon v. Atlas Ins. Agency, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d 1261,
1263 (D. Haw. 2003). Likewise, as to a claim for punitive
damages, Hawaii law does not establish an independent claim for
punitive damages. See Ross, 879 P.2d at 1049 (“[A] claim for
punitive damages is not an independent tort, but is purely
incidental to a separate cause of action.”)
Because any amendment of the Complaint to include
claims against Lowe’s for intentional or negligent infliction of
emotional distress or punitive damages would be futile, the Court
DENIES Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend to assert those
particular claims. See, e.g., Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845
(9th Cir. 1995) (“Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify
the denial of a motion for leave to amend.”).
The Court nevertheless GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend
to the extent he seeks to assert any non-futile claims
appropriate under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant
3/
The exceptions are limited to claims for infliction of
emotional distress or invasion of privacy that arise from sexual
harassment or sexual assault. See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 386-5.
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Lowe’s Home Centers’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The
Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Complaint in its
entirety. The Court DENIES Plaintiff leave to amend to assert
claims against Lowe’s for negligent or intentional infliction of
emotional distress or for punitive damages. The Court GRANTS
Plaintiff leave to amend to assert any other non-futile claims
appropriate under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Plaintiff must file any amended complaint within
thirty days of the issuance of this Order or judgment will be
entered against him and this action will be closed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
Honolulu, Hawaii, February 17, 2015
________________________________
Alan C. Kay
Senior United States District Judge
Davis v. Lowe’s, Civ. No. 14-00385 ACK BMK, Order Granting Defendant’s Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings.
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