Bruser v. Bank of Hawaii

Filing 387

ORDER: DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT; GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DIRECT PAYMENT AND AMEND THE RECEIVERSHIP ORDER OR ENJOIN THE RECEIVER; AND ADDRESSING THE RECEIVER'S MOTION FOR I NSTRUCTIONS re 317 , 320 , 348 , 351 , 360 - Signed by JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI on 9/30/2020. On the basis of the foregoing, AOAO's Motion for Supplemental Judgement Against Plaintiffs Michael David Br user and Lynn Bruser, filed May 5, 2020, is HEREBY DENIED. The Brusers' Non-Hearing Motion for Order (A) Directing Payment to Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff Bank of Hawaii, as Trustee, and (B) Amending/Enjoining the Temporary Receivership Ord er, filed June 30, 2020 is HEREBY GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Receiver's Motion for Instructions, filed July 3, 2020, is denied, that is, the Receiver is HEREBY ORDERED to not disburse any funds related to BOH's rent renegotiation request. The Receiver SHALL remit to BOH the amounts identified above and file a final report, at which point the Brusers may move to terminate the receivership. (emt, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF HAWAII

MICHAEL DAVID BRUSER, TRUSTEES
UNDER THAT CERTAIN UNRECORDED
REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST AGREEMENT
DATED JULY 11, 1988, AS AMENDED,
DOING BUSINESS AS DISCOVERY BAY
CENTER; AND LYNN BRUSER,
TRUSTEES UNDER THAT CERTAIN
UNRECORDED REVOCABLE LIVING
TRUST AGREEMENT DATED JULY 11,
1988, AS AMENDED, DOING BUSINESS
AS DISCOVERY BAY CENTER;
Plaintiffs,
vs.
BANK OF HAWAII, A HAWAII
CORPORATION, AS TRUSTEE, AS
SUCCESSOR BY MERGER WITH
HAWAIIAN TRUST COMPANY, LIMITED,
A FORMER HAWAII CORPORATION AND
AS SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE UNDER THAT
CERTAIN TRUST AGREEMENT DATED
JUNE 6, 1974;
Defendant.
________________________________
vs.
JULIE G. HENDERSON, as Trustee
of the Julie G. Henderson
Irrevocable Trust, and as
Trustee of the Jean K. Gowans
Irrevocable Trust, and as
Trustee of the Louis L. Gowans,
Jr. Irrevocable Trust; RICHARD
L. GOWANS, as Trustee of the
Richard L. Gowans Irrevocable
Trust; KEVIN I. YOKOHAMA;
ASSOCIATION OF APARTMENT OWNERS

CIV. NO. 14-00387 LEK-RLP

DISCOVERY BAY; SUSAN SHEETZ; and
PATRICIA SHEETZ BOW,
Intervening Defendants.
________________________________
BANK OF HAWAII, a Hawaii
corporation, as Trustee, as
successor by merger with
Hawaiian Trust Company, Limited,
a former Hawaii corporation and
as successor Trustee under that
certain Trust Agreement dated
June 6, 1974,
Counterclaim Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL DAVID BRUSER and LYNN
BRUSER, Trustees under that
certain unrecorded Revocable
Living Trust Agreement dated
July 11, 1988, as amended, doing
business as Discovery Bay
Center,
Counterclaim Defendants.

ORDER: DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT;
GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
DIRECT PAYMENT AND AMEND THE RECEIVERSHIP ORDER OR ENJOIN THE
RECEIVER; AND ADDRESSING THE RECEIVER’S MOTION FOR INSTRUCTIONS
Before the Court is Intervenor Defendant/Counterclaim
Plaintiff Association of Apartment Owners of Discovery Bay’s
(“AOAO”) Motion for Supplemental Judgement Against Plaintiffs
Michael David Bruser and Lynn Bruser (“Motion for Supplemental
Judgment”), filed on May 5, 2020.

[Dkt. no. 317.]

Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff Bank of Hawaii, as Trustee

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under the Trust Agreement dated June 6, 1974, as amended, and
not individually (“BOH”), filed its joinder to the Motion for
Supplemental Judgment (“Supplemental Judgment Joinder”) on
May 6, 2020.

[Dkt. no. 320.]

Plaintiffs/Counterclaim

Defendants Michael David Bruser and Lynn Bruser, Trustees under
that certain unrecorded Revocable Living Trust Agreement dated
July 11, 1988, as amended, doing business as Discovery Bay
Center (“the Brusers”), filed their memorandum in opposition
(“Supplemental Judgment Opposition”) on June 9, 2020, and AOAO
filed its reply on June 30, 2020.

[Dkt. nos. 341, 347.]

filed its reply on June 30, 2020.

[Dkt. no. 349.]

BOH

Also before

the Court is the Brusers’ Non-Hearing Motion for Order
(A) Directing Payment to Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff Bank
of Hawaii, as Trustee, and (B) Amending/Enjoining the Temporary
Receivership Order (“Motion for Payment”), filed June 30, 2020.
[Dkt. no. 348.]

AOAO filed its memorandum in opposition to the

Motion for Payment on July 31, 2020.

[Dkt. no. 359.]

BOH filed

its memorandum in opposition to the Motion for Payment (“BOH
Payment Opposition”) on July 31, 2020.

[Dkt. no. 361.]

The

Brusers filed their replies in support of the Motion for Payment
on August 14, 2020.

[Dkt. nos. 369, 370.]

Also before the

Court is Temporary Receiver Steve Sombrero’s (“the Receiver”)
Motion for Instructions Regarding Payment of Certain Trustee’s
Fees and Expenses of Trustee Bank of Hawaii (“Motion for
3

Instructions”), filed July 3, 2020, and an errata to the Motion
for Instructions filed on July 21, 2020.

[Dkt. nos. 351, 357.]

On July 31, 2020, AOAO and BOH filed a joinder and a statement
of no opposition, respectively, to the Motion for Instructions.
[Dkt. nos. 360, 362.]

Also on July 31, 2020, the Brusers filed

their memorandum in opposition to the Motion for Instructions.
[Dkt. no. 358.]

On August 13, 2020, the Receiver filed his

reply in support of his Motion for Instructions.
no. 367.]

[Dkt.

These matters came on for hearing on August 28, 2020.

The Motion for Supplemental Judgment is hereby denied and the
Motion for Payment is hereby granted in part and denied in part.
The Motion for Instructions is denied, the Receiver is ordered
to not disburse funds related to the rent renegotiation for the
reasons set forth below.
BACKGROUND
A summary of the factual background is set forth in
the magistrate judge’s order entered on April 10, 2020, [dkt.
no. 304,] and only the relevant facts will be repeated here.
After a bench trial, judgment was entered in favor of BOH in the
amount of $137,434.50, representing “the difference between what
the Brusers owed and what they paid between October 2014 and
December 2015, including the applicable” general excise tax.
[Judgment in a Civil Case (“Judgment”), filed 6/28/16 (dkt. no.
193), at 2.]

BOH was also awarded attorney’s fees and costs.
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[Id.]

BOH’s attempts to collect the amounts due under the

Judgment were unsuccessful, and on February 7, 2019, the Court
granted BOH’s Motion for Appointment of a Temporary Receiver,
[filed 7/31/18 (dkt. no. 221),] specifically finding that the
Brusers had failed to pay the amounts due under the Judgment for
over two years.
14.]

[Amended Order, filed 2/7/19 (dkt. no. 242), at

On February 13, 2019, the Court appointed the Receiver.

[Order Appointing Temporary Receiver (“Receivership Order”),
filed 2/13/19 (dkt. no. 243).]

Because the Brusers refused to

comply with the Receivership Order including refusing to turn
over the books and records related to the commercial unit at
Discovery Bay (“Commercial Unit”) to the Receiver, on
September 20, 2019, the Court held the Brusers in civil
contempt.

See Minutes, filed 9/4/19 (dkt. no. 261); Minutes,

filed 9/20/19 (dkt. no. 264); see also Order Regarding
Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants’ Response to Order to Show
Cause, filed 1/29/20 (dkt. no. 281).

The parties have since

represented to the Court that the books and records have been
turned over, and the Receiver has been able to assume his duties
under the Receivership Order.

See, e.g., BOH’s Status Report on

the Order to Show Cause Why Plaintiffs Should not be Held in
Contempt for Failure to Comply with Receivership Order, filed
9/16/19 (dkt. no. 262).

5

In the Motion for Supplemental Judgment, AOAO seeks
entry of a supplemental judgment in the amount of $636,272.49,
representing amounts owed to BOH through April 2020.
Supp. of Motion for Suppl. Judgment at 2.]

[Mem. in

In the Motion for

Payment, the Brusers seek an order from this Court directing the
Receiver to pay $705,969.89 to BOH, representing the amounts
owed to BOH and to amend the Receivership Order or otherwise
discontinue the Receiver’s participation in this matter.
[Motion for Payment at 6.]

The Motion for Instructions seeks

guidance from the Court about whether the Receiver should pay to
BOH costs associated with the lease renegotiation between the
lessees of Discovery Bay Condominium and BOH, as requested by
BOH.
The Motion for Supplemental Judgment and the Motion
for Payment demonstrate substantial agreement between the
parties on the amounts owed to BOH and relate to the same
relief.

Granting the Motion for Supplemental Judgment would

result in a supplemental judgment memorializing the amounts AOAO
and BOH argue are owed to BOH given the passage of time since
entry of the Judgment.

On the other hand, granting the Motion

for Payment would result in the execution of the Judgment, with
the funds actually changing hands.

6

The parties agree the

Brusers owe BOH: 1) $137,434.50 under the Judgment;1
2) $468,429.13, representing the amount of trustee’s fees under
the Trust Agreement dated June 6, 1974 (“Trustee’s Fees”) that
have gone unpaid up through April 2020 (“Trustee’s Fee
Shortfall”); and 3) $100,106.26, representing the interest owed
on the Trustee’s Fee Shortfall as accrued through April 2020.
See Mem. in Supp. of Motion for Suppl. Judgment at 10-11; Motion
for Payment at 6.

However, AOAO and BOH contend that BOH is

entitled to prejudgment interest and postjudgment interest
should be awarded based on the state law rate of

ten percent

per year, while the Brusers dispute BOH’s entitlement to
prejudgment interest, and argue that the postjudgment interest
rate should be determined under federal law.
DISCUSSION
“As a general rule, in diversity actions, state law
determines the rate of prejudgment interest, and postjudgment
interest is governed by federal law.”

Citicorp Real Estate,

Inc. v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1097, 1107 (9th Cir. 1998) (brackets,
citation, and quotation marks omitted).

1

The Motion for Supplemental Judgment does not explicitly
state that BOH is entitled to $137,434.50 under the Judgment, as
stated in the Motion for Payment. However, the Motion for
Supplemental Judgment only seeks to supplement the Judgment, not
replace it. BOH does not object to disbursement of this amount.
[BOH Payment Opp. at 3-4.]
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I.

Standing and Sanctions
The Brusers argue that AOAO does not have standing to

bring a motion seeking a supplemental judgment on behalf of BOH.
Generally, a litigant is prohibited from raising another
person’s legal rights.

Amsterdam v. State of Hawaii, CIVIL 15-

00338 LEK-BMK, 2015 WL 7737314, at *4 (D. Hawai`i Nov. 30, 2015)
(citating Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr. Co. v. Williams, No. CIV. 1100632 JMS, 2012 WL 1081174, at *2 (D. Haw. Mar. 29, 2012)).
However, “[a] substantive joinder under Local Rule 7.[7] is a
vehicle ‘through which a party may seek for itself the same
relief the movant seeks.’”

Mohr v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co.,

Civ. No. 16-00493 ACK-RLP, 2019 WL 2476791, at *8 (D. Hawai`i
June 13, 2019) (some citations omitted) (quoting Pascua v.
Option One Mortg. Corp., No. 14-00248 SOM/KSC, 2014 WL 4180947,
at *1 n.1 (D. Haw. Aug. 20, 2014)).

Because BOH filed its

Supplemental Judgment Joinder and undoubtedly has standing to
seek a supplemental judgment on its own behalf, the Brusers’
challenge to standing is rejected.

BOH and AOAO have adequate

standing to pursue the relief sought in the Motion for
Supplemental Judgment.
The Brusers’ request for sanctions, [Supplemental
Judgment Opposition at 10-12] is denied because it was not
brought in a separate motion.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2) (“A

motion for sanctions must be made separately from any other
8

motion and must describe the specific conduct that allegedly
violates Rule 11(b).”).
II.

Prejudgment Interest
AOAO asserts that BOH is entitled to prejudgment

interest of $13,908.59 for “the amounts owed under the []
Judgment for the period November 2014 thru [sic] June 2016 at
the rate of 10% per annum.”
Judgment at 11.]
interest.

[Mem. in Supp. of Motion for Suppl.

The Judgment did not provide for prejudgment

See Judgement at 2-3.
Under Hawai`i state law, prejudgment interest is

discretionary.

Metcalf v. Voluntary Emps.’ Benefit Ass’n of

Hawai`i, 99 Hawai`i 53, 61, 52 P.3d 823, 831 (2002) (citation
omitted).

“[A] postjudgment motion for discretionary

prejudgment interest constitutes a motion to alter or amend the
judgment under [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 59(e).”
Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 175 (1989).

Osterneck v. Ernst &

To the extent the Motion for

Supplemental Judgment seeks prejudgment interest, it is a
postjudgment motion for prejudgment interest and constitutes a
motion under Rule 59(e).

Pursuant to Rule 59(e), “[a] motion to

alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days
after the entry of the judgment.”

The Motion for Supplemental

Judgment was filed more than 28 days after the entry of the
Judgment.

Thus, the Motion for Supplemental Judgment is

untimely with respect to the request for
9

prejudgment interest.

See McCalla v. Royal MacCabees Life Ins. Co., 369 F.3d 1128,
1131-34 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that Rule 59(e) determines the
deadline for filing a postjudgment motion for prejudgment
interest for mandatory, as well as discretionary, prejudgment
interest).

For these reasons, the Motion for Supplemental

Judgment is denied to the extent that it seeks prejudgment
interest in the amount of $13,908.59.
III. Postjudgment Interest
AOAO and BOH argue that the postjudgment interest rate
should be set at the Hawai`i state law rate of ten percent
rather than the federal rate.

AOAO urges this Court to apply

the higher state law interest rate on the basis that “[t]he
Brusers sought to circumvent the State Court determination by
commencing this action in Federal Court.

The Brusers should not

be permitted to take advantage of a lower federal court interest
rate on a judgment against them for having done so.”
Supp. of Motion for Suppl. Judgment at 13-14.]

[Mem. in

BOH argues that,

because it recorded the Judgment with Hawaii’s Bureau of
Conveyances, if BOH were to seek enforcement in state court
under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, Haw.
Rev. Stat. § 636C-1, et seq., it would be entitled to
postjudgment interest at a

ten percent interest rate, and

therefore “this Court should recognize the law of the forum in
determining the appropriate rate of postjudgment interest
10

against the Brusers in this enforcement proceeding.”

[Suppl.

Judgment Joinder at 4 (citing Budish v. Daniel, 417 Mass. 574,
578-79, 631 N.E.2d 1009, 1012 (1994)).]
“It is settled that even in diversity cases ‘postjudgment interest is determined by federal law.’”

Northrop

Corp. v. Triad Int’l Mktg., S.A., 842 F.2d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir.
1988) (per curiam) (brackets and some citations omitted)
(quoting James B. Lansing Sound, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins.
Co. of Pittsburgh, 801 F.2d 1560, 1570 (9th Cir. 1986).

BOH

cites decisions by state courts in Texas, Iowa, and
Massachusetts applying state law that are neither binding on
this Court’s determination of the postjudgment interest rate
applicable to its own Judgment, nor informative of the
procedural/substantive distinction applied to post judgment
interest in federal court.

See In re Cardelucci, 285 F.3d 1231,

1235 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating, “[i]t has long been the rule that
an award of post-judgment interest is procedural in nature and
thereby dictated by federal law” (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460, 473–74, 85 S. Ct. 1136, 14 L. Ed. 2d 8 (1965))).
Neither BOH nor AOAO cites to: any authority to indicate that a
district court, sitting in diversity, has applied the forum
state’s treatment of foreign judgments to its own judgment to
determine the postjudgment interest rate rather than the
applicable federal law; nor any circuit level authority
11

indicating that this would be acceptable, or required.
Therefore, AOAO and BOH’s request that the postjudgment interest
rate be set according to state law is denied.

The postjudgment

interest will be awarded at the rate specified in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1961.
Federal law specifies the postjudgment interest rate
as follows:
(a) Interest shall be allowed on any money
judgment in a civil case recovered in a district
court. Execution therefor may be levied by the
marshal, in any case where, by the law of the
State in which such court is held, execution may
be levied for interest on judgments recovered in
the courts of the State. Such interest shall be
calculated from the date of the entry of the
judgment, at a rate equal to the weekly average
1-year constant maturity Treasury yield, as
published by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, for the calendar week
preceding. [sic] the date of the judgment. The
Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts shall distribute notice of
that rate and any changes in it to all Federal
judges.
(b) Interest shall be computed daily to the date
of payment except as provided in section 2516(b)
of this title and section 1304(b) of title 31,
and shall be compounded annually.
Section 1961(a)-(b).

The parties agree that the interest rate

under § 1961(a) is 0.55% per year.

[Mem. in Supp. of Motion for

Suppl. Judgment at 14; Suppl. Judgment Opp. at 9.]

Therefore,

BOH is entitled to postjudgment interest computed at 0.55% per
year pursuant to § 1961(a), calculated commencing from the date

12

of the entry of the Judgment, computed daily and compounded
annually, through the date of the payment.
IV.

See § 1961(a)-(b).

The Receiver
Next, the Court turns to three closely-related

matters: 1) the Brusers seek to amend the Receivership Order or
to otherwise enjoin the Receiver from performing his duties
under the Receivership Order other than making certain payments
to BOH; 2) BOH and AOAO request that the Receiver continue to
oversee the operations of the Commercial Unit after unpaid
amounts currently owed under the Receivership Order have been
paid; and 3) the Receiver seeks instructions from the Court
regarding a request from BOH for the Receiver to disburse to BOH
$186,420.96 for costs incurred by BOH during the renegotiation
of rent between BOH as lessor of the underlying land and the
lessees of the Discovery Bay Condominium Project.
The discharge of a Receiver is ordinarily a
matter within the discretion of the district
court. See United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141,
146 (2nd Cir. 1995) (citation omitted); see also
Securities & Exchange Commission v. An-Car Oil
Co., Inc., 604 F.2d 114, 119 (1st Cir. 1979)
(“The district court possesses a broad range of
discretion in deciding whether or not to
terminate an equity receivership.”) “A
receivership once imposed . . . should be
terminated and control returned to those who own
the business as soon as the reason for its
imposition ceases.” Securities & Exchange
Commission v. Spence & Green Chem. Co., 612 F.2d
896, 904 (5th Cir. 1980). . . .

13

Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Emvest Mortg. Fund, LLC, CASE
No. 04cv2295-DMS (POR), 2006 WL 8455242, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 2,
2006) (some alterations in Emvest Mortg. Fund).
The Receiver was appointed for the express and limited
purpose of satisfying the Brusers’ liability under the Judgment
and remedying their delinquency for Trustee’s Fee Shortfall.
The Receiver was not appointed to oversee all operations of the
Commercial Unit in perpetuity.

At the hearing and in their

filings, BOH and AOAO note the broad language of the
Receivership Order in their arguments that the Receiver should
continue indefinitely and disburse the funds related to rent
renegotiation costs.

However, the broad language of the

Receivership Order was included to give the Receiver sufficient
authority to fulfil the narrow purposes of securing the amounts
due under the Judgment and the Trustee’s Fee Shortfall.

See,

e.g., Receivership Order at 4 (stating that the Receiver is
empowered to “pay the reasonable and necessary expenses to
maintain and operate the Commercial Unit [] including quarterly
lease rent . . , uncontested monthly Trustee’s fees . . , and
the maintenance fees and assessments of the AOAO allocable to
the Commercial Unit . . . .”).

It appears from the parties’

representations that the Receiver has saved sufficient funds
from the operation of the Commercial Unit to satisfy the amounts

14

owed under the Judgment and bring the Brusers into compliance
with respect to the Trustee’s Fees.
The request for the Receiver to disburse amounts due
for rent renegotiation requires the Receiver, and due to the
Motion for Instructions, the Court, to determine the proper
allocation of costs related to the renegotiation.

This request

for payment is not a matter of interpreting and applying the
Receivership Order, it is a new claim against the Brusers not
previously litigated.

Because the assignment of liability for

costs related to rent renegotiation was not contemplated, let
alone determined, in the Judgment, the question of renegotiation
cost allocation is outside the scope of the Receivership Order
and not properly before this Court.

The Court does not reach

the question of whether the Brusers are responsible for paying
to BOH the amounts related to rent renegotiation.

Therefore,

the Receiver is hereby ordered to not disburse to BOH the
amounts requested related to rent renegotiation.
Because the Receiver has purportedly accumulated
sufficient funds to satisfy the Judgment and remedy the
Trustee’s Fee Shortfall, the Receiver must take the necessary
steps to wind up the Receivership.

To that end, the Receiver is

hereby ordered to:
1)
pay to BOH $137,434.50 in satisfaction of the amount due
under the Judgment;

15

2)
pay to BOH $468,429.13 in satisfaction of the amount due
for the Trustee’s Fee Shortfall for the time period from January
2016 through April 2020;
3)
pay to BOH the amount necessary to become current on the
Trustee’s Fee, as of the date of payment;
4)
pay to BOH $100,106.26 in satisfaction of the interest on
the Trustee’s Fee Shortfall for the period from February 2016
through April 2020, plus any additional interest, if necessary,
calculated in the same manner as presented in Exhibit 1 to the
Declaration of Alika L. Piper attached to the Motion for
Supplemental Judgment for the period from May 2020 through the
date of payment;
5)
pay to BOH postjudgment interest calculated according to
§ 1961, as specified above, for the period from the entry of the
Judgment through the date of payment;
6)

file a final accounting with the Court; and

7)
perform any other action necessary to wind up the
receivership.
The Receiver shall complete these items by December 1, 2020.
Thereafter, the Brusers may file a motion to terminate the
receivership.
Because the amounts owed under the Judgment are
identified above with sufficient clarity, there is no need for
the entry of a supplemental judgment, and the Motion for
Supplemental Judgment is denied as moot.
is granted in part and denied in part.

The Motion for Payment

It is granted to the

extent that the Receiver is ordered to disburse payment in the
above amounts, and it is denied to the extent the Brusers seek
entry of an order amending the Receivership Order or otherwise
enjoining the Receiver from continuing to work on this matter as
16

the Receiver must be able to perform his range of duties in
winding up the receivership.
in all other respects.

The Motion for Payment is denied

The Motion for Instructions is denied in

that the Receiver is ordered to not disburse the amounts
requested by BOH related to rent renegotiation.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, AOAO’s Motion for
Supplemental Judgement Against Plaintiffs Michael David Bruser
and Lynn Bruser, filed May 5, 2020, is HEREBY DENIED.

The

Brusers’ Non-Hearing Motion for Order (A) Directing Payment to
Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff Bank of Hawaii, as Trustee, and
(B) Amending/Enjoining the Temporary Receivership Order, filed
June 30, 2020 is HEREBY GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

The

Receiver’s Motion for Instructions, filed July 3, 2020, is
denied, that is, the Receiver is HEREBY ORDERED to not disburse
any funds related to BOH’s rent renegotiation request.

The

Receiver SHALL remit to BOH the amounts identified above and
file a final report, at which point the Brusers may move to
terminate the receivership.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

17

DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAI`I, September 30, 2020.

MICHAEL DAVID BRUSER, ET AL. VS. BANK OF HAWAI`I, ET AL., ETC.;
CV 14-00387 LEK-WRP; ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT; GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DIRECT PAYMENT AND AMEND THE RECEIVERSHIP
ORDER OR ENJOIN THE RECEIVER; AND ADDRESSING THE RECEIVER'S
MOTION FOR INSTRUCTIONS

18