Mather v. Territorial Savings Bank et al

Filing 31

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S RULE 60(b)(4) MOTION AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 27 , 28 . Signed by JUDGE DERRICK K. WATSON on 12/17/2014. (ecs, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Participants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAI`I

DIANE E. MATHER,

CIVIL NO. 14-00391 DKW-BMK

Plaintiff,
vs.
TERRITORIAL SAVINGS BANK, a
federal savings bank; WAYNE K.D.
Mau, an individual; and EDWIN C.
NACINO, an individual,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
RULE 60(b)(4) MOTION AND
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Defendants.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S RULE 60(b)(4) MOTION AND
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
On November 17, 2014, the Court dismissed Mather’s complaint with
prejudice. Mather now moves the Court to vacate that dismissal order as void
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). Because Mather has provided no basis to do so, the
motion is denied.1 Mather concurrently moves for findings of fact and conclusions
of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Because Rule 52(a) expressly excludes a

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This motion is almost identical to the Rule 60(b)(4) motion that Mather previously filed in
another matter before this Court, which the Court denied. See Mather v. Territorial Savings
Bank, et al., CV No. 14-00082 DKW-RLP, Dkt. No. 54 (D. Haw. Nov. 21, 2014). The reasoning
for the denial of that motion applies equally in denying Mather’s motion here.

dismissal order under Rule 12 from any requirement of issuing findings of fact and
conclusions of law, Mather’s motion to that effect is also denied.
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides an “exception to
finality” that “allows a party to seek relief from a final judgment . . . under a
limited set of circumstances.” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 528–29 (2005).
Specifically, Rule 60(b)(4)—the provision under which Mather brings the instant
motion—authorizes the Court to relieve a party from a final judgment if “the
judgment is void.”
“A void judgment is one so affected by a fundamental infirmity that the
infirmity may be raised even after the judgment becomes final.” United Student
Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 270 (2010). The list of such qualifying
infirmities is “exceedingly short.” Id. “A final judgment is ‘void’ for purposes of
Rule 60(b)(4) only if the court that considered it lacked jurisdiction, either as to the
subject matter of the dispute or over the parties to be bound, or acted in a manner
inconsistent with due process of law.” United States v. Berke, 170 F.3d 882, 883
(9th Cir. 1999); accord Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 271. “A judgment is not void, for
example, simply because it is or may have been erroneous. Similarly, a motion
under Rule 60(b)(4) is not a substitute for a timely appeal.” Espinosa, 559 U.S. at
270 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Motions for relief from
judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) are addressed to the
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sound discretion of the district court.” Barber v. Hawaii, 42 F.3d 1185, 1198 (9th
Cir. 1994).
Mather demonstrates no reason for the Court to grant her post-judgment
relief under Rule 60(b) or any other rule. She argues that this Court misinterpreted
the law related to the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in dismissing the
complaint with prejudice. While such an alleged misinterpretation might serve as
the basis of an appeal of the Court’s order dismissing the complaint, it is not a
basis to void a judgment under Rule 60(b)(4). Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 270.
Further, even if Mather’s arguments were of the type necessary to provide a
basis for post-judgment relief, the Court is not persuaded. Mather argues that relief
is warranted because the Rooker–Feldman doctrine has been abolished. That is
simply not the case. Indeed, Mather’s complaint is precisely the type of case to
which the Supreme Court has held the doctrine applies. In the case cited by
Mather, the Supreme Court stated that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine is confined to
“cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting
district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). No matter how frequently or
vigorously she argues otherwise, this is such a case. Mather’s complaint consisted

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of claims that directly challenged the final judgment issued in the state-court
proceedings and were therefore barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine.
Finally, Mather also moves for findings of facts and conclusions of law
pursuant to Rule 52(a). However, that rule expressly provides that “[t]he court is
not required to state findings or conclusions when ruling on a motion under Rule
12 or 56 or, unless these rules provide otherwise, on any other motion.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 52(a)(3). The Court’s November 17, 2014 order decided Defendants’ Rule
12 motions and ordered dismissal of Mather’s complaint with prejudice. There
was no need to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law in dismissing the
complaint then, and the Court will not do so now.
CONCLUSION
Mather’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion (Dkt. No. 27) and Mather’s motion for
findings of fact and conclusions of law (Dkt. No. 28) are hereby denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: December 17, 2014 at Honolulu, Hawai‘i.

Diane E. Mather v. Territorial Savings Bank, et al.; CV 14-00391 DKW/BMK; ORDER DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S RULE 60(b)(4) MOTION AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

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