James v. Honolulu, City and County of et al
Filing
43
ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DOC. NO. 13 ; AND (2) DECLINING SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION OVER REMAINING STATE LAW CLAIMS. Signed by JUDGE J. MICHAEL SEABRIGHT on 8/26/2015. (afc) WRITTEN ORDER follows July 6, 2015 hearing on Motions for Summary Judgment 13 , 16 . Minutes of hearing: doc. no. 33 . Order furthermore denies Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, doc no. 16 . Excerpt of orde r: p. 34, footnote 4: "Because the court grants the City's Motion for Summary Judgment on all of James' federal claims, the court likewise DENIES James' Motion for Summary Judgment to the extent directed to these same claims.&q uot;CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications will be served by first class mail on August 27, 2015.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
CHOON JAMES,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
CITY AND COUNTY OF
)
HONOLULU; and John Does 1-50 in )
their individual or official capacity,
)
)
Defendants.
)
_______________________________ )
CIVIL NO. 14-00478 JMS-BMK
ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART
DEFENDANT CITY AND COUNTY
OF HONOLULU’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DOC.
NO. 13; AND (2) DECLINING
SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION
OVER REMAINING STATE LAW
CLAIMS
ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT CITY AND COUNTY OF
HONOLULU’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DOC. NO. 13;
AND (2) DECLINING SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION OVER
REMAINING STATE LAW CLAIMS
I. INTRODUCTION
This is now Plaintiff Choon James’ (“James”) second action in this
court against Defendant City and County of Honolulu (the “City”), asserting
United States and Hawaii State Constitutional violations and state law claims
stemming from actions the City took regarding real property located at 54-282
Kamehameha Highway (the “subject property”). Although James is the legal
owner of the subject property, it is the subject of an on-going eminent domain
action in the First Circuit Court of the State of Hawaii, in which the City obtained
an Ex Parte Order of Possession (the “Possession Order”) pursuant to Hawaii
Revised Statutes (“HRS”) § 101-29.
In the first action, James v. City & County of Honolulu, Civ. No. 13397 JMS-BMK (the “First Action”), James alleged the same claims as in this
action, all stemming from the City’s May 29, 2013 seizure of signs she placed on
the subject property. After the court denied the parties’ motions for summary
judgment, a settlement was reached. In this second action, James largely recycles
her Complaint from the First Action, but also includes additional allegations
regarding an October 18, 2013 seizure of signs and the City’s alleged interference
with James’ contract with Reynolds Recycling Inc. (“Reynolds”), who was leasing
the subject property from James. The City has counter-claimed for breach of
settlement agreement.
Currently before the court are Motions for Summary Judgment
brought by both parties. Based on the following, the court GRANTS in part the
City’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to James’ federal claims, and DECLINES
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.
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II. BACKGROUND
A.
Factual Background
Most of the facts relevant to the parties’ Motions for Summary
Judgment are not only undisputed, but were previously outlined in detail in the
court’s August 20, 2014 Order denying the parties’ motions for summary
judgment in the First Action (the “August 20, 2014 Order”). See James v. City &
Cnty. of Honolulu, Civ. No. 13-00397 JMS-BMK, 2014 WL 4181461 (D. Haw.
Aug. 20, 2014). The court therefore first summarizes the relevant facts as outlined
in the August 20, 2014 Order, and then addresses those facts that are new to this
action.
1.
Facts Leading Up to Filing of First Action
The relevant facts, as described in court’s August 20, 2014 Order in
the First Action, include the following:1
On April 21, 2010, the City filed an action in the First Circuit Court
of the State of Hawaii, Civ. No. 10-1-863-05 RAN (the “State Action”), against
James and her husband Mark Olov James seeking to condemn, in fee simple, the
subject property for use in the Hauula Fire Station Replacement Project. On April
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The court outlines the facts presented in the First Action only as are necessary for
putting this second action and its claims into context.
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22, 2010, the City filed an Ex Parte Motion for an Order Putting the City in
Possession of the Property pursuant to HRS § 101-29 (“Ex Parte Motion”). The
City’s Ex Parte Motion and its supporting evidence recites that the City is seeking
condemnation of the subject property for a new Hauula Fire Station, and estimates
that just compensation for the subject property is $521,000, which the City paid to
the Chief Clerk of the First Circuit Court.
On April 27, 2010, the State Court entered the Possession Order. The
Possession Order states in relevant part that the City “is hereby awarded
possession of the real property described in the Complaint filed herein, and [the
City] may do such work thereon as may be required for the purpose for which the
taking of said real property, including its appurtenances and any improvements
thereon, is sought.”
After the Possession Order, James continued to maintain the subject
property by having the lawn mowed and performing other work. And despite the
Possession Order, the City imposed on James certain indicia of ownership. For
example, when James failed to mow the lot frequently enough, she received a
September 14, 2011 citation from the City for a “Vacant Lot Overgrown.” James
also received an October 4, 2011 citation from the City for “Grubbing work w/o a
permit” on the subject property. James paid each of these citations, as well as the
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tax she was assessed on the subject property from 2010 through 2013. In
comparison, the City took little action on the subject property after obtaining the
Possession Order (before the seizure of James’ signs, described below). Indeed,
although the Capital Budget for the City proposed funds for “Hauula Fire Station
Relocation” in 2012, 2013, and 2014, these funds were deleted from the versions
of the Capital Budget adopted by the City.
To protest the City’s taking, James erected two signs on the subject
property, which stated “YOUTUBE: Eminent Domain Abuse Hawaii,” and
“Eminent Domain Abuse Who’s Next?” On May 29, 2013, the City removed the
two signs to an offsite storage location, damaging at least one sign in the process.
At or near where the signs were erected, the City left two “Storage and Removal
Notices” pursuant to Chapter 29, Article 19 of the Revised Ordinances of
Honolulu (“ROH”) (“Article 19”), an ordinance authorizing the City to seize
personal property left on public property after providing twenty-four hours notice.
When James later sought to retrieve her signs, she was asked to sign a document
entitled “Release of Impounded Property” (“Release Form”), which she refused to
do out of concern that signing it could affect the pending State Action. Instead,
James filed the First Action.
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2.
Facts Occurring After Filing of First Action
After the May 29, 2013 removal of the signs from the subject
property and the filing of the First Action on August 13, 2013, the City took some
steps directed to the subject property. In particular, on August 15, 2013, the City
filed in the State Action a Certification stating that the City took possession of the
subject property on June 4, 2010. Doc. No. 14-17, City Ex. M. The City also sent
letters dated August 22, 2013 to James’ then-attorneys (different counsel
represented James in the First Action and the State Action) notifying James of the
City’s sole possession of the subject property. The letters notified James that she
“no longer has a legal right of possession to the Property, the Property is not open
to the public, and the Property is not a designated public for[u]m.” Doc. No. 29-6,
James Opp’n Ex. F; Doc. No. 14-21, City Ex. Q. The letters further stated that
neither James “nor any other person, is authorized to enter the Property for any
purpose, including the placement of signs. Unauthorized entry onto the Property
shall constitute a violation of Section 708-814, Hawaii Revised Statutes and any
personal property found on the Property shall be removed without notice.” Doc.
No. 29-6, James Opp’n Ex. F; Doc. No. 14-21, City Ex. Q. On September 10,
2013, the City issued tax reimbursement checks on the subject property to James.
Doc. No. 14-18, City Ex. N.
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At the time the City took these actions, Reynolds was leasing the
subject property from James to operate a recycling redemption center. See Doc.
No. 29-9, Marvin Iseke Decl. ¶ 13. Reynolds had previously leased a parcel
abutting the subject property from the City, and had terminated the rental
agreement on June 30, 2013 after the City had sought to expand the recyclables
accepted and Reynolds did not wish to do so. See Doc. No. 14-2, Diane Murata
Decl. ¶¶ 7-9. On October 1, 2013, the City sent a letter to Reynolds notifying it of
the City’s Possession Order and that the City had not granted Reynolds the right to
enter or use the subject property. Doc. No. 29-5, James Opp’n Ex. E.
At some point in October 2013, James placed another three signs on
the subject property, which stated “YOU-TUBE: EMINENT DOMAIN ABUSE HAWAII,” “EMINENT DOMAIN ABUSE: WHO’S NEXT?,” AND “NO $$$
FOR BUS! GOT $7B FOR RAIL. MORE BUS PLS.” See No. 29-9, Iseke Decl.
¶ 7. These signs were each several feet tall and several feet wide, and secured into
the ground using deep concrete footings. See Doc. No. 41-1, Brad Kitsu Decl. ¶ 5;
Doc. No. 29-1, James Opp’n Ex. A (photographs).
On October 17, 2013, a Removal Notice for the three signs was
affixed to one of the signs, stating that personal property stored on public property
shall be impounded if not removed within twenty-four hours. See Doc. No. 41-1,
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Kitsu Decl. ¶ 5; Doc. No. 41-2, City Suppl. Ex. A. After the twenty-four hour
period, on October 18, 2013, the City seized the three signs on the subject
property. See Doc. No. 29-1, James Opp’n Ex. A (photographs of signs being
removed); Doc. No. 29-9, Marvin Iseke Decl. ¶¶ 5-7. To seize the signs, the City
enlisted “about a dozen county workers” and also had on hand “a total of six
armed policemen.” Doc. No. 29-9, Iseke Decl. ¶¶ 5, 8. James was at the subject
property at the time of this seizure, and was provided a copy of the Storage and
Disposal Notice, which stated that her signs have been impounded and providing
the address where they could be retrieved. Doc. No. 41-1, Kitsu Decl. ¶ 7; Doc.
No. 41-3, City Suppl. Ex. B. The City took the signs to Halawa, which is
approximately 1.5 hours away, rather than Laie, which is only 10 minutes away
and where the City had previously stored the signs seized on May 29, 2013. Doc.
No. 29-9, Iseke Decl. ¶ 9. Unlike the signs seized on May 29, 2013, however,
James had no difficulties retrieving them and was allowed to alter the language of
the Release Form. See Doc. No. 42, Pl.’s Suppl. Ex. 1.
On October 21, 2013, the City installed a sign in the driveway of the
subject property stating:
GOVERNMENT PROPERTY
NO TRESPASSING
VIOLATORS ARE
SUBJECT TO
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CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU
Doc. No. 29-9, Iseke Decl. ¶ 11; see also Doc. No. 29-2, James Opp’n Ex. B. As a
result of this sign, Reynolds could not access the subject property and open its
recycling business. Doc. No. 29-9, Iseke Decl. ¶ 13.
Also in October 2013, the City put out to bid the rental of the parcel
abutting the subject property, which the City holds in fee. Reynolds was awarded
the contract and given a revocable permit from December 15, 2013 to December
15, 2014. Doc. No. 14-2, Murata Decl. ¶ 11.
B.
Procedural History
1.
The First Action
On August 13, 2013, James filed her complaint in the First Action
alleging twelve claims titled (1) Violation of Fourth Amendment; (2) Due Process
Violation; (3) First Amendment Violation; (4) Failure to Train and Supervise;
(5) Hawaii Constitution -- Unreasonable Seizure; (6) Hawaii Constitution -Property and Due Process Protections; (7) Hawaii Constitution -- Freedom of
Speech; (8) Trespass; (9) Conversion; (10) Replevin; (11) Negligence; and
(12) Trespass to Chattels. All of these claims stemmed from the City’s May 29,
2013 seizure and alleged damage of a sign James placed on the subject property.
The parties both filed motions for summary judgment, and while they
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were pending, the City returned James’ signs that were removed on May 29, 2013.
The August 20, 2014 Order subsequently issued, denying both parties’ motions for
summary judgment.
On September 11, 2014, the parties entered into a Release,
Indemnification and Settlement Agreement (“Settlement Agreement”) whereby the
City agreed to pay James $21 in exchange for release of “any and all claims,
actions, causes of action, claims for relief, liabilities, demands, damages, injuries,
and/or losses that have been alleged in the Lawsuit.” See Doc. No. 14-10, City Ex.
F. On September 15, 2014, the court approved and ordered the parties’ Stipulation
to Dismiss with Prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(a)(1)(A)(ii).
2.
This Action
On October 17, 2014, James filed this action alleging the same twelve
claims as in the First Action. The Complaint alleges verbatim many of the same
allegations as in complaint in the First Action, with the only differences being the
additional allegations regarding the October 18, 2013 seizure of James’ signs and
the City’s interference with James’ lease of the subject property to Reynolds. See
Doc. No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 34-35.
On February 27, 2015, the City filed a Counterclaim asserting that
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James breached the Settlement Agreement by filing this action, and seeking
attorneys’ fees and costs.
On April 13, 2015, the parties filed Motions for Summary Judgment.
Doc. Nos. 13, 16. Oppositions were filed on June 8, 2015, Doc. Nos. 27, 29, and
Replies were filed on June 15, 2015. Doc. Nos. 30, 31. A hearing was held on
July 6, 2015. One of the City’s summary judgment arguments was that James
improperly re-alleged claims that the parties settled from the First Action, and at
the July 6, 2015 hearing, James admitted that she had simply added some new
allegations to the Complaint from her First Action and that she did not intend the
allegations from the First Action to be the basis of her claims in this action. As a
result, the court directed James to file a brief identifying what claims she is
asserting in this action and the facts supporting each claim, to which the City
would respond. See Doc. No. 34.
On July 24, 2015, James filed her supplemental brief. See Doc. No.
36. The City filed its supplemental brief on August 3, 2015, Doc. No. 37, and
James filed a supplemental opposition on August 17, 2015. Doc. No. 39. On
August 24, 2015, the City filed a supplemental reply. Doc. No. 40. Also on
August 24, 2015, the parties submitted statements as requested by the court
regarding whether the October 18, 2013 seizure was pursuant to Article 19. See
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Doc. Nos. 39, 41, 42.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). Rule 56(a) mandates summary judgment “against a party who
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
to the party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also Broussard v. Univ. of
Cal. at Berkeley, 192 F.3d 1252, 1258 (9th Cir. 1999).
“A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of
informing the court of the basis for its motion and of identifying those portions of
the pleadings and discovery responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact.” Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th
Cir. 2007) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323); see also Jespersen v. Harrah’s
Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2004). “When the moving party has
carried its burden under Rule 56[(a)] its opponent must do more than simply show
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts [and] come forward
with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (citation and
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internal quotation signals omitted); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (stating that a party cannot “rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleading” in opposing summary judgment).
“An issue is ‘genuine’ only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on
which a reasonable fact finder could find for the nonmoving party, and a dispute is
‘material’ only if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”
In re Barboza, 545 F.3d 702, 707 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at
248). When considering the evidence on a motion for summary judgment, the
court must draw all reasonable inferences on behalf of the nonmoving party.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587; see also Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille
Sch. Dist. No. 84, 546 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that “the evidence
of [the nonmovant] is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn
in his favor” (citations omitted)).
IV. DISCUSSION
A.
James’ Claims Alleged in this Action
The parties’ Motions for Summary Judgment raise an important
preliminary question, with which both the City and this court are still struggling -what are James’ claims in this action? James, proceeding pro se, filed this action
by largely recycling her complaint in the First Action, even though the facts in this
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action are different and it is unclear whether the same twelve claims alleged in
First Action also apply in this action. James admitted as much at the July 6, 2015
hearing, and the court subsequently required James to file a brief (1) identifying
each claim she is asserting in this action; and (2) for each claim identified,
outlining the facts that support such claim. See Doc. No. 34.
Despite these clear instructions, James filed a 28-page brief that still
leaves the court and the City with little help in identifying her claims. See Doc.
No. 36. In particular, James’ filing includes expansive allegations of government
misconduct regarding not only the October 18, 2013 seizure of her signs and
interference with her lease with Reynolds, but also regarding the City’s decision to
obtain possession of the subject property through eminent domain for the purpose
of a fire station. These new allegations were not in her Complaint and are
therefore not part of this action. As to her specific claims, James appears to allege
most of the claims she alleged in the First Action, which includes claims for
violations of her First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, violations of the
Hawaii Constitution, and other state-law claims. The court therefore addresses the
parties’ arguments as to these claims.
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B.
The City’s Motion for Summary Judgment
The City argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because all of
James’ claims are based on the presumption that she has possessory rights to the
subject property and that she was entitled to treat it as her own. The City asserts
that at the time of the events at issue in this action, the City had exclusive right to
possess the subject property and did not open the subject property as a public
forum such that all of James’ claims fail. Doc. No. 13-1, City Mot. at 12.
Although the court rejected a similar argument made by the City on summary
judgment in the First Action, the City argues that the facts at issue in this action,
which occurred later in time, raise no genuine issue of material fact that the City
has exclusive possession of the subject property. The court first addresses whether
the City has established as a matter of law that it had possession of the subject
property at the time of the events of this action, and then addresses James’ claims.
1.
The City’s Possession of the Subject Property
Just as in the First Action, the parties dispute whether James or the
City had possessory rights in the subject property, an issue relevant to all of
James’ claims. The August 20, 2014 Order in the First Action outlined this issue
in detail and therefore provides much of relevant framework applicable in this
action.
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a.
Analysis/Framework from the August 20, 2014 Order
The August 20, 2014 Order first determined that neither the events in
the State Action nor the quick-take eminent domain statute, HRS § 101-29,
answered whether, at the time of the events of the First Action, the City had
exclusive possession of the subject property or whether James still had rights that
she properly exercised by placing signs on the subject property. See James, 2014
WL 4181461, at *5-6.
Specifically, the August 20, 2014 Order determined that the
Possession Order was silent as to whether it granted the City exclusive possession
of the subject property. Id. at *5. The Possession Order provides simply that the
City “is hereby awarded possession of the real property described in the Complaint
filed herein, and [the City] may do such work thereon as may be required for the
purpose for which the taking of said real property, including its appurtenances and
any improvements thereon, is sought.” Id. Viewing this language on its face, the
August 20, 2014 Order explained that the Possession Order says nothing about
exclusive possession as a matter of law -- it merely “awarded possession” of the
subject property to the City “to do such work as may be required” for a Hauula fire
station. The Possession Order offers no insight as to what rights may remain with
James. In other words, the Possession Order by its own terms does not necessarily
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extinguish all of James’ rights to the subject property and/or grant the City
absolute possession, but instead grants the City possession for the purpose of
constructing the Hauula fire station. Id.
The August 20, 2014 Order further determined that HRS § 101-29
similarly fails to address this precise issue of whether, as a matter of law, the City
had exclusive possession of the subject property. Id. at *6. Rather, § 101-29
merely states that upon the appropriate showing, the State court will issue an ex
parte order putting the City “in possession of the real property sought to be
condemned and permitting [the City] to do such work thereon as may be required
for the purpose for which the taking of the property is sought.” Id. Just as with
the Possession Order, this language suggests that possession is not absolute -§ 101-29 does not grant the City free reign to do as it pleases with the subject
property, and the City may only do such work as may be required for the purpose
of the taking. Indeed, James still has title of the subject property until the end of
the condemnation action.
Beyond the Possession Order, the August 20, 2014 Order found that
the facts, viewed in a light most favorable to James, suggest that the City failed to
take possession of the subject property at the time of the Possession Order and at
the time of the May 29, 2013 seizure. Id. Instead, the City affirmatively imposed
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upon James several responsibilities of ownership of the subject property consistent
with James’ right (or even obligation) to possess the subject property. Id. at *6-7.
Those rights included: (1) citing James for failing to maintain the lawn of the
subject property on September 14, 2011; (2) citing James for “Grubbing work w/o
a permit” on October 4, 2011, and (3) taxing James on the subject property from
2010 through 2013. Id. at *7.
The August 20, 2014 Order therefore concluded that “[t]hese facts
simply do not support the City’s assertion that it had absolute, exclusive
possession of the subject property at the time it removed James’ signs. Rather, in
spite of the Possession Order, it appears that the City either did not exercise its
right of possession to the subject property (which it certainly could have done), or
at the very least shared possession with James at the time she erected her signs.”
Id. The August 20, 2014 Order explained, however, that this holding was limited
to the specific facts presented:
This Order is limited to the City’s narrow
argument that it had the “exclusive right of possession”
to the subject property, and the unique circumstances
presented here where the City placed burdens -- and
indica of ownership -- on James. This Order does not
mean to suggest that the Possession Order failed to give
the City the right to possess the subject property, to the
exclusion of all others, to carry out the public purpose
for which the subject property was taken. Rather, the
court finds that fact questions exist as to whether, despite
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the Possession Order and at the time James had erected
the signs, the City failed to take exclusive possession of
the subject property and/or gave (or shared with) James
certain rights of possession. As a result, a question of
fact exists as to whether the City could unilaterally seize
James’ signs at a time when the City had imposed indica
of ownership on James.
Id. at *8.
b.
Application to this case
The analysis in the August 20, 2014 Order applies to this action -just as with the First Action, neither the Possession Order nor HRS § 101-29
answers whether, at the time of the events comprising the present dispute, the City
had exclusive possession to the subject property. But unlike in the First Action, at
the time of the events at issue in this action -- the October 18, 2013 seizure of
James’ signs and the October 21, 2013 alleged interference with her lease with
Reynolds -- there was no genuine issue of material fact that the City had taken
exclusive possession of the subject property.
Specifically, after the May 2013 seizure of James’ signs and the filing
of the First Action, the City made well known to James that, despite its earlier
mixed messages regarding James’ possession, the City was now taking exclusion
possession of the subject property. In particular, the City established
unequivocally that it was taking possession of the subject property by: (1) filing in
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the State Action an August 15, 2013 Certification stating that the City took
possession of the subject property on June 4, 2010, Doc. No. 14-17, City Ex. M;
(2) notifying James’ then-attorneys that James does not have a legal right of
possession to the subject property, that neither James nor any other person is
authorized to enter the subject property, and that any personal property found on
the subject property will be removed without notice, Doc. No. 29-6, James Opp’n
Ex. F; Doc. No. 14-21, City Ex. Q; and (3) issuing tax reimbursement checks on
the subject property to James. Doc. No. 14-18, City Ex. N.
These actions left no question that the City was exercising its right of
possession of the subject property to the exclusion of James, and the City took no
contradictory actions suggesting to James that she still had possession of the
subject property (such as by taxing James and/or requiring her to maintain the
property as it previously did). Thus, this action stands in contrast to the First
Action’s “unique circumstances” where the City placed burdens and indica of
ownership on James while at the same time exercising its right of possession.
Rather, the Possession Order gave the City the right to possess the subject
property to the exclusion of all others to carry out the public purpose for which the
subject property was taken, and starting in August 2013, the City put James on
notice that it was exercising that right going forward.
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The court therefore finds that by the time of the October 2013 events
that are at issue in this action, James did not have the right to possess the subject
property.
2.
Application to James’ Claims
The court addresses each of James’ claims in light of the City’s
possession of the subject property at the time of the events at issue in this action.
a.
Fourth Amendment
James asserts that the City violated her Fourth Amendment rights by
coming on to the subject property and seizing her signs. The City argues that it is
entitled to summary judgment on this claim because it acted reasonably such that
there was no Fourth Amendment violation. The court agrees with the City.
The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment, protects “persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Lavan v. City of Los
Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2012), explains:
The Fourth Amendment “protects two types of
expectations, one involving ‘searches,’ the other
‘seizures.’ A ‘search’ occurs when the government
intrudes upon an expectation of privacy that society is
prepared to consider reasonable. A ‘seizure’ of property
occurs when there is some meaningful interference with
an individual’s possessory interests in that property.”
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Id. at 1027 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)).
Whether a search or seizure is at issue, the relevant inquiry under the Fourth
Amendment is one of reasonableness -- “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not
proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those which
are unreasonable.” See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (citations
omitted). Whether a seizure is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment
depends upon the particular facts and circumstances. See Miranda v. City of
Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 2005).
The court must balance the invasion of James’ possessory interests in
the signs against the City’s reasons for taking them. See Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1030.
And as this court explained in Fuller v. Aila, 2015 WL 127887, at *4 (D. Haw.
Jan. 7, 2015), reasonableness often turns on whether the search and/or seizure
occurs on private property (where individuals have a heightened privacy interest)
as opposed to public property (where individuals may still have a possessory
interest in their belongings). For example, absent an exception, the Fourth
Amendment generally proscribes warrantless “entr[y] onto private land to search
for and abate suspected nuisances.” Conner v. City of Santa Ana, 897 F.2d 1487,
1490 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). And although “[t]he
Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable interferences in [personal]
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property” that is on public property, a seizure may nonetheless be reasonable
where the owner is given an opportunity to retrieve the property. See Lavan, 693
F.3d at 1028-29, 1030-31 (determining that a municipality seizes a homeless
person’s property unreasonably if it destroys the property before giving its owner a
meaningful opportunity to retrieve it).
In light of the City’s strong possessory interest in the subject property
and given that the City provided advance notice and an opportunity to retrieve the
property, the court finds no genuine issue of material fact that its actions of
entering the subject property and seizing James’ signs were reasonable. James
was well aware of the City’s possession of the subject property, that the City
would not allow James to place personal property on the subject property, and that
James did not otherwise have permission to place them on the subject property.
Further, James was given twenty-four hours notice pursuant to Article 19 that the
signs would be removed, meaning that she could have simply removed the signs if
she wished to keep them. See Doc. No. 41-1, Kitsu Decl. ¶ 5; Doc. No. 41-2, City
Suppl. Ex. A; see also Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1028-29, 1030-31. Finally, when the
signs were in fact seized, she was able to retrieve them from the City. See Doc.
No. 42, Pl.’s Suppl. Ex. 1. Under these circumstances, the City’s seizure of James’
signs was reasonable as a matter of law.
23
The court therefore GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment as to James’ Fourth Amendment claim.
b.
Due Process
James asserts that the City violated her due process rights by seizing
her signs pursuant to Article 19 without the opportunity for a hearing.2 The City
argues that summary judgment should be granted on this claim because James was
provided all the process that was due. Based on the following, the court agrees
with the City.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const.
amend. XIV. “Property” for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment includes an
individual’s personal possessions. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84 (1972).
Where a protected interest is implicated, the relevant question is “what procedures
constitute ‘due process of law.’” Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1031 (quoting Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977)).
“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be
2
James’ July 24, 2015 Supplemental Filing further asserts that the signs were destroyed.
These allegations are not in the Complaint. Further, such assertion is not supported by, and is
actually contradicted, by the evidence -- James retrieved her signs after they were seized. See
Doc. No. 42, Pl.’s Suppl. Ex. 1; see also Doc. No. 29-1, James Opp’n Ex. A (photographs of
signs being removed intact).
24
heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552
(1965)). “This inquiry [] examine[s] the procedural safeguards built into the
statutory or administrative procedure of effecting the deprivation, and any
remedies for erroneous deprivations provided by statute or tort law.” Zinermon v.
Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 126 (1990). As Mathews outlines, determination of what
process is due is a fact-specific inquiry requiring consideration of three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.
424 U.S. at 335.
This court has already addressed and applied this framework to a
challenge to Article 19 in De-Occupy Honolulu v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 2013
WL 2285100, at *5 (D. Haw. May 21, 2013), in the context of a motion for
preliminary injunction, and its legal analysis applies here.
First, James has a property interest in her signs, but this interest is
weaker than in De-Occupy, or in Lavan (upon which De-Occupy relied), as both
involved the seizure of items from homeless individuals. See id. at *6. De25
Occupy explains that balancing this property interest, Article 19 includes several
safeguards to prevent the erroneous deprivation of property, including that the
City must: (1) provide twenty-four hours written notice before items are seized,
ROH §§ 29-19.3(b), 29-19.4(a); (2) provide post-seizure notice describing the
items that have been taken and the location where they may be retrieved, ROH
§ 29-19.5(b); and (3) hold seized items for at least thirty days before destruction.
Id. Thus, “at every step -- pre-seizure, post-seizure, and pre-destruction -- the City
is required to ‘announce its intentions’ and allow Plaintiffs the opportunity to
either move their items away from public property to avoid seizure or retrieve
them post-seizure.” Id. (citations omitted). De-Occupy describes that these
opportunities to prevent permanent deprivation of an individual’s possessions
appear “wholly reasonable,” given that the individual may avoid seizure by
“simply remov[ing] their items from public property within twenty-four hours of
notice being posted, and to avoid their destruction, [the individual] may simply
seek their return from the City.” Id.
Thus, in sum, there are multiple opportunities to prevent permanent
deprivation of personal property, and a hearing, whether pre- or post-seizure,
would add little to prevent an erroneous deprivation. Indeed, it would only
increase the administrative burden, which, combined with the small risk of
26
erroneous deprivation, outweigh consideration of James’ property interest in her
signs (an interest which is considerably weaker than in DeOccupy and Lavan
where the plaintiffs were homeless individuals and the defendants had taken some
or all of their worldly possessions).
In opposition, James offers no arguments as to why this legal analysis
does not apply here -- James offers no facts or evidence suggesting that the Article
19 procedure was not followed in this case (rather, the undisputed facts establish
that the signs were seized pursuant to Article 19, Doc. No. 41-1, Kitsu Decl. ¶¶ 57), or any argument as to why the procedures offered by Article 19 are inadequate.
Indeed, in this case, there is no dispute that James was given notice that the City
would seize her signs before they were taken, and that she was able to retrieve her
signs without any difficulty. See id.; Doc. No. 41-2, City Suppl. Ex. A; Doc. No.
41-3, City Suppl. Ex. B. These circumstances do not support a due process
violation. As the result, the court GRANTS the City’s Motion for Summary
Judgment on James’ due process claim.
c.
First Amendment
James asserts that the City violated her First Amendment rights by
seizing her signs. Whether viewed as a basic First Amendment violation of free
speech or as a First Amendment retaliation claim, the City argues that summary
27
judgment should be granted. The court agrees with the City.
i.
Violation of free speech
Whether a restriction on speech violates the First Amendment
depends on the nature of the government forum at issue, and the Supreme Court
has identified three types of fora for purposes of this analysis. First, traditional
public fora are those such as streets and parks which have “immemorially been
held in trust for the use of the public.” Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). Second, the government may create a
non-traditional “designated public forum” by opening public property “for use by
the public as a place for expressive activity,” and such forum may be open to the
general public for the discussion of all topics, or may be “created for a limited
purpose such as use by certain groups . . . or for the discussion of certain
subjects.” Id. & id. n.7. Finally, “[a]ny public property that is neither a public nor
a designated public forum is considered a nonpublic forum.” Ctr. for Bio-Ethical
Reform, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 455 F.3d 910, 919 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing
Preminger v. Principi, 422 F.3d 815, 823 (9th Cir. 2005) (other citation omitted)).
A “nonpublic forum” is public property “which is not by tradition or designation a
forum for public communication.” Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
In distinguishing between these fora, the Supreme Court has made it
28
clear that
[p]ublicly owned or operated property does not become a
“public forum” simply because members of the public
are permitted to come and go at will. . . . There is little
doubt that in some circumstances the Government may
ban the entry on to public property that is not a “public
forum” of all persons except those who have legitimate
business on the premises. The Government, no less than
a private owner of property, has the power to preserve
the property under its control for the use to which it is
lawfully dedicated.
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177-78 (1983) (internal quotations and
citation omitted).
Applied here, the undisputed facts establish that the subject property
is, at most, a non-public forum (if it is a forum at all).3 In particular, the subject
property is a vacant lot on which a fire station is to be built, and the City never
opened it to the public. Indeed, this vacant lot stands apart from other nonpublic
3
Although the Supreme Court has outlined three distinct fora, it has also recognized that
government properties may be “nonpublic fora or not fora at all.” Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n
v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998) (citing Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,
505 U.S. 672, 678-79 (1992)). This court could find no examples of either the Supreme Court or
the Ninth Circuit identifying a government property that does not qualify as any type of forum. It
stands to reason, however, that certain government properties that are not open to the public in
any manner would to fit such category (e.g., secured buildings, areas posing a hazard, secured
military bases). The subject property at issue here appears to fit in line with such properties -- it
is a vacant lot on which the City intends to build a fire station, has not been open to the public,
and private individuals would have no legitimate purpose to be on it. But because the court finds
that the City’s actions were reasonable under the non-public forum analysis, the court does not
venture into this gray area of whether the government property at issue does not constitute a
forum whatsoever.
29
fora addressed by the courts in that the City never opened it to individuals and it
was never used for communications for any purpose. See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at
679 (determining that airport terminal was a nonpublic forum); Perry Educ. Ass’n,
460 U.S. at 46 (school mail facilities); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976)
(military base allowing civilian traffic). Rather, the City notified James that the
subject property “is not open to the public, and the Property is not a designated
public for[u]m.” Doc. No. 29-6, James Opp’n Ex. F; Doc. No. 14-21, City Ex. Q.
The court must therefore determine whether the City’s restriction of activities on
the subject property passes constitutional muster under the proper test for nonpublic fora.
Where a forum is non-public, the court’s review of the restriction at
issue is deferential:
In addition to time, place, and manner regulations, the
State may reserve the forum for its intended purposes,
communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on
speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress
expression merely because public officials oppose the
speakers’s view. Such sparing treatment stems from the
oft-recognized principle that the First Amendment does
not guarantee access to property simply because it is
owned or controlled by the government.
Currier v. Potter, 379 F.3d 716, 728-29 (9th Cir. 2004) (quotations and citations
omitted); see also Lee, 505 U.S. at 679 (stating that restrictions on speech need
30
“survive only a much more limited review”).
Thus, where a nonpublic forum is at issue, the court must inquire
whether the challenged restriction is “reasonable in light of the purpose served by
the forum,” and is “viewpoint neutral.” Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness of
Cal., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 764 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)).
Under this “deferential” review, a restriction is “reasonable” “where it is ‘wholly
consistent with the [government’s] legitimate interest in preserv[ing] the property
. . . for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated,’” id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n,
460 U.S. at 50-51), and it “need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable
limitation.” Id. (citation omitted). Further, reasonableness “must be assessed in
the light of the purpose of the forum and all the surrounding circumstances.”
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 809.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to James, the court
concludes that the City’s actions were reasonable in light of the purpose of the
subject property and the circumstances James presented to the City. The City took
possession of the subject property via the State Action for the purpose of building
a fire station, and James has long contested the State Action. After the City had
taken down one set of James’ signs in May 2013, the City informed James that it
31
had possession of the subject property, that the subject property was not a
designated public forum, that neither James “nor any other person, is authorized to
enter the Property for any purpose, including the placement of signs,” and that any
personal property found on the subject property would be removed without notice.
Doc. No. 29-6, James Opp’n Ex. F; Doc. No. 14-21, City Ex. Q. In other words,
the City informed James that the subject property was not open to either her or the
public at large, and that any activities by James or others -- regardless of the actor
and/or the content of those activities -- were prohibited. Under the circumstances,
these actions by the City were reasonable -- the City wishes to build a fire station
on the subject property, and allowing the public to use the subject property in any
manner (regardless of the type of activity or the content of any speech on the
property) would conflict with that purpose.
The court further finds that the City’s subsequent seizure of signs that
James placed on the subject property was reasonable. This seizure was viewpoint
neutral -- given the warning the City gave James, the City would have seized any
property James placed on the property, regardless of whether it contained an
expression of speech and regardless of the content of that speech. And under all
of the circumstances, the seizure was reasonable -- this is not a case where James
was contesting the taking of the subject property by personally protesting on the
32
subject property, or even by placing signs on the subject property that could be
easily removed. Rather, James installed large signs on a semi-permanent basis
with deep concrete footings, which even she admits would require at the very least
a shovel to uproot. See Doc. No. 39, Pl.’s Suppl. Opp’n at ECF 18 of 29. Under
these circumstances, the City was reasonable in removing these signs so that the
subject property can be used to build a fire station.
The court therefore GRANTS the City’s Motion as to James’ First
Amendment claim.
ii.
First Amendment retaliation claim
As a to a First Amendment retaliation claim, James must establish
that (1) the City’s actions “would chill a person of ordinary firmness from future
First Amendment activity,” and (2) the “desire to chill [James’] speech was a
but-for cause of the[] allegedly unlawful conduct.” See Ford v. City of Yakima,
706 F.3d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 2013) (citations and quotations omitted); see also
Skoog v. Cnty. of Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221, 1232 (9th Cir. 2006) (requiring the
plaintiff to prove that the “desire to cause the chilling effect” was a “but-for cause
of the defendant’s action”).
Assuming that James’ placing a semi-permanent sign on the subject
property constitutes protected speech, James has failed to raise a genuine issue of
33
material fact that the speech on the sign was the reason for the City removing it.
Rather, the undisputed evidence establishes that the City gave James multiple
written warnings that neither James “nor any other person, is authorized to enter
the Property for any purpose, including the placement of signs,” and that “any
personal property found on the Property shall be removed without notice.” Doc.
No. 29-6, James Opp’n Ex. F; Doc. No. 14-21, City Ex. Q; see also Doc. No. 1417, City Ex. M. In light of these warnings, the City would have removed any
property James placed on the subject property, regardless of whether such property
contained an expression of speech and regardless of the content of that speech. Cf.
Aydelotte v. Town of Skykomish, 2015 WL 3965790, at *5-6 (W.D. Wash. June 29,
2015) (dismissing First Amendment retaliation claim for failing to establish
causation where township removed signs from plaintiff’s private property, for
which he did not have the required permit). As a result, James has failed to raise a
genuine issue of material fact that the City removed James’ signs to chill her
speech.
The court therefore GRANTS the City’s Motion for Summary
Judgment on James’ First Amendment claim.4
4
Because the court grants the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment on all of James’
federal claims, the court likewise DENIES James’ Motion for Summary Judgment to the extent
directed to these same claims.
34
C.
Supplemental Jurisdiction
Having granted summary judgment to the City on James’ federal
claims, there are no federal claims remaining over which the court has original
jurisdiction. See Peralta v. Hispanic Bus., Inc., 419 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir.
2005) (explaining that a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction under
diversity of citizenship (28 U.S.C. § 1332) or through “federal question
jurisdiction” (28 U.S.C. § 1331)). Rather, the only remaining claims are state law
claims over which this court has only supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3). Supplemental jurisdiction applies to the City’s counterclaim for
breach of settlement agreement -- such claim does not provide an independent
basis for the court’s jurisdiction because the terms of the settlement agreement
were not made part of the order of dismissal in the First Action. See K.C. ex rel.
Erica C. v. Torlakson, 762 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that courts
“have ancillary jurisdiction . . . only ‘if the parties’ obligation to comply with the
terms of the settlement agreement has been made part of the order of dismissal -either by separate provision (such as a provision “retaining jurisdiction” over the
settlement agreement) or by incorporating the terms of the settlement agreement in
the order’”).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), “district courts may decline to exercise
35
supplemental jurisdiction . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over
which it has original jurisdiction[.]” “[W]hen deciding whether to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction, ‘a federal court should consider and weigh in each case,
and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience,
fairness, and comity.’” City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156,
173 (1997) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988))).
“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the
balance of factors will point towards declining to exercise jurisdiction over the
remaining state-law claims.” Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th
Cir. 1997) (en banc).
Judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity weigh in favor
of declining jurisdiction over James’ state law claims. The court therefore
declines jurisdiction over James’ remaining claims.5
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the court GRANTS the City’s Motion for
Summary Judgment as to James’ federal claims. There being no other federal
5
28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) provides that “[t]he period of limitations for any claim asserted
under subsection (a), and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at
the same time as or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled while the
claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a
longer tolling period.”
36
claims and no other basis for federal jurisdiction, the court declines to assert
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. The state law
claims are dismissed without prejudice. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the
case file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, August 26, 2015.
/s/ J. Michael Seabright
J. Michael Seabright
United States District Judge
James v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, Civ. No. 14-00478 JMS-BMK, Order (1) Granting in Part
Defendant City and County of Honolulu’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. No. 13; and
(2) Declining Supplemental Jurisdiction over Remaining State Law Claims
37
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