Gowadia v. USA

Filing 6

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR CORRECT A SENTENCE BY A PERSON IN FEDERAL CUSTODY UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255; ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY re 1 as to Noshir S. Gowadia - Signed by CHIEF JUDGE SUSAN OKI MOLLWA Y on 10/5/2015. "The court denies Gowadia's § 2255 motion and declines to issue a certificate of appealability for the reasons set forth above. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of the Governme nt and to close this case."CR 05-00486 SOM; CV 14-00481 SOM-KSC (emt, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Noshir S. Gowadia served by first class mail at the address of record on October 5, 2015.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
NOSHIR S. GOWADIA,
Petitioner,
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CRIM. NO. 05-00486 SOM
CIV. NO 14-00481 SOM/KSC
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR CORRECT
A SENTENCE BY A PERSON IN
FEDERAL CUSTODY UNDER 28
U.S.C. § 2255; ORDER DENYING
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR CORRECT A SENTENCE
BY A PERSON IN FEDERAL CUSTODY UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255; ORDER
DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
I.

INTRODUCTION.
On August 9, 2010, after 41 days of trial and 6 days of

jury deliberation, a jury convicted Noshir S. Gowadia of
violations of the Arms Export Control Act of
1976 [“AECA”], the Espionage Act of 1917, and
related provisions on charges that he
unlawfully exported defense services and
technical data related to the design of the
B–2 stealth bomber and other classified
government projects to the People’s Republic
of China, and that he disclosed related
classified information to persons in
Switzerland, Israel, and Germany. See 22
U.S.C. § 2778; 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(e), 794(a).
United States v. Gowadia, 760 F.3d 989, 990 (9th Cir. 2014);
Verdict, ECF No. 802 (convicting Gowadia of Counts 1, 2, 6, and 8
to 15, and 19 to 21); acquitting Gowadia of Counts 3, 4, 7).
On July 28, 2014, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed his conviction and 32-year sentence.

See id.

On September 26, 2014, Gowadia filed the present Motion
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence
by a Person in Federal Custody.

See ECF No. 952-2.1

The court

denies the motion and declines to issue a certificate of
appealability.

The court denies the motion without a hearing

because “the files and records of the case conclusively show that
. . . [Gowadia] is entitled to no relief.”

28 U.S.C. § 2255(b);

see also Local Rule 7.2(d).
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND.
On October 25, 2007, Gowadia was charged in a 21-count

Second Superseding Indictment.

See ECF No. 133.

The Government

later dismissed Counts 5, 16, 17, and 18 of the Second
Superseding Indictment.

See ECF No. 529.

Count 1 asserted that Gowadia had conspired to
knowingly and willfully export defense services and technical
data, including classified information, to the People’s Republic
of China (“PRC”), without having a license or other written
approval to do so, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.
133.

See ECF No.

In relevant part, the Second Superseding Indictment alleged

that Gowadia traveled to the PRC, sometimes without having his

1

Page A21 of Gowadia’s original motion was deemed to
have contained classified information. See ECF No. 952-1, PageID
# 16299. The original motion is being kept in a secured location
and a redacted version of the motion has been placed in the
public record as ECF No. 952-2. Only five lines of the motion
have been redacted. The redacted material does not affect this
court’s analysis of the issues raised in the motion.
2

passport stamped, to help design, support, and test “a low
observable exhaust nozzle, optimized for significant reduction in
the infrared heat signature, for a PRC cruise missile.”
PageID #s 801, 807-08.

Id.,

Gowadia was alleged to have sent e-mails

to an unindicted co-conspirator about the nozzle, and to have
received approximately $110,000 for that assistance to the PRC.
Id., PageID #s 801-02, 807-08.

The Second Superseding Indictment

alleges that Gowadia gave oral presentations in the PRC,
accompanied by PowerPoint presentations that included classified
information relating to exhaust systems and low observable
technologies, and that he received $15,000 for one of the
presentations.

Id., PageID #s 803-04, 809.

Gowadia allegedly

sent other e-mails to his unindicted co-conspirator containing
classified information and sent bills to the PRC for $19,500 and
$20,000.

See id., PageID # 806-808.

Gowadia also allegedly sent

an e-mail to his unindicted co-conspirator that predicted the PRC
cruise missile’s infrared signature and lock-on range against a
United States air-to-air missile.
Gowadia was convicted of Count 1 and sentenced to 5
years of imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release for Count
1, running concurrently with other terms of imprisonment and
supervised release.

See ECF No. 839, PageID # 8676.

Count 2 asserted that Gowadia had violated the Arms
Export Control Act by knowingly and willfully exporting defense

3

service and related technical data (information concerning the
design, development, testing, and analysis of exhaust nozzles for
PRC cruise missiles optimized for reduced infrared heat
signatures), without having obtained a license or written
approval to do so, to the PRC, in violation of 22 U.S.C.
§ 2778(c).

See ECF No. 133.

Gowadia was convicted of this count

and sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment and 3 years of
supervised release for Count 2, running concurrently with other
terms of imprisonment and supervised release.

See ECF No. 839,

PageID # 8676.
Counts 3, 4, 9, 10, and 11 asserted that Gowadia had
communicated national defense information to persons not entitled
to receive that information, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 793(e).
Counts 3 and 4 concerned an oral presentation and its
accompanying PowerPoint presentation called “Advanced Exhaust
Systems Aero DPB 31 Jul03.ppt,” classified at the Secret level.
Count 9 asserted that Gowadia had sent a fax to a government
official in Switzerland concerning a proposal to develop infrared
technology for the TH-98 Eurocopter that contained information
about a United States defense system classified at the Top Secret
level.

Counts 10 and 11 asserted that Gowadia sent e-mails to

business people in Israel and Germany concerning a proposal to
develop infrared technology for a foreign commercial aircraft
that contained information about United States defense systems

4

classified at the Secret and Top Secret levels.

See ECF No. 133.

Gowadia was convicted of Counts 9, 10, and 11, but acquitted of
Counts 3 and 4.

See ECF No. 802.

Gowadia was sentenced to 10

years of imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release for each
of Counts 9, 10, and 11, running concurrently with other terms of
imprisonment and supervised release.

See ECF No. 839, PageID

# 8676.
Counts 6, 7, and 8 asserted that Gowadia had
communicated national defense information to aid a foreign
nation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 794(a).

Count 6 asserted

that Gowadia had given an oral presentation to PRC agents and
representatives, accompanied by a PowerPoint presentation
identified as “studyresults.ppt,” which concerned low observable
technology for PRC cruise missiles, classified at the Secret
level.

Counts 7 and 8 asserted that Gowadia had sent e-mails to

an unindicted co-conspirator who was a PRC agent, attaching files
called “Analysis of the Shape on the Flow Field.ppt” and “Answers
- 20 Mar 05.doc” that were classified at the Secret level.
ECF No. 133.

See

Gowadia was convicted of Counts 6 and 8, but

acquitted of Count 7.

See ECF No. 802.

He was sentenced to 32

years of imprisonment and 5 years of supervised release for each
of Counts 6 and 8, running concurrently with other terms of
imprisonment and supervised release.
# 8676.

5

See ECF No. 839, PageID

Counts 12, 13, and 14 asserted that Gowadia had
violated the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c).

Count

12 asserted that Gowadia had sent a fax to a government official
in Switzerland with a proposal to develop infrared reduction
technology for the TH-98 Eurocopter, along with technical data
and defense system information classified at the Top Secret
level.

Counts 13 and 14 asserted that Gowadia sent e-mails to

business people in Israel and Germany concerning proposals to
develop infrared technology for a foreign commercial aircraft
that contained information about United States defense systems
classified at the Secret and Top Secret levels.
133.

See ECF No.

Gowadia was convicted of these counts and sentenced to 20

years of imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release for each
of Counts 12, 13, and 14, running concurrently with other terms
of imprisonment and supervised release.

See ECF No. 839, PageID

# 8676.
Count 15 asserted that Gowadia had unlawfully retained
national defense information, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 793(e).
See ECF No. 133.

Gowadia was convicted of Count 15 and sentenced

to 10 years of imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release for
Counts 15, running concurrently with other terms of imprisonment
and supervised release.

See ECF No. 839, PageID # 8676.

Count 19 asserted that Gowadia had laundered the
proceeds of the crime charged in Count 2, in violation of 18

6

U.S.C. § 1957.

See ECF No. 133.

Gowadia was convicted of Count

19 and sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment and 3 years of
supervised release for Counts 19, running concurrently with other
terms of imprisonment and supervised release.

See ECF No. 839,

PageID # 8676.
Counts 20 and 21 asserted that Gowadia had filed false
tax returns, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1).
133.

See ECF No.

Gowadia was convicted of Counts 20 and 21 and sentenced to

3 years of imprisonment and 1 year of supervised release for each
of Counts 20 and 21, running concurrently with other terms of
imprisonment and supervised release.

See ECF No. 839, PageID

# 8676.
III.

ANALYSIS.
A federal prisoner may move to vacate, set aside, or

correct his or her sentence if it “was imposed in violation of
the Constitution or laws of the United States, . . . the court
was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or . . . the
sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is
otherwise subject to collateral attack . . . .”
§ 2255.

28 U.S.C.

There are some general rules regarding what kinds of

claims can and cannot be raised in a § 2255 petition.
A § 2255 petitioner may not invoke § 2255 “to
relitigate questions which were or should have been raised on a

7

direct appeal from the judgment of conviction.”
Marchese, 341 F.2d 782, 789 (9th Cir. 1965).

United States v.

For example, a

§ 2255 petition cannot be based on a claim that has already been
disposed of by the underlying criminal judgment and ensuing
appeal.

As the Ninth Circuit stated in Olney v. United States,

433 F.2d 161, 162 (9th Cir. 1970), “Having raised this point
unsuccessfully on direct appeal, appellant cannot now seek to
relitigate it as part of a petition under § 2255.”
Similarly, a § 2255 petitioner is procedurally barred
from raising an issue in a § 2255 petition if the issue could
have been raised earlier, unless the § 2255 petitioner is
actually innocent, United States v. Guess, 203 F.3d 1143, 1145
(9th Cir. 2000), or he or she can demonstrate both “cause” for
the delay and “prejudice” resulting from the alleged error.
United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982).

As the

Supreme Court stated in Frady, “[T]o obtain collateral relief
based on trial errors to which no contemporaneous objection was
made, a convicted defendant must show both (1) ‘cause’ excusing
his double procedural default, and (2) ‘actual prejudice’
resulting from the errors of which he complains.”

Id.; accord

Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 242 (1973).

To show

“actual prejudice,” a § 2255 petitioner “must shoulder the burden

8

of showing, not merely that the errors at [her] trial created a
possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to [her] actual
and substantial disadvantage, infecting [her] entire trial with
error of constitutional dimensions.”

Frady, 456 U.S. at 170.

Of course, ineffective assistance of counsel claims may
be brought in a § 2255 proceeding, even if not asserted in a
defendant’s direct appeal.
U.S. 500, 504-05 (2003).

See Massaro v. United States, 538
In so ruling, the Supreme Court

recognized that Frady’s procedural bar should not apply in cases
raising ineffective assistance of counsel claims in § 2255
motions because the record may not be properly developed to raise
ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal.

Id.

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must show that (1) his counsel’s performance was
deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced his
defense.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

There is “a strong presumption” that counsel’s conduct was
reasonable and that counsel’s representation did not fall below
“an objective standard of reasonableness” under “prevailing
professional norms.”

Id. at 688.

Even if a petitioner can

overcome the presumption of effectiveness, the petitioner must
still demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for

9

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.”

Id. at 694.

Because “[i]t is all

too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance
after conviction,” judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance is
highly deferential.
A.

Id. at 689.

Gowadia Procedurally Defaulted on His Claim that
the Warrant for the Search of His House Was
Unsupported by Probable Cause (Grounds One and
Sixteen).

In Ground One of his § 2255 motion, Gowadia contends
that the search of his house violated the Fourth Amendment
because the warrant for that search was not supported by probable
cause.

See ECF No. 952-2, PageID # 16334-35.

Ground Sixteen

generally asserts that the use of false evidence was
unconstitutional.

Id., PageID # 16359.

In particular, Gowadia says that FBI Special Agent
Thatcher Mohajerin’s affidavit supporting the warrant application
contained false statements.

Gowadia claims that, on page 17 of

the affidavit, Mohajerin identifies 5 documents as having been
classified at the Secret level when they were unclassified.
Gowadia claims that, although the affidavit stated that Mel
Zerden said that those documents required an export license,
Zerden never saw the documents and no license was needed.
Gowadia also says that the affidavit discusses a Top Secret
10

program that should have been unclassified.
35.

Id., PageID # 16334-

Because Gowadia did not challenge the probable cause

supporting the warrant with this court or with the Ninth Circuit,
he procedurally defaulted on it.

Gowadia does not show Frady’s

cause and prejudice such that his failure to raise the issue is
excused.
At most, Gowadia attempts to say that his attorneys
were ineffective in failing to raise the issue of false
statements after they were given the information.
952-2, PageId # 16357.

See ECF No.

But this contention is insufficient to

show that 1) his attorneys’ performances were deficient, and
(2) the deficient performances prejudiced his defense.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
Gowadia does not demonstrate that his attorneys’
performances were deficient.

In the Joint Declaration of David

F. Klein and Birney B. Bervar, Gowadia’s attorneys state that
they did not ignore Gowadia’s concerns regarding the search
warrant.

To the contrary, the attorneys say that they reviewed

all of the evidence and determined that there was no basis to
support filing a motion to suppress.
#s 16583-84.

11

See ECF No. 972-4, PageID

Nor does Gowadia demonstrate that the failure to raise
the issue prejudiced him.

As Gowadia’s counsel concluded, ample

evidence supported the determination that probable cause
supported the issuance of the warrant.

When reviewing the

issuance of a search warrant, courts defer to a judge’s
determination of probable cause, upholding it when the issuing
judge had a substantial basis for concluding that, based on the
totality of the circumstances, probable cause existed.

See Ewing

v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2009).
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply
to make a practical, common-sense decision
whether, given all the circumstances set
forth in the affidavit before him, including
the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of
persons supplying hearsay information, there
is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place. And the duty of a
reviewing court is simply to ensure that the
magistrate had a “substantial basis for . . .
conclud[ing]” that probable cause existed.
Illinois v. Gates, 426 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983) (quoting Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)).
While pointing to alleged falsehoods in certain
representations in the declaration Mohajerin submitted in support
of the warrant application, Gowadia does not allege, much less
show, that Mohajerin intended to deceive the court.

“‘Omissions

or misstatements resulting from negligence or good faith mistakes
12

will not invalidate an affidavit which on its face establishes
probable cause.’”

Ewing, 588 F.3d at 1224 (quoting United States

v. Smith, 588 F.2d 737, 740 (9th Cir. 1978)).

Even if an agent

had deliberately or recklessly made false statements in his
affidavit, a reviewing court would have to determine whether
those statements were material.

In other words, a reviewing

court would need to examine whether the affidavit still
demonstrated probable cause when the improper statements were
purged from the affidavit.

See Ewing, 588 F.3d at 1224.

United States District Judge Helen Gillmor issued the
warrant for the search of Gowadia’s house on October 13, 2005,
based on Mohajerin’s declaration.

See Misc. No. 05-00833 HG.

That declaration was single-spaced and 26-pages long.
No. 972-3, PageID #s 16553-78.

See ECF

Even if the court disregards the

statements Gowadia complains about, there is still ample support
for the probable cause determination.
The affidavit indicates that Gowadia worked on the B-2
bomber project while at Northrop Grumman Corporation.
No. 972-3, PageID # 16560.

See ECF

It indicates that Gowadia wrote e-

mails stating that he was working with foreign corporations and
governments on commercial applications of defense technologies.
Id., PageID # 16562.

According to the affidavit, Gowadia

13

entered/exited the United states 16 times between 1992 and 2001.
Id.

It further states that Gowadia received substantial wire

transfers of money originating in Switzerland and Australia (more
than $250,000 in 2002).

Id., PageID # 16563.

It notes that

Gowadia lives in a multi-million dollar residence.

Id.

According to Mohajerin’s affidavit, a container
shipment from Singapore to Honolulu listed Gowadia as the sender
and recipient.

Pursuant to a policy of the Department of

Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection Agency, the
container was inspected.

An x-ray of the container indicated

that it contained an 18-inch stack of papers.

The FBI reviewed

the papers, which pertained to the B-2 bomber and discussed
infrared technology used to neutralize missiles.

There were also

proposals to create and implement anti-missile technology for
Israel, Australia, and Singapore.

Id., PageID # 16564.

Mohajerin was informed by an Air Force officer that the material
contained Secret or Top Secret information.

Id.

In 2004, the

Department of State Directorate of Defense Trade Controls
Compliance determined that 10 of the documents were subject to
the Arms Export Control Act and ITAR and that a license was
required to export them.

Id., PageID # 16571.

14

In April 2004, Gowadia was scheduled to travel to Hong
Kong and Singapore.

Gowadia was searched at the airport pursuant

to the Government’s border search authority.

In his carry-on

bag, Gowadia had computer presentations regarding infrared
technology.

While Gowadia contends that this information was

unclassified, Mohajerin stated that he was told that the material
should be classified at the Secret level.
# 16565.

See id., PageID

When Gowadia returned from his trip, he was again

searched and his laptop “mirrored.”

Mohajerin was told that the

information on the laptop included Top Secret, Secret, and
Confidential information.

Id., PageID #s 16566-68.

The

Government discovered that Gowadia had been sending e-mails to
individuals in foreign countries that violated the Arms Export
Control Act.

These e-mails refer to codes used by NASA and to

the B-2 and F-5E designs.

Id., PageID # 16569.

In an August 2004 e-mail to Angelo Comotti, the head of
an Italian company, Gowadia mentioned that he had some
information regarding advanced infrared suppressors.

Id., PageID

# 16570.
In 2005, the FBI received copies of Gowadia’s e-mails
soliciting business and offering his company’s services in
infrared suppressors to people in Germany, France, England,

15

Australia, Singapore, Italy, Arabia, and Africa.
# 16572.

Id., PageID

In two of the e-mails, Gowadia attached a document with

the title “Protection of C-130H Aircraft Against Heat Seeking
Missiles (AIRSS),” which contained Secret/Special Access Required
material.

Id.
Because Gowadia conducted his business from his home,

Mohajerin believed that evidence of a criminal long-term,
systematic effort to market and sell defense technologies would
be located in the home.

Id., PageID #s 16576-77.

Under the totality of the circumstances, even if the
court purges the statements that Gowadia complains of, ample
evidence supports Judge Gillmor’s determination that there was
probable cause to believe that evidence of crimes concerning
classified information would be found in Gowadia’s home.
Accordingly, Gowadia fails to show he was prejudiced by the
allegedly false statements in Mohajerin’s affidavit.
B.

Gowadia May Not Raise the Denial of Bail in the
Present § 2255 Motion (Ground Three).

In his third ground for relief, Gowadia argues that he
was wrongfully denied pretrial bail.
#s 16337-38.

ECF No. 952-2, PageID

But “the denial of bail, which does not affect

either his conviction or sentence, is not ordinarily a cognizable
issue in a § 2255 motion.”

United States v. Prado, 2011 WL
16

2224832, *6 (E.D. Cal. June 7, 2011).

Accord Lucas v. United

States, 2015 WL 4041644, *14 (W.D. Tenn. July 1, 2015) (“A
challenge to a denial of bail cannot be litigated in a § 2255
motion because it does not affect the validity of the criminal
judgment.”); see also Kett v. United States, 722 F.2d 687, 690
(11th Cir. 1984) (“claims of excessive bail are not cognizable in
a section 2255 action”).

This is because, under § 2255, a

federal prisoner may move to vacate, set aside, or correct his or
her sentence if it “was imposed in violation of the Constitution
or laws of the United States, . . . the court was without
jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or . . . the sentence was
in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise
subject to collateral attack . . . .”

28 U.S.C. § 2255.

The

denial of bail to Gowadia did not affect his conviction or his
sentence.
C.

Gowadia May Not Relitigate Arguments Rejected by
This Court or the Jury That He Failed to Ask the
Ninth Circuit to Review.
1.

Gowadia May Not Relitigate His Argument That
Certain Information About the B-2 Bomber Was
Not Classified (Grounds Two, Four, and
Sixteen).

Gowadia claims that he was subject to a fraudulent
indictment and false arrest because he was charged in Counts 6 to
11 of the Second Superseding Indictment with having provided
17

classified information about the B-2 bomber to other governments
(Switzerland, Israel, and Germany), when that information could
not possibly have been classified.
#s 16336.

See ECF No. 952-2, PageID

Ground Sixteen asserts that false evidence was

unconstitutionally used against him.

Id., PageID # 16359.

Gowadia made the same argument in his motion to dismiss
of April 5, 2006.

In that motion, Gowadia contended that the

information he allegedly gave to other governments was developed
through in-flight tests of the B-2 bomber three years after
Gowadia left the program.

Accordingly, Gowadia argued that he

did not have access to the data such that he could have given it
to other governments and that the information he allegedly
provided to the other governments was, at most, an educated
guess.
68.

See ECF No. 42-2, PageID #s 153, 155, 159, 165, and 167-

On August 28, 2006, the court denied the motion to dismiss,

rejecting the argument that Gowadia could not possibly have
provided classified information to other governments.

See ECF

No. 80.
At trial, Gowadia similarly testified that he did not
have access to the “radar cross-section signature or IR
signature” of the B-2 bomber, because the bomber had not been
actually built when he was working for Northrup Grumman

18

Corporation.

See Transcript of Proceeding of June 30, 2010, ECF

No. 898-1, PageID #s 14326-27; Transcript of Proceeding of June
31, 2010, ECF No. 899, PageID # 12506, 12562.

Gowadia also

testified that, although the Air Force B-2 classification guide
said the information was classified, he had not thought it was
classified.

Gowadia testified that the design of the B-2 bomber

made the infrared signature meaningless.

See Transcript of

Proceedings of June 30, 2010, ECF No. 898-1, PageID #s 12343,
14173-4.

The jury necessarily rejected his contentions when it

convicted him.
In his § 2255 motion, Gowadia argues that “propulsion
IR and its effect (Lock-On Range) were not considered in design
and their information did not exist in the program.”
952-2, PageID # 16337.
trial.

ECF No.

Gowadia testified to the same thing at

See Transcript of Proceedings of June 31, 2010, ECF No.

899, PageID # 12543 (“Q

And as far as from your -- from your

working on the B-2, was lock-on a criteria for the B-2?
A

No, sir, it doesn’t make sense for B-2.

Never considered -- I

never considered that into my design.”), 12562 (“Q

Okay. And as

far as your understanding as far as how the B-2 is designed, was
it designed for detection or for lock-on?
detection.

Q

A

Strictly for

Was lock-on a consideration on the B-2?

19

A

Never

was.”), and 12565 (Gowadia testifying that, because he did not
have access to certain data for the B-2 bomber, he made guesses
as to its lock-on range and made up figures in an attempt to
market himself); ECF No. 898-1, PageID # 14174 (stating that the
lock on range is classified if the Air Force classifies the data,
but opining that the lock-on range is meaningless); Transcript of
Proceedings of July 20, 2010, ECF No. 906, PageID # 13114 (“B-2's
lock-on range is identified as unclassified in the original
classification guide, and best to my knowledge, the way I read
today's guide, it still is unclassified.”).
The jury necessarily rejected Gowadia’s contentions
when it convicted him.

Gowadia may not relitigate the same

arguments in the present § 2255 motion.

Marchese, 341 F.2d at

789; Olney, 433 F.2d at 162.
Gowadia argues that his attorneys were ineffective
because “[t]hey were shown why B-2 Counts were false hence arrest
was illegal; it was ignored.”

ECF No. 952-2, PageID # 16358.

Gowadia’s attorneys respond that, “at no time did we ignore Mr.
Gowadia.

We always considered what he informed us, and acted

ethically in accordance with the standards of professional
responsibility.”

ECF No. 972-4, PageID # 16584.

The factual

issues Gowadia presents here were placed before the jury but

20

resolved against him by the jury.

Gowadia neither identifies

specific deficiencies in what his attorneys did nor shows a
reasonable probability that, but for their alleged errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.

Strickland,

466 U.S. at 694.
2.

Gowadia May Not Relitigate His Argument That
Nozzles of Cruise Missiles Need Not Have
Reduced Heat Signatures (Grounds Five and
Sixteen).

In Ground Five of the § 2255 motion, Gowadia claims to
have been the subject of a fraudulent indictment and prosecution
because the Second Superseding Indictment asserts in Counts 1 and
2 that Gowadia designed for the PRC a rectangular nozzle that
greatly reduced heat signatures for cruise missiles.

Gowadia

says that a square nozzle is not needed nor used because the heat
signature of a cruise missile is too small to need it.
No. 952-2, PageID # 16340.

See ECF

Ground Sixteen asserts that the use

of false evidence was unconstitutional.

Id., PageID # 16359.

This is the same argument Gowadia made at trial.
On July 2, 2010, Gowadia testified that infrared or
“IR” suppressors are not important for cruise missiles because
their engines are small and they fly at low altitudes.

Gowadia

testified that, as a result, “all of our cruise missiles have
round nozzles.”

See ECF No. 900, PageID # 12665-66.
21

Colonel

Roger Vincent testified to the contrary.
was a combat pilot who flew an F-15.

He testified that he

He said that he received

training to address cruise missile threats.
PageID #s 13693-94.

See ECF No. 909,

Col. Vincent testified that he was trained

to use an AIM-9 missile against cruise missiles.
13640, 13695.

Id., PageID #s

Col. Vincent explained that the Aim-9 missle is

“IR-guided,” meaning that it looks for a heat source to lock
onto.

Id., PageID # 13643.
In convicting Gowadia, the jury must have rejected his

factual argument concerning the heat signatures of cruise
missiles.

Gowadia may not relitigate that factual argument in

this § 2255 motion.
at 162.

Marchese, 341 F.2d at 789; Olney, 433 F.2d

To the extent Gowadia is claiming ineffective assistance

of counsel with respect to his attorneys’ failure to win the day
with respect to the heat signatures of cruise missiles, Gowadia
cannot show the prejudice necessary to demonstrate ineffective
assistance of counsel--he cannot show a reasonable probability
that, but for alleged attorney deficiencies, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.
694.

22

Strickland, 466 U.S. at

3.

Gowadia May Not Relitigate His Argument That
the Information He Gave the PRC Concerning
the Nozzles of Cruise Missiles Was Not
Classified (Grounds Six and Sixteen).

Counts 6 and 8 of the Second Superseding Indictment
assert that Gowadia violated 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) by providing
classified information to the PRC concerning exhaust nozzles.

In

ground six of Gowadia’s § 2255 motion, Gowadia argues that he
could not have violated § 794(a) because the information he gave
the PRC was not “owned by” the United States.

Gowadia contends

that the information fails to meet the requirements for
classification by an Executive Order.
# 16341.

See ECF No. 952-2, PageID

Gowadia appears to be referring to section 1.1 of

Executive Order 12958 of April 17, 1995, which, in relevant part,
was modified by Executive Order 13292 of March 25, 2003.

See

Transcript of Proceeding of July 14, 2010, ECF No. 905, PageID
12973 (referring to Executive Order 12958).

The 1995 Executive

Order defines “Information” as “any knowledge that can be
communicated or documentary material, regardless of its physical
form or characteristics, that is owned by, produced by or for, or
is under the control of the United States Government.”

The 2003

Executive Order states that information may be originally
classified when it meets certain criteria, such as if “the
information is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the
23

control of the United States Government” and “the unauthorized
disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to
result in damage to the national security.

See Executive Order

13292.
Gowadia contends in Ground Six of his § 2255 motion
that the information he provided to the PRC concerning exhaust
nozzles was not owned by the United States because he made it up
after being “read out” of the classified programs he had
previously been involved with (or “read into”).

Gowadia also

contends that the disclosure of the information could not have
damaged national security because it was based on a student’s
class project and because there is no such thing as a rectangular
nozzle that reduces the heat signatures of cruise missiles.

See

ECF No. 952-2, PageID #s 16341-42.
Ground Sixteen of the § 2255 motion asserts that the
use of false evidence as described in Grounds Six and Eight was
unconstitutional.

Id., PageID # 16359.

Gowadia raised these issues at trial, as he testified
on July 14, 2010, that information he gave the PRC did not meet
the requirements of section 1.1 of the 1995 Executive Order,
including the “mandatory requirement 4 of Section 1.1.”

This

testimony appears to have sought to establish that disclosure of

24

the information did not damage national security.
# 12960.

Id., PageId

He also testified about work for a “Ph.D. student’s

thesis” and discussed writing a textbook using charts from Purdue
students, stating that, pursuant to the Executive Order, that
information was declassified.

Id., PageID #s 12929, 12957-58.

Gowadia also argued that the information he transmitted had been
in open literature and had not been paid for by the United States
Government such that it could be owned by the United States
Government.

See Transcript of Proceedings of July 20, 2010, ECF

No. 906, PageID # 13112-13; see also Transcript of Proceedings of
July 23, 2010, ECF No. 907, PageID # 13307 (stating that basic
physics cannot be classified under the Executive Order), PageID
# 13310-11 (“Read the executive order, and you will find that
there is no crime.

The things you have classified are prohibited

from classification.”), and PageID # 13320 (stating, with respect
to Count 6, “That data is not classified, and even if that data
was classified, that document cannot be classified because the
executive order says it cannot be classified.”).
As described above, Gowadia also testified that
reducing the heat signature of cruise missiles was irrelevant
given the small size of their engines and the low altitudes at
which they flew.

As a result, he claimed, “all of our cruise

25

missiles have round nozzles.”

See ECF No. 900, PageID # 12665-

66.
Having failed to persuade the jury, Gowadia may not
relitigate those issues in this § 2255 motion.
F.2d at 789; Olney, 433 F.2d at 162.

Marchese, 341

Additionally, because

Gowadia did not raise these issues on appeal, he is procedurally
barred from doing so now in the absence of a showing of the cause
and prejudice required by Frady.

See Frady, 456 U.S. 167-68.

Nor does Gowadia demonstrate that his attorneys were ineffective
in failing to raise these matters on appeal, as Gowadia makes no
showing of a reasonable probability that, but for the alleged
errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
4.

Gowadia May Not Relitigate His Argument That
Information Concerning Commercial Aircraft
Never Involves Classified Information
(Grounds Seven and Sixteen).

The Second Superseding Indictment charges Gowadia with
having violated 18 U.S.C. § 793(e).

In Ground Seven, Gowadia

argues that, under section 1.4 of Executive Order 13292,
information concerning commercial aircraft can never be
classified.

That section states:

Information shall not be considered for
classification unless it concerns:

26

(a) military plans, weapons systems, or
operations;
(b) foreign government information;
(c) intelligence activities (including
special activities), intelligence sources or
methods, or cryptology;
(d) foreign relations or foreign activities
of the United States, including confidential
sources;
(e) scientific, technological, or economic
matters relating to the national security,
which includes defense against transnational
terrorism;
(f) United States Government programs for
safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;
(g) vulnerabilities or capabilities of
systems, installations, infrastructures,
projects, plans, or protection services
relating to the national security, which
includes defense against transnational
terrorism; or
(h) weapons of mass destruction.
In Ground Sixteen, Gowadia asserts that false evidence
was unconstitutionally used.

Id., PageID # 16359.

Gowadia made his Ground Seven argument at trial.

On

July 20, 2010, Gowadia testified that because commercial
airplanes are not “military plans, weapon systems, or
operations,” information relating to commercial airplanes should
not be classified.

See ECF No. 906, PageID # 13145.

The jury

did not view this as a viable defense, and Gowadia may not seek
to overcome the jury’s factual determination in this § 2255
motion.

Marchese, 341 F.2d at 789; Olney, 433 F.2d at 162.

The

information Gowadia provided to another government may have had
27

potential application to commercial airplanes, but that does not
necessarily mean that that information must not have been
classified.

Additionally, because Gowadia did not raise the

issue on appeal, he is procedurally barred from doing so now,
given his failure to demonstrate cause and prejudice justifying
that failure.

See Frady, 456 U.S. 167-68.

And, once again, even

if Gowadia had not procedurally defaulted on these arguments, he
does not demonstrate that his attorneys were ineffective in
failing to raise the issue on appeal.

He does not demonstrate a

reasonable probability that, but for alleged errors by his
attorneys, the result of the proceedings would have been
different.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
5.

Gowadia May Not Relitigate His Argument That
He Should Have Been Allowed to Challenge the
Classification Determinations by the
Executive Branch (Ground Ten).

In Ground Ten, Gowadia argues that he should have been
allowed to challenge the security classification at trial.
Gowadia may not relitigate this issue in this § 2255 motion.
On March 6, 2009, the Government filed a Memorandum of
Law Concerning Judicial Review of and Defense Challenges to
Determinations by the Executive Branch That Information Is
Classified.

See ECF No. 303.

That memorandum argued “neither

judicial review of nor defense challenges to classification
28

decisions by executive branch officials is permitted.”

Id.,

PageID # 2698.
On March 10, 2009, Gowadia filed a Response to
Government’s Memorandum of Law Concerning Judicial Review of and
Defense Challenges to Determinations by the Executive Branch That
Information Is Classified.

See ECF No. 308.

Gowadia argued that

he should be permitted to challenge the classification of
material “whether at the Section 6(c) hearing or at the trial of
this case.”

Id., PageID # 2748.

On March 20, 2009, District Judge Helen Gillmor ruled
via a Minute Order that Gowadia was not allowed to challenge
classification decisions by the executive branch or argue at
trial that information should not have been classified, but was
allowed to rebut the elements of a crime, including arguing that
the information he disclosed was not “information relating to the
national defense.”

See ECF No. 320, PageID #s 2790-91.

On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Gowadia argued that
this court should not have prohibited him from challenging the
classification of information at trial based on the Government’s
memorandum of March 6, 2009.

See No. 11-10058, DckEntry 74-1,

ID 8478886, Pages 108 of 146 to 120 of 146 (identified as
Argument B in the Opening Brief, corresponding to page numbers 95

29

to 107 of the Opening Brief).
withdrew that argument.

On February 17, 2014, Gowadia

See No. 11-10058, DckEntry 117,

ID 84780300 (“Appellant Noshir Gowadia hereby withdraws from
consideration Argument ‘B’ in the opening brief at pages 95 to
107.”).
Having unsuccessfully raised this issue before this
court, Gowadia may not relitigate it now.
at 789; Olney, 433 F.2d at 162.

See Marchese, 341 F.2d

Additionally, because Gowadia

chose not to pursue the issue before the Ninth Circuit, he is
procedurally barred from raising the issue in this § 2255 motion.
See Frady, 456 U.S. 167-68.

He shows neither cause nor prejudice

arising from the withdrawal of the issue before the Ninth
Circuit, nor that his attorneys were ineffective in withdrawing
the issue.
6.

Gowadia May Not Relitigate His Argument That
His Confession Was Obtained by Threats
(Ground Eleven).

In Ground Eleven of his § 2255 motion, Gowadia argues
that his confession was obtained through threats that he would
face the death penalty and that his wife and children would be
arrested.

Gowadia made this same argument in his motion to

suppress of November 13, 2008.

See ECF No. 218.

In that motion,

Gowadia argued that suppression was appropriate because his

30

“statements were obtained as a product of threats, coercion, and
unreasonable delay between his arrest and initial appearance, and
thus the statements were involuntary and in violation of due
process as provided by the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.”

Id., PageID # 1198.

Gowadia contended that, to

get him to confess, agents “told Gowadia that if he did not
cooperate they would arrest his wife, his adult son, and his
adult daughter.

One of the agents then laughed and stated that

of course his wife and kids would be found innocent in a year or
two, ‘but in the meantime, their lives will be destroyed.’”
PageID # 1201-02.

Id.,

The agents later allegedly told Gowadia that

“they would seek the death penalty for him and arrest his wife
and kids if he did not continue” confessing.
03.

Id., PageID # 1202-

Agents allegedly told him several more times that his wife

and children would be arrested for having been Gowadia’s coconspirators.

Id., PageID # 1203-04.

After holding hearings on Gowadia’s motion to suppress
over six days, the court denied the motion in a written order.
See ECF Nos. 256-258, 260-61, 264 (minutes of motion to supress),
and ECF No. 376 (order denying motion).

In relevant part,

District Judge Helen Gillmor said she did not believe Gowadia,
ruling that Gowadia’s statements “were made voluntarily and were

31

not the product of psychological or physical coercion.”
No. 376, PageID # 2993.

See ECF

Judge Gillmor noted that “Agents

Mohajerin and Williams both testified that the issue of arrest
was never broached during any of the interviews, either by the
Agents or by Defendant.”

Id., PageID # 3013.

They testified

that neither Gowadia nor his family
were ever threatened in any manner, directly
or indirectly, by themselves or by another
party. More specifically, the Agents
testified that neither the issue of arrest
nor the issue of the death penalty was ever
discussed with Defendant. Agent Mohajerin
stated that the issue of the death penalty
never crossed his mind, and that neither
word, “death” nor “penalty”, was ever used by
any Agent during the interviews with
Defendant.
Id., PageID # 3018.

Given that testimony, Judge Gillmor

determined “that there is no credible evidence of a
direct or indirect threat being made against either the Defendant
or his family members by any Agent during the interviews that
occurred between Thursday, October 13, 2005, and Tuesday, October
25, 2005.”

Id., PageID # 3019.
At trial, Gowadia reiterated that he confessed because

he “was threatened, my family was threatened, I was tired, I was
confused, and I didn’t want the hassle.

So I told them things

which are not completely correct, but like I said, there was no

32

crime, there is no crime today, and all the words in the world
are meaningless.”

Transcript of Proceedings of July 23, 2010,

ECF No. 907, PageID # 13310.
Gowadia did not appeal the denial of his motion to
suppress to the Ninth Circuit.

Accordingly, having raised the

matter unsuccessfully with this court, he may not relitigate it
now.

See Marchese, 341 F.2d at 789; Olney, 433 F.2d at 162.

Additionally, because Gowadia did not pursue the issue before the
Ninth Circuit, he is procedurally barred from raising the issue
in this § 2255 motion.

See Frady, 456 U.S. 167-68.

As with

other issues, he shows neither cause nor prejudice for his
failure to raise the issue with the Ninth Circuit.

Nor does he

demonstrate that his attorneys were ineffective in failing to
pursue the issue on appeal.
D.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

Gowadia Procedurally Defaulted on Issues He Did
Not Appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
1.

Gowadia is Procedurally Barred From Arguing
That the Evidence Did Not Support the Filing
of False Tax Return Charges Asserted in
Counts 20 and 21 of the Second Superseding
Indictment (Grounds Eight and Sixteen).

Grounds Eight and Sixteen challenge Gowadia’s
convictions for the filing of false tax returns, as charged in
Counts 20 and 21.

Because Gowadia was sentenced to three years

for those convictions, and because Gowadia has already served
33

more than three years, Gowadia’s challenge to those convictions
cannot affect the length of his incarceration, but can affect the
fact of conviction and the terms of supervised release for those
convictions.
Counts 20 and 21 of the Second Superseding Indictment
assert that Gowadia filed false tax returns for 2001 and 2002.
In Ground Eight of his § 2255 motion, Gowadia argues that the
income he did not report was the “same as the business expenses
the IRS agents had left out from the calculation.”
2, PageID # 16345.

ECF No. 952-

Ground Sixteen asserts that use of false

evidence is unconstitutional.

Id., PageID # 16359.

This bald

argument regarding business expenses lacks further explanation or
evidence.
Because Gowadia failed to raise this argument on
appeal, he is procedurally barred from raising it in this § 2255
motion.

Frady, 456 U.S. at 167-68; Guess, 203 F.3d at 1145.

Gowadia makes no attempt to demonstrate cause or prejudice
justifying his failure.

Even if the court assumes that Gowadia

is claiming that his appellate attorneys were ineffective in
failing to raise the issue with the Ninth Circuit, Gowadia’s
simple reference to the issue without further discussion does not
amount to the required showing of prejudice.

34

Gowadia does not show a reasonable probability that,
but for his attorneys’ allegedly deficient performance, the
result would have been different.

At trial, the evidence

established that Gowadia had under-reported his income for 2001
and 2002 on his tax returns.

Susan Mitsuyoshi of the Internal

Revenue Service testified on June 9, 2010, that for 2001 Gowadia
had reported a tax liability of zero when he should have paid
$41,400 on $166,908 of income.

See Transcript of Proceedings of

June 9, 2010, ECF No. 916, PageID # 14789 (taxable income for
2001 was $166,908) and # 14791 (paid no tax when he should have
paid $41,400 for 2001).

Mitsuyoshi further testified that, with

respect to 2002, Gowadia paid $6,455 in tax on a reported income
of $17,444, but should have paid $54,333 on a much greater
income.

See id., PageID #s 14789-91.
Gowadia’s conviction of Counts 20 and 21 indicates that

the jury believed that he had under-reported his income for 2001
and 2002.

He does not show prejudice by simply saying, without

explanation or proof, that the alleged unreported income should
not have been considered income.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

At most, Gowadia says that his counsel did not use
“accounting information” from a District of Columbia case.
ECF No. 952-2, PageID # 16358.

Other than pointing to the

35

See

existence of the information, Gowadia does not show that it would
have been relevant or helpful to him.

In his reply in support of

his § 2255 motion, Gowadia attaches what he says is the
accounting information.

See ECF No. 983-3, PageID # 16793-94.

But that information appears to be written in Gowadia’s
handwriting and is nothing more than his disagreement with
Mitsuyoshi’s testimony.

It demonstrates neither that his

counsel’s supposed failure to consider and use that information
fell outside the wide range of professional competence nor that
the result of the proceeding would likely have been different if
counsel had used the information.
2.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

Gowadia is Procedurally Barred From Arguing
That He Did Not Receive Discovery Concerning
His Own E-mails That Would Have Shown That
the Purpose of His Trip to the PRC Was to
Market Drag Reduction of Supertankers (Ground
Twelve).

In Ground Twelve of his § 2255 motion, Gowadia claims
that his “trip to the PRC was to market the drag reduction of
super tankers and for propulsion of ferries.”
PageID # 16350.

ECF No. 952-2,

Gowadia says that he received in discovery only

two of his own e-mails for 2002.

Id.

He says that, had the

Government provided more of the e-mails he had sent to others,
those e-mails would have prevented the Government from
“converting” the purpose of his trip.
36

Id.

Because Gowadia did

not make this argument to the Ninth Circuit, he procedurally
defaulted on it absent showing cause and prejudice.

See Frady,

456 U.S. at 167-68; Guess, 203 F.3d at 1145.
Gowadia fails to show prejudice that would excuse his
procedural default.

Gowadia’s own testimony undercuts Ground

Twelve of his § 2255 motion, as he himself testified that his
trips to the PRC were not for the purpose of marketing his “ship
drag” reduction with respect to large ships.

See Transcript of

Proceeding of July 23, 2010, ECF No. 907, PageID #s 13273-76
(Gowadia testifying that he was not actually working on ship drag
in the PRC and only said that he was to avoid being hassled) and
13339-40 (same).
Gowadia also appears to be arguing that the
Government’s request to e-mail providers should have been much
broader, rather than narrowly tailored to seek selected
information.

Gowadia says that, had the requests been broader,

the Government would have had other e-mails that would have
mentioned words such as “students” and “university,” and those
other e-mails would have supported his claim that certain
information was not classified.

Because Gowadia did not make

this argument on appeal, he procedurally defaulted on it.
Gowadia cannot show that the Government’s narrowly tailored

37

requests prejudiced Gowadia.

Certainly he knew about the

existence of the other e-mails such that he could have had his
attorneys seek to obtain them for use at trial.
U.S. at 167-68; Guess, 203 F.3d at 1145.

See Frady, 456

His broad assertion

that his attorneys “were given all the above information” but
failed to act appropriately is notably lacking in specific
reference to particular e-mails, or in discussion as to the
likelihood of a different result had particular e-mails been
obtained.
3.

Gowadia is Procedurally Barred From Arguing
That His Communications Were Intercepted or
That Witnesses Were Threatened and
Intimidated (Ground Thirteen).

In Ground Thirteen of his § 2255 motion, Gowadia claims
that the Government was improperly monitoring and interfering
with his mail and that witnesses were threatened and intimidated
in what he describes as an abuse of power.

Gowadia says that a

letter he mailed on October 18, 2007, was not received until
January 7, 2008, and that a witness at trial “was wearing a
black, woolen coat buttoned up to her neck.”
PageID #s 16351-52.

See ECF No. 952-2,

Because Gowadia did not raise these issues

at trial or on appeal, he procedurally defaulted on the issues.
Gowadia does not show the cause and prejudice necessary to
justify that default, as he simply raises the issues with almost
38

no factual detail.

See Frady, 456 U.S. at 167-68; Guess, 203

F.3d at 1145.
4.

Gowadia is Procedurally Barred From Arguing
That His Convictions Were Based on False
Evidence (Grounds Fourteen and Sixteen).

In Ground Fourteen of his § 2255 motion, Gowadia argues
that the Government introduced false evidence concerning his
access to information about the B-2 bomber program.

Ground

Sixteen generally asserts that use of false evidence is
unconstitutional.

Gowadia says that the Government introduced

evidence regarding a B-2 access form signed on June 30, 1984.
Gowadia says that he never signed a B-2 access form, and that the
document he signed on June 30, 1984, therefore could not have
been a B-2 access form.

See ECF No. 952-2, PageID # 16353.

Gowadia is correct that the document signed on June 30, 1984, was
not a B-2 access form.

In fact, Scott Betten Conway testified on

April 13, 2010, that the document signed on June 30, 1984, was a
debriefing document that Gowadia signed when he left Northrop
Grumman Corporation.

See ECF No. 856, PageID #s 9405-07.

However, even if Gowadia had not misread the trial
testimony, his argument that his conviction was based on false
evidence would be procedurally barred, as he failed to raise the
issue on appeal and does not show that he was prejudiced by the

39

evidence.

There is no dispute that Gowadia worked on the B-2

bomber program.

See Frady, 456 U.S. at 167-68; Guess, 203 F.3d

at 1145.
Gowadia next argues that he was convicted based on
false evidence provided by Joseph Williams, a special agent or a
criminal investigator for the United States Air Force, Office of
Special Investigations, and by Colonel Roger Vincent of the
United States Air Force.

Gowadia says that, because Gowadia is

one of the “best in the world,” Gowadia knows better than
Williams or Vincent whether material is classified.
2, PageID #s 16354-55.

ECF No. 952-

Gowadia in effect attacks the

Government’s trial evidence with his own statements.

This

particular attack was not one made by Gowadia on appeal.

Gowadia

is therefore procedurally barred from making this argument now
given his failure to show cause and prejudice relating to the
introduction of the evidence at trial.

Gowadia clearly disagrees

with the trial evidence, but that is insufficient to show the
necessary cause and prejudice to excuse his procedural default.
See Frady, 456 U.S. at 167-68; Guess, 203 F.3d at 1145.
E.

Gowadia Does Not Show Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel.

Many of Gowadia’s ineffective assistance of counsel
claims have been addressed in other parts of this order: 1) house
40

search violated Fourth Amendment (Ground One); 2) B-2 counts were
based on false evidence (Grounds Two, Four, and Fourteen); 3) PRC
counts based on false evidence (Grounds Six and Twelve);
4) cruise missiles do not need IR reducing nozzle (Ground Five);
and 5) accountant information not used (Ground Eight).
Gowadia has a host of other complaints: 6) he asked
counsel to have “Mr. Waaland” testify; 7) his attorneys asked
Gowadia not to take notes and/or distract them during trial;
8) the Speedy Trial Act was violated; and 9) counsel did not
argue that Gowadia was entitled to a “jury of his peers”
consisting of people with “familiarity of the subjects.”

Gowadia

throws these complaints out without showing that his attorneys
acted outside the wide range of professional conduct or that, but
for their conduct, the result of the proceeding would likely have
been different.

See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

Gowadia does not explain what “Mr. Waaland” could have
testified to, what helpful notes Gowadia might have taken during
trial, or what useful comments he might have made to counsel but
for instructions not to be distracting.

As for his Speedy Trial

Act concerns, much of the delay flowed from his switching of
counsel, the need for a mental competency examination, the filing
of numerous motions, and the time needed to determine how to

41

present classified information at trial.
the Speedy Trial Act was not violated.

Given these matters,
Finally, Gowadia had no

right to have a jury of persons familiar with classified or
technical subjects.

Gowadia was tried by an impartial jury drawn

from a representative cross-section of the community.

See

Berghuis v. Smith, 595 U.S. 314, 319 (2010) (“The Sixth Amendment
secures to criminal defendants the right to be tried by an
impartial jury drawn from sources reflecting a fair cross section
of the community.”); United States v. Hernandez-Estrada, 749 F.3d
1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 2014) (same).

Gowadia was “not entitled to

a jury of any particular composition.”

See Taylor v. Louisiana,

419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975).
F.

Because Gowadia Fails to Show He Was Improperly
Convicted of the Export Crime Charged in Count 2,
and Because His Challenge to the Money Laundering
Count Relies on the Invalidity of the Export
Conviction, He is Unpersuasive in Arguing that He
Should Not Have Been Convicted of Money Laundering
(Ground Nine).

Count 19 of the Second Superseding Indictment asserted
that Gowadia violated 18 U.S.C. § 1957 by laundering the proceeds
of the export crime asserted in Count 2 of the Second Superseding
Indictment.

In Ground Nine of the § 2255 motion, Gowadia argues

that he should not have been convicted of Count 2 and therefore
could not have laundered the proceeds of the crime charged in

42

Count 2.

However, because Gowadia fails to demonstrate that he

is entitled to § 2255 relief with respect to Count 2, Gowadia is
unpersuasive in arguing that the money laundering count asserted
in Count 19 necessarily fails.
IV.

THE COURT DECLINES TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF
APPEALABILITY.
The court declines to grant Gowadia a certificate of

appealability.

An appeal may not be taken to the court of

appeals from a final order in a § 2255 proceeding “[u]nless a
circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability.”
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B).

The court shall issue a certificate

of appealability “only if the applicant has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”
§ 2253(c)(2).

28 U.S.C.

When a district court denies a § 2255 petition on

the merits, a petitioner, to satisfy the requirements of section
2253(c)(2), “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find
the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims
debatable or wrong.”
(2000).

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

When, however, a
district court denies a habeas petition on
procedural grounds without reaching the
prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a
[certificate of appealability] should issue
when the prisoner shows . . . that jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the
petition states a valid claim of the denial
43

of a constitutional right and that jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the
district court was correct in its procedural
ruling.
Id.
This court does not think any reasonable jurist would
find it debatable that Gowadia has procedurally defaulted on his
claims.

Nor does this court think any reasonable jurist would

find this court’s assessment of the merits of Gowadia's remaining
constitutional claims debatable or wrong.

Accordingly, the court

declines to issue a certificate of appealability.
V.

CONCLUSION.
The court denies Gowadia’s § 2255 motion and declines

to issue a certificate of appealability for the reasons set forth
above.

The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor

of the Government and to close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, October 5, 2015.

/s/ Susan Oki Mollway
Susan Oki Mollway
Chief United States District Judge

United States of America v. Gowadia, Crim. No. 05-00486 SOM and Civ. No. 14-00481
SOM/KSC; ORDER DENYING MOTION TO VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR CORRECT A SENTENCE BY A PERSON
IN FEDERAL CUSTODY UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255; ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

44