Alika Atay et al. v. County of Maui et al.
Filing
55
ORDER DENYING TO DISMISS "MIRROR-IMAGE" CLAIMS ON RIPENESS GROUNDS AND CONTINUING HEARING ON MERITS OF THAT MOTION; ORDER ADOPTING AMENDED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION AND DENYING MOTION TO REMAND re 38 , 45 - Signed by CHIEF JUDGE SUSAN OKI MOLLWAY on 4/15/2015. "The court denies the Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint in the Atay Action, ECF No. 14 , to the extent it seeks dismissal on ripeness grounds of matters that mirror the issu es raised in the Robert Ito Farm Action. The hearing on the merits of that motion is continued until June 15, 2015, at 9:00 a.m. The court adopts the Amended F&R and denies the Motion to Remand the Atay Action to state court, ECF No. [ 15]." ( 14 Motion to Dismiss filed by County of Maui ; 42 MOTION for Joinder re 14 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Agrigenetics, Inc., Concerned Citizens of Molokai and Maui, Dow Agrosciences LLC, Friendly Isle Auto Parts & Supplies, Inc., Hawaii Farm Bureau Federation, Maui County, Hikiola Cooperative, Molokai Chamber of Commerce, Monsanto Company, New Horizon Enterprises, Inc., Robert Ito Farm, Inc. continued to 6/15/2015 09:00 AM before CHIEF JUDGE SUSAN OKI MOLLWAY.) (emt, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
ALIKA ATAY; LORRIN PANG; MARK )
SHEEHAN; BONNIE MARSH;
)
LEI`OHU RYDER; and SHAKA
)
MOVEMENT,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
COUNTY OF MAUI; MONSANTO
)
COMPANY; DOW AGROSCIENCES
)
LLC; ROBERT ITO FARM, INC.;
)
HAWAII FARM BUREAU
)
FEDERATION; MAUI COUNTY;
)
MOLOKAI CHAMBER OF COMMERCE; )
AGRIGENETICS, INC.; CONCERNED )
CITIZENS OF MOLOKAI AND MAUI; )
FRIENDLY ISLE AUTO PARTS &
)
SUPPLIES, INC.; NEW HORIZON
)
ENTERPRISES, INC., dba MAKOA )
TRUCKING AND SERVICES;
)
HIKIOLA COOPERATIVE; et al., )
)
Defendants
)
_____________________________ )
CIVIL NO. 14-00582 SOM/BMK
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
DISMISS “MIRROR-IMAGE” CLAIMS
ON RIPENESS GROUNDS AND
CONTINUING HEARING ON MERITS
OF THAT MOTION; ORDER
ADOPTING AMENDED FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATION AND DENYING
MOTION TO REMAND
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS "MIRROR-IMAGE" CLAIMS ON
RIPENESS GROUNDS AND CONTINUING HEARING ON MERITS OF THAT MOTION;
ORDER ADOPTING AMENDED FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATION AND DENYING MOTION TO REMAND
I.
INTRODUCTION.
This case arises out of an initiative to ban
genetically modified organisms in the County of Maui that won a
majority of votes in an election held in November 2014.
Plaintiffs in this case originally filed this action in state
court, arguing in relevant part that the County should be
required to implement the law.
A day later, the private entities
that are Defendants in this case filed Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v.
County of Maui, Civil No. 14-00511 SOM/BMK (“Robert Ito Farm
Action”), in this court, arguing that the ban violated the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution and that the
ban was preempted by state and federal law.
After the Complaint
filed in the state court was amended, the state court case was
removed to this court.
Before the court are Plaintiffs’ motion to remand this
case to state court and the County’s motion to dismiss the First
Amended Complaint.
The court declines to dismiss on ripeness
grounds claims that mirror the claims in the Robert Ito Farm
Action.
The court continues the hearing on the merits of the
motion to dismiss to the same time as the dispositive motions in
the Robert Ito Farm Action.
The court adopts the
Magistrate Judge’s Amended Findings and Recommendation to Deny
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand and denies Plaintiffs’ remand
motion.
II.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND.
On November 4, 2014, “A Bill Placing a Moratorium on
the Cultivation of Genetically Engineered Organisms” (the
“Ordinance”) was passed by ballot initiative in the County of
Maui.
See ECF No. 1-3, PageID # 85.
The Ordinance renders it “unlawful for any person or
entity to knowingly propagate, cultivate, raise, grow or test
2
Genetically Engineered Organisms within the County of Maui” until
such ban is amended or repealed by the Maui County Council.
PageID # 88.
Id.,
Any person or entity violating the Ordinance is
subject to civil penalties of $10,000 for the first violation,
$25,000 for the second violation, and $50,000 for the third or
any subsequent violation.
Id. PageID # 89.
Each day that a
person or entity is in violation of the Ordinance is considered a
separate violation.
See id.
In addition to civil penalties, “any person or entity,
whether as principal, agent, employee, or otherwise, violating or
causing or permitting the violation of any of the provisions of
[the Ordinance], shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon
conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than
two-thousand dollars ($2,000.00), or imprisoned not more than one
(1) year, or both, for each offense.”
Id.
On November 12, 2014, only eight days after the ballot
initiative passed, Plaintiffs Alika Atay, Lorrin Pang, Mark
Sheehan, Bonnie Marsh, Lei'ohu Ryder, and SHAKA Movement filed a
Complaint for Declaratory Relief in the Circuit Court of the
Second Circuit, State of Hawaii.
(“Atay Action”).
See ECF No. 1-3, PageID # 25
Paragraphs 25 and 26 of the Complaint alleged
that Defendants Monsanto Company and Dow Agrosciences LLC had
made statements that they intended to challenge the legality and
enforceability of the Ordinance.
Id., PageID # 30.
3
Paragraph 29
of the Complaint alleged that Maui County’s mayor had publicly
indicated that the County was determining how much manpower,
equipment, and other resources would be needed to implement the
Ordinance.
Id., PageID # 29.
Count I of the Complaint sought
declaratory relief to establish the enforceability of the
Ordinance under state law.
Count II of the Complaint sought
declaratory relief to have Maui County implement the Ordinance
and allow Plaintiffs to participate in that implementation.
The following day, November 13, 2014, Robert Ito Farm,
Inc., Hawaii Farm Bureau Federation, Maui County, Molokai Chamber
of Commerce, Monsanto Company, Agrigenetics Inc., Concerned
Citizens of Molokai and Maui, Friendly Isle Auto Parts &
Supplies, Inc., New Horizon Enterprises, Inc., and Hikiola
Cooperative sued the County of Maui by filing the Robert Ito Farm
Action in this court.
The complaint in that case asserts 1) that
the Ordinance is preempted by federal law (First Cause of
Action); 2) that Maui County lacks authority to enact and enforce
the Ordinance and that it is preempted by state law (Second Cause
of Action); 3) that the Ordinance violates the Commerce Clause of
the United States Constitution (Third Cause of Action); and
4) that the Ordinance is invalid under the Maui County Charter
and state law (Fourth Cause of Action).
See Robert Ito Farm,
Inc. v. County of Maui, Civil No. 14-00511 SOM/BMK, ECF No. 1.
4
On November 13, 2014, the plaintiffs in the Robert Ito
Farm Action also moved for an order temporarily restraining the
implementation of the Ordinance and for a preliminary injunction
seeking the same relief.
See id., ECF No. 5.
On November 17, 2014, the plaintiffs in the Robert Ito
Farm Action and Maui County stipulated, and the court ordered,
that the Ordinance not be “published, certified as an Ordinance,
enacted, effected, implemented, executed, applied, enforced, or
otherwise acted upon until March 31, 2015, or until further order
of this Court, in order to allow for adequate time for the
parties to brief and argue and for the Court to rule on the
legality of the Ordinance as a matter of law.”
See id., ECF No.
26, PageID # 441.
On December 10, 2014, Plaintiffs in the Atay Action
filed a First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief.
See ECF No. 1-3, PageID # 38.
The First Amended
Complaint added Defendants in the Atay Action so that all the
plaintiffs in the Robert Ito Farm Action became parties in the
Atay Action.
Id.
The First Amended Complaint in the Atay Action
criticized Maui County for having stipulated to a delay in
certifying election results concerning the Ordinance.
PageID # 49.
Id.,
The pleading reiterated assertions from the
original Atay Complaint that the Ordinance was not preempted by
state law and sought a declaration that the Ordinance was
5
enforceable.
See Id., Count I.
The First Amended Complaint also
asserted that Maui County should implement the Ordinance, that
the Atay Plaintiffs should be permitted to assist and participate
in that implementation, and that Maui County should be required
to certify the election results and implement the Ordinance.
Id., Counts II and III.
See
Finally, it sought attorney’s fees under
the private attorney general doctrine.
See Id., Count IV.
On December 15, 2014, Alika Atay, Lorrin Pang, Mark
Sheehan, Bonnie Marsh, Lei'ohu Ryder, and SHAKA Movement, the
Atay Plaintiffs, were permitted to intervene in the Robert Ito
Farm Action.
See Civ. No. 14-00511 SOM/BMK, ECF No. 63.
On December 30, 2014, Dow Agrosciences removed the Atay
Action to this court.
See ECF No. 1.
On January 15, 2015, Maui County moved to dismiss the
Atay Action.
See ECF No. 14.
Maui County argued that the case
was not ripe, that Plaintiffs in the Atay Action had no right to
be consulted regarding implementation of the Ordinance, and that
Plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney’s fees.
See id.
Maui
County sought to stay the removed Atay Action pending
adjudication of the summary judgment motions filed in the Robert
Ito Farm Action.
Also filed on January 15, 2015, was a motion by the
Atay Plaintiffs to remand the removed action to state court.
ECF No. 15.
On February 27, 2015, Magistrate Judge Barry M.
6
See
Kurren issued his Findings and Recommendations (“F&R”) in which
he recommended that the court decline to remand this action.
ECF No. 36.
the F&R.
See
On March 5, 2015, Magistrate Judge Kurren amended
See ECF No. 38.
On March 11, 2015, the Atay Plaintiffs filed objections
to the Amended F&R.
See ECF No. 45.
This court now addresses
those objections.
III.
STANDARD.
A district judge reviews de novo those portions of a
magistrate judge’s findings and recommendation to which an
objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or
in part, the findings and recommendation made by the magistrate
judge.
74.2.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Local Rule
In other words, a district judge “review[s] the matter
anew, the same as if it had not been heard before, and as if no
decision previously had been rendered.”
Freeman v. DirectTV,
Inc., 457 F.3d 1001, 1005 (9th Cir. 2006).
The district judge may accept those portions of the
findings and recommendation that are not objected to if the
district judge is satisfied that there is no clear error on the
face of the record.
United States v. Bright, 2009 WL 5064355, *3
(D. Haw. Dec. 23, 2009); Stow v. Murashige, 288 F. Supp. 2d 1122,
1127 (D. Haw. 2003).
The district judge may receive further
evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with
7
instructions.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The district judge may
also consider the record developed before the magistrate judge.
Local Rule 74.2.
While the district judge must arrive at
independent conclusions about those portions of the magistrate
judge’s report to which objections are made, a de novo hearing is
not required.
United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617 (9th
Cir. 1989); Bright, 2009 WL 5064355, *3; Local Rule 74.2.
IV.
ANALYSIS.
Before the court are objections to the thorough and
well-reasoned Amended F&R, which recommended denial of the motion
to remand this case to state court.
After de novo review, the
court adopts the Amended F&R and denies the motion to remand.
Before analyzing the motion to remand, the court turns to Maui
County’s contention that this court lacks jurisdiction over this
matter because the claims are not ripe.
The court denies the
motion to dismiss to the extent it is based on that contention
and continues the remainder of that motion to June 15, 2015, at
9:00 a.m.
A.
Plaintiffs’ Claims are Ripe.
Article III, section 2, of the Constitution confines
federal courts to deciding cases or controversies.
To qualify
for adjudication in a federal court, a plaintiff must show that
an actual controversy exists at all stages of the case.
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 63
8
(1997).
No case or controversy exists if a dispute lacks
ripeness, which has both a constitutional and a prudential
See Coons v. Lew, 762 F.3d 891, 897 (9th Cir. 2014).
component.
Only the constitutional component of ripeness is at issue here.
“A dispute is ripe in the constitutional sense if it
presents concrete legal issues, presented in actual cases, not
abstractions.”
Montana Environmental Info. Ctr. v. Stone-
Manning, 766 F.3d 1184, 1188 (9th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks,
alterations, and citation omitted).
“In the context of a
declaratory judgment suit, the inquiry depends upon whether the
facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a
substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal
interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the
issuance of a declaratory judgment.”
citations omitted).
Id. (quotation marks and
“The constitutional component of the
ripeness inquiry is often treated under the rubric of standing
and, in many cases, ripeness coincides squarely with standing’s
injury in fact prong.”
Coons, 762 F.3d at 897.
By the time the First Amended Complaint was filed in
state court, the County had entered into a stipulation with the
plaintiffs in the Robert Ito Farm Action to stay implementation
of Ordinance until this court ruled on its enforceability.
The
Atay Plaintiffs are challenging, among other things, the County’s
refusal to immediately certify and enforce the Ordinance.
9
At
least some of Atay Plaintiffs’ claims mirror the claims in the
Robert Ito Farm Action.
Both cases seek determinations
concerning the enforceability of the Ordinance.
Given the
preemption issues raised by the plaintiffs in the Robert Ito Farm
Action and the positions taken in that case by the County, this
court finds no ripeness impediment with respect to such claims.
The Atay Plaintiffs’ “mirror-image” claims present a substantial
controversy among parties having adverse legal interests that is
of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant a determination
that the claims are ripe.
See Montana Environmental Info. Ctr.,
766 F.3d at 1188.
As the parties know, the calendar of court proceedings
in the Robert Ito Farm Action has changed from what it was when
the motion to dismiss in the Atay Action was filed.
Those
changes now make it efficient for this court to address the
merits of the motion to dismiss in the Atay Action at the same
time the court addresses the dispositive motions in the Robert
Ito Farm Action, a coordination that this court was not
originally amenable to.
B.
The Court Denies the Motion to Remand.
A defendant may remove any civil action brought in
state court over which the federal court would have original
jurisdiction.
28 U .S.C. § 1441(a).
That is, a civil action
that could have originally been brought in federal court may be
10
removed from state to federal court.
Caterpillar Inc. v.
Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (“Only state-court actions
that originally could have been filed in federal court may be
removed to federal court by the defendant.”).
A federal court
has original jurisdiction “of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”
28 U.S.C.
§ 1331.
“The presence or absence of federal-question
jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’
which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a
federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's
properly pleaded complaint.”
Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392.
Plaintiffs are therefore the master of their claims and, in the
absence of diversity jurisdiction, may avoid federal jurisdiction
by exclusive reliance on state law.
Id.
Generally, “a case may not be removed to federal court
on the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of
pre-emption.”
Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392.
This general rule
is inapplicable, however, when a matter is completely preempted.
That is, when “an area of state law has been completely
pre-empted, any claim purportedly based on that pre-empted state
law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and
therefore arises under federal law.”
Id.
not an issue in this removed action.
This court therefore
11
Complete preemption is
applies the general rule and examines whether the Atay Action is
an action arising under federal law that could have been
originally filed in this court.
For purposes of determining
whether this court has federal question jurisdiction over the
Atay Action, this court need identify only a single federal
question, as any additional related claims arising solely under
state law could be addressed under this court’s supplemental
jurisdiction.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Relying on Janakes v. United States Postal Service, 768
F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1985), and its progeny, this court determines
that it would have had federal question jurisdiction over the
claims in the First Amended Complaint in the Atay Action had they
been filed in this court.
Janakes was a mail carrier who suffered injuries while
delivering mail.
Id. at 1092.
Janakes applied for and received
$1,545.58 for “continuation of pay” under 5 U.S.C. § 8118.
Id.
Defendant United States Postal Service (“USPS”) informed Janakes
that he was required to reimburse the “continuation of pay” if
the third-party tortfeasor paid him any money.
Id. at 1092-93.
In relevant part, Janakes filed suit under the Declaratory
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, seeking an interpretation of 5
U.S.C. §§ 8101 to 8193 and the USPS’s right to subrogation and
reimbursement under those statutes.
12
Id. at 1093.
The Ninth Circuit noted that the Declaratory Judgment
Act, by itself, did not provide the district court with
jurisdiction.
Id.
The Ninth Circuit then drew a distinction
between a plaintiff with a Declaratory Judgment Act claim who
asserts a federal defense to enforcement of a state law and a
“coercive action” to enforce rights.
The former provides no
jurisdiction, while the latter does if it arises under federal
law.
Id.
The Ninth Circuit stated, “If . . . the declaratory
judgment defendant could have brought a coercive action in
federal court to enforce its rights, then we have jurisdiction
notwithstanding the declaratory judgment plaintiff’s assertion of
a federal defense.”
Id.
Although Janakes filed his action in
anticipation of an action by the USPS for reimbursement and his
action was therefore in the nature of a federal defense, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the USPS could have filed a wellpleaded coercive federal suit for reimbursement under 5 U.S.C.
§ 8132.
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that it had
jurisdiction over Janakes’s claims.
Id. at 1095.
In Standard Insurance Company v. Saklad, 127 F.3d 1179,
1181 (9th Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit explained that, under
Janakes, “A person may seek declaratory relief in federal court
if the one against whom he brings his action could have asserted
his own rights there. . . .
In other words, in a sense we can
reposition the parties in a declaratory relief action by asking
13
whether we would have jurisdiction had the declaratory relief
defendant been a plaintiff seeking a federal remedy.”
The original state-court complaint in the Atay Action
was filed just days after the Ordinance was voted on.
No. 1-3, PageID # 25.
See ECF
It alleged that “Monsanto and Dow have
made public statements stating that they will challenge the
legality and enforceability of the GMO bill in court.”
see also id. ¶¶ 25, 26.
Id. ¶ 35;
The original state-court Complaint also
alleged that Maui County’s mayor had made public statements
indicating that the County was finalizing how much manpower,
equipment, and other resources it would need to implement the
Ordinance.
Id., PageID ¶ 29.
Under those circumstances, the
Atay Action Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Ordinance
was enforceable and not preempted by state law.
The Atay Action
Complaint was clearly filed in anticipation of the Robert Ito
Farm Action that was shortly thereafter filed in federal court.
The complaint in the Robert Ito Farm Action seeks a
declaration that the Ordinance is preempted by both state and
federal law, that Maui County lacks the authority to enact and
enforce the invalid Ordinance, and that the Ordinance violates
the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.
No. 14-00511 SOM/BMK, ECF No. 1.
See Civ.
Concurrent with filing the
federal case, the plaintiffs in the Robert Ito Farm Action filed
14
a motion seeking temporary and permanent injunctive relief.
See
Civ. No. 14-00511 SOM/BMK, ECF No. 5.
After the Robert Ito Farm Action suit was initiated,
Plaintiffs in the Atay Action filed a First Amended Complaint
alleging that Maui County was not acting to implement the
Ordinance.
The First Amended Complaint alleged that the County
had stipulated to a “temporary injunction to delay the
certification and implementation of the Ordinance.”
Amended Complaint ¶ 48, ECF No. 1-3, PageID # 47.
See First
On November
17, 2014, Magistrate Judge Barry M. Kurren signed a stipulation
that stated, “In order to maintain the status quo and avoid any
irreparable harm that may occur upon the enactment of the
Ordinance, to allow the parties sufficient time to brief the
merits of a summary disposition of this action before this Court,
and to give the Court adequate time to decide the matter, the
parties have agreed to an extension of the effective date of the
Ordinance by stipulation and proposed order.”
00511 SOM/BMK, ECF No. 26.
See Civ. No. 14-
On March 19, 2015, this court issued
an order, noting that the terms of the stipulated injunction
allowed the court to continue the injunction until the court
ruled on the merits of the Robert Ito Farm Action, and deciding,
moreover, that even without the stipulation, an injunction was
warranted.
See Civ. No. 14-00511 SOM/BMK, ECF No. 134.
court continued until June 15, 2015, the hearing on the
15
The
dispositive motions in the Robert Ito Farm Action addressing
whether the Ordinance was preempted under both federal and state
law.
Under these circumstances, the Magistrate Judge was
correct in determining that the Atay Action was filed in
anticipation of the coercive Robert Ito Farm Action, filed by
parties who were Defendants in the Atay Action.
PageID # 602.
See ECF No. 38,
The Atay Action is akin to Public Service
Commission of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 242 (1952), in
which the court said:
In this case, as in many actions for
declaratory judgment, the realistic position
of the parties is reversed. The plaintiff is
seeking to establish a defense against a
cause of action which the declaratory
defendant may assert in the [state] courts.
Respondent here has sought to ward off
possible action of the petitioners by seeking
a declaratory judgment to the effect that he
will have a good defense when and if that
cause of action is asserted. Where the
complaint in an action for declaratory
judgment seeks in essence to assert a defense
to an impending or threatened state court
action, it is the character of the threatened
action, and not of the defense, which will
determine whether there is federal-question
jurisdiction in the District Court.
Because the Robert Ito Farm Action has a basis in federal law,
the court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the Atay Action
can be maintained in federal court pursuant to Janakes and
Saklad.
When the parties are repositioned, this court has
16
jurisdiction over this declaratory relief action.
See Saklad,
127 F.3d at 1181.
Because this action could have originally been filed in
this court, removal was proper.
Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392.
See 28 U .S.C. § 1441(a);
In so ruling, this court is
applying the principle that, if the action could have originally
been filed in this court, it may be removed to this court.
C.
Brillhart/Dizol Factors Do Not Weigh in Favor of
Remand.
The Supreme Court has noted that “the Declaratory
Judgment Act has been understood to confer on federal courts
unique and substantial discretion in deciding whether to declare
the rights of litigants.”
277, 286 (1995).
Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S.
Guidance concerning when to exercise discretion
to decide a matter is provided by Brillhart v. Excess Insurance
Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491 (1942), and its progeny.
In Brillhart, the Supreme Court stated that it would
ordinarily
be uneconomical as well as vexatious for a
federal court to proceed in a declaratory
judgment suit where another suit is pending
in a state court presenting the same issues,
not governed by federal law, between the same
parties. Gratuitous interference with the
orderly and comprehensive disposition of a
state court litigation should be avoided.
17
316 U.S. at 495.
Brillhart set forth a nonexhaustive list of
factors to be considered in determining whether to stay or
dismiss a federal court Declaratory Judgment Act case:
Where a district court is presented with a
claim such as was made here, it should
ascertain whether the questions in
controversy between the parties to the
federal suit, and which are not foreclosed
under the applicable substantive law, can
better be settled in the proceeding pending
in the state court. This may entail inquiry
into the scope of the pending state court
proceeding and the nature of defenses open
there. The federal court may have to
consider whether the claims of all parties in
interest can satisfactorily be adjudicated in
that proceeding, whether necessary parties
have been joined, whether such parties are
amenable to process in that proceeding, etc.
Id.
In Government Employees Insurance Company v. Dizol, 133
F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth Circuit stated, “The
Brillhart factors remain the philosophic touchstone for the
district court.
The district court should avoid needless
determination of state law issues; it should discourage litigants
from filing declaratory actions as a means of forum shopping; and
it should avoid duplicative litigation.”
The Ninth Circuit
explained,
If there are parallel state proceedings
involving the same issues and parties pending
at the time the federal declaratory action is
filed, there is a presumption that the entire
suit should be heard in state court. The
pendency of a state court action does not, of
itself, require a district court to refuse
18
federal declaratory relief. Nonetheless,
federal courts should generally decline to
entertain reactive declaratory actions.
Id. (citations omitted).
Dizol recognized that the Brillhart factors are not
exhaustive and noted that district courts may consider
whether the declaratory action will settle
all aspects of the controversy; whether the
declaratory action will serve a useful
purpose in clarifying the legal relations at
issue; whether the declaratory action is
being sought merely for the purposes of
procedural fencing or to obtain a “res
judicata” advantage; or whether the use of a
declaratory action will result in
entanglement between the federal and state
court systems.
Id. at 1225 n.5 (quoting Am. States Ins. Co. v. Kearns, 15 F.3d
142, 145 (9th Cir. 1994) (J. Garth, concurring) (quotation marks
omitted)).
In other words, “when deciding whether to exercise
its jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgments Act, [a district
court] must balance concerns of judicial administration, comity,
and fairness to the litigants.”
Chamberlain v. Allstate
Insurance Company, 931 F.2d 1361, 1367 (9th Cir. 1991).
As the Magistrate Judge correctly noted, this court
need not determine whether any party was engaged in forum
shopping to determine whether it should decide the issues raised
in the Atay Action.
Although the Atay Action seeks a
determination that the Ordinance is not preempted by state law
and the Atay Action Plaintiffs argue that the state courts should
19
decide issues of state law, this court is unpersuaded that it
should remand this matter to state court when the result would be
uneconomical duplicative proceedings.
The Robert Ito Farm Action
has pending dispositive motions that Atay Action Plaintiffs have
briefed.
The Robert Ito Farm Action examines whether the
Ordinance is preempted under both federal and state law and
raises the issue of whether the Ordinance violates the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution.
In that respect, the
Robert Ito Farm Action will examine issues raised in the statecourt case.
If this court were to remand the Atay Action to
state court, there would be potentially duplicative litigation as
to the issue of state-law preemption without any gain in judicial
economy.
The Robert Ito Farm Action would remain before this
court, while the Atay Action would not decide the issues of
federal law raised in the Robert Ito Farm Action.
Under these
circumstances, it is better to have the issues in the Robert Ito
Farm Action and the Atay Action decided by the same judge.
The court recognizes that, if it retains jurisdiction
over the Atay Action, the Atay Plaintiffs will not be proceeding
in their chosen state-court forum on Maui.
But the case does
remain within Hawaii, and, as the Magistrate Judge noted,
proceeding in federal court will not be overly burdensome on
Plaintiffs in the Atay Action.
Counsel for those Plaintiffs
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lists a downtown Honolulu address near this court as counsel’s
place of business.
The court therefore adopts the Amended F&R, and
incorporates its factual and legal analyses.
V.
CONCLUSION.
The court denies the Motion to Dismiss the First
Amended Complaint in the Atay Action, ECF No. 14, to the extent
it seeks dismissal on ripeness grounds of matters that mirror the
issues raised in the Robert Ito Farm Action.
The hearing on the
merits of that motion is continued until June 15, 2015, at 9:00
a.m.
The court adopts the Amended F&R and denies the Motion
to Remand the Atay Action to state court, ECF No. 15.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, April 15, 2015.
/s/ Susan Oki Mollway
Susan Oki Mollway
Chief United States District
Alika Atay, et al. v. County of Maui, et al.; Civil No. 14-00582 SOM/BMK; ORDER
DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS "MIRROR-IMAGE" CLAIMS ON RIPENESS GROUNDS AND CONTINUING
HEARING ON MERITS OF THAT MOTION; ORDER ADOPTING AMENDED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
AND DENYING MOTION TO REMAND
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