Shavelson v. Valenciano

Filing 8

ORDER: (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN DISTRICT COURT WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES OR COSTS 3 ; AND (2) DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. Signed by JUDGE J. MICHAEL SEABRIGHT on 2/26/2015. (afc)CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII

EILEEN SHAVELSON,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
JUDGE RANDALL VALENCIANO, )
individually and in his official capacity )
as Justice of the Fifth Civil Circuit
)
Court of Kauai County,
)
)
Defendant.
)
________________________________ )

CIV. NO. 15-00047 JMS-KSC
ORDER: (1) GRANTING
PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO
PROCEED IN DISTRICT COURT
WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES OR
COSTS; AND (2) DISMISSING
PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND

ORDER: (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO PROCEED
IN DISTRICT COURT WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES OR COSTS;
AND (2) DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the court is pro se Plaintiff Eileen Shavelson’s (“Plaintiff”)
Verified Complaint, Doc. No. 1, and Application to Proceed in District Court
Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (“IFP Application”). Doc. No. 3. For the
reasons set forth below, the court GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP Application and
DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint without leave to amend.
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II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed her Complaint against Defendant Judge Randall
Valenciano (“Defendant” or “Judge Valenciano”), individually and in his official
capacity as Circuit Judge of the State of Hawaii Fifth Circuit in Kauai, alleging
that Defendant deprived her of due process in connection with state court judicial
proceedings, resulting in monetary damages. Plaintiff seeks injunctive and
declaratory relief, damages, and litigation costs.
More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to issue a
“summary judgment default ruling” in Plaintiff’s favor in a state court proceeding,
and failed to give reasons for such failure and to respond to numerous writs filed
by Plaintiff against Defendant seeking such relief and/or reasoning. Doc. No. 1,
Compl. at 1-3. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant’s failure to perform his
judicial duties for nearly two years has exacerbated the drastic change in living
costs Plaintiff incurred following the state action defendants’ conduct after
Plaintiff sought relief from the Fair Housing Office in December 2012. Plaintiff
seeks an injunction commanding Judge Valenciano to “give a summary judgment
default ruling” and to award damages relating to that case. Id.
On February 20, 2015, Plaintiff filed the instant action and the IFP
Application, which is GRANTED. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(d), the court finds
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these matters suitable for disposition without a hearing.
III. DISCUSSION
A.

Standard of Review
The court must subject each in forma pauperis civil action

commenced pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) to mandatory screening, and order the
dismissal of any claims it finds “frivolous, malicious, failing to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune
from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,
1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only
permits but requires” the court to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis
complaint that fails to state a claim); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir.
2001) (per curiam) (holding that “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are
not limited to prisoners”).
Plaintiff is apprearing pro se; consequently, the court liberally
construes her Complaint. See Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir.
1987) (“The Supreme Court has instructed the federal courts to liberally construe
the ‘inartful pleading’ of pro se litigants.”) (citing Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S.
364, 365 (1982) (per curiam)). For screening purposes, the court accepts as true
the allegations of the complaint. Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S.
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738, 740 (1976). The court also recognizes that “[u]nless it is absolutely clear that
no amendment can cure the defect . . . a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the
complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the
action.” Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Lopez,
203 F.3d at 1126.
Nevertheless, the court may dismiss a complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted[.]” A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper when there is either a “‘lack of
a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged.’” UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir.
2013) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.
1990)).
Although a plaintiff need not identify the legal theories that are the
basis of a pleading, see Johnson v. City of Shelby, Mississippi, 135 S. Ct. 346, 346
(2014) (per curiam), a plaintiff must nonetheless allege “sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Weber v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 521 F.3d 1061,
1065 (9th Cir. 2008). This tenet -- that the court must accept as true all of the
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allegations contained in the complaint -- “is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Rather, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 1949
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In other words, “the factual allegations that are
taken as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not
unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery
and continued litigation.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).
Factual allegations that only permit the court to infer “the mere possibility of
misconduct” do not show that the pleader is entitled to relief as required by Rule
8. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
B.

Application
Plaintiff asserts a single claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

violation of her constitutional (through the Fourteenth Amendment) due process
rights, based at least in part on violations of the Hawaii Revised Code of Judicial
Conduct. The basis of Plaintiff’s claim is that over a two-year period, Defendant
failed to grant her request for default judgment in an underlying state proceeding,
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and subsequently failed to rule or respond to various writs Plaintiff filed seeking
such ruling and/or reasoning for failing to grant such relief. See generally Doc.
No. 1, Compl. at 1-3. Based on the following, the court finds that Plaintiff has
failed to assert a plausible claim against Defendant.
Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant fails because judges are absolutely
immune from liability for acts done by them in the exercise of their judicial
functions. See, e.g., Miller v. Davis, 521 F.3d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 2008); Mullis
v. Bankr. Ct. for the Dist. of Nev., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding
that judges are absolutely immune from civil liability for damages for their judicial
acts). Judicial immunity “is not limited to immunity from damages, but extends to
actions for declaratory, injunctive and other equitable relief.” Moore v. Brewster,
96 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1996), superceded by statute on other grounds as
recognized in Tia v. Mollway, 2011 WL 2945813, at *4 (D. Haw. July 20, 2011).
The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity is based on the policy that “judges
should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear
of consequences.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (applying judicial
immunity to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Judicial immunity is an immunity
from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages. See Mireles v. Waco, 502
U.S. 9, 11 (1991). “Accordingly, judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations
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of bad faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily cannot be resolved
without engaging in discovery and eventual trial.” Id. Judicial immunity applies
“however erroneous the act may have been, and however injurious in its
consequences it may have proved to the plaintiff.” Moore, 96 F.3d at 1244
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “A judge is not deprived of
immunity because he takes actions which are in error, are done maliciously, or are
in excess of his authority.” Meek v. Cnty. of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir.
1999) (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978)).
The Complaint asserts that Defendant refused (1) to give a final
ruling for nearly two years in an underlying state action in which the state
defendants never responded; (2) to respond to Plaintiff’s motions and writ seeking
such final ruling and/or reasons for denial; and (3) to give any reasons for his
denial of motions. See Doc. No. 1, Compl. at 2. Because these allegations are all
directed to Defendant’s acts done in the exercise of his judicial functions,
Defendant is absolutely immune from suit and Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant
fails.
Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiff also generally alleges that the
Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals (“ICA”), specifically Craig Nakamura,
Chief Judge of the ICA, and the Supreme Court of Hawaii, contributed to the lack
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of due process by not granting or responding with reasons to various writs and
appeals, such allegations are also directed to acts done in the exercise of judicial
function. Thus, even if Plaintiff were to amend her Complaint naming as
defendants additional judges, these judges would also be absolutely immune from
suit and Plaintiff’s claims would fail.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because Defendant is absolutely immune from suit, Plaintiff has
failed to assert a plausible claim for relief. And because of such immunity, the
court finds that granting Plaintiff leave to amend her Complaint would be futile -no amendment would remedy her inability to assert claims against Judge
Valenciano based on the allegation that Judge Valenciano’s conduct in the
exercise of his judicial function violated Plaintiff’s due process rights.
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Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without leave to
amend. This action is DISMISSED. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the
case file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, February 26, 2015.

/s/ J. Michael Seabright
J. Michael Seabright
United States District Judge

Shavelson v. Valenciano, Civ. No. 15-00047 JMS-KSC, Order: (1) Granting Plaintiff’s
Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs; and (2) Dismissing
Plaintiff’s Complaint Without Leave to Amend

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