Mariano et al v. Bank of Hawaii et al
Filing
68
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' BANK OF HAWAII, PETER HO, RAECHELLE HESTER, SUI LUM, AND MITZI A. LEE'S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT AND JEROME ADARNA'S JOINDER THEREIN; ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT LORRIN A. KAU'S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLA INT; ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE & CONSUMER AFFAIRS MOTION TO DISMISS; ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF ELVIRA R. MARIANO'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT re 18 , 22 , 25 , 28 , 48 , 54 - Signed by JUDGE SUSAN OKI MOLLWAY on 1/2 2/2016. (emt, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Elvira Mar iano and Alejandro B. Mariano, Jr. served by first class mail at the address of record on January 22, 2016. Gregory W. Kugle, Esq., (pro bono counsel for Alejandro B. Mariano, Jr) of the law firm Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert served electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
ELVIRA R. MARIANO; ALEJANDRO
B. MARIANO, JR.; and ESTATE
OF CRISOSTOMO R. RAGUINE,
deceased,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
BANK OF HAWAII; PETER HO;
RICK MURPHY; RAECHELLE
HESTER; SUN LUM; MITZI A.
LEE; LORRIN A. KAU; JEROME
ADARNA; DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE; el al.
Defendants.
____________________________
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CIVIL NO. 15-00087 SOM/BMK
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’
BANK OF HAWAII, PETER HO,
RAECHELLE HESTER, SUI LUM,
AND MITZI A. LEE’S MOTION TO
DISMISS COMPLAINT AND JEROME
ADARNA’S JOINDER THEREIN;
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
LORRIN A. KAU’S MOTION TO
DISMISS COMPLAINT;
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE &
CONSUMER AFFAIRS MOTION TO
DISMISS;
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF
ELVIRA R. MARIANO’S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' BANK OF HAWAII, PETER HO, RAECHELLE
HESTER, SUI LUM, AND MITZI A. LEE'S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT
AND JEROME ADARNA'S JOINDER THEREIN; ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
LORRIN A. KAU'S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT; ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE & CONSUMER AFFAIRS
MOTION TO DISMISS; ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF
ELVIRA R. MARIANO'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I.
INTRODUCTION.
Plaintiffs Elvira R. Mariano, her husband Alejandro B.
Mariano, Jr., and the Estate of Crisostomo R. Raguine, deceased,
have filed a Complaint against various Defendants arising out of
a state-court action that resulted in the foreclosure of the
mortgage on their home.
Plaintiffs name as Defendants: 1) Bank
of Hawaii; 2) its President, Peter Ho; 3) its former Vice
President, Rick Murphy; 4) two of its employees, Raechelle Hester
and Sui Lum; 5) its attorney, Mitzi A. Lee; 6) the courtappointed foreclosure commissioner, Lorrin A. Kau, 7) the
purchaser of their home at the public auction, Jerome Adarna; and
8) the State of Hawaii Department of Commerce and Consumer
Affairs.
See ECF No. 1.
Before the court are a number of motions.
Pursuant to
Local Rule 7.2(d), the court decides these motions without a
hearing.
On June 11, 2015, Defendants Bank of Hawaii, Peter Ho,
Raechelle Hester, Sui Lum, and Mitzi A. Lee (collectively, “Bank
of Hawaii”) moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.1
See ECF No. 18.
On June 22, 2015,
Defendant Jerome Adarna filed a Joinder in Bank of Hawaii’s
motion to dismiss.
See ECF No. 25.
The court denies the motion
and joinder, as special counsel for Alejandro Mariano has
clarified that federal claims are being asserted that provide
this court with subject matter jurisdiction.2
1
Defendant Rick Murphy has been dismissed from this case
given a lack of service. See ECF No. 62.
2
This court earlier raised concerns about Elvira Mariano’s
attempt to represent her husband, Alejandro Mariano. The court
thanks Gregory W. Kugle, E. Kumau Pineda-Akiona, and Loren A.
Seehase, of Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert, who now represent
Alejandro Mariano on a pro bono basis for the limited purpose of
filing a memorandum as to whether he is asserting any federal
claim in the Complaint. Given the filing of a memorandum
regarding the court’s federal question jurisdiction, the court
discharges them from any further obligation in this case,
2
On June 15, 2015, Defendant Lorrin A. Kau moved to
dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint, arguing that it fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
See ECF No. 22.
The
court grants the motion, as the Complaint lacks any factual
allegations of wrongdoing on Kau’s part.
On August 20, 2015, Defendant Department of Commerce
and Consumer Affairs filed a motion to dismiss.
See ECF No. 48.
That motion is granted, as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars this
court from reviewing the state-court foreclosure judgments and
orders.
Additionally, the Complaint lacks any factual
allegations of wrongdoing on the part of the Department of
Commerce and Consumer Affairs.
On June 28, 2015, Plaintiff Elvira Mariano filed a
response to the motions to dismiss.
See ECF No. 28.
She also
attached her own motion for summary judgment to her response,
arguing that the foreclosure was wrongful.
That motion is denied.
See ECF No. 28-1.
As noted above, she may not seek to have
this court review the state-court foreclosure proceedings.
II.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND.
Although Plaintiffs’ Complaint is unclear, the court
has gleaned from it the gist of what Plaintiffs say has occurred.
although the Clerk of Court is directed to include them among the
persons served with this order.
3
Plaintiffs purchased real property in Aiea, Hawaii,
which they financed through a loan from Bank of Hawaii.
was secured by a mortgage on the property.
# 2.
The loan
See ECF No. 1, PageID
Plaintiffs lived in the home for close to two decades.
See
id., PageID #s 6-7.
In 2009, Plaintiffs requested a loan modification from
Bank of Hawaii.
See id., PageID # 3.
Bank of Hawaii agreed to
temporarily modify the loan, reducing the amount of Plaintiffs’
monthly mortgage payments for a period of one year.
See id.
In
June, 2010, Plaintiffs requested a permanent loan modification,
which Bank of Hawaii denied.
See id.
In April 2011, Plaintiffs received a letter from Bank
of Hawaii, demanding immediate payment of the remaining balance
of their loan of $237,327.87, because Plaintiffs had allegedly
defaulted on their mortgage payments.
See id., PageID # 15.
The
court takes judicial notice of an action in state court in which
Bank of Hawaii, represented by its attorney, Defendant Mitzi A.
Lee, sued Plaintiffs and sought to foreclose Bank of Hawaii’s
mortgage liens and security interests on Plaintiffs’ home.
Bank of Hawaii v. Mariano, Civil No. 11-1-0994-05.
See
The state
court determined that Bank of Hawaii was entitled to foreclose on
the mortgage, ordered that the home be sold, and appointed
Defendant Lorrin Kau as the court’s foreclosure commissioner to
sell the home.
See ECF No. 22-3, PageID #s 120-24.
4
With respect to the foreclosure proceedings and/or the
loan modification request, Plaintiffs sought assistance from Bank
of Hawaii’s President, Defendant Peter Ho; its Vice President,
Defendant Rick Murphy; and one of its employees, Defendant Sui
Lum.
See ECF No. 1, PageID # 4.
Plaintiffs were directed to
contact Bank of Hawaii’s attorney.
See id.
Plaintiffs then contacted Defendant Department of
Commerce and Consumer Affairs to lodge a complaint against Bank
of Hawaii.
See id.
Eventually, the home was sold at a public
foreclosure auction to Defendant Jerome Adarna.
See id., PageID
# 12.
On March 19, 2013, Plaintiffs were evicted from their
home.
Elvira Mariano’s father, Crisostomo R. Raguine, lived with
the Marianos and was home at the time of the eviction.
He was
transported to Pali Momi Medical Center in a state of shock.
id., PageID # 8.
See
Raguine passed away on November 13, 2013.
See
id., PageID # 9; ECF No. 1-1, PageID # 14 (Certificate of Death).
Plaintiffs allege that Bank of Hawaii discriminated
against them because of Alejandro Mariano’s schizophrenia.
ECF No. 1, PageID # 8.
See
Bank of Hawaii allegedly knew Alejandro
Mariano was disabled because Plaintiffs allegedly told Bank of
Hawaii that Alejandro Mariano received Social Security disability
payments.
Id.
Plaintiffs allege that Bank of Hawaii treated
5
them differently from other applicants for loan modifications.
Id.
III.
STANDARD.
The motions raise arguments under Rules 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may either attack the
allegations of the complaint as insufficient to confer upon the
court subject matter jurisdiction, or attack the existence of
subject matter jurisdiction in fact.
Thornhill Publ’g Co. v.
Gen, Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979).
When the motion to dismiss attacks the allegations of the
complaint as insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction,
all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Fed’n of
African Am. Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1207
(9th Cir. 1996).
When the motion to dismiss is a factual attack
on subject matter jurisdiction, however, no presumptive
truthfulness attaches to the plaintiff’s allegations, and the
existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial
court from evaluating for itself the existence of subject matter
jurisdiction in fact.
Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733.
When presented with a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6), a court’s review of the sufficiency of a complaint is
6
generally limited to the contents of the complaint.
Sprewell v.
Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001);
Campanelli v. Bockrath, 100 F.3d 1476, 1479 (9th Cir. 1996).
If
matters outside the pleadings are considered, the Rule 12(b)(6)
motion is treated as one for summary judgment.
See Keams v.
Tempe Tech. Inst., Inc., 110 F.3d 44, 46 (9th Cir. 1997);
Anderson v. Angelone, 86 F.3d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 1996).
However,
courts may “consider certain materials--documents attached to the
complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint,
or matters of judicial notice--without converting the motion to
dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.”
Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003).
United States v.
Documents whose
contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity is not
questioned by any party may also be considered in ruling on a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
See Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d
449, 453-54 (9th Cir. 1994).
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, all allegations
of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Fed’n of African Am.
Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir.
1996).
However, conclusory allegations of law, unwarranted
deductions of fact, and unreasonable inferences are insufficient
to defeat a motion to dismiss.
Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988; Syntex
Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 1996).
7
Additionally, the court need not accept as true allegations that
contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or
allegations contradicting the exhibits attached to the complaint.
Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988.
“[T]o survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,
factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true even if doubtful in fact.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (“the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not
require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than
an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”).
“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s
obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to
relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
The complaint must “state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Id. at 570.
“A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
556 U.S. at 677.
8
Iqbal,
IV.
ANALYSIS.
A.
Elvira R. Mariano May Not Represent the Estate of
Crisostomo R. Raguine.
In the Complaint, Plaintiff Elvira R. Mariano purports
to be representing the Estate of her father, Crisostomo R.
Raguine, who passed away on November 13, 2013.
PageID # 1; ECF No. 1-1, PageID # 14.
is not an attorney.
See ECF No. 1,
However, Elvira R. Mariano
A non-attorney “may appear in propria
persona in his [or her] own behalf[,]” but “has no authority to
appear as an attorney for others.”
C.E. Pope Equity Trust v.
United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987).
Accordingly,
Elvira R. Mariano may not represent the Estate of Crisostomo R.
Raguine.
See Sutton v. Llewellyn, 288 Fed App’x 411, 413 (9th
Cir. 2008) (citing C.E. Pope Equity Trust, 818 F.2d at 697)
(holding that nonattorney appellants lacked standing to prosecute
action pro se on behalf of decedent’s estate).
Because the estate is not represented by an attorney,
and because Mariano may not represent the estate, the court gives
the estate until February 29, 2016, to have an attorney make an
appearance in this case.
By that date, the attorney must submit
a document indicating that the attorney is accepting and adopting
the Complaint with respect to the estate.
Alternatively, the
attorney may reject the Complaint with respect to the estate and
ask that the estate be dismissed without prejudice, or may move
to amend the Complaint if all other Plaintiffs are in agreement.
9
If the court does not get a timely notice of appearance or motion
by an attorney representing the estate, the estate will
automatically be dismissed from this action, without prejudice to
the estate’s seeking of such other relief as it may otherwise be
entitled by law to pursue in a permissible manner.
B.
Bank of Hawaii’s Motion to Dismiss is Denied.
On June 11, 2015, Bank of Hawaii filed a motion to
dismiss the Complaint, arguing that this court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction.
the motion.
See ECF No. 18.
See ECF No. 25.
Defendant Adarna joined in
The entire motion is based on the
argument that there is a lack of complete diversity under 28
U.S.C. § 1332.
The court agrees that diversity jurisdiction is
lacking.
In relevant part, diversity jurisdiction exists when
“the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000”
and is between “citizens of different States.”
28 U.S.C. § 1332.
A natural person’s state citizenship is “determined by her state
of domicile, not her state of residence.
A person’s domicile is
her permanent home, where she resides with the intention to
remain or to which she intends to return.”
Kanter v.
Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001).
For this
court to exercise diversity jurisdiction, there must be complete
diversity between the parties.
That is, the citizenship of each
plaintiff must be diverse from the citizenship of each defendant.
10
See Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996).
This
court lacks diversity jurisdiction when even one defendant and
one plaintiff share the same citizenship.
Plaintiffs are Hawaii citizens.
See id.
They owned and lived
in their Aiea, Hawaii, home for close to two decades.
See ECF
No. 1, PageID # 2.
Defendant Bank of Hawaii is also a Hawaii citizen.
A
corporation is “deemed to be a citizen of every State . . . by
which it has been incorporated and of the State . . . where it
has its principal place of business.”
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
The phrase “principal place of business” refers to “the place
where a corporation’s officers direct, control, and coordinate
the corporation’s activities.”
U.S. 77, 92-93 (2010).
State of Hawaii.
See Hertz Corp v. Friend, 559
Bank of Hawaii was incorporated in the
See ECF No. 18-2, PageID # 96.
In addition,
Bank of Hawaii’s principal place of business is in Hawaii.
See
id.
Even if this court were to hold that Bank of Hawaii is
not a citizen of Hawaii, complete diversity of citizenship still
does not exist because Defendants Sui Fun Lum and Jerome Adarna
are also citizens of Hawaii.
See ECF No. 18-3, PageID #s 97-98;
ECF No. 25-2, PageID #s 138-39.
Accordingly, this court lacks
diversity jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims.
11
The lack of diversity jurisdiction does not, by itself,
establish that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, as
this court may also exercise jurisdiction over claims arising
under federal law.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1331.
In a filing of
November 20, 2015, special counsel for Alejandro Mariano
clarified that the Complaint is seeking to assert claims under
the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3605, and under the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691.
The assertion of these
federal claims is sufficient to establish this courts’ subject
matter jurisdiction.
The court assumes for now that Elvira
Mariano is similarly asserting those federal claims.
In its Reply, Bank of Hawaii argues that claims under
the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act are
time-barred.
Those arguments were understandably not raised
before the filing of the Reply.
Relying on Local Rule 7.4, and
seeking to proceed fairly, this court does not address the
timeliness argument in this order.
Bank of Hawaii and Adarna may
raise that matter in a future motion.
The court denies Bank of Hawaii’s motion to dismiss and
Adarna’s joinder therein.
Within 14 days of this order, Bank of
Hawaii and Adarna must either file an Answer to the Complaint or
file another motion based on the newly established understanding
that the Complaint is asserting claims under the Fair Housing Act
and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.
12
C.
Defendant Lorrin Kau’s Motion to Dismiss is
Granted.
On June 15, 2015, Defendant Lorrin Kau filed his Motion
to Dismiss.
Kau argues that the Complaint fails to assert any
claim against him and that, even if it did, he would have quasijudicial immunity for his actions as court-appointed commissioner
to sell Plaintiffs’ property at auction.
See ECF No. 22-1.
The Complaint does not assert any viable claim against
Kau.
At most, it states, “Lorrin A. Kau, as an individual, a
commissioner, also in affiliation for the FORCED-SALE to our
home.”
ECF No. 1, PageID # 11.
In other words, the Complaint
alleges only that Kau sold the property as the court-appointed
commissioner of a court-ordered foreclosure sale.
This is
insufficient to allege any wrongdoing on the part of Kau.
Because the Complaint does not assert a viable claim
with respect to Kau, the court need not reach his argument that
he would have quasi-judicial immunity from any such claim.
D.
Defendant Department of Commerce and Consumer
Affairs’ Motion to Dismiss is Granted.
On August 20, 2015, Defendant Department of Commerce
and Consumer Affairs filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Plaintiffs’ request to have this
court review the state-court foreclosure judgment and that no
viable claim was asserted against it.
13
See ECF No. 48.
Defendant Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs
correctly argues that Plaintiffs may not seek to have this court
review the state-court foreclosure proceedings under the guise of
trying to hold the Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs
liable for having failed to prevent the foreclosure in this
matter.
Any attempt to appeal the state-court foreclosure orders
and judgments to this court violates the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86
(1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is confined to cases brought by
state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the federal district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of
those judgments.
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courts are
divested of jurisdiction to conduct a direct review of statecourt judgments even when a federal question is presented.
Bennett v. Yoshina, 140 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 1998.
See
Accord
Mackay v. Pfeil, 827 F.2d 540, 543 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Federal
district courts, as courts of original jurisdiction, may not
serve as appellate tribunals to review errors allegedly committed
by state courts.” (footnote omitted)).
Thus, jurisdiction is
lacking even if a state court’s decision is challenged as
14
unconstitutional.
Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486; Branson v. Nott, 62
F.3d 287, 291 (9th Cir. 1995) (“As courts of original
jurisdiction, federal district courts have no authority to review
the final determinations of a state court in judicial
proceedings.
This is true even when the challenge to a state
court decision involves federal constitutional issues.”
(citations omitted)).
Litigants who believe that a state
judicial proceeding has violated their constitutional rights must
appeal that decision through their state courts and then seek
review in the Supreme Court.
See Feldman, 460 U.S. 482-483;
Bennett, 140 F.3d at 1223 (noting that the rationale behind the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine “is that the only federal court with the
power to hear appeals from state courts is the United States
Supreme Court”).
To the extent the Complaint seeks to hold the
Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs liable for some other
claim, the Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs also
correctly argues that the Complaint fails to allege a viable
cause of action against it.
At most, the Complaint alludes to
the Department’s alleged failure to regulate Bank of Hawaii.
ECF No. 1, PageID # 11.
See
But no facts are alleged or legal theory
discussed under which Plaintiffs can state a claim against the
Department.
The Complaint itself alleges that the state court
oversaw the foreclosure proceedings.
15
No facts are alleged
establishing any duty on the part of the Department to have
somehow directed the state-court foreclosure proceedings.
E.
Elvira Mariano’s Motion for Summary Judgment is
Denied.
On June 17, 2015, Elvira Mariano filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment.
Although her motion is not entirely clear, it
appears to be based on the argument that the state-court
foreclosure proceeding was improper because Plaintiffs had
complied with the terms of the loan modification and/or should
have received a permanent loan modification.
See ECF No. 28-2.
As discussed above, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents this
court from reviewing state-court judgments.
Elvira Mariano’s
motion seeks to have this court review the state-court
foreclosure proceedings and declare the state-court judgment null
and void, which this court cannot do.
Accordingly, Elvira
Mariano’s motion is denied.
V.
CONCLUSION.
The court denies the Motion to Dismiss filed by
Defendants Bank of Hawaii, Peter Ho, Raechelle Hester, Sui Lum,
and Mitzi A. Lee and the joinder therein filed by Jerome Adarna.
However the court grants the Motions to Dismiss filed by
Defendants Lorrin A. Kau and Department of Commerce and Consumer
Affairs.
The court also denies Plaintiff Elvira Mariano’s Motion
for Summary Judgment.
16
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
Honolulu, Hawaii, January 22, 2016.
/s/ Susan Oki Mollway
Susan Oki Mollway
Chief United States District Judge
Mariano, et al. v. Bank of Hawaii, et al., Civil No. 15-00087 SOM/BMK; ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANTS' BANK OF HAWAII, PETER HO, RAECHELLE HESTER, SUI LUM, AND MITZI A. LEE'S
MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT AND JEROME ADARNA'S JOINDER THEREIN; ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT LORRIN A. KAU'S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT; ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE & CONSUMER AFFAIRS MOTION TO DISMISS; ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF
ELVIRA R. MARIANO'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
17
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