Lee et al v. Field

Filing 19

ORDER AFFIRMING BANKRUPTCY COURT ORDERS re 1 - Signed by CHIEF JUDGE SUSAN OKI MOLLWAY on 9/21/2015. "This court affirms the bankruptcy court rulings challenged by Lee on this appeal. This court determines that th ere was no abuse of discretion in the bankruptcy court's decision to hear Lee's motion to dismiss immediately before trial, and that there was no clear error in the bankruptcy court's finding that Lee fraudulently transferred the Pal ua Place properties to avoid creditors' claims. This order disposes of all issues in this appeal. The Clerk of Court is therefore directed to enter judgment against Lee and to terminate this appeal." (emt, )< hr>CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
)
)
ADAM LEE,
)
)
Debtor/
)
Appellant,
)
)
)
)
DANE S. FIELD, Trustee
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
ADAM LEE and YUKA YAHAGI LEE, )
)
Defendants.
)
)
In re

CIVIL NO. 15-00100 SOM/RLP
ORDER AFFIRMING BANKRUPTCY
COURT ORDERS
Bankr. Case No. 13-01356 (RJF)
Chapter 7
Adv. Pro. No. 14-90003

ORDER AFFIRMING BANKRUPTCY COURT ORDERS
I.

INTRODUCTION.
Debtor/Appellant Adam Lee appeals two rulings by the

bankruptcy court.

First, Lee claims that the bankruptcy judge

abused his discretion in even considering (and ultimately
denying) Lee’s untimely, eleventh-hour motion to dismiss an
adversarial proceeding and should have instead continued the
trial and handled the motion to dismiss at a different time.
Because Lee shows no such abuse of discretion, the court affirms
the bankruptcy judge’s decision to adjudicate Lee’s motion.
Lee also appeals the bankruptcy judge’s determination
that Lee fraudulently transferred properties to himself and his
wife as tenants by the entirety.

Because Lee shows no clear

error with respect to the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact,
and because the bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law are
correct, the court affirms the bankruptcy court’s determination
as to the fraudulent transfer.
II.

FACTS.
Lee filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.

7-3, PageID # 175.
estate parcels.

See ECF No.

His bankruptcy Schedule A included three real

Two properties were on Palua Place and were

listed as held in tenancies by the entirety.

The schedule stated

that, with respect to one of the Palua Place properties, Lee had
a 75% interest, and Alexandria Shiroma had a 25% interest.

The

schedule stated that the other Palua Place property had
approximately $838,000 in equity.

See ECF No. 14-1, PageID

# 740.
Lee retained Chuck Choi as his attorney in September
2010 to look into a possible bankruptcy filing and into
bankruptcy exemptions.

See Transcript of 341 Creditors’ Meeting

at 22-23, ECF No. 14-2, PageID # 753-54.

After meeting with

Choi, Lee transferred the Palua Street properties so they were
held in tenancies by the entirety for what he says was the
purpose of avoiding creditors’ claims.

Id. at 24-25, PageID

# 755-56.
On January 14, 2014, the bankruptcy trustee filed an
adversary proceeding, AP 14-90003, seeking to set aside those

2

property transfers as fraudulent.
#s 263-270.

See ECF No. 7-6, PageID

In a scheduling order filed on March 24, 2014, the

court set August 25, 2014, as the trial date for the adversary
proceeding.

See U.S. Bankr. Ct. # 14-90003, Dkt. # 14.

Motions

to dismiss were to be filed in time “to be heard not later than
28 days before the trial date.”

Id.

On July 14, 2014, the parties stipulated to a
continuance of the trial for the adversary proceeding.
Bankr. Ct. # 14-90003, Dkt. # 33.

See U.S.

On July 24, 2014, the

bankruptcy court set a new trial date of February 2, 2015, for
the adversary proceeding, stating that the scheduling order of
March 24, 2014, otherwise remained in effect.

See U.S. Bankr.

Ct. # 14-90003, Dkt. # 34.
On January 15, 2015, although represented by counsel at
the time, Lee filed a pro se Motion to Dismiss Chapter 7
Bankruptcy Case and 3 Adversarial Proceedings.

See ECF No. 8-2.

Lee also filed a motion to shorten time so that the motion to
dismiss could be heard before the trial date of February 2, 2015.
See ECF No. 8-3.

On January 23, 2015, the bankruptcy court

denied the motion to shorten time.

See ECF No. 8-5.

The motion to dismiss described a conversation in which
the bankruptcy trustee had allegedly threatened not to refer
matters to Lee’s attorney, Choi, until Lee’s case was settled.
See ECF No. 8-2, PageID # 441.

Although Lee appeared to have had

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in hand the factual bases for his motion by October 2014, he
waited until several weeks before trial to file the motion.

See

ECF No. 8-2, PageID # 475 (letter dated October 16, 2014,
complaining that the bankruptcy trustee had told Choi, “Let’s get
these cases settled, I have 3 more in the pipeline.”).
On January 21, 2015, Lee’s new attorney, Lars Peterson,
moved to withdraw as his counsel, in part because Lee had filed
the motion to dismiss on a pro se basis despite being represented
by Peterson at the time.

See ECF No. 14-5.

In connection with

his pro se motion, Lee had submitted a declaration stating that
he wanted to have the motion to dismiss heard before the upcoming
trial.

See ECF No. 14-5, PageID # 781.
On January 27, 2015, Lee and his wife filed a pro se

motion to continue the trial date.

See ECF No. 8-7.

Lee also

filed a motion to shorten time so that the motion to dismiss
could be heard before the trial scheduled to begin on February 2,
2015.

See ECF No. 8-8.

The motion to shorten time was granted,

and the hearing on the motion to continue the trial date was set
for February 2, 2015, right before the trial was to start.

See

ECF No. 8-9.
The bankruptcy judge began proceedings on February 2,
2015, by stating that, after addressing the motion to withdraw as
counsel, he wanted to take up a matter not on the calendar–-Lee’s
motion to dismiss.

The bankruptcy judge noted that he had denied

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the motion to shorten time for the motion to dismiss, but, in
preparing for the hearing, thought the motion should be taken up
before trial.

The bankruptcy judge noted that an opposition to

the motion to dismiss had been filed and that “Everybody’s here.”
See ECF No. 7-13, PageID # 357.
Referring to the motion to withdraw, Lee told the
bankruptcy judge that he wanted Peterson to represent him with
respect to the adversary proceeding.

See Transcript, U.S. Bankr.

Ct. # 14-90003, Docket # 329, Page 6 of 26.

Peterson indicated

that he was ready to proceed with the adversary proceeding trial.
The bankruptcy judge then granted Peterson’s motion to withdraw,
except with respect to the adversary proceeding.

Id., Page 7 of

26.
Turning to Lee’s motion to dismiss, the bankruptcy
judge asked Lee and Peterson whether there was anything they
wanted to tell him other than what had been submitted in writing.
Lee responded only that he thought the trustee had made comments
that were out of line (presumably referring to the alleged
comments to Choi) that put Lee at a disadvantage, and that Lee
thought there was a cover up.

Neither Lee nor his attorney

objected to the bankruptcy court’s proposal that it address Lee’s
motion to dismiss at that time.

Id., Pages 7 and 8 of 26.

The bankruptcy judge proceeded to deny the motion to
dismiss, saying there was a dispute about what had been said by

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the trustee to Choi and that it appeared Lee had heard something
different from what everybody else involved heard.
7-13, PageID # 359.

See ECF No.

The bankruptcy judge then stated that, even

assuming what Lee contended was true, dismissal would not be the
appropriate remedy.

Instead, the bankruptcy judge thought

replacement of Choi might be more appropriate, but that had
already occurred.

Replacement of the trustee might alternatively

be considered but was not being requested.

Id.

The bankruptcy court then turned to the motion to
continue trial, which the court denied.

See Transcript, U.S.

Bankr. Ct. # 14-90003, Docket # 329, Page 19-25 of 26.

Because

the motion to continue was premised on the need to decide the
motion to dismiss before trial, and because the motion to dismiss
was being denied, Lee himself appeared to be saying that denial
of the motion to continue would be appropriate.

Id. at 19 of 26.

At trial on February 2, 2015, Choi was the first
witness.

He testified that he had two face-to-face meetings with

Lee in September 2010.

See Transcript, U.S. Bankr. Ct. # 14-

90003, Dkt. # 330, Page 52 of 111.

Choi reiterated that, at the

meeting of creditors pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 341, he had stated
that he had met with Lee in September 2010 to discuss a potential
bankruptcy and exemptions.

See ECF No. 14-7, PageID # 794.

With

respect to the Palua Place properties, Choi testified that he and
Lee talked about the benefits of putting the properties into

6

tenancies by the entirety.

See Transcript, U.S. Bankr. Ct. # 14-

90003, Dkt. # 330, Page 76 of 111.
The second trial witness was Darryl Masagatani of the
State of Hawaii Department of Taxation.

Masagatani’s direct

testimony was in the form of a declaration that was received into
evidence.

See ECF No. 14-17 (copy of declaration); Transcript,

U.S. Bankr. Ct. # 14-90003, Dkt. # 330, Page 79 of 111.
Masagatani indicated that Lee owed $1,656,660.68 in taxes.
at 83 of 111.

Masagatani could not explain, based on what he had

before him, how that number had been calculated.
of 111.

Id.

See id. at 87

However, on redirect examination, Masagatani, after

reviewing an exhibit, was able to say that the total included
$1,384,000 owed for general excise taxes from 2006 to 2009.

Id.

at 98 of 111.
On February 3, 2015, Thomas Oh of Central Pacific Bank
testified.

See ECF No. 14-14, PageID # 822; U.S. Bankr. Ct.

# 14-90003, Dkt. # 331, Page 4 of 159.

Oh noted that Lee had

defaulted on one of his loans with Central Pacific Bank in
January 2010, pertaining to a Liholiho project.
of 159.

See id., Page 11

Central Pacific Bank agreed to a discounted settlement

of that matter.

See id., page 76 of 159.

Central Pacific Bank

also foreclosed on property Lee had on Kinau Street.
Page 137 of 159.

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See id.,

On February 3, 2015, John Michael Friedel of the City
and County of Honolulu Department of Planning and Permitting
testified.

His direct testimony was submitted via a declaration.

See ECF No. 14-10 (copy of declaration); Docket No. 331
(transcript of proceedings), Page 102 of 159.

He testified that

the Department of Planning and Permitting issued a notice of
violation to Lee concerning unpermitted plumbing on one of his
projects.

Friedel further testified that, because Lee did not

correct the problem, the city issued a notice in January 2010
that required Lee to correct the problem and to pay a civil fine
of $1000 for the violation.

The notice of violation also

required Lee to pay a fine of $1000 per day for each day the
violation remained uncorrected beyond February 22, 2010.

Friedel

testified that $64,000 in fines remained unpaid as of January 5,
2015.

See ECF No. 14-10, PageID #s 805-06.

Friedel acknowledged

that a reduction of the fine to 10% of the assessed amount was
common for first-time violators.

See U.S. Bankr. Ct. # 14-90003,

Docket No. 331, Page 104-05 of 159.
Friedel also testified that Lee received a notice of
violation for electrical work, that Lee did not correct the
problem, and that Lee was being fined $1000 per day for that
violation.

Friedel testified that Lee owed $341,000 in that

regard as of October 10, 2010, and that as of January 5, 2015,

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the total owed was $1.491 million.

See ECF No. 14-10, PageID

# 806.
Adam Lee testified on February 3, 2015.

See

Transcript, U.S. Bankr. Ct. # 14-90003, Dkt. # 331, 118 of 159.
Lee testified that he conveyed the Palua Place properties to
himself and his wife because they had gotten married in 2010 and
wanted to live in the properties.

Lee understood that a tenancy

by the entirety was beneficial for a married couple.

Id., Page

140-141 of 159.
Lee indicated that, when he went to see Choi in
September 2010, he took with him a fax transmittal from the
Department of Taxation that indicated that Lee had been selected
for an audit of his 2006 to 2008 tax returns.
159.

Id., Page 127 of

He also stated that one reason he went to see Choi was that

Central Pacific Bank, one of his creditors, had foreclosed on one
of his properties.

See id., Page 143 of 159.

On August 3, 2011, the Department of Planning and
Permitting recorded a $701,000 lien against Lee’s property.

See

U.S. Bankr. Ct. # 14-90003, Dkt. # 70, Page 4 of 4.
Lee continued his testimony the following day, February
4, 2015.
3 of 115.

See Transcript, U.S. Bankr. Ct. # 14-90003, Dkt. # 332,
Lee testified that Choi had told him in passing to

transfer his property to a tenancy by the entirety.
of 115.

Id., Page 6

Lee stated that, although he had a “massive net worth,”

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he wanted to protect his interests in property in case a deal
with Central Pacific Bank fell through.

Id., Page 8 of 115.

that reason, Lee was considering bankruptcy as an option.
Page 11 of 115.

Id.,

Lee admitted that he knew that creditors could

not reach properties held by tenants by the entirety.
20 of 115.

For

Id., Page

In fact, Lee acknowledged having given deposition

testimony stating that he conveyed his personal residence to
himself and his wife as tenants by the entirety to protect it in
the event things went wrong.

Id., Page 23, of 115.

Lee was

experienced in real estate development, having begun
condominiumizing projects in 2003 and having completed over 25
such projects.

Id., Page 32-33 of 115.

Lee recognized that his

continuing involvement with “projects” raised the potential that
he would have future creditors.

Id., Page 25 of 115.

Lee admitted having failed to file tax returns in 2010.
Id., Page 65 of 115.

In December 2010, the State of Hawaii

Department of Taxation placed a $22,000 lien on one of the Palua
Place properties.

See Schedule D–-Creditors Holding Secured

Claims, ECF No. 7-4, PageID # 205.

After an audit, the state

alleged that Lee owed more than one million dollars.

See

Transcript, U.S. Bankr. Ct. # 14-90003, Dkt. # 332, 66 of 115.
On February 27, 2015, the bankruptcy judge issued his
thorough and well-reasoned Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.

He found that Lee was a successful real estate investor

10

facing serious financial challenges by 2010.
PageID #s 680-81.

See ECF No. 9-1,

The State of Hawaii Department of Planning and

Permitting had begun fining Lee $1000 per day beginning in
October 2009.

On August 1, 2011, it had placed a $701,000 lien

on Lee’s property.

Id., Page 3 of 18.

The bankruptcy judge

found that Lee also had tax problems, including being notified in
August 2010 that he was being audited for tax years 2005 to 2008.
The bankruptcy judge noted that, at the conclusion of the audit
in 2013, Lee was assessed over $1.6 million.

He noted that Lee

has not filed any tax returns since 2010.
The bankruptcy judge found that Lee met with Choi in
late September 2010 regarding bankruptcy issues.

On October 1,

2010, within days of meeting with Choi, Lee transferred the Palua
Place properties to himself and his wife as tenants by the
entirety.

See ECF No. 9-1, PageID # 686.

The bankruptcy judge

found that, based on Choi’s testimony, there was “clear and
convincing evidence [] that Mr. Lee transferred his interest . .
. with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his existing
and future creditors.”

Id.

The bankruptcy judge viewed Lee’s

own testimony as supporting this fraudulent intent, noting that
Lee had met with Choi to discuss “exemption planning,” and that
Lee had conceded that he was involved with a high-risk business
that made it advisable to hold his personal property in a tenancy

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by the entirety to protect it from creditors.

Id., PageID # 687-88.

Based on these fraudulent intent findings, the
bankruptcy judge concluded that the transfers of the Palua Place
properties were “subject to avoidance” under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)
and sections 651C-4(a)(1) and 651C-7(a)(1) of Hawaii Revised
Statutes.
III.

Id., PageID # 694-95.
STANDARD OF REVIEW.
The granting or denial of a continuance is a matter

within the discretion of the bankruptcy judge and will be
reversed only when the bankruptcy judge abuses his of her power.
See In re Leonetti, 28 B.R. 1003, 1008 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
Similarly, a court’s determination as to whether to hold a
hearing is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.

See

United States v. Peninsula Commc’ns, Inc., 287 F.3d 832, 839 (9th
Cir. 2002).
This court reviews a bankruptcy court’s findings of
fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.

See In

re Kimura (United States v. Battley), 969 F.2d 806, 810 (9th Cir.
1992) (“The court reviews the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact
under the clearly erroneous standard and its conclusions of law
de novo.”).

The court “must accept the Bankruptcy Court’s

findings of fact, unless the court is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.
questions of law and fact are reviewed de novo.”

12

Mixed
In re JTS

Corp., 617 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and
citations omitted).
IV.

ANALYSIS.
A.

The Bankruptcy Judge Did Not Abuse His
Discretion In Hearing Lee’s Motion to Dismiss
Before the Start of Trial, Instead of
Continuing the Trial.

A mere two weeks before trial was set to begin, Lee
filed a motion to dismiss and asked the bankruptcy judge to hear
the motion to dismiss on an expedited basis.

When his motion to

expedite the hearing was denied, Lee filed a motion to continue
the trial.

Immediately before trial began and before hearing the

motion to continue trial, the bankruptcy judge told the parties
that he had changed his mind about expediting the hearing on the
motion to dismiss and thought addressing the motion to dismiss
before trial started was appropriate after all.

The bankruptcy

judge had received briefing on the motion and asked the parties
whether they had anything they wanted to add to what was in their
briefs.

Receiving no new material, the bankruptcy judge denied

the motion to dismiss, noting that dismissal of the bankruptcy
cases was not an appropriate remedy for the alleged violations.
Lee argues that the bankruptcy judge abused his
discretion in deciding to hold the hearing immediately before
trial.

Lee argues that he was “surprised” by the decision to

address his motion before trial, rather than after it.
No. 7, PageID # 152.

See ECF

Had the motion been later, Lee says he
13

could have obtained “further supporting evidence” and would have
had an evidentiary hearing.
The bankruptcy judge did not abuse his discretion with
respect to the timing of the hearing on the motion to dismiss or
the refusal to continue the trial in light of the motion to
dismiss.
First, the motion to dismiss was untimely, having been
filed right before trial and after the dispositive motions
deadline, even though Lee knew the bases for his motion to
dismiss for months.
Second, the bankruptcy judge did not abuse his
discretion in deciding to adjudicate a motion to dismiss before
trial began.

Had the motion to dismiss been granted, it would

have kept the court and the parties from wasting their time in
trial.
Third, the parties did not object to the court’s
proposal to address the motion to dismiss right before trial when
the judge presented the proposal.

To the contrary, this was the

very timing that Lee had originally asked for and essentially
amounted to a reconsideration by the bankruptcy judge of his
earlier denial of Lee’s request for an expedited hearing.
Fourth, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its
discretion because the relief the motion sought, dismissal of the

14

bankruptcy proceedings, was not an appropriate remedy for the
alleged violations, as explained by the bankruptcy judge.
Finally, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its
discretion by failing to announce the standard it was applying in
adjudicating the motion to dismiss because the motion clearly
sought inappropriate relief.

In other words, the motion to

dismiss was properly denied, as Lee failed to demonstrate that
dismissal of the adversary proceeding was appropriate under the
circumstances.
Accordingly, the court affirms the bankruptcy judge.
In so ruling, this court is unpersuaded by Lee’s argument that,
had the hearing on the motion to dismiss been continued, he might
have been able to present evidence warranting dismissal.
not specifically identified any such evidence.

He has

Lee was asked by

the bankruptcy judge whether there was anything else he wanted to
present.

Lee failed to present any evidence at that time, and

even now fails to indicate what he could have provided if only
the hearing had been later.

He merely asserts that an

evidentiary hearing could have been held at which he might have
produced unidentified evidence.

On this record, Lee fails to

show any abuse of discretion.
Even assuming that, with a short delay, Lee could have
produced evidence supporting his version of what the trustee
allegedly said, the bankruptcy judge did not abuse his discretion

15

in declining to continue the trial to allow for discovery.

Lee

had the factual bases for his motion to dismiss at least by
October 2014.

His delay of several months, until after the

dispositive motions cutoff and until immediately before trial,
raises the possibility that Lee filed the motion to delay trial.
Lee himself had asked for an expedited hearing and neither
objected at the time to the holding of the hearing nor identified
at the hearing anything else that he wanted to include in the
record.

The bankruptcy judge therefore cannot be said to have

abused his discretion in deciding to hear the motion to dismiss
before the start of trial.
B.

The Bankruptcy Court Did Not Clearly Err in
Finding That Lee Had Fraudulently Transferred His
Palua Place Properties to Avoid Creditors’ Claims.

Lee says that the bankruptcy court clearly erred in
finding that he transferred the two Palua Place properties to
himself and his wife, as tenants by the entirety, with the actual
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud existing and future
creditors, rendering the transfers voidable.

This court is not

left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was
committed by the bankruptcy judge.

Even if the trial evidence

could have supported a contrary finding, the bankruptcy judge was
in the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
This court therefore finds no clear error in the bankruptcy

16

judge’s factual determination, which is supported by substantial
evidence.
This court readily finds support in the record for the
bankruptcy judge’s finding that, at the time Lee transferred the
Palua Place properties in October 2010, he was in serious
financial difficulty.

As the bankruptcy judge noted, Lee,

although previously a successful real estate investor, was, by
2010, being cited by the State of Hawaii Department of Planning
and Permitting for violations of law and was being fined every
day.

By the time Lee went to see his attorney in September 2010,

one of his properties was being foreclosed on by Central Pacific
Bank, and Lee had received a notice that his tax returns for 2005
to 2008 were being audited.

Those audits ultimately resulted in

a determination that Lee owed more than $1.3 million in general
excise taxes.

Lee also had failed to file his 2010 tax return

and has not filed a tax return since.
When Lee met with Choi in September 2010, they
discussed what assets were exempt in a possible bankruptcy
proceeding.

They also discussed the benefit of holding property

in a tenancy by the entirety.

Shielding property from creditors

is one such benefit.
Shortly after Lee met with Choi, Lee transferred the
Palua Place properties to himself and his wife as tenants by the
entirety.

Although Lee says this was nothing more than sound

17

financial planning, the court cannot say that the bankruptcy
judge clearly erred in finding that, given the circumstances, the
transfers were made to avoid creditors’ claims.
business that carried inherent risks.
known financial difficulties.

Lee was in a

He had known creditors and

The evidence certainly supports

the bankruptcy judge’s determination that Lee made the transfers
with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud one or more
creditors.
In so ruling, the court is not saying that any transfer
of property to a tenancy by the entirety is inherently or
necessarily fraudulent.

Nor is the court saying that a transfer

to a tenancy by the entirety is always fraudulent if the
transferor has any debt or any financial difficulty at all.

The

court is only ruling that the constellation of facts before the
bankruptcy judge in this case is sufficient to support his
determination that Lee’s transfers were made with the intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud one or more of his creditors.
This court is not disputing that a different judge
might, based on the evidence, have determined that Lee had no
such fraudulent intent.

But the standard this court applies here

is not whether a different conclusion could have been reached.
Rather, this court defers to the bankruptcy court’s reasonable
interpretation of the evidence, conscious that the bankruptcy
court, having tried the case, was in a superior position to

18

evaluate the evidence and determine which testimony to believe.
See, e.g., Husain v. Olympic Airways, 316 F.3d 829, (9th Cir.
2002) (noting that the trier of fact is “in a superior position
to appraise and weigh the evidence, and its determination
regarding the credibility of witnesses is entitled to special
deference”); de la Fuente v. F.D.I.C., 332 F.3d 1208, 1221 (2003)
(stating in the context of an administrative appeal that the
trier of fact is in a superior position to evaluate conflicting
testimony).

“If two views of the evidence are possible, the

trial judge’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”
In re Beauchamp, 236 B.R. 727, 729-30 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1999).
V.

CONCLUSION.
This court affirms the bankruptcy court rulings

challenged by Lee on this appeal.

This court determines that

there was no abuse of discretion in the bankruptcy court’s
decision to hear Lee’s motion to dismiss immediately before
trial, and that there was no clear error in the bankruptcy
court’s finding that Lee fraudulently transferred the Palua Place
properties to avoid creditors’ claims.
This order disposes of all issues in this appeal.

The

Clerk of Court is therefore directed to enter judgment against
Lee and to terminate this appeal.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, September 21, 2015.

/s/ Susan Oki Mollway
Susan Oki Mollway
Chief United States District Judge

In re Adam Lee, Civ. No. 15 00100 SOM; ORDER AFFIRMING BANKRUPTCY COURT ORDERS

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