Department of Education, State of Hawai'i v. L. et al

Filing 27

ORDER (1) REMANDING THE CASE TO THE ADMINISTRATVE HEARINGS OFFICER AND (2) DENYING DEFENDANTS' 18 MOTION FOR SANCTIONS. Signed by JUDGE DERRICK K. WATSON on 3/31/2016. -- Based on the foregoing, the Court REMANDS the case to the AHO for proceedings consistent with this and the Court's prior orders. Defendants Motion for Sanctions is DENIED. (ecs, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notificat ions received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAI`I

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
STATE OF HAWAII,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RIA L., by and through her Parent,
RITA L.,

CIVIL NO. 15-00164 DKW-BMK
ORDER (1) REMANDING THE
CASE TO THE ADMINISTRATVE
HEARINGS OFFICER AND (2)
DENYING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

Defendants.

ORDER (1) REMANDING THE CASE TO THE
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS OFFICER AND
(2) DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
In this interlocutory appeal, the Court is asked by the Administrative
Hearings Officer (“AHO”) to address whether a decision on the merits of a case or
an admission of liability by a party is a condition precedent to dismissal. As set
forth below, the Court answers the question in the negative, i.e., an admission of
liability is not required before a case may be dismissed as moot. The Court
REMANDS the case to the AHO for proceedings consistent with this and its prior
orders, and DENIES the Motion for Sanctions filed by Ria L. (“Ria” or “Student”)
and Rita. L (“Parent”) (collectively “Defendants”). Dkt. No. 18.

BACKGROUND
The parties are already familiar with the history of this case, which has been
laid out in some detail in prior orders. See DOE v. Ria L., et al., CV No. 12-00007
DAE-KSC, Dkt. No. 27 (D. Haw. July 31, 2012); DOE v. Ria L. et al., CV No. 1200007 HG-KSC, Dkt. No. 39 (D. Haw. Oct. 30, 2012); DOE v. Ria L., et al., CV
No. 14-00034 DKW-RLP, Dkt. No. 30 (D. Haw. Dec. 15, 2014); DOE v. Ria L., et
al., CV No. 14-00034 DKW-RLP, Dkt. No. 40 (D. Haw. Jan. 27, 2015). Because
the question presented by the AHO on interlocutory review is a question of law,
only the limited, relevant factual and procedural background is included here.
On March 11, 2011, Defendants filed their Request for Impartial Hearing.
See Dkt. No. 13-2, Plf. Exh. 2 at 27. They requested the following relief:
Find the DOE both procedurally and substantively denied Ria
FAPE. Order placement of Ria at ABC School for the
remainder of the 2010-2011 school year. Order reimbursement
to parents for any costs related to placement at ABC School
including but not limited to tuition, transportation, and other
expenses. Order a comprehensive evaluation of Ria by a
provider of Parents’ choice at DOE expense. Order
compensatory education for failure to provide a FAPE for the
prior two school years in the form of placement at ABC School
for the 2011-2012 and 2012-2013 school years. And other
remedies the Hearings Officer deems appropriate.
Dkt. No. 13-2, Plf. Exh. 2 at 28.
Following a six-day administrative hearing, AHO Haunani Alm issued a
decision, finding that the DOE had denied Student a free appropriate public
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education (“FAPE”) under the provisions of Student’s February 25, 2009 and
February 18, 2010, individualized education programs (“IEPs”). The DOE
appealed this decision, and on July 31, 2012, Judge Ezra vacated and remanded it
to the AHO. DOE v. Ria L., et al., CV No. 12-00007 DAE-KSC, Dkt. No. 27
(D. Haw. July 31, 2012). On remand, AHO Alm held a further evidentiary hearing
and again found in favor of Student. The DOE appealed a second time.
On December 15, 2014, this Court issued an Order Affirming in Part and
Remanding Decision of the Administrative Hearings Officer. DOE v. Ria L., et al.,
CV No. 14-00034 DKW-RLP, Dkt. No. 30 (D. Haw. Dec. 15, 2014). In the
decision, the Court remanded the matter for further clarification on the issue of the
credibility of witnesses. The Court, however, was subsequently notified that AHO
Alm had retired and was unavailable to address the matter on remand.
Accordingly, on January 27, 2015, the Court issued its Order Vacating in Part the
Administrative Hearings Officer’s December 27, 2013 Decision and Remanding
for Further Proceedings Before a New Hearings Officer. DOE v. Ria L., et al., CV
No. 14-00034 DKW-RLP, Dkt. No. 40 (D. Haw. Jan. 27, 2015).
On remand, the case was assigned to AHO Richard Young, who decided that
the merits of the remanded issue would be determined through a third hearing. On
March 30, 2015, prior to the scheduled hearing, the DOE filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment or in the Alternative, to Dismiss. Dkt No. 13-2, Plf. Exh. 2.
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The AHO denied the DOE’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. No. 13-1, Plf.
Exh. 1.
On April 24, 2015, the DOE simultaneously filed two motions: (1) a Motion
for Reconsideration of its Motion for Summary Judgment, and (2) a Motion for
Leave to File Interlocutory Appeal. On May 1, 2015, the AHO denied the Motion
for Reconsideration [Dkt. No. 1-3], but granted the Motion for Leave to File
Interlocutory Appeal. Dkt. No. 1-1. In the Order Denying the DOE’s Motion for
Reconsideration, the AHO maintained that the matter was not moot because
Student requested relief in the form of a finding that the “DOE procedurally and
substantively denied [Student] a FAPE” and that the issue of “whether or not a
denial of FAPE occurred due to alleged abuse is a live controversy.” Dkt. No. 1-3
at 2. In the Order Granting the DOE’s Motion for Leave to File Interlocutory
Appeal, the AHO stated that:
[T]he standard for allowing leave to file an interlocutory appeal
is that an important question of law is in doubt which may
substantially affect the final result of the case. As [the DOE]
argues, in the interest of judicial economy, the Court is asked to
resolve the issue as to whether the DOE, having already paid
more than what was sought in the Request for Due Process
Hearing, must first admit to liability before the case can be
dismissed. This issue appears to be a matter of first impression;
and the determination of this issue may facilitate dismissal on
jurisdictional grounds.
Dkt. No. 1-4 at 2 (emphasis added).

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On May 7, 2015, the DOE filed the instant Complaint, seeking review and
reversal of: (1) the AHO’s Order Denying the DOE’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, or in the Alternative, to Dismiss; and (2) the Order Denying the DOE’s
Motion for Reconsideration. Dkt. No. 1 at 4-5. The DOE asserted that the case is
moot because Student has received all of the requested relief, and thus, the case
should be dismissed. Dkt. No. 1 at 6. On July 21, 2015, Student, by and through
her Parent, filed her Answer to the DOE’s Complaint. Dkt. No. 8. Thereafter, the
parties submitted their respective briefs. Dkt. Nos. 12, 13, 16.
On February 10, 2016, Defendants filed a Motion for Sanctions, arguing that
the DOE had violated Rule 11 in bringing the instant Complaint. Dkt. No. 18. The
following day, the Court ordered the parties to a settlement conference before
Magistrate Judge Kurren and held the matters before the Court in abeyance,
pending the outcome of the settlement conference. Dkt. No. 20. On March 3,
2016, the Court was notified that the parties were not able to reach a settlement.
Dkt. No. 24. The Court elected to decide the matters before it without a hearing
pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(d). Dkt. No. 20.
DISCUSSION
I.

Interlocutory Appeal
As a preliminary matter, the Court clarifies the scope of this appeal. This

matter returns to this Court on interlocutory appeal solely to address “whether the
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DOE, having already paid more than what was sought in the Request for Due
Process Hearing, must first admit to liability before the case can be dismissed.”
Dkt. No. 1-4 at 2. Stated differently, the question presented is whether an
admission of liability is required before a case may be dismissed as moot. This
purely legal question is limited in scope, and it is the only question the Court
addresses.1 As set forth below, the Court finds that an admission of liability is not
necessary before a case may be dismissed as moot.
Under Article III of the Constitution, federal courts only have jurisdiction
over “cases” and “controversies.” See U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Public
Utilities Comm’n v. F.E.R.C., 100 F.3d 1451, 1458 (9th Cir. 1996). A party must
maintain a live controversy at all stages of review, not simply at the time the action
is initiated. See Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 177 F.3d 789, 797 (9th Cir.
1999) (en banc). “If an action or claim loses its character as a live controversy,
then the action or claim becomes ‘moot,’” and the court lacks jurisdiction to
resolve the underlying dispute. Id. at 797–98. It is well-established that “[t]he
court must be able to grant effective relief, or it lacks jurisdiction and must dismiss
the appeal.” Public Utilities, 100 F.3d at 1458.

1

Both parties brief at length issues that extend well beyond the limited question posed by the
AHO to this Court for interlocutory consideration. For instance, the DOE styles its Complaint as
one seeking review, in part, of the AHO’s denial of the DOE’s motion for summary judgment.
The denial of a motion for summary judgment, however, is not appealable. See Datagate, Inc. v.
Hewlett–Packard Co., 941 F.2d 864, 868 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1991).

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The AHO’s determination that an admission of liability is a condition
precedent to dismissal of a case on the basis of mootness was in error. Whether or
not the AHO’s characterization of the question before the Court as one of first
impression is accurate, numerous cases in this circuit illustrate that a party need not
first admit to liability in order for a court to dismiss a case on the basis of
mootness. Rather, the inquiry focuses on whether the court is able to grant
“effective relief.” See, e.g., S. Cal. Painters & Allied Trades, Dist. Council No. 36
v. Rodin & Co., 558 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2009) (declining to reach the issue
of declaratory relief because it would constitute an advisory opinion and there was
no evidence of a live dispute between the parties); Back v. Sebelius, 684 F.3d 929,
932-33 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissing the petitioner’s claim as moot when she
received the exact relief requested in her complaint).
Even within the specific context of Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (“IDEA”) cases, neither a decision on the merits nor an admission of liability
is required before a case may be dismissed as moot. For example, in Browell v.
Lemahieu, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (D. Haw. 2000), the district court determined that
a plaintiff’s claim that he was denied a FAPE because he did not receive
educational services for eight weeks was moot, notwithstanding the absence of an
admission of liability by the defendants. The district court reached this conclusion
after examining what the plaintiff had requested and received, and ultimately
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determined that there was “no effective relief” that the court could grant to the
plaintiff. Browell, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1126; see also M.M. v. Lafayette Sch. Dist.,
767 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2014) (upholding the district court’s conclusion that a
parent’s claim for reimbursement of the cost of a certain evaluation was moot);
Derek H. v. DOE, Civil No. 14-00143 ACK-KSC, 2015 WL 9478231, at *3 (D.
Haw. Dec. 29, 2015) (declining to reach the merits where the operation of the
IDEA’s stay-put provision provided the student with the requested relief, thus
mooting the case).
In sum, the Court finds that neither an admission of liability nor a decision
on the merits is a condition precedent to the dismissal of a case on the basis of
mootness.2
II.

Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions
Defendants request sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

11(b), asserting that the DOE’s Complaint against Defendants “has no basis in fact
or law.” Dkt. No. 18-1 at 7. Specifically, Defendants contend that by bringing this
appeal, the DOE is in contempt of this Court’s January 27, 2015 remand order, and
that Defendants’ claim violates the law of the case doctrine. The Court finds that
while the DOE briefed issues extending beyond the scope of the AHO’s Order

2

The Court recognizes that even if a case is moot because “effective relief” is no longer
available, exceptions to the mootness doctrine may apply. However, that issue is not properly
before this Court.

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Granting the DOE’s Motion for Leave to File Interlocutory Appeal, Rule 11
sanctions are not warranted.
Rule 11(b) provides in relevant part:
By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other
paper—whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later
advocating it—an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that
to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief,
formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose,
such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly
increase the cost of litigation; [and]
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument
for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for
establishing new law . . . .
In determining whether a party has violated Rule 11, the Court applies an
objective reasonableness standard. Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987 F.2d 622, 628
(9th Cir. 1993). The Ninth Circuit has instructed the district courts to engage in the
following inquiry when considering whether Rule 11 sanctions are warranted:
When, as here, a “complaint is the primary focus of Rule 11
proceedings, a district court must conduct a two-prong inquiry
to determine (1) whether the complaint is legally or factually
baseless from an objective perspective, and (2) if the attorney
has conducted a reasonable and competent inquiry before
signing and filing it.” As shorthand for this test, we use the
word “frivolous” “to denote a filing that is both baseless and
made without a reasonable and competent inquiry.”

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Holgate v. Baldwin, 425 F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted)
(emphases in original).
Having reviewed the Complaint, the Court finds that Rule 11 sanctions are
not warranted because the Complaint is not “frivolous.” As a preliminary matter,
the Court agrees with the DOE that the interlocutory appeal was not brought in
contempt of this Court’s January 27, 2015 remand order or in violation of the law
of the case doctrine. The Court did not intend to prohibit the filing of relevant prehearing motions when it issued its order, nor did its order suggest otherwise.
Although the scope of the DOE’s Complaint extends beyond what the AHO
identified as an important question of law, the DOE’s Complaint did address this
issue, and the DOE’s position on the issue is supported by existing case law.
Because the standard for Rule 11 sanctions has not been met, the Court
declines to impose any.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court REMANDS the case to the AHO for
proceedings consistent with this and the Court’s prior orders. Defendants’ Motion
for Sanctions is DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 31, 2016 at Honolulu, Hawai‘i.

DOE v. Ria L. et al.; CV 15-00164 DKW-BMK; ORDER (1) REMANDING THE
CASE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS OFFICER AND (2)
DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

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