Smith-Marras v. General Nutrition Corporation
Filing
31
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND ORDERING CONSOLIDATION OF CASES re 5 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI on 12/09/2015. The Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint, fil ed on May 27, 2015 in Smith-Marras v. General Nutrition Corp., et al., CV 15-00188 LEK-KSC, and the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, filed on September 18, 2015 in Marras v. USPlabs, LLC, et al., CV 15-00329 LEK-KSC, are H EREBY DENIED. However, this Court HEREBY CONSOLIDATES CV 15-188 and CV 15-329 with Pavao, et al. v. UPSlabs, LLC, et al., CV 14-00367 LEK-KSC. In addition, Ronden Marras's request for sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 is DENI ED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the filing of a motion that complies with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). (eps)CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
RONSONETTE P.C. SMITH-MARRAS, )
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
GENERAL NUTRITION
)
CORPORATION; USPLABS, LLC,
S.K. LABORATORIES, INC.; DOE )
)
DEFENDANTS 1-100,
)
)
Defendants.
_____________________________ )
)
RONDEN MARRAS,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
USPLABS, LLC, JONATHAN
)
VINCENT DOYLE (an
)
individual), JACOB GEISSLER
(an individual) a/k/a JACOBO )
)
GEISSLER, USPLABS OXYELITE,
)
LLC, USPLABS OXYELITE PN,
)
LLC, GNC CORPORATION, and
)
DOES 1-500, Inclusive,
)
)
Defendants.
_____________________________ )
CIVIL 15-00188 LEK-KSC
CIVIL 15-00329 LEK-KSC
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS
AND ORDERING CONSOLIDATION OF CASES
Before the Court are: 1) Defendants USPlabs, LLC
(“USPlabs”) and General Nutrition Corporation’s (“GNC”) Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint in Smith-Marras v. General
Nutrition Corp., et al., CV 15-00188 LEK-KSC (“CV 15-188
Defendants” and “CV 15-188 Motion”), filed on May 27, 2015; and
2) Defendants USPlabs, Jonathan Vincent Doyle (“Doyle”),
Jacob Geissler (“Geissler”), USPlabs OxyElite, LLC (“OxyElite
LLC”), USPlabs OxyElite PN, LLC (“OxyElite PN”), and GNC’s Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint in Marras v. USPlabs, LLC, et
al., CV 15-00329 LEK-KSC (“CV 15-329 Defendants” and “CV 15-329
Motion”), filed on September 18, 2015.
CV 15-329, dkt. no. 6.]
[CV 15-188, dkt. no. 5;
Plaintiff Ronsonnette P.C. Smith-Marras
(“Smith-Marras”) filed her memorandum in opposition to the CV 15188 Motion on August 3, 2015, and Plaintiff Ronden Marras filed
his memorandum in opposition to the CV 15-329 Motion on
November 2, 2015.
10.]
[CV 15-188, dkt. no. 15; CV 15-329, dkt. no.
The CV 15-188 Defendants filed their reply on November 10,
2015, and the CV 15-188 Defendants filed their reply on
November 9, 2015.
12.]
[CV 15-188, dkt. no. 28; CV 15-329, dkt. no.
These matters came on for hearing on November 23, 2015.
After careful consideration of the motions, supporting and
opposing memoranda, and the arguments of counsel, the motions are
HEREBY DENIED for the reasons set forth below.
However, this
Court HEREBY CONSOLIDATES CV 15-188 and CV 15-329 with Pavao, et
al. v. USPlabs, LLC, et al., CV 14-00367 LEK-KSC (“Pavao”).
BACKGROUND
On April 23, 2015, Smith-Marras filed her Complaint
(“CV 15-188 Complaint”) in the State of Hawai`i Circuit Court of
the First Circuit.
The CV 15-188 Defendants removed the case to
2
this district court based on diversity jurisdiction.
[CV 15-188,
Notice of Removal, filed 5/20/15 (dkt. no. 1), at ¶ 6.]
Ronden Marras filed his Complaint in this district court on
August 17, 2015, based on diversity jurisdiction.
[CV 15-329,
dkt. no. 1 at ¶ 1.]
Both cases arise from the death of Sonnette Marras, who
died on or about October 8, 2013, as a result of liver failure
allegedly caused by her use of an OxyElite Pro product
(“Product”) manufactured by USPlabs and sold by GNC.1
[CV 15-188
Complaint at ¶¶ 22-23; CV 15-329 Complaint at ¶¶ 49-51.]
Sonnette Marras was Smith-Marras’s and Ronden Marras’s mother.
[CV 15-188 Complaint at ¶ 2; CV 15-329 Complaint at ¶ 47.]
The CV 15-188 Complaint alleges the following claims:
wrongful death; intentional infliction of emotional distress
(“IIED”); and negligent infliction of emotional distress
(“NIED”).
[CV 15-188 Complaint at pgs. 5-7.]
The CV 15-329
Complaint alleges the following claims: two negligence claims;
two claims for strict products liability - manufacturing defect;
two claims for strict products liability - design defect; two
claims for strict products liability - failure to warn; and two
1
The CV 15-188 Complaint also names SK Laboratories, Inc.
(“SK Labs”) as a defendant and alleges that SK Labs participated
in the formulation, encapsulation, bottling, and labeling of the
Product. [CV 15-188 Complaint at ¶¶ 13-14.] Smith-Marras,
however, has not filed any proof that she served the Complaint on
SK Labs, and it has not appeared in the case.
3
claims for breach of implied warranty.
[CV 15-329 Complaint at
pgs. 45-72.]
On August 15, 2014, Plaintiffs Keahi Pavao;
Derek Kamiya (“Kamiya”), as personal representative of the Estate
of Sonnette Marras; Gary Powell (“Powell”), on behalf of and as
conservator for M.P.C.F.S.M., a minor child, R.P.O.C.S.S.M., a
minor child, M.P.C.I.H.S.M., a minor child, and M.K.C.S.M., a
minor child (collectively, “the Minor Children”); Michael Soriano
(“Soriano”); and Lance Taniguchi filed their Complaint.
dkt. no. 1.]
[Pavao,
On July 15, 2015, they filed their First Amended
Complaint (“Pavao Amended Complaint”).
[Id., dkt. no. 172.]
The
Pavao Amended Complaint also alleges that Sonnette Marras died
because of her use of the Product.
Sonnette Marras was the Minor
Children’s mother, and Soriano’s common-law wife.
[Id. at ¶¶ 57-
61.]
The CV 15-188 Motion argues that: 1) this Court should
dismiss CV 15-188 because it is duplicative of Pavao, and Hawai`i
law only provides for a single wrongful death action; and 2) even
if Smith-Marras can pursue a separate wrongful death action, this
Court should dismiss the CV 15-188 Complaint pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because it fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
The CV 15-329 Motion makes the same
arguments regarding CV 15-329.
In addition, the CV 15-329 Motion
argues that this Court should dismiss the CV 15-329 Complaint
4
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) as to Doyle and Geissler
(“the Individual Defendants”) and as to OxyElite LLC and OxyElite
PN (“the Subsidiary Defendants”) for lack of personal
jurisdiction.
DISCUSSION
I.
Hawaii’s Wrongful Death Statute
Hawaii’s wrongful death statute, Haw. Rev. Stat. § 663-
3 states:
(a) When the death of a person is caused by the
wrongful act, neglect, or default of any person,
the deceased’s legal representative, or any of the
persons enumerated in subsection (b), may maintain
an action against the person causing the death or
against the person responsible for the death. The
action shall be maintained on behalf of the
persons enumerated in subsection (b), except that
the legal representative may recover on behalf of
the estate the reasonable expenses of the
deceased’s last illness and burial.
(b) In any action under this section, such
damages may be given as under the circumstances
shall be deemed fair and just compensation, with
reference to the pecuniary injury and loss of love
and affection, including:
(1) Loss of society, companionship, comfort,
consortium, or protection;
(2) Loss of marital care, attention, advice,
or counsel;
(3) Loss of care, attention, advice, or
counsel of a reciprocal beneficiary as
defined in chapter 572C;
(4)
Loss of filial care or attention; or
5
(5) Loss of parental care, training,
guidance, or education, suffered as a result
of the death of the person;
by the surviving spouse, reciprocal beneficiary,
children, father, mother, and by any person wholly
or partly dependent upon the deceased person. The
jury or court sitting without jury shall allocate
the damages to the persons entitled thereto in its
verdict or judgment, and any damages recovered
under this section, except for reasonable expenses
of last illness and burial, shall not constitute a
part of the estate of the deceased. Any action
brought under this section shall be commenced
within two years from the date of death of the
injured person, except as otherwise provided.
(Emphasis added.)
The CV 15-188 Defendants and the CV 15-329
Defendants argue that § 663-3 only allows for a single wrongful
death action, brought on behalf of all of the persons identified
in the statute.
This Court agrees.
Addressing a prior version of § 663-3, the Hawai`i
Supreme Court stated: “It is the plain intent of section 246-2[2]
2
R.L.H. § 246-2 stated:
Death by wrongful act. When the death of a person
is caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default
of any person or corporation, the deceased’s legal
representative, or any of the persons hereinafter
enumerated, may maintain an action against the
person or corporation causing the death or against
such person or corporation responsible for such
death, on behalf of the persons hereinafter
enumerated.
In any such action under this section, such
damages may be given as under the circumstances
shall be deemed fair and just compensation, with
reference to the pecuniary injury and loss of love
and affection, including (a) loss of society,
(continued...)
6
that all of the persons enumerated therein shall join in one
action and be governed by the provisions of that section, so far
as the right to sue for the wrongful death itself is concerned.”
Rohlfing v. Moses Akiona, Ltd., 45 Haw. 373, 393-94, 369 P.2d 96,
106-07 (1961) (emphasis added), overruled on other grounds by
Greene v. Texeira, 54 Haw. 231, 505 P.2d 1169 (1973).
Although this Court agrees that § 663-3 only permits
one wrongful death action, it disagrees with the defendants’
position that dismissal is the remedy for the filing of multiple
wrongful death actions.
The Hawai`i Supreme Court has recognized
that, under § 663-3, “the decedent’s surviving spouse, children,
2
(...continued)
companionship, comfort, consortium or protection,
(b) loss of marital care, attention, advice or
counsel, (c) loss of filial care or attention or
(d) loss of parental care, training, guidance or
education suffered as a result of the death of the
person by the surviving spouse, children, father,
mother, and by any person wholly or partly
dependent upon the deceased person. The jury or
court sitting without jury shall allocate the
damages to the persons entitled thereto in its
verdict or judgment, and any damage recovered
under this section, except for reasonable expenses
of last illness and burial, shall not constitute a
part of the estate of the deceased. If an action
is brought pursuant to this section and a separate
action brought pursuant to section 246-6, such
actions may be consolidated for trial on the
motion of any interested party, and a separate
verdict, report or decision may be rendered as to
each right of action. Any action brought under
this section shall be commenced within two years
from the date of death of such injured person.
7
parents and dependents each are granted by the statute, the
right, independent of one another, to recover under the wrongful
death statute.”
Hun v. Ctr. Props., 63 Haw. 273, 279-80, 626
P.2d 182, 187 (1981) (emphases added).
Because Smith-Marras and
Ronden Marras each have a right – independent of each other’s
rights and independent of Kamiya, Powell, and Soriano’s rights –
to recover under § 663-3, this Court DENIES the CV 15-188 Motion
and the CV 15-329 Motion as to the request for dismissal pursuant
to § 663-3.
Further, based on the clear language in both § 663-3
and Hawai`i case law stating that only one wrongful death action
is permitted, this Court HEREBY CONSOLIDATES CV 15-188 and CV 15329 with Pavao.
II.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)
The CV 15-329 Defendants argue that this Court does not
have personal jurisdiction over the Individual Defendants and the
Subsidiary Defendants.
However, the jurisdictional allegations
in the CV 15-329 Complaint, [CV 15-329 Complaint at ¶¶ 3-41,] are
substantively identical to those in the First Amended Complaint
in Davidson, et al. v. USPlabs, LLC, et al., CV 14-00364 LEK-KSC
(“Davidson”).
[Davidson, First Amended Complaint, filed 7/2/15
(dkt. no. 228), at ¶¶ 3-41.]
This Court has analyzed those
allegations and concluded that: the allegations are sufficient to
plead a prima facie showing that the Individual Defendants and
the Subsidiary Defendants are the alter egos of USPlabs, which
8
has not contested jurisdiction in the cases arising from liver
damage allegedly caused by the Product; and there is personal
jurisdiction over the Individual Defendants and the Subsidiary
Defendants based on the alter ego theory.
[Davidson, Order
Denying Motion to Dismiss, filed 10/30/15 (dkt. no. 280)
(“Davidson 10/30/15 Order”), at 9-16.]
Pursuant to the analysis
in the Davidson 10/30/15 Order, this Court CONCLUDES that it has
personal jurisdiction over the Individual Defendants and the
Subsidiary Defendants in CV 15-329 based on an alter ego theory.
The Court therefore DENIES the CV 15-329 Motion as to the
personal jurisdiction issue.
III. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
Both motions argue that the respective complaints fail
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
A.
The CV 15-329 Complaint
The claims in the CV 15-329 Complaint are substantively
identical to the claims in Davidson.
For the reasons stated in
the Davidson 10/30/15 Order at 16-18, and in the prior orders
cited in the Davidson order, this Court CONCLUDES that
Ronden Marras’s claims in the CV 15-329 Complaint are facially
plausible.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” (citing
9
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955
(2007))).
This Court therefore DENIES the CV 15-329 Motion as to
the request for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
B.
The CV 15-188 Complaint
The CV 15-188 Defendants argue that Smith-Marras’s
wrongful death claim fails to state a plausible claim because the
CV 15-188 Complaint does not contain sufficient allegations
regarding how the Product was defective or how the Product caused
Sonnette Marras’s injuries and death.
Although the allegations
in the CV 15-188 Complaint are not as extensive as the
allegations in the Davidson First Amended Complaint, they are
similar, and this Court concludes that the same analysis applies
to Smith-Marras’s wrongful death claim that this Court applied to
the claims in Davidson.
For the same reasons set forth in the
Davidson 10/30/15 Order, as well as in this Court’s orders in the
related cases, this Court concludes that Smith-Marras’s wrongful
death claim states a claim that is plausible on its face.
The
CV 15-188 Motion is therefore DENIED as to the request to dismiss
Smith-Marras’s wrongful death claim.
As to Smith-Marras’s IIED claim, the CV 15-188
Defendants argue that Smith-Marras has not pled sufficient
allegations of causation, and that the allegations of the CV 15188 Complaint do not rise to the level of outrageousness
necessary to support an IIED claim.
10
This Court has rejected the
CV 15-188 Defendants’ causation argument as to Sonnette Marras’s
injuries and death.
The CV 15-188 Complaint alleges that
Sonnette Marras’s death as a result of “untested and unreliable
ingredients” in the Product caused Smith-Marras to suffer extreme
emotional distress.
[CV 15-188 Complaint at ¶ 31.]
Viewing the
allegations of the CV 15-188 Complaint as a whole, this Court
concludes that they are sufficient to allege the causation
element of an IIED claim.
See Young v. Allstate Ins. Co., 119
Hawai`i 403, 429, 198 P.3d 666, 692 (2008) (stating the elements
of an IIED claim).
As to the element that the defendant’s act was
outrageous, the Hawai`i Supreme Court has stated:
“The term ‘outrageous’ has been construed to mean
without just cause or excuse and beyond all bounds
of decency.” Enoka v. AIG Hawai`i Ins. Co., Inc.,
109 Hawai`i 537, 559 128 P.3d 850, 872 (2006)
(citations and some internal quotation marks
omitted). “The question whether the actions of
the alleged tortfeasor are unreasonable or
outrageous is for the court in the first instance,
although where reasonable people may differ on
that question it should be left to the jury.”
Takaki v. Allied Machinery Corp., 87 Hawai`i 57,
68, 951 P.2d 507, 518 (App. 1998) (quotations and
quotation marks omitted).
Young v. Allstate Ins. Co., 119 Hawai`i 403, 429, 198 P.3d 666,
692 (2008).
The CV 15-118 Complaint alleges, inter alia, that:
Defendants withdrew a prior version of the Product from the
market because the United States Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”) found that the prior version contained an illegal
11
stimulant which could cause cardiovascular problems; after a
reformulation, Defendants replaced the prior version with the
Product that Sonnette Marras consumed, but the reformulated
version contained aegeline, which had not been sufficiently
tested; the FDA notified USPlabs in October 2013 that it objected
to the distribution and sale of the Product; and the FDA notified
USPlabs in November 2013 about a possible link between use of the
Product and reports of liver damage in Hawai`i and other states.
The allegations in the CV 15-188 Complaint do not
simply recite the elements of the IIED claim; the allegations are
sufficient to give the CV 15-188 Defendants fair notice of SmithMarras’s IIED claim and to allow them to defend themselves
effectively.
This Court must therefore assume that the factual
allegations supporting Smith-Marras’s IIED claim are true.
See
Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 765 F.3d 1123, 1135 (9th Cir. 2014).
Assuming that the factual allegations in support of SmithMarras’s IIED claim are true, this Court cannot decide the
outrageousness issue as a matter of law because reasonable minds
could differ on the issue of whether the CV 15-188 Defendants’
conduct was outrageous.
This Court therefore CONCLUDES that
Smith-Marras’s IIED claim states a claim that is plausible on its
face.
The CV 15-188 Motion is DENIED as to the request to
dismiss Smith-Marras’s IIED claim.
12
As to Smith-Marras’s NIED claim, the CV 15-188
Defendants argue that it fails to state a plausible claim
because: Smith-Marras did not allege that they owed her a duty
and that they breached that duty; and Smith-Marras cannot rely on
any duty that they allegedly owed to Sonnette Marras.3
See
Toguchi v. Matayoshi, Civil No. 13–00380 DKW–KSC, 2014 WL
7420003, at *6 (D. Hawai`i Dec. 31, 2014) (stating the elements
of an NIED claim).
The CV 15-188 Complaint alleged that: the
CV 15-188 Defendants had a duty “to not cause serious mental
distress as a result of consuming” the Product; and they breached
this duty when they supplied the Product “to Plaintiff intending
for her to consume it.”
(emphasis added).]
[CV 15-188 Complaint at ¶¶ 34-35
Reading the CV 15-188 Complaint as a whole,
the allegation that Defendants supplied the Product to Plaintiff,
i.e. to Smith-Marras, is clearly a mistake.
Reading the CV 15-
188 Complaint as a whole, it is apparent that it was Sonnette
Marras who consumed the Product.
See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 2, 22.
Further, even though it was Sonnette Marras who consumed the
Product and allegedly suffered injuries as a result, Hawai`i law
allows Smith-Marras to bring an NIED claim for the emotional
3
The CV 15-188 Defendants also argue that the NIED claim
fails because Smith-Marras failed to plead sufficient allegations
that the Product is dangerous and that it caused Sonnette
Marras’s death. For the same reasons set forth as to her
wrongful death claim and her IIED claim, the Court rejects this
argument.
13
distress that she suffered as a result of the injuries to
Sonnette Marras.
Dolan v. Hilo Medical Center involved claims arising
from a surgical procedure during which pieces of a screwdriver
were implanted into Arturo Iturralde’s spine instead of the
intended titanium rods.
127 Hawai`i 325, 329-30, 278 P.3d 382,
386-87 (Ct. App. 2012).
A jury, inter alia, found in favor of
Arturo as to his negligence claim against Hilo Medical Center
(“HMC”) and Robert Ricketson, M.D., the surgeon who performed the
procedure.
The circuit court ruled that, although HMC and
Dr. Ricketson were jointly and severally liable for Arturo’s
damages, they were not liable for damages to
Rosalinda Iturralde,4 in her individual capacity, on her NIED
claim because her claim “was derivative of Arturo’s injuries and
death.”
Id. at 331, 278 P.3d at 388.
The Hawai`i Intermediate
Court of Appeals held that the circuit court erred because:
An NIED claim is only “derivative” in the
sense that it generally does not arise absent a
“predicate injury either to property or to another
person” that is separate from the claimant’s
psychological injury. [Doe Parents No. 1 v.
State, Dep’t of Educ., 100 Hawai`i 34,] 69, 58
P.3d [545,] 580 [(2002)]. Here, Arturo’s injuries
and death comprise the requisite predicate injury.
Rosalinda’s NIED claim for her own injuries,
however, is “independent and separate” from those
of Arturo. Torres v. Nw. Eng’g Co., 86 Hawai`i
383, 404–05, 949 P.2d 1004, 1025–26 (App. 1997)
4
Rosalinda was “Arturo’s younger sister and caretaker.”
Dolan, 127 Hawai`i at 330, 127 P.3d at 387.
14
(quoting Tabieros v. Clark Equip. Co., 85 Hawai`i
336, 361, 944 P.2d 1279, 1304 (1997) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)). . . .
Id. at 344-45, 278 P.3d 382, 401-02.
Similarly, in the instant case, Sonnette Marras’s
injuries and death constitute the predicate injury, and
Defendants’ duties to Sonnette Marras as a consumer of their
Product provide the required duty, but Smith-Marras may pursue an
independent and separate claim for the emotional distress that
she suffered as a result of Sonnette Marras’s injuries and death.
This Court CONCLUDES that Smith-Marras’s NIED claim states a
claim that is plausible on its face.
The CV 15-188 Motion is
therefore DENIED as to the request to dismiss Smith-Marras’s NIED
claim.
The CV 15-188 Defendants also argue that the CV 15-188
Complaint should be dismissed because it does not differentiate
between them.
This Court rejects this argument and concludes
that the allegations of the CV 15-188 Complaint are sufficient to
put each of the CV 15-188 Defendants on notice of the claims
against it.
The CV 15-188 Motion is therefore DENIED in its
entirety.
III. Ronden Marras’s Request for Sanctions
Finally, in his memorandum in opposition to the CV 15329 Motion, Ronden Marras argues that the motion “bring[s]
identical challenges on identical allegations which have been
15
settled by this Court.”
[CV 15-329, Mem. in Opp. at 6.]
He
urges this Court to impose sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 11.
Rule 11(c)(2) states, in pertinent part:
A motion for sanctions must be made separately
from any other motion and must describe the
specific conduct that allegedly violates Rule
11(b). The motion must be served under Rule 5,
but it must not be filed or be presented to the
court if the challenged paper, claim, defense,
contention, or denial is withdrawn or
appropriately corrected within 21 days after
service or within another time the court
sets. . . .
This Court therefore cannot consider a request for Rule 11
sanctions presented within a memorandum in opposition to a motion
to dismiss.
This Court DENIES Ronden Marras’s request for
Rule 11 sanctions.
This Court expresses no opinion as to whether
or not it would award Rule 11 sanctions to Ronden Marras if he
files a motion that complies with Rule 11(c)(2).
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Complaint, filed on May 27, 2015 in Smith-Marras v.
General Nutrition Corp., et al., CV 15-00188 LEK-KSC, and the
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, filed on September 18,
2015 in Marras v. USPlabs, LLC, et al., CV 15-00329 LEK-KSC, are
HEREBY DENIED.
However, this Court HEREBY CONSOLIDATES CV 15-188
and CV 15-329 with Pavao, et al. v. UPSlabs, LLC, et al., CV 1400367 LEK-KSC.
16
In addition, Ronden Marras’s request for sanctions
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the
filing of a motion that complies with the requirements of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11(c)(2).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, December 9, 2015.
/s/ Leslie E. Kobayashi
Leslie E. Kobayashi
United States District Judge
RONSONETTE P.C. SMITH-MARRAS VS. GENERAL NUTRITION CORPORATION,
ET AL; CIVIL 15-00188 LEK-KSC; RONDEN MARRAS VS. USPLABS, LLC, ET
AL; CIVIL 15-00329 LEK-KSC; ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS AND ORDERING CONSOLIDATION OF CASES
17
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?