Nahooikaika et al v. Mossman et al
Filing
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ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by JUDGE DERRICK K. WATSON on 9/30/2015. The Court DISMISSES the Complaint with prejudice. The Office of the Clerk is directed to close the case file. (ecs, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAI`I
CIVIL NO. 15-00210 DKW-KSC
KAIWA KAAI NAHOOIKAIKA, ET
AL.,
Plaintiffs,
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT
WITH PREJUDICE
vs.
MARCE K. MOSSMAN, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE
Plaintiffs Kaiwa Kaai Nahooikaika and Tanelle Kahealani Costa, proceeding
pro se, have filed this civil action against various governmental agencies and
individuals. However, beyond their demand for $100,000,000 in damages,
Plaintiffs’ claims are barely discernible. The largely incomprehensible complaint
lists over twenty defendants, including several state agencies, judges and attorneys
employed by the state, private individuals, and what appear to be national banking
institutions.
Because this action is wholly frivolous and Plaintiffs do not state a
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claim against any defendant, the Court DISMISSES the complaint with prejudice for
failure to comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 8 mandates that a complaint include a “short and plain statement of the
claim.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[E]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and
direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). A complaint that is so confusing that its “‘true
substance, if any, is well disguised’” may be dismissed for failure to satisfy Rule 8.
Hearns v. San Bernardino Police Dep’t, 530 F.3d 1124, 1131 (9th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Gillibeau v. City of Richmond, 417 F.2d 426, 431 (9th Cir. 1969)); see also
McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Something labeled a
complaint but written . . . prolix in evidentiary detail, yet without simplicity,
conciseness and clarity as to whom plaintiffs are suing for what wrongs, fails to
perform the essential functions of a complaint.”). A district court may dismiss a
complaint for failure to comply with Rule 8 where the complaint fails to provide
defendants with fair notice of the wrongs they have allegedly committed. See
McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1178-80 (affirming dismissal of complaint where “one cannot
determine from the complaint who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory,
with enough detail to guide discovery”).
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) authorizes a court to dismiss claims
over which it lacks proper subject matter jurisdiction. “A party invoking the federal
court’s jurisdiction has the burden of proving the actual existence of subject matter
jurisdiction.” See Thompson v. McCombe, 99 F.3d 352, 353 (9th Cir. 1996).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Pursuant to Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 555
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570
(2007)). “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained
in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. Accordingly,
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Rather, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Factual
allegations that only permit the court to infer “the mere possibility of misconduct”
do not constitute a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief as required by Rule 8(a)(2). Id. at 679.
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Because Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, the Court liberally construes their
pleadings. See Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The
Supreme Court has instructed the federal courts to liberally construe the >inartful
pleading= of pro se litigants.”) (citing Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365
(1982) (per curiam)). The Court also recognizes that “[u]nless it is absolutely clear
that no amendment can cure the defect . . . a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the
complaints deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the
action.” Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995).
DISCUSSION
The complaint consists of three documents: (1) a two-page caption entitled,
“Violating Our Human Rights Under UCC1-308.4 Forcefully kidnapping Our
Assets (Children), Child Welfare Services Hilo, HI. Perjury and Fraud (Marce K.
Mossman);” (2) a summons; and (3) a 27-page, single-spaced document that
consists of difficult-to-decipher statements relating to the sovereign Kingdom of
Hawaii.
Although not entirely legible and far from clear, this lawsuit appears to
arise out of Plaintiffs’ dissatisfaction with child welfare proceedings in Hawai‘i
state court.1
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Among other things, the identities and roles of the parties that Plaintiffs intended to sue are not
clear from the face of the complaint. Based upon the motions filed by the State Defendants, the
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Plaintiffs do not identify in any coherent or organized manner the separate
causes of action that they assert, nor provide specific factual allegations to support
their conclusions.
Rather, the complaint is largely comprised of long,
unintelligible sentences containing mixed statements of law and fact, and
numerous unrelated and unsubstantiated conclusions.
Even applying the most
liberal pleading standard, the Court cannot discern from the complaint the conduct
on which any claim is based, other than Plaintiffs’ vague grievances relating to
some unspecified conduct.
Beyond their unintelligibility, Plaintiffs’ allegations are frivolous for several
reasons.
First, all claims for damages against the State Defendants (the State,
state agencies or departments, and state officials acting in their official capacities)
are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
See Will v. Mich. Dep’t State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 275 (1986); Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1985); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984); see also Linville v. Hawaii, 874 F.Supp. 1095,
Court is aware that the Honorable Lloyd Van De Car and the Honorable Henry T. Nakamoto are
Family Court judges in the Third Circuit on the Island of Hawaii, and Marlene Kalua, is a court
clerk in the Third Circuit. Defendants Maree K. Mossman, Roselyn Viernes, Wendy Robinson
and Karlan Osorio are employed by the State of Hawaii and work for the Department of Human
Services. Plaintiffs also appear to name Attorney General Douglas S. Chin, Deputy Attorneys
General Diana M. Mellon-Lacey, Sandra L. S. Freitas, Brent K. Osterstock and Adriel C. S.
Menor.
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1103 (D. Haw. 1994) (State of Hawaii has not waived its sovereign immunity for
civil rights actions brought in federal court); Sherez v. Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 396 F.
Supp. 2d 1138, 1142-43 (D. Haw. 2005) (dismissing claims against state agency
and state official in his official capacity based on Eleventh Amendment immunity).
Thus, Eleventh Amendment immunity bars Plaintiffs’ claims for damages against
the State Defendants.
Second, all of the claims against the individual capacity defendants are
barred as a matter of law by various immunity doctrines. The claims against the
state court judges for conduct undertaken in their judicial capacities are barred by
the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity.
See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
553-54 (1967) (“This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting
maliciously and corruptly, and it is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious
or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the
judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and
without fear of consequences.”).
The claims against the state court clerk are
barred by the doctrine of absolute quasi-judicial immunity.
See Mullis v. United
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1987)
(explaining that court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages
for civil rights violations when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the
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judicial process); Sharma v. Stevas, 790 F.2d 1486 (9th Cir. 1986). The claims
asserted against the state attorneys in their individual capacities are barred by the
doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity.
See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 430 (1976) (holding a prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from a suit
alleging that he maliciously initiated a prosecution, used perjured testimony at trial,
and suppressed material evidence at trial); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F .2d 1072, 1078
(9th Cir. 1986) (holding that an alleged conspiracy between judge and prosecutor
to predetermine the outcome of a judicial proceeding does not pierce absolute
prosecutorial immunity). Finally, the claims against employees of the Child
Welfare Services Branch of the Department of Human Services are barred by
quasi-prosecutorial immunity.
See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 350-3(a); Beltran v. Santa
Clara County, 513 F.3d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that social workers have
immunity when they make discretionary, quasi-prosecutorial decisions to institute
court dependency proceedings to take custody away from parents); Williamson v.
Basco, 2007 WL 4570496, at *6 (D. Haw. Dec. 31, 2007) (holding that defendant
was entitled to immunity pursuant to HRS § 350-3 where claims arose out of the
performance of defendant’s duties as a Child Protective Services employee).
Accordingly, all of the identified defendants are immune from suit.
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Third, to the extent Plaintiffs’ claims relate to actions that culminated in the
termination of Nahooikaika’s parental rights by the Family Court for the State of
Hawaii, those claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine (Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983),
collectively referred to as Rooker-Feldman), “‘a losing party in state court is barred
from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in
a United States District Court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state
judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.’”
Bennett v. Yoshina, 140 F.3d
1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06
(1994)). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine divests federal district courts of
jurisdiction to conduct direct reviews of state court judgments even when a federal
question is presented.
Because Plaintiffs appear to be challenging a state-court
decision regarding child custody, any such challenge must be made through the
state-court appellate process.
Plaintiffs may not appeal that state-court decision
to this court.
Finally, setting aside Plaintiffs’ meritless assertion of admiralty jurisdiction
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and “U.S. Vessels,”2 and vague references to courts of bankruptcy (“all courts in
America are bankrupt”), there is no other asserted basis for this Court’s
jurisdiction, nor can the Court discern any.
A complaint that is “obviously
frivolous” does not confer federal subject matter jurisdiction and may be dismissed
sua sponte before service of process. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227 n.6
(9th Cir. 1984); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global
Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 593 (2004) (“[I]t is the obligation of both district court
and counsel to be alert to jurisdictional requirements.”).
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court DISMISSES the Complaint pursuant
to Rule 8, Rule 12(b)(1), and Rule 12(b)(6) as legally frivolous and failing to confer
jurisdiction on this Court. See Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227 n.6. Although the Court
recognizes that “[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect
. . . a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and an
opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action,” see Lucas, 66 F.3d at 248,
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“Admiralty jurisdiction exists only if the complained of incident “occurred on navigable waters
or is substantially related to traditional maritime activity.” Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 533 (1995). There is no allegation of any maritime
activities, no allegation of any incident occurring on the navigable waters of the United States,
and no suggestion that any maritime vessel is implicated. As such, the Court finds that
Plaintiffs’ claims do not invoke this Court’s admiralty jurisdiction.
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there is no amendment that can save this Complaint. Accordingly, this dismissal is
without leave to amend.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court DISMISSES the Complaint with
prejudice.
The Office of the Clerk is directed to close the case file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 30, 2015 at Honolulu, Hawai‘i.
Kaiwa Nahooikaika et al v. Marce Mossman, et al.; Civil No. 15-00210 DKW-KSC;
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE
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