Cummings v. Sequiera et al
Filing
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ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(a) re: 6 . Signed by JUDGE J. MICHAEL SEABRIGHT on 8/13/2015. Summary of conclusion: Plaintiff may file an amended complaint cur ing the deficiencies noted [in the instant order]. Failure to timely amend the Complaint and cure the pleading deficiencies will result in DISMISSAL of this action for failure to state a claim, and shall be counted as a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. & #167; 1915(g).(afc) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). A copy of the instant Order, and a "Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint" form with its instructions, will be served on Friday, August 14, 2015 by first class mail to Mr. Jason J.K. Cummings at his address of record.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
JASON J.K. CUMMINGS,
#A0132125,
Plaintiff,
vs.
WARDEN MICHAEL J.
HOFFMAN, JOHN DOES 1-10,
JANE DOES 1-10,
Defendants.
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CIV. NO. 15-00227 JMS/RLP
ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED
COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(a)
ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED COMPLAINT
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(a)
Before the court is pro se Plaintiff Jason J.K. Cummings’ amended
prisoner civil rights complaint. Am. Compl., Doc. No. 6. Plaintiff is incarcerated
at the Oahu Community Correctional Center (“OCCC”), and is proceeding in
forma pauperis. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants OCCC Warden Michael J.
Hoffman (“Warden Hoffman”) and unidentified prison staff Jane and John Does 120 violated his constitutional rights when they failed to install safety rails on
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OCCC’s upper bunks and ignored his request for a bottom bunk. Plaintiff names
all Defendants in their official capacities only.1
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend
as permitted by this Order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A, for
failure to state a cognizable claim for relief. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend on
or before August 28, 2015.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff claims that during his intake interview on or about
September 19, 2013, he advised Jane Does OCCC intake staff that he had
fractured four ribs one month earlier.2 Plaintiff says they logged this information
on his intake form and sent the information to the OCCC medical unit to issue him
a “Bottom Bunk memo.” Am. Compl., Doc. No. 6, PageID #28. He says he heard
one Jane Doe repeat “No Top Bunk,” and is certain she wrote his request on his
intake form. Id. (“But I know she wrote it down when she checked me in at
intake.”). Plaintiff says the medical unit was also separately “advised per module
5#” of his request for a Bottom Bunk memo. Id., PageID #29. While Plaintiff
1
Nonetheless, because Plaintiff is pro se, the court construes his claims as against
Defendants in their official and individual capacities.
2
Plaintiff states that he had also previously fractured another rib, his neck, and his back,
but does not allege he told OCCC intake staff about these older injuries.
2
does not provide a copy of his intake notes, his attached “Multidisciplinary
Progress Notes,” show that he was readmitted to OCCC on September 13, 2013,
and seen at the OCCC medical unit on September 23, 2013. See Pl.’s Attach. 6-1.3
These notes do not reflect that Plaintiff requested or was denied a Bottom Bunk
memo at the September 23, 2013, medical appointment. Id.
In the early morning hours of September 26, 2013, Plaintiff fell from
his assigned top bunk while asleep. Id., PageID #27; see also Attach. 6-1, PageID
#31-33. Medical staff arrived at Plaintiff’s cell within minutes, where they
stabilized him and called for an ambulance. Attach. 6-1, PageID #32. Plaintiff
was taken to The Queen’s Medical Center (“QMC”), where he was treated and
admitted for two days. Id., PageID #33. Plaintiff sustained several new fractures
and lacerations from the fall. See id.
On September 28, 2013, Plaintiff returned to OCCC. Id. His medical
chart details the injuries he incurred as a result of the fall, noting that he had
“closed [fractures] of 5 ribs.” Id. Plaintiff was given a “[Bottom Bunk] memo x 3
mo, neck brace x 1 mo,”4 and rehoused in Module 2. Id. Plaintiff seeks damages
3
Courts may consider documents attached to a complaint in assessing whether to dismiss
the complaint. See, e.g., United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003).
4
“BB memo x 3 mo” appears to mean a Bottom Bunk memo approved for three months.
Attach. 6-1, PageID #33.
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for his physical and mental injuries based on Defendants’ failure to install guard
rails on OCCC’s upper bunks or assign him a bottom bunk earlier.
II. SCREENING
The court must screen all civil actions brought by prisoners
proceeding in forma pauperis or seeking redress from a government entity, officer,
or employee. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(a). Complaints or claims that are
frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) &
1915A(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (c)(1).
A complaint that lacks a cognizable legal theory or alleges
insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory fails to state a claim. Balistreri
v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). To state a claim, a
pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8 does not demand
detailed factual allegations, but “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To state a plausible claim, a
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plaintiff must plead facts that allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
First, a court must identify “the allegations in the complaint that are
not entitled to the assumption of truth,” that is, those allegations that are legal
conclusions, bare assertions, or merely conclusory. Id. at 679-80. Second, the
court must consider the factual allegations “to determine if they plausibly suggest
an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 681. If the allegations state a plausible claim for
relief, the claim may proceed. Id. at 680.
“The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but
it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). A court must “accept factual allegations in the
complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025,
1031 (9th Cir. 2008). The court is not required to “‘assume the truth of legal
conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations.’”
Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (quoting W.
Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981)). “[C]onclusory
allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient.” Adams v.
Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004); accord Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
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Leave to amend should be granted if it appears the plaintiff can
correct the defects in the complaint. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir.
2000) (en banc). When it is clear the complaint cannot be saved by amendment,
however, dismissal without leave to amend is appropriate. Sylvia Landfield Trust
v. City of L.A., 729 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2013).
III. DISCUSSION
To state a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff “must
allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United
States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person
acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
A.
Immunity and Injunctive Relief
Defendants named in their official capacities are not persons subject
to suit under § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71
(1989); Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 824-25 (9th Cir. 2007). The only
exception is “for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief against state
officers, sued in their official capacities, to enjoin an alleged ongoing violation of
federal law.” Young v. Hawaii, 911 F. Supp. 2d 972, 983 (D. Haw. 2012) (quoting
Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Hardin, 223 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir.
2000)); see Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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Plaintiff names Defendants in their official capacities only and does
not request injunctive relief. Thus, claims against Defendants in their official
capacities for monetary damages are DISMISSED without leave to amend.
B.
Deliberate Indifference5
Prison officials have a duty to provide inmates adequate food,
clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must “take reasonable measures to
guarantee” their safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (citing
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). To state a constitutional claim
for failure to prevent harm, an inmate must show that he is incarcerated under
conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834
(citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)). Two requirements must be
met to establish a constitutional violation based on the failure to prevent harm:
(1) objectively, the alleged deprivation must have been “sufficiently serious,” in
that “the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a
substantial risk of serious harm;” and (2) subjectively, the prison official must
have had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind” manifesting “deliberate
5
Whether Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee in 2013, protected from cruel and unusual
punishment under the Fourteenth Amendment, or a convicted prisoner protected under the Eighth
Amendment, the legal standard is the same. See Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011,
1017 (9th Cir. 2010).
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indifference” to the inmate’s health or safety. See id.; see also Wilson v. Seiter,
501 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1991); Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir.
2002).
The test for deliberate indifference is the same as that for criminal
recklessness, i.e., the official must actually know of and disregard an excessive
risk to inmate safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836-37. Neither negligence nor gross
negligence constitutes deliberate indifference. See id. at 835-36 & n.4; Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
C.
Claims Against Warden Hoffman
Other than naming Warden Hoffman in his official capacity and
broadly alleging, “O.C.C.C. officials failed to install Guard Rails on the upper
bunks!,” the Amended Complaint contains no specific allegations against
Hoffman. Am. Compl., Doc. No. 1, PageID #27. The court liberally construes
this as a claim against Warden Hoffman for an institutional failure to authorize
and install guard rails on upper bunks at OCCC.
This claim does not satisfy the objective prong for a deliberate
indifference claim. Not “every injury suffered by an inmate . . . necessarily
translate[s] into constitutional liability for prison officials.” Osolinski v. Kane, 92
F.3d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 1996). “[O]nly those deprivations denying ‘the minimal
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civilized measure of life’s necessities,’ are sufficiently grave to form the basis of
an Eighth Amendment violation.” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298 (citation omitted);
Osolinski, 92 F.3d at 937-38 (granting qualified immunity against deliberate
indifference claim stemming from inmate’s second degree burns suffered when
oven door fell off its hinges).
Upper bunks that lack guard rails do not present a risk so grave that
they “violate ‘contemporary standards of decency’” amounting to cruel and
unusual punishment. Milsap v. Cate, 2012 WL 1037949, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 27,
2012) (quoting Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 833 (9th Cir. 1997)). Milsap
concluded that a prison’s failure to install “safety apparatus” on bunk beds does
not objectively state a viable claim for deliberate indifference. Id. at *4 (collecting
district court cases within and outside the Ninth Circuit finding the same); see
also, Grushen v. Hedgpeth, 2012 WL 2590390, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 3, 2012)
(“Bunk beds -- even those without ladders and/or handrails -- do not satisfy the
objective prong necessary for an Eighth Amendment violation.”); Connolly v. Cty.
of Suffolk, 533 F. Supp. 2d 236, 241 (D. Mass. 2008) (holding ladderless bunk
beds are not objectively sufficiently serious conditions of confinement in light of
evidence that “[t]housands of . . . inmates access bunk beds daily without the aid
of a ladder and without incident” and only about a dozen injuries had been
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reported) (citing Osolinski, 92 F.3d at 939). This court agrees that prison wardens
are not required to install guard rails on every upper bunk in every prison to satisfy
the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff’s official capacity claim against Warden
Hoffman fails to allege an ongoing violation of federal law sufficient to warrant
injunctive relief and is DISMISSED without leave to amend.
To the extent Plaintiff’s intent is to hold Warden Hoffman
individually liable for his subordinates’ alleged failure to approve a Bottom Bunk
memo, this claim also fails. Section 1983 requires an actual connection or link
between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation allegedly suffered by the
plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978) (“Congress
did not intend § 1983 liability to attach where . . . causation [is] absent.”); Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976) (holding that § 1983 requires an
affirmative link between the misconduct alleged and the adoption of a plan or
policy by supervisors that authorized or approved such misconduct). “A person
‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning
of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative
acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the
deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743
(9th Cir. 1978).
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Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional
conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 676; Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding no
liability when there was no allegation of personal participation); Mosher v.
Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding no liability where there was
no evidence of personal participation). Rather, each government official may only
be held liable for his or her own personal misconduct. That is, a supervisor may
be held individually liable if (1) he was personally involved in the constitutional
deprivation, or (2) there is a sufficient causal connection between his or her
wrongful conduct and the Constitutional violation. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202,
1207 (9th Cir. 2011); Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989). In
general, a plaintiff “must allege that every government defendant -- supervisor or
subordinate -- acted with the state of mind required by the underlying
constitutional provision.” OSU Student Alliance v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1070 (9th
Cir. 2012). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of
official personnel in civil rights violations are insufficient. See Ivey v. Bd. of
Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding complaint insufficient that is
devoid of specific factual allegations of personal participation).
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Plaintiff alleges no facts linking Warden Hoffman to any alleged
deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Plaintiff fails to explain how
Warden Hoffman was personally involved in his assignment to an upper bunk, or
knew that Plaintiff was injured and his assignment to an upper bunk was
dangerous, and despite this knowledge, acted with deliberate indifference to
Plaintiff’s safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 105 (1976). Plaintiff also fails to point to any official policy or procedure
that Warden Hoffman implemented that caused the Jane and John Doe Defendants
to violate his rights. In short, Plaintiff fails to plead a causal connection between
Warden Hoffman’s actions or inactions and Plaintiff’s fall from his bunk. Claims
against Warden Hoffman for damages are DISMISSED with leave to amend.
D.
Claims Against John and Jane Does 1-20
Plaintiff’s claims against John and Jane Does 1-20 are difficult to
comprehend. It appears he alleges one or more female OCCC intake staff
members, identified as “Jane Does 1-10,” failed to comply with his request for a
Bottom Bunk memo. See Am. Compl., Doc. No. 1, PageID #28 (Count II). He
also vaguely suggests that OCCC medical staff, identified as the remaining Jane
and John Does, failed to comply with a request for a Bottom Bunk memo made by
“Module 5#” staff, on “inmates” behalf. Id., PageID #29 (Count III).
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1.
OCCC Intake Staff
Plaintiff’s attempt to hold OCCC Jane Doe intake staff liable for
failing to “comply” with his request for a Bottom Bunk memo fails to state a
claim. The Jane Does’ actions -- logging Plaintiff’s health information on intake,
supposedly including his fractured ribs from a month earlier, and forwarding that
information and his request for a Bottom Bunk memo to the medical unit -- does
not suggest that they acted with deliberate indifference to an excessive risk to
Plaintiff’s safety. First, Plaintiff does not allege Jane Does intake staff assigned
him to an upper bunk or denied him a bottom bunk, or had the authority to issue
him a Bottom Bunk memo. He fails to allege who assigned him to an upper bunk
or when that actually occurred. We know only that (1) he reentered OCCC on
September 13; (2) was interviewed at intake on September 19; (3) was seen at the
medical unit on September 23; and (4) fell from a top bunk on September 26,
2013. Moreover, Plaintiff emphatically asserts that the intake Jane Does
forwarded his request for a Bottom Bunk memo to the medical unit. This suggests
that they did not have authority to grant his request for a Bottom Bunk memo, yet
passed his intake information to the medical unit to assess and grant such a
request.
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Nor is the risk presented by Plaintiff’s month-old healing rib
fractures, without anything further, so obvious as to allow the court to plausibly
infer that OCCC’s intake staff acted with the “sufficiently culpable state of mind,”
that is, criminal recklessness, when they logged his intake information and
forwarded it to the appropriate prison departments, but did not immediately ensure
that he was assigned to a bottom bunk. Without more information, Plaintiff fails
to state a claim against OCCC Jane Does intake staff. Thus, claims against OCCC
Jane Does intake staff are DISMISSED with leave to amend.
2.
Medical Unit Staff
To the extent that Plaintiff claims OCCC’s medical staff failed to act
on his Bottom Bunk memo request at intake (and Module 5#’s later request on his
behalf) he also fails to state a claim. First, Plaintiff alleges no specific claims
against the OCCC medical unit staff and identifies no action, inaction, or
individual that can liberally be imputed to John and Jane Does medical staff.
Rather, Plaintiff carefully limits his statement of facts to the OCCC intake staff.
Plaintiff alleges no specific facts that can be construed liberally as identifying the
OCCC medical staff (or Warden Hoffman) as having a personal connection to his
alleged deprivation or fall.
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Second, Plaintiff’s Multidisciplinary Progress Notes show he was
seen at the medical unit three days before he fell from his bunk, on September 23,
2013. Plaintiff does not allege that he reiterated his request for a Bottom Bunk
memo at that time or that such request was denied. The Multidisciplinary Progress
Notes support a finding that he did not. Accordingly, claims against OCCC John
and Jane Doe medical unit staff are DISMISSED with leave to amend.
3.
Doe Defendants
Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a plaintiff
to include the names of all parties in the action in the caption. As a practical
matter, it is impossible in most instances for the United States Marshal or his
designee to serve a summons and complaint on an anonymous defendant. The use
of doe defendants is therefore generally disfavored in the federal court. See
Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980).
If the names of individual defendants are unknown at the time a
complaint is filed, however, a plaintiff may refer to the unknown defendants as
Defendant John Doe 1, John Doe 2, John Doe 3, and so on, but he must allege
facts to support how each particular doe defendant violated the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. A plaintiff may thereafter use the discovery processes to
obtain the names of any doe defendants he believes violated his constitutional
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rights and seek leave to amend to name those defendants, unless it is clear that
discovery would not uncover the identities, or that the complaint would be
dismissed on other grounds. Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th
Cir. 1999) (citing Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642 (9th Cir. 1980)).
Plaintiff sues Jane and John Doe Defendants 1-20 without alleging
how any individual violated his constitutional or statutory rights. Plaintiff
provides no identifying facts against any John Doe 1-10, and provides only the
most basic facts against possibly two Jane Does 1-10, who worked at intake.
Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendants John and Jane Does 1-20
and they are dismissed. Plaintiff may reallege claims against doe defendants,
subject to the limitations set forth herein, but he must allege specific facts showing
what each particular doe defendant did to violate his rights.
Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for deliberate indifference
against any OCCC official or employee for failing to install guard rails on all
upper bunks. He also fails to state a claim that his fall from his upper bunk while
asleep is attributable to the deliberate indifference of OCCC employees or
officials. Plaintiff’s claims against Doe Defendants are DISMISSED with leave to
amend.
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IV. LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff may file an amended complaint on or before August 28,
2015, consistent with the Order -- that is, the amended complaint must cure the
deficiencies noted above. An amended complaint generally supersedes the
original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967), overruled
in part by Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc)).
Therefore, although this court will not ignore Plaintiff’s original statement of facts
when reviewing an amended complaint, any amended complaint should stand on
its own as a complete document without incorporating or referring to an original
complaint. Defendants not named in the caption and claims dismissed without
prejudice that are not realleged in an amended complaint may be deemed
voluntarily dismissed. See Lacey, 693 F.3d at 928 (“[C]laims dismissed with
prejudice [need not] be repled in a[n] amended complaint to preserve them for
appeal . . . [but] claims [that are] voluntarily dismissed [are] . . . waived if not
repled.”). In an amended complaint, each claim and the involvement of each
Defendant must be sufficiently alleged. Plaintiff is NOTIFIED that he must
comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules for the
District of Hawaii if he chooses to amend his pleading.
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V. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)
If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint correcting the
deficiencies identified in this Order on or before August 28, 2015, this dismissal
shall count as a “strike” under the “3-strikes” provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A
prisoner may not bring a civil action or appeal a civil judgment in forma pauperis
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915
if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while
incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action
or appeal in a court of the United States that was
dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious,
or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of
serious physical injury.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
VI. CONCLUSION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
(1)
The Amended Complaint is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Specifically, Plaintiff’s
official capacity claims against (a) all Defendants for damages; and (b) Warden
Hoffman for his alleged failure to install or approve upper bunk guard rails at
OCCC, are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
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Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims regarding Plaintiff’s bunk
assignment as alleged against Warden Hoffman, OCCC Jane Does intake staff,
and OCCC Jane and John Does medical unit staff, are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE, with leave granted to amend. Plaintiff may file an amended
complaint curing the deficiencies noted above on or before August 28, 2015.
(2)
Failure to timely amend the Complaint and cure the pleading
deficiencies discussed above will result in DISMISSAL of this action for failure to
state a claim, and shall be counted as a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
(3)
The Clerk is directed to mail Plaintiff a form prisoner civil rights
complaint so he can comply with the directions in this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, August 13, 2015.
/s/ J. Michael Seabright
J. Michael Seabright
United States District Judge
Cummings v. Hoffman, Civ. No. 15-00227 JMS/RLP; Order Dismissing Amended Complaint
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(a).
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