Taylor v. Leu et al

Filing 23

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR INJUNCTIONS re 7 , 9 , 11 , 12 , 17 , 22 - Signed by JUDGE SUSAN OKI MOLLWAY on 12/16/2015. " The court grants the motions and joinders and dismisses the Complaint without prejudice. The court grants Taylor leave to file an Amended Complaint. Because of Taylor's claimed disabilities, the court gives her an extended period of two months, until February 16, 2016, to fil e any Amended Complaint. Should Taylor fail to timely file an Amended Complaint, this action will be automatically terminated." "The court gathers from Taylor's submissions that communicating by United States mail pre sents physical difficulties for her. The court therefore permits Taylor to submit documents for filing by e-mail attachment sent to [e-mail]. To be allowed to communicate electronically wi th the court, a litigant must first receive permission from the judge assigned to a case. See Local Rule 100.2.2(1). While Taylor is allowed to file documents via e-mail in this case, she must separately receive permission to do so in any o ther case in this court. E-mail may not be used by Taylor to engage in off-the-record or one-sided communication with the court. E-mail should be used only to submit materials that would otherwise be mailed to the court and served on opposing couns el and that are intended to be placed in the court file for this case. Permission to submit documents via e-mail may be rescinded by this court at any time for any reason, as this court is not aware of any requirement that it allow Taylor to com municate by e-mail. The court extends this accommodation to Taylor without announcing that Taylor has any right to e-mail her filings." "Taylor may contact the opposing attorneys about serving them and being served via e-mail.&q uot; A copy of this order will be sent to Taylor via e-mail." (emt, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Sarah Taylor served by e-mail at [e-mail] (e-mail address referenced in docket entry 6 . Additionally, the Clerk's Office will serve Ms. Taylor by first class mail at the address of record on December 17, 2015.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
SARAH MARGARET TAYLOR,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
LESTER K LEU; ANDREW LEE; LEU )
OKUDA & DOI;
)
)
PITE DUNCAN, LLP; ANNA T.
)
VALLIENTE; DAVID E.
)
McALLESTER;
)
)
CHRISTIAN FENTON;
)
)
SUSAN FENTON;
)
)
STATE OF HAWAII; THIRD
)
CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE
)
DISTRICT OF HAWAII;
)
)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT )
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII;
)
)
WELLS FARGO, NA, aka
)
AMERICA’S SERVICING COMPANY; )
)
ASSURANT SPECIALTY PROPERTY, )
aka WELLS FARGO NA AS STORM
)
INSURER;
)
)
US BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION )
AS TRUSTEE FOR STRUCTURED
)
ASSET SECURITIES CORPORATION )
MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH
)
CERTIFICATE, SERIES 2006-NC1 )
)
Defendants.
)
_____________________________ )

CIVIL NO. 15-00265 SOM/KSC

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND
DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFF’S
REQUEST FOR INJUNCTIONS

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT
AND DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR INJUNCTIONS

I.

INTRODUCTION.
This case arises out of an ongoing state-court

foreclosure proceeding.

Plaintiff Sarah Margaret Taylor appears

to include as Defendants all persons and entities having anything
to do with that proceeding.

Although Taylor complains generally

about being discriminated against and has clearly asserted that
she was deprived of electricity in a way that jeopardized her
health and well-being, the court cannot determine what she is
claiming each Defendant did wrong.

The court therefore dismisses

the Complaint and denies as moot Taylor’s request for
injunctions.
Complaint.

The court gives Taylor leave to file an Amended
This means that this case is not yet over.

Taylor

may file a document bearing the title “Amended Complaint” that
sets forth amended claims as described later in this order.
The court also gives Taylor permission to file
documents via e-mail, as described later in this order.
II.

BACKGROUND FACTS.
The court takes judicial notice of the proceeding and

pleadings in the state-court foreclosure case.

U.S. Bank

National filed a complaint seeking foreclosure on Taylor’s
mortgage.

See 3CC 14-1-000289, ECF No. 7-3, PageID # 154;

http://hoohiki1.courts.state.hi.us/jud/Hoohiki/JSAPM51F5.jsp?star
tseq=1 (last visited December 4, 2015) (state-court docket
indicating the foreclosure complaint was filed on July 31, 2014).
2

On January 16, 2015, Taylor removed the state
foreclosure action to this court.
No. 15-00018 DKW/KSC.

See Notice of Removal, Civ.

The removed action, which preceded the

present action, was assigned to Judge Derrick Watson.

According

to the federal court docket in Judge Watson’s case, on February
25, 2015, Taylor sent the court a motion via fax or e-mail.
Judge Watson told Taylor in a Minute Order:
Filings may not be made through chambers, and
certainly not via email or fax. The Court
forwarded the document to the clerk’s office
for filing in this instance as a courtesy.
However, in the future, no such courtesy will
be extended. Defendant, like all other
parties, must submit all documents she wishes
to file directly to the clerk's office (over
the counter or via mail). Local Rule 10.2(k)
(“No document may be filed by faxing to the
clerk’s office unless the filing party has
first obtained leave to do so from the judge
to whom the filing is addressed, or, if no
judge has been assigned to a matter, from the
clerk. Leave will [be] granted only for good
cause.”). Although Defendant is proceeding
pro se, she is nevertheless expected to
comply with all rules and statutes. Local
Rule 83.13.
Civ. No. 15-00018 DKW/KSC, ECF No. 14.

The Minute Order denied

the merits of Taylor’s motion, which asked for an extension of
time to pay the applicable filing fee or to submit an amended In
Forma Pauperis application.

Judge Watson reasoned that the

Magistrate Judge assigned to the case had already issued Findings
and a Recommendation to remand the case to state court and that

3

the deadline Taylor sought to extend had already been vacated.
Id.
On March 10, 2015, Judge Watson adopted findings and a
recommendation to remand the foreclosure proceedings to state
court.

Civ. No. 15-00018 DKW/KSC, ECF No. 15.
The state-court foreclosure proceedings are still

ongoing.

See 3CC 14-1-000289, ECF No. 7-3, PageID # 154;

http://hoohiki1.courts.state.hi.us/jud/Hoohiki/JSAPM51F5.jsp?star
tseq=1 (last visited December 4, 2015) (state-court docket).
On July 14, 2015, Taylor filed the present action,
naming as Defendants the lender foreclosing on her mortgage in
state court, the attorneys representing the lender, the State of
Hawaii, the Third Circuit Court for the State of Hawaii, and this
court.

See ECF No. 1.

In the Complaint’s caption, Taylor also

listed “Assurant Specialty Property aka (WELLS) WELLS FARGO, NA
AS STORM INSURER,” as a party, but it is not clear from the
Complaint whether Taylor is asserting a claim directly against
Assurant or against Wells Fargo as Assurant’s designee or agent.
Id.
Although the Complaint contains few factual
allegations, it says in its caption that it is asserting claims
of (1) disability discrimination; (2) torture; (3) conspiracy to
torture to take home and employment through blocking civil
rights; (4) violations of Hawaii rules of professional conduct

4

relating to “candor”; (5) violation of foreclosure mediation
laws; (6) deception of courts; (7) storm policy fraud;
(8) failure of Hawaii courts, the State and the County of Hawaii,
and the mayor to preserve federal ADAAA, FHA, EEOC, EECC rights
and many federal and state laws; (9) failure to provide equal
access to federal courts and protections by providing no avenue
for timely filing; (10) violation of rights to rehabilitation and
employment opportunities; (11) robotic loan servicing in
violation of the ADAAA; (12) fraud on the bureau of conveyances;
(13) deceptive lending, servicing accounting, and loan
modification in violation of the U.S. Constitution; (14) failure
to provide law enforcement relating to the bureau of conveyances;
and (15) violation of the U.S. Constitution.
III.

Id.

RULE 12(b)(6) STANDARD.
Although the motions to dismiss and joinders therein

raise jurisdictional issues, this court examines them under Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because Taylor’s
references to violations of federal law at least suggest federal
question jurisdiction and because the court cannot begin to
analyze any jurisdictional issue without first understanding
Taylor’s claims.
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a court’s review of the sufficiency of a complaint is
generally limited to the contents of the complaint.

5

Sprewell v.

Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001);
Campanelli v. Bockrath, 100 F.3d 1476, 1479 (9th Cir. 1996).

If

matters outside the pleadings are considered, the Rule 12(b)(6)
motion is treated as one for summary judgment.

See Keams v.

Tempe Tech. Inst., Inc., 110 F.3d 44, 46 (9th Cir. 1997);
Anderson v. Angelone, 86 F.3d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 1996).

However,

courts may “consider certain materials--documents attached to the
complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint,
or matters of judicial notice--without converting the motion to
dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.”
Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003).

United States v.
Documents whose

contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity is not
questioned by any party may also be considered in ruling on a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
449, 453-54 (9th Cir. 1994).

See Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d

The court therefore cannot consider

most of the documents belatedly submitted by Taylor with her
Opposition of December 15, 2015.1

1

In future filings, Taylor should refrain from
submitting stacks of documents. The court has no independent
duty to scour such a submission to glean from it any factual
proposition. Instead, Taylor should submit only relevant pages
and also explain in a filing what the documents purport to
demonstrate. Taylor is also cautioned that a motion to dismiss
decided under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure turns on the sufficiency of a complaint, without regard
to materials outside of the complaint that may be relevant at
other stages of a lawsuit.
6

On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, all allegations
of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Fed’n of African Am.

Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir.
1996).

However, conclusory allegations of law, unwarranted

deductions of fact, and unreasonable inferences are insufficient
to defeat a motion to dismiss.

Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988; Syntex

Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 1996).
Additionally, the court need not accept as true allegations that
contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or
allegations contradicting the exhibits attached to the complaint.
Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988.
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on either:
(1) lack of a cognizable legal theory, or (2) insufficient facts
under a cognizable legal theory.

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Robertson v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th Cir.
1984)).
“[T]o survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,
factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true even if doubtful in fact.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

7

678 (2009) (“the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not
require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than
an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”).
“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s
obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to
relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

The complaint must “state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Id. at 570.

“A

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 677.
IV.

ANALYSIS.
A.

This Judge Declines to Recuse Herself From This
Action.

As an initial matter, because Taylor names the United
States District Court as a Defendant, this judge examines whether
she must recuse herself from the case.

Under the current

circumstances, this judge declines to do so.
A judge has “as strong a duty to sit when there is no
legitimate reason to recuse as he does to recuse when the law and
facts require.”

Clemens v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist.

Of Cal., 428 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Nichols v.
8

Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 351 (10th Cir. 1995)).

However, there are

situations requiring a judge to recuse himself or herself.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 144, a judge must recuse herself when
a party to a district court proceeding “files a timely and
sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is
pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in
favor of any adverse party.” 28 U.S.C. § 144.

The standard for

recusal under § 144 is “whether a reasonable person with
knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”

United States v.

Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).
Because no affidavit has been filed, § 144 is inapplicable.
Accordingly, this judge examines her obligation to
recuse herself under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), which provides that
“[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States
shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”

28 U.S.C.

§ 455(a).
28 U.S.C. § 455 requires recusal where a
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned or where he has personal bias or
prejudice concerning a party, or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding. Recusal is also
required where the judge knows he has a
fiduciary interest in the subject matter in
controversy or in a party to the proceedings,
or any other interest that could
substantially affect the outcome of the
proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4).
9

Hanson v. Palehua Cmty. Ass’n, 2013 WL 1187948 (D. Haw. Mar. 20,
2013).
Any claim against the United States District Court for
the District of Hawaii is tenuous at best.

Taylor, who explains

that she is disabled, alleges that she “was prevented electronic
communication with my courts” and was denied the same electronic
communication that other parties represented by attorneys had.
See ECF No. 1, PageID # 2.

Taylor complains that, while opposing

counsel received court orders through the CM/ECF system, she
received the documents through the United States Postal Service.
Id.

Taylor says that this is disability discrimination, although

she does not specifically identify any statute or regulation the
court might have violated.

Id.

Taylor might be asserting a disparate treatment claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), which states:
No individual shall be discriminated against
on the basis of disability in the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns, leases
(or leases to), or operates a place of public
accommodation.
She might also be asserting her claim under section
489-3 of Hawaii Revised Statutes, which states:
Unfair discriminatory practices which deny,
or attempt to deny a person the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations of a place of public
10

accommodation on the basis of race, sex,
color, religion, ancestry, or disability are
prohibited.
Because Taylor’s untimely Opposition to the motions provides no
clarity on this point, the court cannot determine whether either
of these provisions is the statute at issue or whether Taylor
might be proceeding under some other statute.

Nevertheless, in

any case of discrimination, absent direct evidence of
discrimination, Taylor would have to proceed using circumstantial
evidence of discrimination.

See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540

U.S. 44, 51–55 (2003) (applying burden shifting framework set
forth for Title VII cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) to disparate treatment claim asserted
under ADA provision in 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)).
Taylor’s Complaint does not refer to any direct
evidence of discrimination, and if she intends to prove her case
with circumstantial evidence, she must at some point identify a
similarly situated nondisabled individual who was treated more
favorably than she was.

At this point, the record lacks factual

allegations supporting such a circumstance.

At most, Taylor

alleges that attorneys were allowed to use the court’s CM/ECF
system, while she was not allowed to do so.

But that allegation

does not involve similarly situated individuals.

To use the

court’s CM/ECF system, attorneys must register and take a
training course.

See Local Rule 100.4.1 to 100.4.4.

11

Pro se

parties “may not utilize electronic filing without leave of
court, which decision rests in the discretion of the assigned
district or magistrate judge.”

Local Rule 100.2.2(1).

Taylor

does not allege that she even asked to use the CM/ECF system.
Taylor did submit a motion to Judge Watson on February
25, 2015, via fax or e-mail.

Judge Watson allowed that motion to

be filed, but told Taylor to refrain from sending in motions
electronically in the future.
before that case was remanded.

Taylor filed no further documents
Nor did Taylor file objections to

the Findings and Recommendation to remand that case.

The

Complaint and docket lack any indication that Taylor asked for
any reasonable accommodation to file any objection.
The record in the present action is similarly devoid of
any request to use the CM/ECF system.

Under these circumstances,

Taylor fails to allege facts supporting her discrimination claim
against the court.
Had Taylor alleged facts that supported a possibly
viable claim against this court, this judge would recuse herself
from the case.

Taylor’s failure to allege a viable claim causes

this judge to decline to recuse herself at this time.

To proceed

otherwise would delay this case by forcing the court to bring in
a visiting judge.

Because no reasonable judge would consider

Taylor’s claim against the United States District Court for the
District of Hawaii to be viable in its present form, it makes no

12

sense for this judge to recuse at this time.

Should Taylor amend

her Complaint to assert a potentially viable claim against the
United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, this
judge will reevaluate the recusal decision.
B.

The Motions to Dismiss and Substantive Joinders
Therein Are Granted.

Having examined the Complaint’s allegations, this court
determines that the Complaint lacks the factual allegations
needed to support any claim against any Defendant.

The Complaint

presents only the very types of allegations that the Supreme
Court has cautioned are insufficient--“unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s].”
556 U.S. at 678.

See Iqbal,

Accordingly, the court dismisses the Complaint.

In so ruling, the court has considered Taylor’s untimely
Opposition of December 15, 2015.
1.

The Claims Against the State Defendants Are
Dismissed.

The court begins its analysis of the motions and
joinders with an examination of Taylor’s claims against the
state-court Defendants, which include the State of Hawaii, Judge
Hara of the Third Circuit Court, and an unidentified ADA
coordinator.

The Complaint lacks factual allegations with

respect to what any of these Defendants specifically did to harm
Taylor.

For example, the Complaint alleges that Judge Hara

granted Taylor a continuance.

See ECF No. 1, PageID # 2.

Without more, this allegation fails to state a claim against
13

Judge Hara.

The court therefore does not reach the issue of

whether Judge Hara has absolute judicial immunity for claims
arising out of decisions he made as a judge.

See Mireles v.

Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991).
The Complaint implies that an unidentified ADA
coordinator may have told Taylor that she could not communicate
with the ADA coordinator via e-mail.

See ECF No. 1, PageID # 2.

In the same sentence, Taylor complains that opposing counsel
refused to permit her to communicate by e-mail.

Id.

But Taylor

identifies no authority suggesting she has a right to communicate
with the ADA coordinator or opposing counsel via e-mail.

Taylor

does not allege that she suffered disparate treatment because
other, nondisabled individuals were allowed to have e-mail
communication with them.

Nor does she assert that the ADA

coordinator should have reasonably accommodated her disability by
allowing such communication.

The court is not ruling here that

Taylor has no right to reasonable accommodation.

The court is

simply noting that Taylor’s Complaint lacks factual allegations
supporting any identifiable claim against the ADA coordinator.
The court therefore does not reach the issue of whether the ADA
coordinator has quasi-judicial immunity from any claim.
The Complaint alleges that the state court possibly
prevented Taylor from communicating with the court via e-mail.
See ECF No. 1, PageID # 2.

It appears that the State of Hawaii

14

may have been named as a Defendant as part of Taylor’s naming of
the state court.

Id.

But Taylor does not allege that any other

party is allowed to have such electronic communication with the
state court.

Taylor thus fails to allege disparate treatment

discrimination.

To the extent Taylor might be asserting a claim

of failure to accommodate her disability, such a claim is not
pled because she fails to allege that she even asked for such an
accommodation or informed the state court of any inability or
difficulty concerning filing things in paper form.
The court notes that Defendants affiliated with the
State have asked this court to abstain from exercising
jurisdiction over Taylor’s claims under the principles set forth
in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)l; Gilbertson v.
Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc).

Younger

abstention is required when four requirements are satisfied:
(1) a state-initiated proceeding is ongoing;
(2) the proceeding implicates important state
interests; (3) the federal plaintiff is not
barred from litigating federal constitutional
issues in the state proceeding; and (4) the
federal court action would enjoin the
proceeding or have the practical effect of
doing so, i.e., would interfere with the
state proceeding in a way that Younger
disapproves.
San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce Pol. Action Comm. v.
City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2008).

Because

the Complaint does not appear to be challenging anything at issue
in the ongoing state-court proceedings, the court cannot say from
15

the present record that Younger abstention is appropriate.

At

most, Taylor might be complaining about an inability to file
documents electronically in state court.

However, with no claim

adequately pled, the court cannot determine what Taylor is
seeking through the Complaint in the present action.
In Taylor’s Opposition of December 15, 2015, she asks
the court to enjoin the state court from proceeding for at least
90 days from when she receives transcripts and/or CDs of
hearings.

Because the Complaint is being dismissed, the court

denies that request.

The court notes that the requested relief

is the very interference with state-court proceedings that
Younger counsels against.

If Taylor desires such relief, she

should seek it from the state court.
Similarly, because the Complaint does not appear to be
asking for money damages and instead appears limited to seeking
prospective injunctive relief to “restrain Defendants from
Disability Discrimination,” see ECF No. 1, PageID # 4, Eleventh
Amendment immunity appears inapplicable at this time.

See

Douglas v. California Dep’t of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d 812, 818, as
amended by 271 F.3d 910, (9th Cir. 2001).

This court cannot,

however, actually determine the applicability of the Eleventh
Amendment at this time given the inadequate pleading.

16

Because no viable claim is asserted against Defendants
affiliated with the State, their Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 7, is
granted.
2.

The Claims Against the Bank Defendants Are
Dismissed.

Taylor’s Complaint’s caption lists as Defendants Wells
Fargo, NA, aka America’s Servicing Company and aka Assurant
Specialty Property, and US Bank National Association as Trustee
for Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Pass-through
Certificate, Series 2006-NC1 (collectively, “Bank Defendants”).
The allegations in the Complaint fail to assert viable claims
against the Bank Defendants.

As with the other Defendants, the

Complaint lacks factual detail supporting identifiable claims.
The Complaint accuses the bank of leaving Taylor “without power
or security during a state of emergency” but does not describe
sufficiently what any Bank Defendant did in that regard or what
duty, contract, or law was violated.
It is not clear whether Taylor is attempting to
challenge the bank’s right to foreclose on her mortgage in the
state-court action or challenging the procedures employed by the
state court.

The Complaint mentions ownership of the loan and

predatory lending, but does not allege sufficient factual detail
to support a viable claim.

This court therefore need not

determine at this time whether Younger abstention is appropriate.

17

In a letter dated July 7, 2015, and attached to the
Complaint, ECF No. 1-8, PageID # 19, a claims adjuster for
Assurant Specialty Property Claims informed Taylor that a
supplemental payment of $6,895.76 was being issued to its
insured, “AMERICAS SERVICING CO,” due to “windstorm.”

The letter

states that Taylor is an “Additional Name” on the policy.

Id.

But the Complaint’s allegations are insufficient to determine why
Assurant might be named as a Defendant.
The Complaint does allege that an insurance adjuster
came to Taylor’s property but refused to look at the damage.
ECF No. 1, PageID # 3.

See

The Complaint then alleges that the

adjuster flew back to his office and issued a check “to
themselves.”

Id.

To the extent Taylor is seeking to hold the

insurance company liable for breach of an insurance agreement,
the Complaint fails to state a viable claim.

It does not explain

what rights Taylor had to insurance proceeds or clarify whether
Taylor is asserting a claim based on the insurance company’s
failure to properly and timely investigate her claim and pay out
insurance proceeds.
The documents attached to the Complaint list Taylor as
an “Additional Name,” not the “insured.”

Without allegations

concerning Taylor’s entitlement to the insurance proceeds, such
as an allegation that Taylor is also an insured under the
applicable insurance policy, the court cannot discern a viable

18

claim.

Because the Complaint fails to allege a viable claim

against Assurant, the court denies Taylor’s request in her
Opposition that this court order Assurant to pay for the repairs
to her house.
Given Taylor’s failure to assert a viable claim against
any Defendant Taylor says is associated with her lender, the
court grants the Bank Defendants’ Substantive Joinder in the
Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 12.
3.

The Claims Against the Attorney Defendants
Are Dismissed.

Like the claims against the other Defendants, the
claims against the attorneys are not supported by factual
allegations.

Without identifying anyone in particular, Taylor

alleges that attorneys “denied” her the right to communicate via
e-mail, “battered” her with paperwork she was “unable to read,”
and opposed her attempt to obtain a jury trial.
PageID # 2.

See ECF No. 1,

She appears to be alleging that these actions

related to actions by the banks that “left [her] without power or
security during a state of emergency.”

Id., PageID # 3.

But

none of these allegations supports a viable identified claim.
The source of a right to communicate by e-mail, or of a
right to be free of an opposing attorney’s paperwork, is unstated
and unknown.

Because no viable claim supported by sufficient

factual allegations is alleged in the Complaint, the court grants
the attorney Defendants’ motion to dismiss, ECF No. 17, and their
19

substantive joinder in the State Defendants’ motion, ECF No. 7,
without reaching the issue of whether Younger abstention applies.
Additionally, because no viable claim is asserted
against the attorney Defendants, to the extent Taylor’s
Opposition of December 15, 2015, asks this court to enjoin them
(and other agents of Wells Fargo) from harassing her at her home
without an appointment is denied.

If the attorneys are doing

something inappropriate with respect to the foreclosure of
Taylor’s mortgage, Taylor should raise that issue in the statecourt foreclosure proceeding.
V.

CONCLUSION.
Pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(d), the court rules without

a hearing on the motions to dismiss and joinders therein, ECF
Nos. 7, 9, 11, 12, and 17.

The court grants the motions and

joinders and dismisses the Complaint without prejudice.

The

court grants Taylor leave to file an Amended Complaint.

Because

of Taylor’s claimed disabilities, the court gives her an extended
period of two months, until February 16, 2016, to file any
Amended Complaint.

Should Taylor fail to timely file an Amended

Complaint, this action will be automatically terminated.
The court provides Taylor with some guidance with
respect to any Amended Complaint.

First, any Amended Complaint

must be complete in itself; it may not incorporate by reference
anything previously filed with this court or any other court.

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Second, pursuant to Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.”

This means that, with respect to each Defendant in the

Amended Complaint, Taylor should describe what each Defendant did
to harm her in separate, numbered paragraphs, including
sufficient facts and references to legal claims to put each
Defendant on notice of why he, she, or it is being sued.

For

example, instead of merely saying that a particular defendant
discriminated against her, Taylor should describe the facts
supporting such alleged discriminatory conduct and identify the
legal basis or bases for asserting a claim against the Defendant.
Taylor should not base claims against one person on something
that someone else did, unless the person can be said to be
legally responsible for the conduct of the other.

Taylor should

not simply attach voluminous documents to the Amended Complaint
and expect the court and Defendants to guess what claims those
documents might support.
Third, to the extent that Taylor believes that a judge
may have harmed her through some ruling the judge made, Taylor
should be aware that judges have absolute judicial immunity with
respect to such claims.
(1991).

See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11

In other words, judges are not liable just because they

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made certain rulings as judges, even if those rulings are wrong.
A party’s remedy is an appeal.
Fourth, to the extent that Taylor seeks money damages
from the State of Hawaii or one of its agencies, the Eleventh
Amendment, which recognizes a state’s sovereign immunity, bars
such a claim in this court.

See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11

(1991).
Fifth, to the extent Taylor seeks to challenge
something that would affect the ongoing state-court foreclosure
proceedings, Taylor should consider the Supreme Court’s ruling
concerning courts’ abstention from interfering in ongoing
proceedings in state courts.

See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37

(1971)l; Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir.
2004) (en banc).
The court gathers from Taylor’s submissions that
communicating by United States mail presents physical
difficulties for her.

The court therefore permits Taylor to

submit documents for filing by e-mail attachment sent to
[e-mail].

To be allowed to communicate

electronically with the court, a litigant must first receive
permission from the judge assigned to a case.
100.2.2(1).

See Local Rule

While Taylor is allowed to file documents via e-mail

in this case, she must separately receive permission to do so in
any other case in this court.

E-mail may not be used by Taylor

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to engage in off-the-record or one-sided communication with the
court.

E-mail should be used only to submit materials that would

otherwise be mailed to the court and served on opposing counsel
and that are intended to be placed in the court file for this
case.

Permission to submit documents via e-mail may be rescinded

by this court at any time for any reason, as this court is not
aware of any requirement that it allow Taylor to communicate by
e-mail.

The court extends this accommodation to Taylor without

announcing that Taylor has any right to e-mail her filings.
Taylor may contact the opposing attorneys about serving
them and being served via e-mail.
A copy of this order will be sent to Taylor via e-mail.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, December 16, 2015.

/s/ Susan Oki Mollway
Susan Oki Mollway
Chief United States District Judge

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Taylor v. Leu, et al., Civil No. 15-00265 SOM/KSC; ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT
AND DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR INJUNCTIONS

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