Taylor v. Leu et al

Filing 81

ORDER DISMISSING FEDERAL QUESTION CLAIMS AND DECLINING TO EXERCISE SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION OVER REMAINING STATE LAW CLAIMS re 43 , 44 , 46 , 47 , 49 , 51 - Signed by JUDGE SUSAN OKI MOLLWAY on 9/9/2016. "Pursuant t o Local Rule 7.2(d), this court rules without a hearing on the motions to dismiss and joinders therein. The court grants the motions and joinders to the extent they seek dismissal of the federal question claims asserted in the Amended Complaint. The court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. Taylor has had multiple chances to articulate a viable claim. Giving her further leave to amend her claims would be an exercise in futility. Accordingly, the court denies leave to file another amended complaint and orders the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and to close this case. The Clerk of Court is further ordered to send a copy of this order to Taylor via e-mail.&quo t; (emt, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Sarah Margaret Taylor shall be served via e-mail at [e-mail] on September 9, 2016. Additionally, a hard copy of the order will be served by first class mail to Ms. Taylor at the address of record on September 9, 2016.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
SARAH MARGARET TAYLOR,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
LESTER K LEU; ANDREW LEE; LEU )
OKUDA & DOI;
)
)
PITE DUNCAN, LLP; ANNA T.
)
VALLIENTE; DAVID E.
)
McALLESTER;
)
)
CHRISTIAN FENTON;
)
)
SUSAN FENTON;
)
)
STATE OF HAWAII; THIRD
)
CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE
)
DISTRICT OF HAWAII;
)
)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT )
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII;
)
)
WELLS FARGO, NA, aka
)
AMERICA’S SERVICING COMPANY; )
)
ASSURANT SPECIALTY PROPERTY, )
aka WELLS FARGO NA AS STORM
)
INSURER;
)
)
US BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION )
AS TRUSTEE FOR STRUCTURED
)
ASSET SECURITIES CORPORATION )
MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH
)
CERTIFICATE, SERIES 2006-NC1 )
)
Defendants.
)
_____________________________ )

CIVIL NO. 15-00265 SOM/KSC

ORDER DISMISSING FEDERAL
QUESTION CLAIMS AND DECLINING
TO EXERCISE SUPPLEMENTAL
JURISDICTION OVER REMAINING
STATE LAW CLAIMS

ORDER DISMISSING FEDERAL QUESTION CLAIMS AND
DECLINING TO EXERCISE SUPPLEMENTAL
JURISDICTION OVER REMAINING STATE LAW CLAIMS

I.

INTRODUCTION.
Plaintiff Sarah Margaret Taylor brings this action to

complain about matters relating to a state-court foreclosure of
her mortgage.

Proceeding pro se, Taylor in her Amended Complaint

mentions every person or entity having anything to do with that
foreclosure proceeding and includes claims against 1) her lender,
Wells Fargo, N.A.; 2) her insurer, Assurant Specialty Property;
3) the lender’s attorneys, Christian Fenton, Susan L. Fenton,
David E. McAllester, Anna T. Valliente, and the law firm of Pite
Duncan LLP, nka Aldridge Pite, LLP (“Aldridge Pite Defendants”);
as well as Andrew Lee, Esq., Lester K. Leu, Esq., and the law
firm of Leu Okuda & Doi (“Leu Okuda Defendants”); and 4) the
state court adjudicating the ongoing foreclosure proceeding.
Taylor also complains about this court, but it is not clear that
she is suing this court.
Because this court could not tell from the Amended
Complaint who was being sued and what claims were being asserted,
the court ordered Taylor to provide a more definite statement in
the form of a chart.
The Amended Complaint is before this court on federal
question jurisdiction.

The court has attempted to glean from the

Amended Complaint and the chart what claims Taylor may be
asserting.

Taylor appears to be including the following claims

in her Amended Complaint: 1) a claim against the state court in

2

Hawaii’s Third Circuit for allegedly having denied Taylor
reasonable accommodations in violation of the Americans With
Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act; 2) a claim against
Wells Fargo-related entities for having allegedly violated the
Fair Housing Act and the 4th and 14th Amendments of the United
States Constitution; and 3) claims against the attorneys
representing the foreclosing lender in state court for not
stopping the 4th Amendment violation by Wells Fargo.

Although

the Amended Complaint does not assert claims against this court
that are supported by factual assertions, Taylor’s chart
complains that this court denied her reasonable accommodations in
violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act and the
Rehabilitation Act.

Taylor also asserts various state-law

claims, including what appear to be claims of breach of insurance
contract, invasion of privacy, trespass, fraud, and unfair and
deceptive practices.
This court dismisses the federal claims asserted in the
Amended Complaint and declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.

Although the

court would normally give a pro se plaintiff a chance to file a
second amended complaint, the court declines to do so in this
case, as Taylor has demonstrated through the proceedings in this
case the futility of allowing such an amendment.

3

II.

BACKGROUND FACTS.
The court takes judicial notice of the proceeding and

pleadings in the related state-court foreclosure case, as
requested by the Aldridge Pite Defendants.

ECF No. 70-1.

On

July 31, 2014, U.S. Bank National filed a complaint seeking
foreclosure of Taylor’s mortgage.

The state-court foreclosure

proceedings are still ongoing on the Island of Hawaii (or “Big
Island”), a plane ride away from Oahu, where the federal court is
located.

See 3CC 14-1-000289, ECF No. 7, PageID #s 1117-24.

See 3CC 14-1-000289, ECF No. 7-3, PageID # 154.
On July 14, 2015, Taylor filed the present action,
naming as Defendants the lender foreclosing on her mortgage in
state court, the attorneys representing the lender, the State of
Hawaii, the Third Circuit Court for the State of Hawaii, and this
court.

See ECF No. 1.

In the original Complaint’s caption,

Taylor also listed “Assurant Specialty Property aka (WELLS) WELLS
FARGO, NA AS STORM INSURER,” as a party, but it was not clear
from the Complaint whether Taylor was asserting a claim directly
against Assurant or against Wells Fargo as Assurant’s purported
designee, principal, or agent.

Id.

On December 17, 2015, the court dismissed the
Complaint, giving Taylor leave to file an amended complaint and
allowing her to file her documents via e-mail given her assertion

4

that she had difficulty picking up or sending material through
the United States mail.

See ECF No. 23.

On February 17, 2016, Taylor sent five e-mails to the
court attaching documents that, in combination, the court deemed
to be her Amended Complaint.

See ECF Nos. 25, 28-31.

Wells Fargo, the State Defendants (the State of Hawaii
and the Third Circuit Court), and the Aldridge Pite Defendants
filed motions to dismiss.

See ECF Nos. 43, 44, and 47.

Joinders

in the motions to dismiss have been filed by Wells Fargo and the
Leu Okuda Defendants.

ECF Nos. 46, 49, and 51.

On June 14, 2016, the court began a hearing on the
motions to dismiss and joinders therein.

Taylor had been sent a

notice of the hearing via e-mail, as she had requested.

See ECF

No. 54 (text-only document stating that the hearing on the
motions and joinder was continued to June 14, 2016, at 9:00
a.m.).

While Taylor is not registered with this court’s ECF

system, the e-mail, had it been opened, would have made the
content of the text-only document immediately visible to Taylor.
The notice did not include any e-mail attachment or any other
material accessible only to ECF registrants.

Thus, Taylor should

have known about the hearing, which the court had said she could
attend by telephone.

Nevertheless, Taylor seemed surprised when

the court called her to begin the hearing.

The court allowed

Taylor to speak at the hearing and then continued the hearing to

5

allow Taylor to clarify her claims and to allow the parties to
submit supplemental briefing in light of any clarification by
Taylor.

See ECF No. 58.
Because the Amended Complaint did not clearly identify

who was being named as a Defendant and what claims were being
asserted, the court ordered Taylor to file a more definite
statement in the form of a chart.

See ECF No. 57.

To aid Taylor

in describing her claims in a manner that would put Defendants on
notice of what was being asserted against them, the court
prepared the chart form and ordered Taylor to describe her claims
by filling out the chart.

Taylor was to identify what claims

were being asserted and to explain the factual basis of any claim
in 25 words or less.

Taylor was also ordered to identify the

paragraph number in the Amended Complaint in which the claim was
asserted.

See id.

Taylor was told, “Any claim not identified in

the chart shall be deemed waived, and any Defendant not listed in
the left-hand column shall be deemed to not be a party in this
lawsuit.”

Id., PageID # 1025.
On July 12, 2016, Taylor filed her chart of claims.

See ECF Nos. 65-67.

Taylor’s chart does little to clarify her

claims and fails to tie any claim to a paragraph in the Amended
Complaint.

Id.

6

III.

RULE 12(b)(6) STANDARD.
The court set forth the standard governing motions

under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
its order of December 17, 2015.
46.
IV.

See ECF No. 23, PageID #s 643-

That standard is incorporated herein by reference.
ANALYSIS.
A.

This Judge Continues to Decline to Recuse Herself
From This Action.

In its order of August 24, 2016, this judge determined
that she need not recuse herself from this matter.
78, PageID #s 1309-12.

See ECF No.

The court incorporates by reference that

determination and the analysis supporting it, noting that the
Amended Complaint lacks factual assertions concerning what the
United States District Court for the District of Hawaii may have
done to harm Taylor.

At most, the Amended Complaint’s ad damnum

clause asks that the court give Taylor transcripts of all
hearings and “Promogulate the ADAAA and ‘Borrow and ADOPT’
Washington state guides for accommodating people with
disabilities in courts.”

ECF No. 33, PageID # 879.

That request

is more akin to a motion than a claim against this court.

It

thus does not appear that the United States District Court for
the District of Hawaii is actually named as a Defendant in the
Amended Complaint.
Despite the lack of any claim against this court in the
Amended Complaint, Taylor’s chart lists the United States
7

District Court for the District of Hawaii as if this court is a
party to this action, having allegedly violated the Americans
With Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”).
See ECF No. 66.

As discussed in the court’s order of August 24,

2016, any disability discrimination claim against this court
under the ADA or RA is frivolous.

See ECF No. 78, PageID # 1310.

Taylor may be attempting to proceed against this court
under Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the RA, which prohibit
discrimination on the basis of disability.
Title II of the ADA provides:
Subject to the provisions of this subchapter,
no qualified individual with a disability
shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied
the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be
subjected to discrimination by any such
entity.
42 U.S.C. § 12132.

Section 504 of the RA provides:

No otherwise qualified individual with a
disability in the United States . . . shall,
solely by reason of her or his disability, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance . . .
.
29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
Taylor’s Amended Complaint and chart do not allege
facts supporting a viable claim against this court of disability
discrimination.

For example, Taylor says that she and other

8

people living on the Big Island are being denied equal access to
this court in violation of the ADA and the RA because the federal
court provides no drop box at the state courthouse on the Big
Island of Hawaii for after-hours submission by litigants of
federal court filings.

As discussed in this court’s order of

August 24, 2016, there is no requirement that this court maintain
an after-hours drop box.

If a pro se party living on the Big

Island needs to file matters with this court after hours, that
party may use the mail or request leave to submit documents via
fax or e-mail.

In fact, Taylor has been permitted to file

documents via e-mail given disabilities she describes.

This

court made that special accommodation as soon as it realized that
Taylor was claiming a need for it.

In the face of that

accommodation, Taylor could not be injured by the lack of a drop
box on the Big Island.
Taylor does not allege that she paid for expedited
shipping to file a document with this court, or that she was
forced to take any other action because of the lack of a drop
box.

Nor was she robbed of any time to prepare a document that a

drop box might have afforded her.
her filings by e-mail.

She was given leave to submit

Because Taylor cannot have been harmed by

the lack of a drop box on an island where this court has no
courthouse and no Clerk’s Office staff to monitor the box, Taylor
lacks a concrete injury giving her standing to assert a

9

disability discrimination claim relating to the lack of a drop
box.

See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).

Taylor also lacks standing to assert claims on behalf of other
people living on the Big Island.

See Patee v. Pac. Nw. Bell Tel.

Co., 803 F.2d 476, 478–79 (9th Cir. 1986) (employees lack
standing to bring claims based on discrimination against others).
Taylor’s chart also indicates that this court is
discriminating against her by not rescheduling hearings to a time
when she is physically able to participate.
PageID # 1070.
claim.

See ECF No. 66,

But Taylor does not allege facts supporting the

Her chart does not, for example, even assert that she

ever requested that a particular hearing be rescheduled in light
of a disability.

At most, this court gleans from the record that

Taylor was surprised when the court called her with respect to
the hearing on the motions to dismiss on June 14, 2016.
No. 58.

See ECF

Because this court continued that hearing to allow

supplemental briefing, any claim that this court did not
accommodate a reasonable request for a different hearing date and
time is frivolous and does not require this judge to recuse
herself.
To the extent Taylor’s chart complains of this court’s
“partiality” because the court has ruled against her, Taylor’s
remedy is to appeal this court’s decisions.

10

Rulings against a

party are generally insufficient to require recusal of a judge.
See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).
No reasonable judge would consider Taylor’s filings to
be stating a cognizable claim against the United States District
Court for the District of Hawaii.

It therefore makes no sense

for this judge or her colleagues in this district to recuse and
to request that a visiting judge fly to this district to preside
over this case.
B.

The Court Dismisses the Federal Question Claims.

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; they
may only consider claims raising federal questions or satisfying
diversity requirements.

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331–32.

A federal

question claim is one “arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States.”

28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Diversity

exists when the “matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value
of $75,000” and is between “citizens of different States.”
U.S.C. § 1332.

28

A person is considered a citizen of the state in

which he or she is domiciled, meaning the state in which he or
she resides with the intent to remain or to return.

See Kantor

v. Warner-Lamvert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001).
Because Taylor appears to be a citizen of Hawaii and is
naming as Defendants the State Defendants and individuals who
appear to be citizens of Hawaii, there is a lack of diversity
jurisdiction.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

11

This court can therefore

have subject matter jurisdiction only as a matter of federal
question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

This court has

done its best to discern from the Amended Complaint and the chart
what claims Taylor is asserting.

Taylor appears to be asserting

the following federal claims: 1) the Third Circuit Court and
possibly this court have denied her reasonable accommodations as
required by the ADA and RA; 2) Wells Fargo has violated the Fair
Housing Act and the 4th and 14th Amendments of the United States
Constitution; and 3) the lender’s attorneys are somehow
responsible for the 4th Amendment violation by Wells Fargo.
1.

The ADA and RA Claims Asserted Against the
State Defendants (and Possibly This Court)
Are Dismissed.

Taylor claims that the Third Circuit Court and possibly
this court violated the ADA and the RA.

Although Taylor does not

identify any specific section of the ADA and RA that she believes
was violated, it appears that she is asserting claims under Title
II of the ADA and § 504 of the RA.

To establish a violation of

Title II of the ADA, Taylor must demonstrate that “(1) she is a
qualified individual with a disability; (2) she was excluded from
participation in or otherwise discriminated against with regard
to a public entity's services, programs, or activities, and
(3) such exclusion or discrimination was by reason of her
disability.”
2002).

Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir.

To establish a violation of § 504 of the RA, Taylor “must

12

show that (1) she is handicapped within the meaning of the RA;
(2) she is otherwise qualified for the benefit or services
sought; (3) she was denied the benefit or services solely by
reason of her handicap; and (4) the program providing the benefit
or services receives federal financial assistance.”

Id.

As described above, Taylor does not have standing to
maintain her discrimination claims against this court.

For that

reason, to the extent Taylor may be attempting to assert a claim
against this court under the ADA or the RA even though her
Amended Complaint includes no such claim, the claim is dismissed.
Taylor’s Amended Complaint does not name any State
Defendant in its caption or clearly articulate a claim against
the State Defendants supported by factual allegations.

For

example, the Amended Complaint states in paragraph 8, “I motion
USDC to order 33C to PERFORM and deliver to me without charge,
this readily achievable accommodations electronic and transcript
so that I am able to participate equally.”
# 871.

ECF No. 33, PageID

The Amended Complaint’s ad damnum clause asks this court

to order the Third Circuit Court to provide Taylor with copies of
transcripts of all hearings and “to Promulgate the ADAAA and
‘Borrow and ADOPT’ Washington state guides for accommodating
people with disabilities in courts.”

Id., PageID # 879.

Taylor’s chart of her claims against the State
Defendants does not clarify her discrimination claim with respect
to the State Defendants.

Instead, it complains that the Third

13

Circuit Court is partial to the foreclosing parties and its
attorneys in Taylor’s foreclosure proceedings.
PageID # 1062.

See ECF No. 66,

It also reiterates her request for transcripts

and complains that the state court’s decisions denied her
redress.

Id., PageID # 1063; ECF No. 67, PageID # 1077.

The

Amended Complaint seeks an order requiring the Third Circuit
Court to provide reasonable accommodations with respect to
Taylor’s disabilities, presumably under Title II of the ADA.
This court takes judicial notice that the state court
denied without prejudice Taylor’s requested reasonable
accommodations with respect to her disabilities because Taylor
had not substantiated the extent of her disabilities.

See Court

Minutes, July 15, 2015, ECF No. 70-2, PageID #s 1169-74.
Moreover, it appears that the state court actually provided
Taylor with an accommodation with respect to the hearing on the
requested accommodations, as Taylor was allowed to appear by
telephone at the hearing.
DEFT. [Taylor])

See id., PageID # 1172 (“SCREAMING BY

COURT - YOU ARE SCREAMING OVER THE PHONE.”).

Final Judgment has, to this court’s knowledge, not been
entered in the action in state court, and an order by this court
directed to how the state court is conducting ongoing litigation
would be not only an unwarranted intrusion by this court, it
would mean that two courts are reviewing the same issue.

The

state court has already proceeded further than this court on the

14

issue of the state court’s accommodation of Taylor’s
disabilities.

Either under Colorado River Water Conservation

Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), and Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Construction Corporation, 460 U.S. 1
(1983), or under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and
Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2004) (en
banc), this court abstains from addressing the disability issue
already before the state court.
Even if the state court has completed its consideration
of Taylor’s complaint regarding the state court’s reaction to her
alleged disabilities, this court will not sit as an appellate
court over that decision and, in fact, lacks jurisdiction to act
in that capacity.

See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust
Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923).

If Taylor believes that the

Third Circuit Court made the wrong decision or was biased against
her, Taylor’s remedy is to appeal through the Hawaii’s appellate
court system.

This court therefore dismisses Taylor’s claims

under the ADA and RA and any other claim seeking relief from
rulings by the Third Circuit Court.
To the extent Taylor’s ad damnum clause asks this court
to “ORDER Third Circuit Court to close its case by DEFENDANTS
against me,” the court abstains under the principles set forth in

15

Younger and Gilbertson.

Younger abstention is required when four

requirements are satisfied:
(1) a state-initiated proceeding is ongoing;
(2) the proceeding implicates important state
interests; (3) the federal plaintiff is not
barred from litigating federal constitutional
issues in the state proceeding; and (4) the
federal court action would enjoin the
proceeding or have the practical effect of
doing so, i.e., would interfere with the
state proceeding in a way that Younger
disapproves.
San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce Pol. Action Comm. v.
City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2008).
No other viable claim is asserted against the State
Defendants.

For example, although Taylor’s chart indicates that

the state court did not reasonably accommodate a request to hold
court hearings when Taylor is physically able to participate, see
ECF No. 66, PageID # 1070, no facts are alleged supporting such a
claim.

The Complaint and chart present only the very types of

allegations that the Supreme Court has cautioned are
insufficient--“unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully- harmed-me
accusation[s].”

See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Accordingly, to the extent the State Defendants seek
dismissal of the claims against them, including the disability
discrimination claim under the Americans With Disabilities Act,
the motion is granted.

16

2.

The Federal Claims Against the Bank
Defendants and Law Firm Defendants Are
Dismissed.

The Amended Complaint, as clarified by the chart,
asserts claims against 1) Taylor’s lender, Wells Fargo, 2) Wells
Fargo’s servicing company, America’s Servicing Company, and
3) Taylor’s insurance company, Assurant Specialty Property, which
Taylor appears to believe is part of or controlled by Wells Fargo
(collectively, “Bank Defendants”).

The Amended Complaint asserts

claims against the Bank Defendants for violations the Fair
Housing Act and the 4th and 14th Amendments of the United States
Constitution, in addition to various state-law claims.

The

allegations in the Complaint fail to assert viable federal
question claims against the Bank Defendants.

Accordingly, the

court grants the Bank Defendants’ motion to dismiss, ECF No. 43,
to the extent it seeks dismissal of the federal question claims
asserted against the Bank Defendants.
Neither the Amended Complaint nor the chart identifies
the specific section of the Fair Housing Act at issue.

It

appears that Taylor is attempting to assert a claim against the
Bank Defendants for a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a), as
paragraph 24 of the Amended Complaint mentions that section in
the context of quoting from what appears to be another case.

In

relevant part, § 3605(a) prohibits discrimination in residential
real estate transactions because of a person’s “race, color,

17

religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.”
Neither the Amended Complaint nor the chart alleges any facts
supporting a discrimination claim under § 3605(a).

The Amended

Complaint generally refers to Wells Fargo as having treated
“blacks like ‘mud people.’”

See ECF No. 33, PageID # 873.

It

also refers to New Century Mortgage’s “predatory lending scheme
on people of color.”

Id., PageID # 874.

But the Amended

Complaint and chart do not allege that the Bank Defendants took
any action against Taylor because of her race or her
disabilities.

They do not allege, for example, that Taylor

herself suffered because of her race or her disabilities.

The

Bank Defendants are given no notice of what actions of theirs
Taylor is relying on in alleging any Fair Housing Act violation.
Under these circumstances, no viable Fair Housing Act claim is
asserted against the Bank Defendants.
To the extent Taylor is claiming that the Bank
Defendants violated her 4th and 14th Amendment rights, no viable
claim is asserted.

“The United States Constitution protects

individual rights only from government action, not from private
action.”

Single Moms, Inc. v. Montana Power Co., 331 F.3d 743,

746 (9th Cir. 2003).

No facts are alleged supporting an

inference that the Bank Defendants’ actions may be fairly treated
as government action.

Accordingly, no viable claim against the

18

Bank Defendants is asserted based on alleged violations of the
4th and 14th Amendments.
For the same reason, this court dismisses any claim
against the Law Firm Defendants based on their own alleged
violations of Taylor’s constitutional rights or for their alleged
failure to stop the Bank Defendants from violating Taylor’s 4th
Amendment rights, see ECF No. 33, PageID # 878.

In short, the

court grants the Aldrich Pite Defendants’ motion to dismiss and
Leu Okuda Defendants’ substantive joinder therein to the extent
they seek dismissal of the federal question claims asserted in
the Amended Complaint.
C.

See ECF Nos. 47 and 49.

The Court Declines to Exercise Supplemental
Jurisdiction Over the Remaining State-law Claims.

Supplemental jurisdiction over state claims exists when
a federal claim is sufficiently substantial to confer federal
jurisdiction, and there is “a common nucleus of operative fact
between the state and federal claims.”

Brady v. Brown, 51 F.3d

810, 816 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Gilder v. PGA Tour, Inc., 936
F.2d 417, 421 (9th Cir. 1991)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

This

court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a
state law claim if: (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue
of state law; (2) the state law claim substantially predominates
over the claim or claims over which the district court has
original jurisdiction; (3) the district court has dismissed all
claims over which it has original jurisdiction; or (4) in
19

exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Supplemental jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion,
not of a plaintiff’s right.

City of Chicago v. Int’l College of

Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172 (1997); United Mine Workers of Amer.
v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Maltzman v. Friedman, 103
F.3d 139 (9th Cir. 1996) (“the doctrine of supplemental
jurisdiction is a flexible one, giving a district court the power
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim and the
discretion whether to exercise such jurisdiction”).

When “the

federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not
insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should
be dismissed as well.”

Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.

Although the

Supreme Court later noted that such a dismissal is not “a
mandatory rule to be applied inflexibly in all cases,” it also
recognized that, “in the usual case in which all federal-law
claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be
considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine--judicial
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity--will point toward
declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law
claims.”

Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7

(1988)

20

Because all of Taylor’s federal claims have been
dismissed, the court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over her remaining state-law claims.
V.

THE COURT DECLINES TO GRANT TAYLOR LEAVE TO FILE A
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT.
It is well established that, “[u]nless it is absolutely

clear that no amendment can cure the defect . . . , a pro se
litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies
and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action.”
Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per
Accord Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125, 1139 (9th Cir.

curiam).
2015).

This court earlier provided such notice to Taylor and

gave her leave to file what is now her Amended Complaint.

This

court has liberally construed that Amended Complaint, as required
by Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987).
However, the futility of allowing any further amendment is clear
from the record.

District courts do not abuse their discretion

when they deny leave to amend if amendment would be futile, see
Valero v. Bac Home Loans Servicing, LP, 2016 WL 3450204, at *1
(9th Cir. June 23, 2016), or when a plaintiff fails to cure a
complaint’s deficiencies despite repeated opportunities, AE ex
rel. Hernandez v. Cty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir.
2012).

Here, Taylor has had more than one opportunity and has

more than once demonstrated that she will not follow directions

21

and cure deficiencies so as to state a claim over which this
court has subject matter jurisdiction.
On July 14, 2015, Plaintiff filed her original
Complaint in this matter.

See ECF No. 1.

the court dismissed the original Complaint.

On December 17, 2015,
See ECF No. 23.

The

court reasoned that the “Complaint lacks the factual allegations
needed to support any claim against any Defendant.”
# 651.

Id., PageID

The court then provided Taylor with “guidance” as to how

she could cure the deficiencies of the Complaint:
First, any Amended Complaint must be
complete in itself; it may not incorporate by
reference anything previously filed with this
court or any other court.
Second, pursuant to Rule 8(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint
must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” This means that, with
respect to each Defendant in the Amended
Complaint, Taylor should describe what each
Defendant did to harm her in separate,
numbered paragraphs, including sufficient
facts and references to legal claims to put
each Defendant on notice of why he, she, or
it is being sued. For example, instead of
merely saying that a particular defendant
discriminated against her, Taylor should
describe the facts supporting such alleged
discriminatory conduct and identify the legal
basis or bases for asserting a claim against
the Defendant. Taylor should not base claims
against one person on something that someone
else did, unless the person can be said to be
legally responsible for the conduct of the
other. Taylor should not simply attach
voluminous documents to the Amended Complaint
and expect the court and Defendants to guess
what claims those documents might support.
22

Third, to the extent that Taylor
believes that a judge may have harmed her
through some ruling the judge made, Taylor
should be aware that judges have absolute
judicial immunity with respect to such
claims. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11
(1991). In other words, judges are not
liable just because they made certain rulings
as judges, even if those rulings are wrong.
A party’s remedy is an appeal.
Fourth, to the extent that Taylor seeks
money damages from the State of Hawaii or one
of its agencies, the Eleventh Amendment,
which recognizes a state’s sovereign
immunity, bars such a claim in this court.
See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11
(1991).
Fifth, to the extent Taylor seeks to
challenge something that would affect the
ongoing state-court foreclosure proceedings,
Taylor should consider the Supreme Court’s
ruling concerning courts’ abstention from
interfering in ongoing proceedings in state
courts. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971)l; Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d
965, 970 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
On February 17, 2016, Taylor sent a five-part e-mail to
the court that was deemed to be her Amended Complaint.
Nos. 28-33.

See ECF

Taylor’s Amended Complaint shows she paid little

attention to the court’s “guidance.”

It attached voluminous

documents and failed to identify what each Defendant had
allegedly done to harm Taylor.
Rather than dismiss the Amended Complaint, the court
ordered Taylor to provide a more definite statement “[t]o provide
Defendants and this court with notice of what claims are being

23

asserted and against whom.”

See ECF No. 57, PageID # 1025.

It

was this court’s thought that, if Taylor could fill out the form
generated by the court, she would then have set forth the claims
she was making.

To that end, the court ordered Taylor to fill

out the following:
Name of
Defendant
Being Sued

Relationship
to Taylor
and/or to Any
Other Party
(e.g.,
Taylor’s
lender,
lender’s
attorney in
state court,
etc.)

Type of Claim
(e.g.,
physical
injury, fraud,
etc.)

Legal Basis
for Claim
(e.g., statute
identified by
name or
number, common
law)

Summarize
Facts Alleged
in Amended
Complaint and
Provide ECF #,
PageID #,
Paragraph #

Example 1:
Jane Smith

Taylor’s
neighbor

Defamation

Common Law

Smith accused
Taylor at
public
gathering of
stealing
Smith’s car
(ECF No. 1,
PageID # 325,
¶ 2)

Example 2:
David Brown

Police Officer

Use of
excessive
force

Violation of
4th Amendment
(42 U.S.C.
§ 1983)

Brown tasered
Taylor causing
Taylor to fall
to ground and
suffer bruises
and cuts (ECF
No. 1, PageID
# 425, ¶ 28)

ECF No. 57, PageID # 1028.
The court explained:

24

Taylor may fill out the chart using only
keywords, not sentences. Any summary of
facts for a particular claim should not
exceed 25 words (not counting ECF, PageID,
and paragraph numbers). In other words,
Taylor shall not argue her claims; she is
allowed to identify what the claims are and
against whom they are asserted. Taylor must
also identify the paragraph number of the
Amended Complaint in which she gives the
Defendant notice of the claim being asserted.
All references to the Amended Complaint must
contain the ECF Number (that is, ECF No. 33),
and PageID Number (these numbers are located
at the top of the filed documents), as well
as the paragraph number.
Id., PageID # 1026.
On July 12, 2016, Taylor filed her chart, but did not
follow the court’s guidance or directions.

See ECF Nos. 65-67.

For example, Taylor lumped Defendants together.

Additionally,

instead of limiting the summary of the facts to 25 words, Taylor
had long descriptions of the matters raised, placing those
descriptions in the sections of the chart concerning the type and
legal basis for the claim.

This misplacement appears to have

been an attempt to evade the 25-word limit.

Most importantly,

even with the chart, Taylor did not clearly identify who was
being sued and for what.

Taylor did not list paragraph numbers

from the Amended Complaint.

While leaving out required

information, Taylor included in the chart her description of
allegedly discriminatory actions by this court (e.g., this
court’s failure to maintain a drop box on the Big Island).
Taylor clearly does want to assert various state-law claims,
25

although she arguably does not do so with adequate clarity.

In

any event, she does not clearly identify any federal claims.
Given Taylor’s history of pleadings, the court does not
believe that Taylor can or will even try in good faith to assert
any viable federal claim.

She has not alleged any facts

supporting a Fair Housing Act claim and has raised only patently
noncognizable assertions concerning any other purported federal
claim.

Under these circumstances, the court foresees no

colorable claim.

This court would dismiss any noncolorable

federal claim on which subject matter jurisdiction might be
asserted.

Allowing further amendment would impose an undue

burden on Defendants given Taylor’s anticipated continued failure
to state a federal claim.
Of course, this ruling does not prohibit Taylor from
pursuing her state-law causes of action in state court, assuming
they are not otherwise barred by state law.

See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(d).
VI.

CONCLUSION.
Pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(d), this court rules

without a hearing on the motions to dismiss and joinders therein.
The court grants the motions and joinders to the extent they seek
dismissal of the federal question claims asserted in the Amended
Complaint.

The court declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.

26

Taylor has had multiple chances to articulate a viable
claim.

Giving her further leave to amend her claims would be an

exercise in futility.

Accordingly, the court denies leave to

file another amended complaint and orders the Clerk of Court to
enter judgment in favor of Defendants and to close this case.
The Clerk of Court is further ordered to send a copy of
this order to Taylor via e-mail.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, September 9, 2016.

/s/ Susan Oki Mollway
Susan Oki Mollway
United States District Judge
Taylor v. Leu, et al., Civil No. 15-00265 SOM/KSC; ORDER DISMISSING FEDERAL
QUESTION CLAIMS AND DECLINING TO EXERCISE SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION OVER
REMAINING STATE LAW CLAIMS

27