Navaja v. Honolulu Academy of Arts et al
Filing
34
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE COURT'S ORDER AND REVISIT THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS re 23 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI on 04/18/2016. Plaintiff 39;s Motion to Reconsider the Court's Order and Revisit the Plaintiff's Claims, filed March 9, 2016, is HEREBY DENIED in its entirety.In light of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration, this Court ORDERS Plaintiff to file his amen ded complaint consistent with the rulings in the 2/29/16 Order by May 18, 2016. This Court CAUTIONS Plaintiff that, if he fails to file his amended complaint by May 18, 2016, all of the claims that this Court dismissed without prejudice in the 2/29 /16 Order will be dismissed with prejudice, and this Court will direct the Clerk's Office to issue the final judgment and close the case.In other words, Plaintiff would have no remaining claims in this case. This Court also CAUTIONS Plaintif f that, as to any claim that was dismissed without prejudice in the 2/29/16 Order, if the amended complaint fails to cure the defects identified in that order, the claim may be dismissed with prejudice (eps ) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
JAMES J. NAVAJA,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
HONOLULU ACADEMY OF ARTS,
)
STEPHAN JOST DIRECTOR,
)
CHRIS ATHERALL,
)
LINDA FERRARA, JAME HUSBAND, )
)
Defendants.
)
_____________________________ )
CIVIL 15-00344 LEK-RLP
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO RECONSIDER
THE COURT’S ORDER AND REVISIT THE PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS
On February 29, 2019, this Court issued its Order
Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss Verifiable Qui Tam Complaint for Employment Fraud,
Harassment, Discrimination, Retroactive Back Pay, Fraud (“2/29/16
Order”).
[Dkt. no. 21.1]
On March 9, 2019, pro se Plaintiff
James J. Navaja (“Plaintiff”) filed a motion for reconsideration
of the 2/29/16 Order (“Motion for Reconsideration”).
23.]
[Dkt. no.
On March 28, 2016, Defendants Honolulu Academy of Arts
(“HAA”), Stephan Jost, Chris Atherall, Linda Ferrara, and
Jame Husband (“Defendants”) filed their memorandum in opposition
to the Motion for Reconsideration.
[Dkt. no. 26.]
The Court has
considered the Motion for Reconsideration as a non-hearing matter
1
The 2/29/16 Order is also available at 2016 WL 843250.
pursuant to Rule LR7.2(e) of the Local Rules of Practice of the
United States District Court for the District of Hawai`i (“Local
Rules”).
After careful consideration of the motion, supporting
and opposing documents, and the relevant legal authority,
Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is HEREBY DENIED for the
reasons set forth below.
BACKGROUND
On August 26, 2015, Plaintiff filed his “Verifiable Qui
Tam Complaint for Employment Discrimination, Harassment
Retroactive Back Pay, Fraud” (“Complaint”) against his employer,
HAA, and other HAA employees.
Plaintiff’s claims arise from: the
alleged failure to compensate him for hours that he worked; the
refusal to give him, and others, a forty-hour work week; the
denial of benefits associated with a forty-hour work week; and
the alleged failure to follow HAA policies regarding internal
complaints.
Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss Verifiable Qui
Tam Complaint for Employment Fraud, Harassment, Discrimination,
Retroactive Back Pay, Fraud (“Motion to Dismiss”) on January 12,
2016.
[Dkt. no. 18.]
In the 2/29/16 Order, this Court granted
the Motion to Dismiss in part and denied it in part, and
dismissed the Complaint in its entirety.
Court:
2
Specifically, this
-dismissed Plaintiff’s qui tam claims because Plaintiff did not
bring this action on behalf of the federal government, he
did not allege any of the acts described in 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(a)(1), and he did not follow the required procedures
for bringing a qui tam action; [2/29/16 Order at 8-10;]
-dismissed Plaintiff’s harassment/retaliation claim and his
discrimination claim because, whether he brought those
claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(“Title VII”) or Haw. Rev. Stat. Chapter 378, he was
required to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to
filing this action, and the Complaint did not allege that he
did so; [id. at 10-13;]
-dismissed Plaintiff’s claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., because they were
untimely; [id. at 13-15;]
-dismissed Count III of the Complaint because it was unclear what
claim Plaintiff was alleging in that Count; [id. at 16;]
-dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages because
punitive damages is a form of relief, not an independent
cause of action; [id. at 16-17;] and
-although the Complaint stated that this was a “civil rights
case,” [Complaint at pg. 1,] this Court stated that it did
not construe the Complaint as alleging a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claim [2/29/16 Order at 17].
The dismissal of the qui tam claims, the claim for punitive
damages, and all portions of the FLSA claim – except for the
portions regarding the denial of a forty-hour work week and
associated benefits within three years prior to August 26, 2015 –
were dismissed with prejudice.
All other portions of the
Complaint were dismissed without prejudice.
This Court gave
Plaintiff until April 12, 2016 to file an amended complaint.2
2
In light of the pending Motion for Reconsideration,
(continued...)
3
[Id. at 18.]
In the Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff argues
that this Court erred in dismissing his harassment/retaliation
claim and his discrimination claim because: the United States
Constitution does not require exhaustion of remedies; he did
exhaust his remedies under state law by filing actions in state
court; and he is bringing these claims pursuant to the Hawai`i
Whistleblowers Protection Act (“HWPA”), Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-61,
et seq.
He also argues that this Court erred in ruling that he
failed to follow the required procedures for a qui tam action
because he did so in the state court action.
As to the FLSA
claim, Plaintiff argues that it is timely because he did not
discover the basis for this claim until around April 10, 2014.
STANDARD
This Court has previously stated that a motion for
reconsideration
“must accomplish two goals. First, a motion for
reconsideration must demonstrate reasons why the
court should reconsider its prior decision.
Second, a motion for reconsideration must set
forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature
to induce the court to reverse its prior
decision.” See Davis v. Abercrombie, Civil No.
11-00144 LEK-BMK, 2014 WL 2468348, at *2 (D.
Hawaii June 2, 2014) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). This district court
2
(...continued)
Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint by the April 12, 2016
deadline.
4
recognizes three circumstances where it is proper
to grant reconsideration of an order: “(1) when
there has been an intervening change of
controlling law; (2) new evidence has come to
light; or (3) when necessary to correct a clear
error or prevent manifest injustice.” Tierney v.
Alo, Civ. No. 12-00059 SOM/KSC, 2013 WL 1858585,
at *1 (D. Hawaii May 1, 2013) (citing School
District No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262
(9th Cir. 1993)). “Mere disagreement with a
previous order is an insufficient basis for
reconsideration.” Davis, 2014 WL 2468348, at *3
n.4 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Riley v. Nat’l Ass’n of Marine Surveyors, Inc., Civil No. 1400135 LEK-RLP, 2014 WL 4794003, at *1 (D. Hawai`i Sept. 25,
2014).
DISCUSSION
I.
“Exhaustion” of the Qui tam Claims
In the 2/29/16 Order, this Court noted that “Plaintiff
did not follow the procedures for qui tam actions set forth in
[31 U.S.C.] § 3730(b).”
[2/29/216 Order at 9.]
Plaintiff argues
that this “decision on exhaust should be vacated” because he
filed a qui tam action in state court, Navaja v. Honolulu Academy
of Arts, et al., Civil No. 14-1-1773-08 GWBC, but his motion to
seal the case was denied.
[Motion for Reconsideration at 2.]
However, the fact that Plaintiff filed another qui tam action in
state court does not prove that he satisfied the § 3730(b)(2)
requirements for the qui tam action currently before this Court.
5
In addition to the failure to follow the § 3730(b)(2)
procedures, this Court dismissed Plaintiff’s qui tam claims
because he did bring the Complaint on behalf of the federal
government, and because the Complaint does not allege fraud
against the federal government, as described in § 3729(a)(1).
[2/29/16 Order at 9.]
The Motion for Reconsideration does not
address those grounds for the dismissal of the qui tam claims.
This Court FINDS that Plaintiff has not presented any
change in the controlling law or newly discovered evidence since
this Court issued the 2/29/16 Order, nor has he established that
this Court committed a clear error when it dismissed his qui tam
claims with prejudice.
This Court therefore CONCLUDES that
Plaintiff is not entitled to reconsideration of the 2/29/16 Order
as to the dismissal of his qui tam claims.
II.
Exhaustion of Plaintiff’s Discrimination,
Harassment, and Retaliation Claims
This Court recognized in the 2/29/16 Order that it was
unclear what legal authority Plaintiff brought his
harassment/retaliation claim and his discrimination claim under.
[2/29/16 Order at 10.]
This Court construed those claims as
claims pursuant to Title VII and Chapter 378.
To the extent that
Plaintiff intended to allege claims pursuant to the HWPA, this
Court could not determine Plaintiff’s intent from the Complaint.
This Court therefore does not construe the Complaint as alleging
6
any HWPA claims, and this Court will not address the issue of
exhaustion as to any HWPA claims.
If Plaintiff wishes to allege
HWPA claims, he should expressly state those claims in his
amended complaint.
Both Title VII and Chapter 378 contain requirements
that a plaintiff exhaust his administrative remedies before
filing a claim in court.
See 2/29/16 Order at 11-12 (discussing
relevant case law and statutes).
In order to obtain relief under
either Title VII or Chapter 378, Plaintiff must comply with those
requirements.
The fact that the United States Constitution does
not contain an exhaustion requirement does not invalidate the
exhaustion requirements in Title VII and Chapter 378.3
Further,
the fact that Plaintiff filed discrimination, harassment, and
retaliation claims in state court before filing this action is
not a substitute for the filing of a timely charge of
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) or the Hawai`i Civil Rights Commission (“HCRC”).
See,
e.g., Vasquez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir.
3
Plaintiff states he “has a right under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s equal protection and the right to sue under the First
and Seventh amendment to sue under the constitution.” [Motion
for Reconsideration at 1.] This Court recognized that Plaintiff
may have been attempting to allege claims for constitutional
violations pursuant to § 1983, but this Court could not construe
the Complaint as alleging a § 1983 claim. [2/29/16 Order at 17.]
If Plaintiff wishes to allege a § 1983 claim, he should expressly
state that claim in his amended complaint.
7
2003) (“To establish subject matter jurisdiction over his Title
VII retaliation claim, [the plaintiff] must have exhausted his
administrative remedies by filing a timely charge with the
EEOC.”).
This Court FINDS that Plaintiff has not presented any
change in the controlling law or newly discovered evidence since
this Court issued the 2/29/16 Order, nor has he established that
this Court committed a clear error when it dismissed his
discrimination, harassment, and retaliation claims.
This Court
therefore CONCLUDES that Plaintiff is not entitled to
reconsideration of the 2/29/16 Order as to the dismissal of his
discrimination, harassment, and retaliation claims.
III. FLSA Claims
This Court stated that Plaintiff’s FLSA claims are
based on the following factual allegations: the failure to pay
him for certain hours worked in June and August 2006; the failure
to implement a forty-hour work week for all employees in the HAA
security department from July 15, 2005 to May 1, 2013; and the
denial of benefits associated with a forty-hour work week.
[2/29/16 Order at 14.]
Plaintiff argues that his FLSA claims
were timely because they did not accrue until he discovered them
around April 10, 2014.
Plaintiff is incorrect.
[Motion for Reconsideration at 2.]
The Ninth Circuit has stated that a new
FLSA claim “accrues at each payday immediately following the work
8
period for which compensation is owed.”
Dent v. Cox Commc’ns Las
Vegas, Inc., 502 F.3d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 2007).
This Court FINDS that Plaintiff has not presented any
change in the controlling law or newly discovered evidence since
this Court issued the 2/29/16 Order, nor has he established that
this Court committed a clear error when it dismissed his FLSA
claims.
This Court therefore CONCLUDES that Plaintiff is not
entitled to reconsideration of the 2/29/16 Order as to the
dismissal of his FLSA claims.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion to
Reconsider the Court’s Order and Revisit the Plaintiff’s Claims,
filed March 9, 2016, is HEREBY DENIED in its entirety.
In light of the denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration, this Court ORDERS Plaintiff to file his amended
complaint – consistent with the rulings in the 2/29/16 Order – by
May 18, 2016.
This Court CAUTIONS Plaintiff that, if he fails to
file his amended complaint by May 18, 2016, all of the claims
that this Court dismissed without prejudice in the 2/29/16 Order
will be dismissed with prejudice, and this Court will direct the
Clerk’s Office to issue the final judgment and close the case.
In other words, Plaintiff would have no remaining claims in this
case.
This Court also CAUTIONS Plaintiff that, as to any claim
9
that was dismissed without prejudice in the 2/29/16 Order, if the
amended complaint fails to cure the defects identified in that
order, the claim may be dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, April 18, 2016.
/s/ Leslie E. Kobayashi
Leslie E. Kobayashi
United States District Judge
JAMES J. NAVAJA VS. HONOLULU ACADEMY OF ARTS, ET AL; CIVIL 1500344 LEK-RLP; ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE
COURT’S ORDER AND REVISIT THE PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS
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