Roberts v. City and County of Honolulu

Filing 42

ORDER DISMISSING THE ACTION AND SUBMITTING COMMENTS - Signed by JUDGE ALAN C. KAY on 1/15/2020. (jo)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
___________________________________
)
ANDREW NAMIKI ROBERTS,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
) Civ. No. 15-00467 ACK-RLP
)
CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU;
)
)
Defendant.
)
___________________________________)
ORDER DISMISSING THE ACTION AND SUBMITTING COMMENTS
The Court enters this order dismissing the action, to
clarify the apparent confusion in the record, and to submit
comments on the established role of magistrate judges in the
determination of attorney’s fees for prevailing parties. 1/
The Court feels it necessary to submit the following
comments solely to emphasize the important role of magistrate

1/

On September 12, 2019 the Ninth Circuit panel, after
hearing arguments on October 9, 2018, vacated this Court’s order
in Roberts v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, Civ. No. 15-00467 ACKRLP, 2016 WL 3136856 (D. Haw. June 3, 2016) (the “2016 Order”),
inter alia, approving the magistrate judge’s recommendation
setting Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees hourly rates and “remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.” On
December 20, 2019, Defendant-Appellee, City and County of
Honolulu (“Defendant City”), filed with the Ninth Circuit a
Status Report stating that on December 6, 2019, Defendant City
had filed with the Ninth Circuit a Stipulated Motion to
Voluntarily Dismiss Appeal (Docket No. 42) pursuant to FRAP
42(b); although Defendant City had subsequently on December 20,
2019, after receiving inquiries from the District Court’s Clerk,
transmitted a Stipulated Dismissal (which reflected it had been
signed by Plaintiff’s attorneys on December 5, 2019, and by
(Continued . . .)
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judges in establishing a prevailing hourly rate in attorney’s
fees disputes.

The Court notes that the Ninth Circuit panel in

this case apparently misread the Court’s decision which relied
essentially on the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion of the hourly
rates for the Plaintiff’s attorneys.
The Ninth Circuit has earlier acknowledged and
approved of the significant role that judges perform in the
determination of prevailing hourly rates for attorneys given
their extensive knowledge of the rates in the subject community
based on their constant experience in handling such attorney’s
fees requests.
In Ingram v. Oroudjian, 647 F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 2011)
the court held “[t]his court has never addressed whether it is

Defendant’s attorneys on December 4, 2019) to the District Court
requesting “that all claims be dismissed with prejudice” and
that “as a result of this Stipulated Dismissal, this action is
concluded in totem.” The Status Report concluded that the
parties nevertheless were “awaiting this Court’s ruling on the
previously filed Stipulated Motion to Dismiss Appeal.”
Notwithstanding the foregoing and that the case on September 17,
2019 had been remanded to this Court, the Ninth Circuit panel
then on December 22, 2019, filed an order dismissing the appeal
with prejudice.
To avoid any confusion, the Court files this order,
together with the Stipulated Dismissal signed by the parties
submitted to the Court on December 20, 2019, and approved by
this Court, together with this Court’s comments on the role of
magistrate judges. This Court has not addressed the
appropriateness of the settlement since the Ninth Circuit panel
approved the parties’ settlement and the parties are thoroughly
familiar with the record and have negotiated a settlement based
on their own respective determinations.
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proper for a district court to rely on its own familiarity with
the legal market.

Other circuit courts have held that judges

are justified in relying on their own knowledge of customary
rates and their experience concerning reasonable and proper
fees” and “[w]e agree.

We conclude that the district court did

not abuse its discretion either by relying, in part, on its own
knowledge and experience, or by setting an hourly rate of $350
for Appellants’ lawyers.”

Id. at 928.

In Sam K. ex rel. Diane C. v. Hawaii Department of
Education, 788 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2015), the court held, in
affirming this Court’s decision determining attorney’s fees,
“[d]istrict courts may also use their ‘own knowledge of
customary rates and their experience concerning reasonable and
proper fees.’”

Id. at 1041 (citing Ingram, 647 F.3d at 928).

Notably, the Ninth Circuit in Sam K. favorably cited a D.C.
Circuit decision where the district court accepted the
recommendation of “the magistrate judge [who] noted the court’s
familiarity with the prevailing rates in the community and cited
specific fee awards in other cases in the district.”
1041 (emphasis added).
case.

Id. at

That is exactly what occurred in this

In concurring in part, the judge who authored the Roberts

decision stated “I agree with the majority that the district
court acted within its discretion in determining a reasonable

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hourly rate for the calculation of attorney’s fees in this
case.”

Id. at 1042.
However, the Roberts decision, while mentioning in

passing that the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s
recommendation that Holcomb and Beck (the attorneys seeking fees
here) receive hourly rates of $200 and $150, respectively, 938
F.3d at 1023, is thereafter devoid of any discussion or
acknowledgement that it is appropriate for a district judge to
rely extensively on a magistrate judge’s knowledge and
experience in establishing prevailing hourly rates for attorneys
in their community.

Instead, the panel found “the district

court’s wholesale rejection of the relevant attorney
declarations submitted by plaintiffs and the court’s singular
reliance on the hourly rates previously awarded to plaintiffs in
unrelated cases departed from the correct legal standard.”
Roberts v. City of Honolulu, 938 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 2019)
(emphasis added).

Accordingly, the panel left the impression

that a district court is not authorized to place reliance on the
magistrate judge’s determination of the appropriate prevailing
hourly rate based on its own knowledge and experience in
constantly handling attorney’s fees requests.

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And as a result,

the panel likewise concluded that this Court had not applied the
correct legal standard.
As noted, this Court in its 2016 Order adopted the
Magistrate Judge’s determination of the appropriate hourly rates
(“The Court therefore ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation that Mr. Holcomb receive an hourly rate of
$200.00, and that Mr. Beck receive an hourly rate of $150.00,”
2016 Order at *7).

This Court further specified, in adopting

the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, that the Magistrate Judge
declared he had “. . . tak[en] into consideration ‘the Court’s
experience with attorneys’ fee motions, the information provided
by counsel, and the Court’s knowledge of the prevailing rates in
the community,’” and accordingly, based on that experience and
knowledge of prevailing rates, “the Magistrate Judge reduced
counsel’s rates to $200.00 for Mr. Holcomb and $150.00 for Mr.
Beck.”

2016 Order at *5 (emphasis added).

Mr. Holcomb is an

attorney with eleven years of experience, and Mr. Beck is an
attorney with seven years of experience.

2016 Order at *4.

The Court notes that in the District of Hawaii most
motions for attorney’s fees are handled by the magistrate
judges.

LR54.2.

Consequently, they have more involved

experience and knowledge of the reasonable prevailing attorney’s
fee rates in Hawaii than the District Judges because they handle
virtually all of the motions for attorney’s fees-including the
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vast majority for which there are no objections filed to the
magistrate judge’s reasonable attorney’s fees determination.
The Magistrate Judge, in his Findings and
Recommendations dated March 24, 2016, also noted pertinent
attorney fees awarded to Plaintiff’s attorneys as well as other
attorneys in other civil rights cases all within the previous
two years, namely:

De-Occupy Honolulu v. City & Cty. of

Honolulu, Civ. No. 12-00668 JMS, 2015 WL 1013834 (D. Haw. Mar.
9, 2015) (awarding Plaintiff’s attorney Mr. Holcomb $200 per
hour and awarding $185 per hour to an attorney with nine years
of experience); York v. Jordan, Civ. No. 13-00311 DKW-RLP, 2015
WL 728227 (D. Haw. Jan. 30, 2015) (awarding $200 per hour to an
attorney with fifteen years of experience and $140 per hour to
an attorney with six years of experience); Hawaii Def. Found. v.
City & Cty. of Honolulu, Civ. No. 12-00469 JMS, 2014 WL 2804448
(D. Haw. June 19, 2014) (awarding Plaintiff’s attorneys Mr.
Holcomb $200 per hour and Mr. Beck $150 per hour).
This Court noted that “Plaintiff asserts that the[]
declarations show that the rates requested for Mr. Holcomb and
Mr. Beck are lower than the rates counsel with similar years of
experience charge clients, and that the requested rates are
therefore reasonable.

[citation.]

Addressing this argument,

the Magistrate Judge noted that ‘the fees stated in the
attorneys’ declarations vary significantly without
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explanation.’”

2016 Order at *5.

And no adequate explanation

of the variation was provided to this Court.

This Court further

stated it was not persuaded by Plaintiff’s submission of the
Laffey matrix, a grid of inflation-adjusted hourly rates for
attorneys in the Washington, D.C. area.

2016 Order at *6;

see Haw. Def. Found., 2014 WL 2804448, at *3 (citing Laffey v.
Nw. Airlines, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1983)).
Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the Court found,
“There is no evidence that rates awarded by this district have
remained unchanged for anywhere near the past ten years, a
practice that occurred in Sacramento about which the Ninth
Circuit expressed concern in Moreno.

[citation.]

This district

awarded Mr. Beck an hourly rate of $150.00 as recently as
2014, see Hawaii Defense Foundation, 2014 WL 2804448, at *5, and
awarded Mr. Holcomb an hourly rate of $200.00 just last
year, see De-Occupy Honolulu, 2015 WL 1013834, at *11.

The

Court feels such rates continue to ensure that future counsel
will be attracted to civil rights cases such as this one.”

2016

Order at *7.
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit in Sam K. found no evidence
that this Court “followed a policy to ‘hold the line’” to limit
the awards to an unfair rate.

Sam K., 788 F.3d at 1041.

The

Ninth Circuit noted “[t]hat other attorneys may think that a
given rate is ‘reasonable’ does not necessarily say what the
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prevailing market rates actually are.

That is especially true

when the opinion[s] are expressed by attorneys whose own
professional interests might motivate them to favor higher
rates.”

Sam K., 788 F.3d at 1041.

The Ninth Circuit panel

further proclaimed, “It was telling, however, that none of the
declarations stated that any of the attorneys had actually been
paid fees at that $375 rate for work of this type, or that any
attorney of similar training and experience had.”

Id.

Likewise, in this case none of the submitted declarations
represented the subject attorneys had been paid at such rates or
that such rates had been approved by the Hawaii Federal District
Courts or otherwise met the criteria specified by the Sam K.
decision.
This Court further found that the issues presented in
this case were neither novel nor complex, with the case being
settled (with the exception of attorney’s fees) after Plaintiff
filed only one pleading, the complaint.

2016 Order at *6.

The

Court ended its five-page analysis of the hourly rates requested
by plaintiff’s attorneys with the following finding in adopting
the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation: “For all of the foregoing
reasons, the Court finds that the hourly rates requested for Mr.
Holcomb and Mr. Beck are unreasonable, and that the Magistrate
Judge recommended reasonable rates given counsels' experience,

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skill, and reputation, as well as the prevailing rates in the
community.”

2016 Order at *7.

In conclusion, it should be reiterated that, as
approved in Ingram and Sam K., the Ninth Circuit has recognized
that judges, including magistrate judges, may rely on their own
knowledge of customary rates and their experience concerning
reasonable and proper fees.
This Action is Dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

Honolulu, Hawai`i, January 15, 2020.

________________________________
Alan C. Kay
Sr. United States District Judge

Roberts v. City and County of Honolulu, Civ. No. 15-00467 ACK-RLP, Order
Dismissing the Action and Submitting Comments.

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