Resorts World at Sentosa Pte Ltd. v. Chan
Filing
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ORDER (1) DENYING DEFENDANT'S 10 MOTION TO DISMISS AND (2) DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 16 MOTION TO STRIKE AS MOOT. Signed by JUDGE DERRICK K. WATSON on 4/18/2016. --Because the Court has personal jurisdiction over Chan with respect to each claim in the Complaint, and because service of process in both Singapore and Hawai'i was sufficient, Chan's motion to dismiss is DENIED. RWS's motion to strike is DENIED AS MOOT. (ecs, )< center>CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAI`I
RESORTS WORLD AT SENTOSA
PTE LTD.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CV. NO. 15-00499 DKW-KJM
ORDER (1) DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS AND (2) DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
STRIKE AS MOOT
MICHELLE MAI CHAN,
Defendant.
ORDER (1) DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND
(2) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE AS MOOT
This case concerns the recognition and enforcement of a Singapore
Judgment in favor of Plaintiff Resorts World At Sentosa Pte Ltd. (“RWS”) against
Defendant Michelle Mai Chan. Before the Court is Chan’s Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Insufficient Service of Process (Dkt. No. 10),
and RWS’s Motion to Strike New Argument (Dkt. No. 16). Because the Court
finds both that service was proper and that it has personal jurisdiction over Chan,
Chan’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. RWS’s Motion to Strike is DENIED AS
MOOT.
BACKGROUND
I.
Singapore Judgment
In 2014, RWS sued Chan in the High Court of the Republic of Singapore to
collect on a debt that Chan owed RWS. See Complaint; Ex.1 (Judgment).
On May 13, 2015, the High Court of the Republic of Singapore entered
Judgment in favor of RWS against Chan. Complaint ¶ 5. The Judgment was for
the principal amount of $1,168,450.00 in Singapore dollars, or $882,644.79 in
United States dollars, plus interest and costs. Id.
II.
The Instant Case
On December 3, 2015, RWS filed its Complaint seeking recognition of the
Singapore Judgment as a foreign-country judgment under 658F-6 of the Hawaiʻi
Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act (“HUFCMJRA”),
Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 658F-1. et seq. RWS alleges that “Defendant is a United States
citizen, U.S. Passport No. [redacted], a citizen of the State of Hawaiʻi, and a
resident of the County of Honolulu.” Complaint ¶ 2. RWS also alleges that the
Singapore Judgment is final and conclusive between RWS and Chan, and was
rendered under a system that provides impartial tribunals or procedures compatible
with the requirements of due process of law. Complaint ¶¶ 7, 10. RWS further
claims that the High Court of the Republic of Singapore had personal jurisdiction
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over the Defendant, and had subject matter jurisdiction over the matter resulting in
the Singapore Judgment. Complaint ¶¶ 12, 13.
On January 19, 2016, Chan filed the instant motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction and for insufficient service of process. See Dkt. No. 10.
Chan argues that, on the face of the Complaint, RWS has not shown that the
Singapore court established personal jurisdiction over Chan by means of effective
service of process there, which she argues is a necessary prerequisite to
establishing the validity of the Singapore judgment. Mem. in Supp. at 1-2. In
addition, Chan argues that this Court lacks general and specific jurisdiction over
her because the underlying controversy in Singapore has no connection to Hawaiʻi,
and because Chan is not a resident of Hawaiʻi. Id. at 7-8. Finally, Chan argues
that RWS failed to satisfy any of the bases for service of process set forth in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e). Id. at 9-11.
RWS argues that the HUFCMJRA places the burden of proving nonrecognition of the Singapore judgment upon Chan, and Chan failed to prove any
basis for non-recognition of the Singapore Judgment. Opposition at 14-20. RWS
also argues that both the Singapore Court and this Court have jurisdiction over this
recognition action. Opposition at 20-33. RWS also argues that it substantially
complied with the service of process requirements of Rule 4. Opposition at 33-42.
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In her reply, Chan argues that, because the Complaint is based on diversity
of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), this Court lacks jurisdiction, as Chan
is a citizen of Vietnam and a resident of China. Reply at 3-4. Chan also argues
this Court lacks in rem jurisdiction over Chan’s property, as alleged in RWS’s
Opposition. Id. at 5-6.
III.
RWS’s Motion to Strike New Argument
On March 1, 2016, RWS filed a Motion to Strike New Argument. Dkt. No.
16 (“Mtn. to Strike”). RWS asks the Court to strike Chan’s argument regarding
the lack of subject matter jurisdiction raised for the first time in the reply, pursuant
to Local Rule 7.4. Mtn. to Strike at 1-4. Chan argues that she did not address any
arguments other than those in RWS’s Opposition. Opp. Mtn. to Strike at 4. RWS
argues that Chan’s subject matter jurisdiction argument does not trump Local Rule
7.4 preventing parties from raising an issue for the first time in a reply brief. RWS
Reply Mem. at 4-5. RWS also argues that Chan’s factual attack on subject matter
jurisdiction is unsustainable. RWS Reply Mem. at 5-8. Alternatively, RWS seeks
leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery to confirm this Court’s subject matter
jurisdiction. RWS Reply Mem. at 8-10.
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STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.
Personal Jurisdiction
A plaintiff has the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over a
defendant. Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1995); Flynt
Distrib. Co. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1392 (9th Cir. 1984). When a motion to
dismiss is brought prior to discovery, a plaintiff is required “only to make a prima
facie showing” of jurisdiction. Kowalski v. Integral Seafood LLC, 2007 WL
1376378, at *2 (D. Haw. May 4, 2007). “In determining whether a plaintiff has
made a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts, the court must accept
uncontroverted allegations in a complaint as true, even if unsupported by any
evidence in the record before the court.” Resnick v. Rowe, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1128,
1132 (D. Haw. 2003). “If the defendant presents evidence to contradict the
allegations in the complaint, the plaintiff must go beyond the pleadings and present
affirmative proof of personal jurisdiction through affidavits and declarations.
Conflicts between the parties’ affidavits and other discovery materials must be
resolved in favor of the plaintiff for purposes of deciding whether a prima facie
case for personal jurisdiction exists.” Id. (citations omitted).
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II.
Service of Process
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) allows a defendant to move for
dismissal for insufficient service of process. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5). “The
burden is on the party claiming proper service to establish valid service.”
Taniguchi v. Native Hawaiian Office of Atty. Gen., 2009 WL 1404731, at *2 (D.
Haw. May 15, 2009).
III.
RWS’s Motion to Strike New Argument
RWS brings its Motion under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(f). Under Rule
12(f) , a court has discretion to strike “an insufficient defense or any redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “The
function of a Rule 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and
money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those
issues prior to trial.” Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sumo-Nan LLC, 2015 WL2449480,
at *3 (D. Haw. May 20, 2015) (internal citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
The Court addresses Chan’s arguments regarding personal jurisdiction,
service of process, and the validity of the Singapore Judgment.
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I.
Personal Jurisdiction
Chan contends that this Court lacks general and specific jurisdiction over
her. “A court may exercise general jurisdiction over a defendant when the
defendant is a resident or domiciliary of the forum state, or the defendant’s
contacts with the forum state are continuous, systematic, and substantial.” Resnick
v. Rowe, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1135 (D. Haw. 2003) (citing Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16 (1984)).
On the face of its Complaint, RWS makes a prima facie showing of
jurisdiction over Chan. Specifically, RWS alleges that “[t]he Defendant is a
United States citizen, U.S. Passport No. [redacted], a citizen of the State of
Hawaiʻi, and a resident of the County of Honolulu.” Complaint ¶ 2.
In the Motion to Dismiss, Chan argues that her nationality is Vietnamese and
her residence is in Macau, China. Mem. in Supp. at 8. Chan presented evidence to
contradict RWS’s allegations in the form of declarations by individuals living at
the Waianae home that Chan owns who deny that Chan lives or lived at that
address, or that she is a Hawaii resident at all. See Declaration of Bienvenido
Domingo, Jr. (“BDJ Declaration”) at ¶¶ 10-11; Declaration of Bienvenido C.
Domingo (“BCD Declaration”) at ¶¶ 7-8.
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In response, RWS presented sworn evidence of this Court’s personal
jurisdiction over Chan. RWS presented the declaration of Anthony Shannon, a
civil process server for the State of Hawaii. See Declaration of Anthony Shannon.
Shannon declared that when attempting to serve Chan with the Summons and
Complaint at Chan’s home on Oheohe Street in Waianae, a man answered and
identified himself as Ben Domingo. Shannon Declaration ¶ 5. When Shannon
asked Mr. Domingo if he knew Michelle Chan, Mr. Domingo replied yes, and
stated that Michelle Chan was his girlfriend. Id. ¶ 6. Mr. Domingo also stated that
Chan lived with him at that residence in Waianae. Id. ¶ 7. Mr. Domingo then
signed the Proof of Service form to acknowledge service, which Shannon
submitted to the Court. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. RWS also presented a deed showing that Chan
purchased and currently owns the house located on Oheohe Street, Waianae,
Hawaiʻi 96792. See RWS Mem. in Opposition, Ex. 8 (Deed).
RWS has presented affirmative proof of this Court’s jurisdiction over Chan.
Mr. Domingo’s first representations to process server Anthony Shannon, without
any knowledge of this case or any reason to misrepresent the truth, demonstrate
that Chan resides at the home she owns in Waianae. Furthermore, while property
ownership alone is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction, profit-making
ventures, such as the leasing of property to renters, can satisfy personal jurisdiction
requirements. See Bruggeman v. Meditrust Acquisition Co., 138 N.C. App. 612,
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618 (2000) (holding that leasing of property satisfies requirements of general
jurisdiction by their “continuous and systematic” nature). Here, Bienvenido C.
Domingo swore he has lived at Chan’s house since 2008. BCD Declaration ¶ 4.
Whether or not he pays rent, Chan has legal duties to Domingo, who does not
himself appear on the property’s deed. See RWS Mem. in Opposition, Ex. 8
(Deed).
Because the Court has personal jurisdiction over Chan, the motion is denied
on this basis.1
II.
Service of Process
Chan also argues the Court lacks personal jurisdiction based on RWS’s
failure to sufficiently serve the Complaint and Summons under Rule 4(e). The
burden is on RWS, the party claiming proper service, to establish as much.
Taniguchi v. Native Hawaiian Office of Atty. Gen., 2009 WL 1404731, at *2 (D.
Haw. May 15, 2009). A signed return of service constitutes prima facie evidence
of valid service, which can be overcome only by strong and convincing evidence.
S.E.C. v. Internet Sols. for Bus. Inc., 509 F.3d 1161, 1166 (9th Cir. 2007).
Here, Chan presented evidence in the form of declarations of the two men
living at the Oheohe Street residence. Bienvenido Domingo Jr. declared that on
To the extent RWS argues that personal jurisdiction over Chan is not required because the
instant case is an enforcement action under the HUFCMJRA, this Court does not reach the issue,
having already found personal jurisdiction over Chan due to her contacts with Hawaiʻi.
1
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December 15, 2015, a process server served the Complaint and Summons at the
residence. BDJ Declaration ¶ 5. Mr. Domingo was asked if he knows Defendant
and responded affirmatively. Id. ¶ 6. Mr. Domingo declared that he is not Chan’s
agent or authorized in any way to sign papers on Chan’s behalf. Id. at ¶ 9; BCD
Declaration ¶ 6. Mr. Domingo also declared that he did not understand that the
papers he was given were for a lawsuit. BDJ Declaration ¶ 8.
Bienvenido C. Domingo also lives at the Oheohe Street residence. BCD
Declaration at ¶ 4. Like his father, Bienvenido C. Domingo declared that he is not
an agent for Chan and does not have any authority to accept or sign documents on
her behalf. Id. ¶ 5. Both Domingos asserted that Chan does not, and has never
lived at, the Oheohe Street residence, and to the best of their knowledge, Chan has
never been a resident of the State of Hawai’i at all. BDJ Declaration ¶¶ 10-11;
BCD Declaration ¶¶ 7-8.
In response, RWS submitted the Declaration of Anthony Shannon, the civil
process server who served the Complaint and Summons and submitted a Proof of
Service, in which he attested to serving Chan by leaving a copy of the Summons
and Complaint at Chan’s house with a person of majority age. See Shannon Decl.
¶¶ 3-8. The Proof of Service states that the Complaint and Summons were left at
Chan’s house with “Ben Domingo,” a resident there. Id. Ben Domingo wrote his
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name and “authorize[d] to accept” on the Proof of Service, and signed and dated
the form. Id.
Here, RWS’s signed return of service satisfies its prima facie obligations.
Although Chan has submitted some evidence, in an attempt to rebut RWS’s prima
facie showing, that evidence is neither strong nor convincing. Indeed, some of the
declarative statements made by the Domingos are suspect, directly contradicting
the impromptu statements they made to the process server before having been
informed of this lawsuit and prior to being contacted by counsel. Other statements
are made without any foundation or indication of their basis. The Court therefore
finds that service upon Chan was valid and sufficient, and the motion to the
contrary is denied.
III.
Validity of the Singapore Judgment
Chan argues that neither the underlying Singapore Judgment nor the
Complaint in this case establish that Chan had been properly served and had a
meaningful opportunity to appear before the Singapore court. Mem. in Supp. at 3.
The HUFCMJRA provides that “[a] court of this State need not recognize a
foreign-country judgment if . . . [t]he defendant in the proceeding in the foreign
court did not receive notice of the proceeding in sufficient time to enable the
defendant to defend . . . .” Haw. Rev. Stat. § 658F-4(c)(1).
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Here, RWS has provided ample evidence demonstrating that Chan was
sufficiently served with process with respect to the Singapore proceedings before
entry of the Judgment. RWS showed that personal service was attempted twice at
Chan’s Hong Kong address, by publication in two daily Hong Kong newspapers,
any by mailing copies of the Writ of Summons, the Statement of Claim, and the
Order of Substituted Service to Chan at her Hong Kong address, all with the
approval of and supervision by the Singapore court. Declaration of Shankar s/o
Angammah Sevasamy ¶¶ 4, 5, 7, 10-11; see also Affidavit of Mak Yan Yan
Winnie; Affirmation of Chan Chi Keung. She fails to muster any rebuttal to this
substantial showing by RWS, suggesting that this contention is no longer being
advanced.
Chan received notice of the Singapore action, which allowed her more than
sufficient time to defend before the Singapore Court. Accordingly, Chan’s Motion
to Dismiss on this ground is DENIED.
IV.
RWS’s Motion to Strike
RWS contends that Chan improperly raised the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction for the first time in her Reply Memorandum, which RWS argues
should therefore be stricken.
There is no merit, however, to an alleged lack of subject matter jurisdiction
based on diversity. As noted above, Chan’s passport and the deed for her solely12
owned home in Hawaiʻi affirmatively establish that she is a United States citizen
with her residence in Hawaiʻi, thereby demonstrating citizenship diverse from
RWS, a Singapore corporation. In the face of this evidence, Chan has submitted
nothing but unsupported argument. Accordingly, RWS’s Motion to Strike New
Argument is DENIED AS MOOT.
CONCLUSION
Because the Court has personal jurisdiction over Chan with respect to each
claim in the Complaint, and because service of process in both Singapore and
Hawaiʻi was sufficient, Chan’s motion to dismiss is DENIED. RWS’s motion to
strike is DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 18, 2016 at Honolulu, Hawai‘i.
Resorts World at Sentosa Pte Ltd. v. Chan; CV 15-00499 DKW-KJM; ORDER (1)
DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND (2) DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE AS MOOT
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