Hyland v. County of Hawaii et al

Filing 80

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS SUIT WITHOUT PREJUDICE re 74 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI on 09/30/2016. -- Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Suit Without Prejudice, filed August 15, 2016, is HEREBY GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff's Motion is GRANTED insofar as the Representative Claims and Plaintiff's Lease Termination Claim are HEREBY DISMISSED WITHOUT PRE JUDICE to the re-filing of those claims in a new case. Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED insofar as all of the other claims which remained at issue in this case after this Courts March 16, 2016 order are HEREBY DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. There being no remaining claims in this case, this Court DIRECTS the Clerk's Office to enter final judgment and close the case on October 21, 2016, unless any party files a motion for reconsideration of the instant Order by October 17,2016. (eps, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications served by first class mail on October 3, 2016

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
LANRIC HYLAND,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
OFFICE OF HOUSING & COMMUNITY )
DEVELOPMENT, ET AL.,
)
)
)
Defendants.
_____________________________ )

CIVIL 15-00504 LEK-RLP

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DISMISS SUIT WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Lanric Hyland’s
(“Plaintiff”) Motion to Dismiss Suit Without Prejudice
(“Motion”), filed on August 15, 2016.

[Dkt. no. 74.]

On

August 17, 2016, this Court issued an entering order informing
the parties that it was inclined to grant Plaintiff’s Motion and
to dismiss the case without prejudice, with each party to bear
its own fees and costs (“Inclination”).

[Dkt. no. 75.]

Defendant Hawaii Affordable Properties, Inc. (“HAPI”)
and Defendant Ainakea Senior Residences LLLP (“Ainakea”) filed
their respective objections to the Inclination on August 18, 2016
and August 29, 2016.1

[Dkt. nos. 76, 77.]

The Court finds this

matter suitable for disposition without a hearing pursuant to
1

Defendants Office of Housing & Community Development and
the County of Hawaii (“the County Defendants”) did not file a
response to the Inclination. This Court will refer to the County
Defendants, HAPI, and Ainakea collectively as “Defendants.”

Rule LR7.2(d) of the Local Rules of Practice of the United States
District Court for the District of Hawai`i (“Local Rules”).
After careful consideration of the Motion, supporting and
opposing documents, and the relevant legal authority, Plaintiff’s
Motion is HEREBY GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART for the
reasons set forth below.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff originally filed his “Verified Complaint of
Lanric Hyland; Complaint for Complaint for [sic] Declaratory &
Injunctive Relief; Appeal from Declaratory Petition”
(“Complaint”) in state court on August 11, 2015, and the County
Defendants removed it to this district court.

[Notice of

Removal, filed 12/9/15 (dkt. no. 1), Decl. of Melody Parker,
Exh. A.]

The factual and procedural background of this case is

set forth in this Court’s March 16, 2016 Order Granting in Part
and Denying in Part Defendants Office of Housing & Community
Development, County of Hawaii’s Motion to Dismiss; and Granting
in Part and Denying in Part Defendant Hawaii Affordable
Properties, Inc.’s Substantive Joinder (“3/16/16 Order”).
no. 47.]

[Dkt.

In the Complaint, Plaintiff attempted to bring various

claims – on his own behalf and on behalf of others — arising from
events at Ainakea Senior Residences (“ASR”), the low income
housing project where he resides.

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In the 3/16/16 Order, this Court dismissed the
Complaint in its entirety, with limited leave to amend.
Specifically, this Court dismissed the following claims with
prejudice: Plaintiff’s claims against HAPI related to the
increase in the ASR contract rent, the security deposit, and
Plaintiff’s portion of the rent; and the portion of the claims
that Plaintiff was attempting to bring on behalf of other current
and former ASR tenants (“Representative Claims”) against HAPI
regarding the increases in the contract rent, security deposits,
and the tenants’ portions of the rent.

This Court dismissed the

following claims without prejudice: Plaintiff’s claims against
the County Defendants and Ainakea challenging the increases in
the contract rent and the security deposit; Plaintiff’s claims
against all Defendants regarding lease termination; and
Plaintiff’s equal protection claim against all Defendants.

This

Court also dismissed all other portions of the Representative
Claims without prejudice, stating that it would not address the
merits of those claims unless Plaintiff retained counsel.
[3/16/16 Order at 21-23.]

In addition, this Court noted that,

although Plaintiff apparently intended to do so, the Complaint
did not actually allege claims against the County Defendants and
Ainakea challenging the increase in his portion of the rent.
However, this Court granted Plaintiff leave to include such
[Id. at 21-22.]

claims in his amended complaint.
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The 3/16/16 Order directed Plaintiff to file a motion
seeking leave to file an amended complaint by May 2, 2016.
at 24.]

[Id.

On May 2, 2016, Plaintiff filed a document titled “First

Amended Complaint,” [dkt. no. 54,] which the magistrate judge
construed as a motion for leave to file an amended complaint
(“Motion for Leave”).

[Dkt. no. 56.]

On June 9, 2016, the

magistrate judge issued the Order Granting in Part and Denying in
Part Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint
(“6/9/16 Order”).

[Dkt. no. 63.]

The magistrate judge construed the Motion for Leave as
raising five “areas of concern” and three claims asserting
constitutional violations.

[6/9/16 Order at 5.]

The five areas

of concern were: “security deposits, tenant grievances, tenant
organizations, redetermination of contract rent, and termination
of tenancy.”

[Id. (citing Motion for Leave at ¶¶ 20, 49-78).]

The three claims were:
(1) denial of due process because his lease could
be terminated for a rule violation without due
process; (2) denial of equal protection because he
is treated differently than the tenants at other
senior housing projects; (3) denial of assembly
and association because he is not allowed to form
a tenants organization.
[Id. (citing Motion for Leave at ¶¶ 102-12).]

Plaintiff again

attempted to allege the Representative Claims based on alleged
injuries to other tenants.

The magistrate judge denied the

Motion for Leave as to those claims, concluding that they were
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futile because Plaintiff was still pro se.

[Id. at 6-7.]

The magistrate judge denied the Motion for Leave as to
all of the proposed claims regarding security deposits: the claim
arising from the increase in the amount of the 2015-2016 security
deposit; the claim that the manner in which the security deposit
was determined violated Hawaii’s Residential Landlord-Tenant
Code; the equal protection claim regarding the determination; and
the claim alleging that the determination violated the United
States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”)
regulations.

[Id. at 7-12.]

The magistrate judge also denied

the Motion for Leave as to Plaintiff’s claim based on Defendants’
alleged failure to comply with HUD regulations regarding tenant
grievances.

[Id. at 12-13.]

The magistrate judge concluded that

all of these claims were futile.
The Motion for Leave included various claims arising
from the ASR’s tenants’ inability to form a tenant organization.
These claims included: an alleged violation of 24 C.F.R.
§ 245.100; a claim that the different treatment of ASR tenants
and tenants of the Waimea Elderly Housing Project violated
Plaintiff’s equal protection rights; and alleged violations of
Plaintiff’s constitutional right to free assembly and
association.

The magistrate judge concluded that these claims

were futile.

[Id. at 13-15.]

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The Motion for Leave also included a claim against
Defendant Office of Housing & Community Development based on
alleged contractual violations in the calculation of the contract
rent and a claim that Plaintiff’s due process rights were
violated because he could not participate in the determination of
the contract rent.

The magistrate judge denied the Motion for

Leave as to these claims, concluding that they were futile.

[Id.

at 17-20.]
Finally, the Motion for Leave included a due process
claim based on a threat of termination of Plaintiff’s lease
(“Lease Termination Claim”).

When this Court dismissed the

corresponding claim in the original Complaint, this Court
concluded that, although Plaintiff arguably pled sufficient facts
to establish a credible threat of lease termination for a rule
violation, the Complaint did not allege that Plaintiff intends to
engage in a course of conduct that is arguably affected with a
constitutional interest, but is prohibited by ASR’s rules.
[3/16/16 Order at 17-18.]

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave alleged

that he wants to buy and use a small grill, but that it is
prohibited by ASR rules, and he alleged that the prohibition is a
violation of his right to acquire and possess property under
Article 1, section 2 of the Hawai`i State Constitution.

The

magistrate judge concluded that Plaintiff alleged sufficient
facts, for purposes of the Motion for Leave, to state a due
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process claim.

Thus, the magistrate judge granted the Motion for

Leave as to Plaintiff’s Lease Termination Claim.

[6/19/16 Order

at 21-22.]
The magistrate judge gave Plaintiff until June 20, 2016
to file a second amended complaint.

[Id. at 23.]

Plaintiff

later moved for an extension of the deadline, and the magistrate
judge extended the deadline to August 11, 2016.

[Dkt. nos. 67

(motion), 69 (entering order granting extension).]
On July 25, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion for
reconsideration of the 6/19/16 Order, and the magistrate judge
issued an order denying the motion on August 1, 2016 (“8/1/16
Order”).

[Dkt. nos. 72, 73.]

Plaintiff did not appeal either

the 6/9/16 Order or the 8/1/16 Order to this Court.
Instead of filing a second amended complaint, Plaintiff
filed the instant Motion.

He states that he is not “physically

or mentally capable” of pursuing this action at this time, and he
asks this Court to dismiss the action without prejudice.
at 1.]

[Motion

In its objections to the Inclination, HAPI states that it

does not object to the dismissal of Plaintiff’s case, but HAPI
argues that the dismissal should be with prejudice.

In the

alternative, HAPI argues that this Court should only dismiss the
Lease Termination Claim without prejudice.

In its objections,

Ainakea also argues that the dismissal should be with prejudice,
emphasizing that Plaintiff: already had the opportunity to cure
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the defects in his claims and failed to do so; and did not file
the Motion until four days after his deadline to file his second
amended complaint.
STANDARD
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) states that “an action may be
dismissed at the plaintiff’s request only by court order, on
terms that the court considers proper.”
The phrase “terms that the court considers proper”
provides district courts the discretion to dismiss
with or without prejudice. See Hargis v. Foster,
312 F.3d 404, 412 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Rule 41 vests
the district court with discretion to dismiss an
action at the plaintiff’s instance ‘upon such
terms and conditions as the court deems proper.’
That broad grant of discretion does not contain a
preference for one kind of dismissal or
another.”).
. . . In Westlands Water District v. United
States, 100 F.3d 94, 96 (9th Cir. 1996), we
stated, “[w]hen ruling on a motion to dismiss
without prejudice, the district court must
determine whether the defendant will suffer some
plain legal prejudice as a result of the
dismissal.” . . .
Diamond State Ins. Co. v. Genesis Ins. Co., 379 F. App’x 671, 673
(9th Cir. 2010) (some alterations in Diamond State Ins.).
DISCUSSION
First, this Court is not persuaded by Ainakea’s
argument that the dismissal should be with prejudice because
Plaintiff filed the Motion after his deadline to file the second
amended complaint.

It is true that Plaintiff’s pro se status
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does not excuse him from following the applicable court rules and
deadlines.

See Briones v. Riviera Hotel & Casino, 116 F.3d 379,

382 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (stating that “pro se litigants
are not excused from following court rules”).

However, this

Court finds that Plaintiff’s filing of the Motion four days after
the deadline did not cause Defendants to suffer “some plain legal
prejudice.”

This Court therefore rejects Ainakea’s argument

regarding the timing of Plaintiff’s Motion.
Second, this Court notes that, insofar as the 3/16/16
Order has already dismissed some of Plaintiff’s claims with
prejudice, those claims are no longer at issue in this case.

The

claims dismissed with prejudice in the 3/16/16 Order would not be
affected by this Court’s rulings on Plaintiff’s Motion.
Finally, after careful consideration of the Motion and
the objections, this Court agrees with HAPI and Ainakea that, if
this Court dismissed all of the remaining portions of Plaintiff’s
case without prejudice, it would result in “some plain legal
prejudice” to Defendants.

As to the claims proposed in the

Motion for Leave that the magistrate judge concluded were futile,
Plaintiff would not have been allowed to include those claims had
he filed a second amended complaint in this case because he did
not appeal the magistrate judge’s orders to this Court.

If this

Court dismissed the remainder of this case without prejudice,
Plaintiff could re-file all of those claims in a new action.
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This Court finds that Defendants would suffer plain legal
prejudice if they were required to respond to claims that the
magistrate judge ruled were futile on the merits.

This Court

therefore FINDS that the Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal of Plaintiff’s
proposed claims which the magistrate judge denied leave to amend
on the merits must be WITH PREJUDICE.
This Court, however, emphasizes that neither it nor the
magistrate judge ruled on the merits of the Representative
Claims.

Ultimately, the magistrate judge denied Plaintiff’s

Motion for Leave as to the Representative Claims because
Plaintiff is still proceeding pro se and “he cannot pursue claims
on behalf of others in a representative capacity.”
at 6 (citing 3/16/16 Order at 9-11).]

[6/9/16 Order

Thus, this Court finds

that dismissing the Representative Claims without prejudice would
not result in “some plain legal prejudice” to Defendants.
Further, insofar as the magistrate judge granted the Motion for
Leave as to Plaintiff’s Lease Termination Claim, this Court also
finds that dismissing that claim without prejudice would not
result in “some plain legal prejudice” to Defendants.

This Court

FINDS that the Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal of the Representative
Claims and Plaintiff’s Lease Termination Claim must be WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.

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CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion to
Dismiss Suit Without Prejudice, filed August 15, 2016, is HEREBY
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

Plaintiff’s Motion is

GRANTED insofar as the Representative Claims and Plaintiff’s
Lease Termination Claim are HEREBY DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to
the re-filing of those claims in a new case.

Plaintiff’s Motion

is DENIED insofar as all of the other claims which remained at
issue in this case after this Court’s March 16, 2016 order are
HEREBY DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
There being no remaining claims in this case, this
Court DIRECTS the Clerk’s Office to enter final judgment and
close the case on October 21, 2016, unless any party files a
motion for reconsideration of the instant Order by October 17,
2016.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, September 30, 2016.

/s/ Leslie E. Kobayashi
Leslie E. Kobayashi
United States District Judge

LANRIC HYLAND VS. OFFICE OF HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, ET
AL; CIVIL 15-00504 LEK-RLP; ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DISMISS SUIT WITHOUT PREJUDICE

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