Dennis Alexio v. Barack Obama et al

Filing 5

ORDER: (1) GRANTING IFP APPLICATION 4 ; (2) DENYING PETITION TO SEAL 2 ; AND (3) DISMISSING BILL IN EQUITY 1 WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. Signed by CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE J. MICHAEL SEABRIGHT on 12/16/2015. (afc)CERTIF ICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
DENNIS RAYMOND ALEXIO,
Beneficiary Pre-1933 Private
American National Citizen of the
United States,

)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
BARACK OBAMA, Trustee,
)
President/Commander in Chief, United )
States of America; JACOB LEW,
)
Trustee, Secretary of the Treasury,
)
United States of America,
)
)
Defendants.
)
_______________________________ )

CIV. NO. 15-00507 JMS-BMK
ORDER: (1) GRANTING IFP
APPLICATION; (2) DENYING
PETITION TO SEAL; AND
(3) DISMISSING BILL IN EQUITY
WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND

ORDER: (1) GRANTING IFP APPLICATION; (2) DENYING PETITION
TO SEAL; AND (3) DISMISSING BILL IN EQUITY WITHOUT
LEAVE TO AMEND
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 9, 2015, Plaintiff Dennis Raymond Alexio (“Plaintiff”),
proceeding pro se, filed the following documents: (1) a Bill in Equity Petition for
Declaratory Relief, Enforcement of Trusts, Protections and Full Accounting (“Bill
in Equity”), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and naming as Defendants
Barack Obama, Trustee, Commander in Chief, United States of America and Jacob
Lew, Trustee, Secretary of the Treasury, United States of America (collectively,

“Defendants”), (2) a Petition to Seal the Bill in Equity (“Petition to Seal”), (3) a
Civil Cover Sheet for Private American National Citizens/Non-Combatants (“Civil
Cover Sheet”), and (4) an Application to Proceed in District Court in forma
pauperis (“IFP Application”). Doc. Nos. 1-4. The Civil Cover Sheet states that
the United States Constitution is a public trust and identifies Plaintiff as the
beneficiary and heir of that trust.1 Doc. No. 3, Civil Cover Sheet at 2. Defendants
1

More specifically, the Civil Cover Sheet identifies Plaintiff as:
Dennis Raymond: Alexio, Beneficiary Non-statutory, Pre-March
9, 1933, Private American National Citizen of the United States of
America protected by Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution for the United States of America; Beneficiary and
Heir of the Constitution for the United States of America (the
Trust) holding the right to a civilian due process of law secured by
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution for the United States;
Privately residing outside of the UNITED STATES under military
occupation and temporarily under emergency war powers military
government since March 9, 1933; Privately residing outside of a
“federal district” and/or a “federal territory” under emergency war
powers military government since March 9, 1933; Without the
emergency war powers military jurisdiction of the UNITED
STATES temporarily-imposed on April 25, 1938; Without the
military jurisdiction of the munical corporation of Washington,
D.C. presently under emergency war powers military government
since March 9, 1933; Non-statutory, Private Citizen of the State of
Hawaii protected by Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution for the United States of America; Non-statutory,
Private Resident of the State of Hawaii protected by Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution for the United
States of America; Privately residing within the geographic State of
Hawaii, on a non-militarily-occupied private estate; Privately
residing outside of the STATE OF HAWAII under military
occupation and temporarily under emergency war powers military
government since March 9, 1933.
(continued...)
2

are identified as “Trustees” of the public trust, and of a private equity trust,
allegedly created by the filing of Plaintiff’s birth certificate, entitled “DENNIS
RAYMOND ALEXIO.” Doc. No. 1, Bill in Equity ¶¶ 6-8, 18-19. The Bill in
Equity purports to provide notice of Plaintiff’s “status” as beneficiary of these
trusts, and seeks (1) a declaration from this court confirming such “status,” and (2)
injunctive relief enforcing the trusts by ordering Defendants to provide an
accounting of all assets and property held in trust by Defendants for Plaintiff’s
benefit.2 Id. ¶ 24. The Petition to Seal seeks an order sealing the Bill in Equity.
Doc. No. 3.
Pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(d), the court finds these matters suitable
for disposition without a hearing. For the reasons discussed below, the court
GRANTS the IFP Application, DENIES the Petition to Seal, and DISMISSES the
Bill in Equity without leave to amend.
///
///

1

(...continued)
Doc. No. 3, Civil Cover Sheet at 2.
2

Plaintiff instructed the Clerk of Court to open this as a miscellaneous case, but because
he seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, the court directed the Clerk of Court to convert this
action to a civil action. See Alexio v. Obama, Misc. No. 15-00337 JMS-BMK, Doc. No. 6,
Entering Order.
3

II. DISCUSSION
A.

Plaintiff’s IFP Application Is Granted
Plaintiff’s IFP Application indicates that he has no income or assets.

Doc. No. 4 ¶¶ 2-5. Plaintiff also reports that he has no monthly expenses, debts or
other financial obligations. Id. ¶¶ 6-8. Because Plaintiff has made the required
showing under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to proceed in forma pauperis (i.e., without
prepayment of fees), the court GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP Application.
B.

Plaintiff’s Petition to Seal is Denied
Plaintiff seeks to seal the Bill in Equity contending that it “concerns

extraordinary matters” and that the “DENNIS RAYMOND ALEXIO” trust
documents are “special and private, restricted and confidential, proprietary and
privileged to be seen only by the Chancellor in Chambers.” Doc. No. 3, Petition at
1.
Based on the “general right to inspect and copy public records and
documents, including judicial records and documents,” there is a “strong
presumption” in favor or maintaining public access to judicial records that are not
of a type “traditionally kept secret for important policy reasons.”3 Kamakana v.

3

Records that are traditionally kept secret include “grand jury transcripts and warrant
materials in the midst of a pre-indictment investigation.” Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu,
(continued...)
4

City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006). To overcome this
strong presumption with respect to documents upon which an action is based,
courts in the Ninth Circuit have applied the “compelling reasons” standard. See,
e.g., Davies v. Broadcom Corp., --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2015 WL 5545513, at *7
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2015) (applying “compelling reasons” standard to a complaint);
see also Delfino Green & Green v. Workers Compensation Solutions, LLC, 2015
WL 4235356, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2015) (“Because Plaintiff’s complaint and
Defendant’s answer and counter-claim are the pleadings on which this action is
based, the Court applies the ‘compelling reasons’ standard to Defendant’s motions
to seal.”).
To meet this standard, the moving party “must ‘articulate compelling
reasons supported by specific factual findings’ that outweigh . . . public policies
favoring disclosure.” Kamakana, 447 F. 3d at 1178-79 (quoting Foltz v. State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)). The court may
not rely on hypothesis or conjecture. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135. In determining
whether the moving party has presented a sufficiently compelling reason to seal
judicial records, the court considers “the public interest in understanding the

3

(...continued)
447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006).
5

judicial process and whether disclosure of the material could result in improper
use of the material for scandalous or libelous purposes or infringement upon trade
secrets.” Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135 (quoting Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430,
1434 (9th Cir. 1995)); Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178-79.
Here, the Bill in Equity is a judicial record for which there is a
“strong presumption” in favor of maintaining public access. Kamakana, 447 F.3d
at 1178. And Plaintiff has failed to present “compelling reasons” supported by
factual findings that outweigh this strong presumption. For example, Plaintiff’s
vague privacy concerns alone, absent identification of a legally cognizable basis
for any restriction or privilege supporting sealing any portion of the Bill in Equity,
are insufficient. In short, Plaintiff has utterly failed to meet his burden of
“‘articulat[ing] compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings’ that
outweigh . . . public policies favoring disclosure.” Accordingly, the Petition to
Seal is DENIED.
C.

Plaintiff’s Bill in Equity is Dismissed Without Leave to Amend
1.

The Bill in Equity
The Bill in Equity is largely unintelligible and incoherent. However,

as best as the court can discern, it appears that Plaintiff, a citizen of Hawaii and
the United States, believes that he acquired some form of alternate legal status
6

titled the “DENNIS RAYMOND ALEXIO” trust under the Trading With the
Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 4301, et seq., and the Emergency Banking Relief Act of
1933, 12 U.S.C. §§ 95a, 95b, thereby precluding him from enjoying the benefits
guaranteed to citizens by the United States Constitution. Doc. No. 1, Bill in
Equity ¶¶ 1, 6-13. By executing a Release, or Declaration of Status, Plaintiff
alleges that he is now restored to private citizen sovereign status and is entitled to
rights as the beneficiary of both the public and private trusts, and an accounting of
assets held in trust allegedly for his benefit. Id. ¶¶ 17, 24. The Bill in Equity
further alleges that Defendants have failed to “do their duties as Trustees, the
President/Commander in chief refusing to provide protection and the Secretary of
the Treasury refusing to give a full accounting of all assets and property, as
demanded by” Plaintiff, in violation of the First, Second, Fifth, Thirteenth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. Id. ¶¶ 21-22. Plaintiff seeks a court
order (1) declaring his “status,” and (2) enforcing these trusts by ordering
Defendants to provide Plaintiff protection, in the form of “special identification
documents,” and a full accounting of all assets and property held in trust for his
benefit. Id. ¶ 24.
///
///
7

2.

Legal Standard
The court must subject each civil action commenced pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a) to mandatory screening, and order the dismissal of any claims it
finds “frivolous, malicious, failing to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir.
2000) (en banc) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but requires”
the court to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a
claim); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (holding
that “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners”).
Plaintiff is appearing pro se; consequently, the court liberally
construes the Bill in Equity. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see
also Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The Supreme Court
has instructed the federal courts to liberally construe the ‘inartful pleading’ of pro
se litigants.”) (citing Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per
curiam)). The court also recognizes that “[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no
amendment can cure the defect . . . a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the
complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the

8

action.” Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995); see also
Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977-78 (9th Cir. 2013).
Nevertheless, the court may dismiss a complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if it fails to “contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Weber v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 521 F.3d 1061,
1065 (9th Cir. 2008). This tenet -- that the court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in the complaint -- “is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Rather, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 1949
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Factual allegations that only permit the court
to infer “the mere possibility of misconduct” do not show that the pleader is
entitled to relief as required by Rule 8. Id. at 679.
A complaint must also meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8, mandating that a complaint include a “short and plain statement of
9

the claim,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and that “each allegation must be simple,
concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). A district court may dismiss a
complaint for failure to comply with Rule 8 where it fails to provide the defendant
fair notice of the wrongs allegedly committed. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d
1172, 1178-80 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of complaint where “one
cannot determine from the complaint who is being sued, for what relief, and on
what theory, with enough detail to guide discovery”); cf. Mendiondo v. Centinela
Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1105 n.4 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding dismissal under
Rule 8 was in error where “the complaint provide[d] fair notice of the wrongs
allegedly committed by defendants and [did] not qualify as overly verbose,
confusing, or rambling”). Rule 8 requires more than “the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation[s]” and “[a] pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (citations and quotations omitted). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it
tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (quotation
signals omitted). “The propriety of dismissal for failure to comply with Rule 8
does not depend on whether the complaint is wholly without merit.” McHenry, 84
F.3d at 1179.

10

3.

Application to the Bill in Equity
Even construing the Bill in Equity liberally, it is an incoherent,

unintelligible document that fails to comply with the pleading requirements set
forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The pleading neither asserts
“simple, concise, and direct allegations” against either Defendant, see Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8, nor states any claim that is remotely plausible. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(explaining that to survive dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiff’s
vague allegations -- for example, that Defendants “refused to do their duties as
Trustees” without alleging what such duties may be -- lack the required specificity
to provide Defendants with fair notice of the wrongs they have allegedly
committed. Doc. No. 1, Bill in Equity ¶ 21; see McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1180.
And, as alleged, each claim identifies a particular constitutional
amendment followed by Plaintiff’s rambling interpretation of the protections
guaranteed by such amendment based on application of the Trading With the
Enemy Act, the Emergency Banking Relief Act, and the Bible.4 Doc. No. 1, Bill

4

For example, Plaintiff’s first claim states:
(continued...)
11

in Equity ¶ 22. These allegations utterly fail to state a plausible claim for relief.
See Dvornekovic v. Obama, 2015 WL 6164780, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 2015)
(dismissing “Bill in Equity” based on nearly identical allegations and claims for,
among other reasons, “wholly fail[ing] to comply with the pleading standards of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”); see also McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1177-80
(affirming dismissal of “argumentative, prolix [complaint], replete with
redundancy and largely irrelevant”); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A pleading that
offers labels and conclusions” that are “devoid of further factual enhancement” or
“a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”).
Moreover, as this court noted in United States v. Alexio, 2015 WL
4069160 (D. Haw. July 2, 2015), similar allegations regarding Plaintiff’s “status”
show that Plaintiff adheres to a “sovereign citizen,” “redemption,” or other similar
theory, all of which have been “flatly rejected” by numerous courts as “frivolous,

4

(...continued)
First Amendment: guaranteeing to every Pre-March 9, 1933,
Private American National Citizen freedom of conscience/freedom
of worship securing Complainant’s Biblical duty to “submit . . . to
the king, as supreme” and “honor the king (1 Peter 2:13, 17), “the
king” being the sovereign “We the People” of the United States of
America as they spoke by their written Constitution for the United
States of America, the supreme law of the land in opposition to the
current “Trading With the Enemy Act” (50 USC App. 5(b)) as
amended by the “Emergency Banking Relief Act” (12 USC 95a)[.]

Doc. No. 1, Bill in Equity ¶ 22.a.
12

irrational [and] unintelligible.” Id. at **2-4 (explaining in more detail each theory
and collecting cases); see also Alexio v. Obama, 2015 WL 5440800, at *3 (D.
Haw. Sept. 15, 2015) (noting uniform rejection of sovereign citizen theories and
dismissing with prejudice a nearly identical “Bill in Equity”).
Finally, as is evident from the nature of Plaintiff’s allegations and the
uniform rejection of claims and arguments based on similar allegations by
numerous courts, it would be futile to grant leave to amend.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the court GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP
Application, DENIES the Petition to Seal, and DISMISSES the Bill in Equity
without leave to amend. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, December 16, 2015.

/s/ J. Michael Seabright
J. Michael Seabright
Chief United States District Judge

Alexio v. Obama, Civ. No. 15-00507 JMS-BMK, Order: (1) Granting IFP Application;
(2) Denying Petition to Seal; and (3) Dismissing Bill in Equity Without Leave to Amend
13