Bald v. Kuakini Medical Center
Filing
39
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTION DISTRESS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND AND GRANTING DEFENDANT KUAKINI MEDICAL CENTER'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FO R WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY : re 30 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by MAGISTRATE JUDGE RICHARD L. PUGLISI on 04/10/2017. 1. Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of em otional distress is preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act and is DISMISSED. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint no later than May 1, 2017. The deadline to file dispositive motions is extended to June 16, 2 017.2. The Court GRANTS Defendant Kuakini Medical Center's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's Claim for Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy. (eps, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
SUSAN BALD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KUAKINI MEDICAL CENTER,
Defendant.
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CIVIL NO. 15-00525 RLP
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
EMOTION DISTRESS WITH LEAVE TO
AMEND AND GRANTING DEFENDANT
KUAKINI MEDICAL CENTER’S MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS
TO PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR
WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN
VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM
FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTION DISTRESS WITH LEAVE TO
AMEND AND GRANTING DEFENDANT KUAKINI MEDICAL CENTER’S MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR
WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
Plaintiff Susan Bald filed this action against
Defendant in Hawaii state court alleging that she was fired from
her job as a Healthcare Technician in violation of public policy.
See ECF No. 1-2.
Complaint:
Plaintiff asserts two state law claims in her
wrongful termination in violation of public policy
and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”).
Defendant removed this action to this Court on the basis of
preemption under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act.
See ECF No. 1.
On March 17, 2017, Defendant Kuakini
Medical Center’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to
Plaintiff’s Claim for Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public
Policy, came on for hearing.
During the hearing on the Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment, the Court directed the parties to
submit supplemental briefing on the issue of jurisdiction.
ECF Nos. 37, 38.
See
After carefully considering the parties’
submissions, the relevant legal authority, and the arguments of
counsel at the hearing, the Court FINDS that it has jurisdiction,
DISMISSES WITH LEAVE TO AMEND Plaintiff’s claim for IIED, and
GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
BACKGROUND
In her Complaint, Plaintiff asserts a claim for
wrongful termination in violation of public policy and a claim
for IIED.
ECF No. 1-2.
Defendant removed this case from the
Circuit Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, on December
21, 2015.
ECF No. 1.
In the Notice of Removal, Defendant states
that this action is properly removed “because some or all of
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant clearly arise under federal
law.”
Id. at 2.
Specifically, Defendant states that “some or
all of Plaintiffs claims are preempted by § 301 of the National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185.”
Id.
Defendant states
that to the extent Plaintiff’s claims are not preempted, the
Court has supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Id. at 3.
In the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Defendant
argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.
ECF No. 30.
2
DISCUSSION
I.
The Court Has Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
Before the Court can address Defendant’s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, the Court must address the issue of
subject matter jurisdiction.
The Court has a “continuing
obligation to assess its own subject-matter jurisdiction, even if
the issue is neglected by the parties.”
United States v.
Ceja–Prado, 333 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2003).
It is an
“obligation to investigate and ensure [its] own jurisdiction.”
Id.; see also, Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th
Cir. 1999) (stating that a federal court has an independent
obligation to address sua sponte whether it has subject matter
jurisdiction).
As discussed below, the Court finds that it has
subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff’s claim for IIED is
preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.
The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s IIED claim with leave to amend.
As noted above, Defendant removed this action based on
its argument that “some or all” of Plaintiff’s claims were
preempted by Section 301.
See ECF No. 1.
In its Supplemental
Brief, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s IIED claim is preempted
by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.
No. 37.
See ECF
Under the doctrine of complete preemption, a complaint
that contains a state law claim that is preempted by Section 301
of the Labor Management Relations Act is presumed to allege a
3
claim arising under federal law, and, thus, may be removed to
federal court.
See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386,
393-94 (1987).
Section 301 creates federal jurisdiction for claims for
breach of a collective bargaining agreement.1
Miller v. AT&T
Network Sys., 850 F.2d 543, 545 (9th Cir. 1988).
Section 301
preemption applies to cases whose resolution “is substantially
dependent upon analysis of the terms of [a collective bargaining
agreement].”
(1985).
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220
Section 301 preempts applications of state law “only if
such application requires the interpretation of a collective
bargaining agreement.”
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc.,
486 U.S. 399, 413 (1988).
Such preemption is intended to promote
the uniform interpretation of collective bargaining agreements.
Balcorta v. Twentieth Century–Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1108
(9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
“The linchpin of preemption
analysis is whether the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement must be interpreted in order to evaluate a plaintiff’s
state law claim.”
Hotel Emps. and Restaurant Emps. Local 2 v.
1
Section 301 provides: “Suits for violation of contracts
between an employer and a labor organization representing
employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of
the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or
without regard to the citizenship of the parties.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(a).
4
Vista Inn Mgmt. Co., 393 F.Supp. 2d 972, 984 (N.D. Cal. 2005)
(citing Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, 255 F.3d 683, 691-92 (9th
Cir. 2001)).
Here, Plaintiff does not dispute that she was a member
of the United Public Workers Union and that her employment with
Defendant was covered by a collective bargaining agreement.
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s IIED claim is completely
preempted by Section 301 because it requires an analysis of the
collective bargaining agreement.
To prevail on a claim for IIED,
Plaintiff must show that (1) that the act causing harm was
intentional; (2) that the act was unreasonable; and (3) that the
actor should have recognized that the act was likely to result in
harm.
See Marshall v. Univ. of Haw., 821 P.2d 937, 947 (Haw. Ct.
App. 1991).
To be considered “unreasonable,” the act must be
“without just cause or excuse and beyond all bounds of decency”
and “outrageous.”
Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co., 879 P.2d 1037,
1048 (Haw. 1994).
To determine if an IIED claim is preempted,
the Court must consider whether the collective bargaining
agreement covers the allegedly outrageous conduct.
See Humble v.
Boeing Co., 305 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2002) (“if the CBA does
not ‘cover’ the allegedly extreme and outrageous conduct, the
intentional infliction claim will not preempted”); see also
Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke, 846 F.3d 1081, 1090 (9th Cir.
2017) (stating that the first step in Section 301 preemption
5
analysis is “whether the CBA contains provisions that govern the
actions giving rise to a state claim”).
The only conduct alleged in the Complaint relates to
Defendant’s termination of Plaintiff.
See ECF No. 1-2.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated “for
medical reporting, and recording observations of a patient, and
providing clean bed linens for a patient.”
Id. ¶ 8.
Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant’s “conduct in terminating [] Plaintiff was
wrongful, and contravened the letter and purpose of laws,
regulations, rules[,] and public policy.”
Id. ¶ 9.
Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant “engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct
against the Plaintiff by intentionally and/or recklessly and/or
negligently permitting Plaintiff to be terminated.”
Id. ¶ 13.
In its Supplemental Brief, Defendant details the
various provisions of the collective bargaining agreement that
address termination of employees.
See ECF No. 37 at 3-4.
These
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement set forth the
standards and procedures for termination.
See id.
In assessing
Plaintiff’s IIED claim the Court would be required to determine
whether Defendant’s actions in terminating Plaintiff were
“without just cause or excuse and beyond all bounds of decency”
and “outrageous.”
See Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co., 879 P.2d 1037,
1048 (Haw. 1994).
The terms of the collective bargaining
agreement governing termination would need to be analyzed to
6
determine if Defendant’s actions in terminating Plaintiff were
unreasonable.
Because an interpretation of the terms in the
collective bargaining agreement will be necessary, Plaintiff’s
IIED claim based on her termination is preempted.
See Scott v.
Machinists Auto. Trades Dist. Lodge No. 190 of N. Cal., 827 F.2d
589, 594 (9th Cir. 1987) (“state tort claims for intentional
infliction of emotional distress are preempted when they arise
out of the employee’s discharge or the conduct of the defendants
in the investigatory proceedings leading up to the discharge”);
see also Price v. Molokai Gen. Hosp., No. CIV.09-00548 DAE-KSC,
2010 WL 715413, at *6 (D. Haw. Mar. 1, 2010) (holding that the
plaintiff’s claim for IIED based on termination was preempted).
Plaintiff’s IIED is preempted by Section 301 and is dismissed
with leave to amend.
II.
Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is
GRANTED.
Although Plaintiff’s IIED claim is preempted by Section
301, the Court finds that it is appropriate to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful
termination in violation of public policy.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367
(“in any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental
jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims
in the action within such original jurisdiction”); Jackson v.
7
Southern Cal. Gas Co., 881 F.2d 638, 644 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding
that Section 301 does not preempt a state law claim for wrongful
termination in violation of public policy); Brown v. Brotman Med.
Ctr., Inc., 571 Fed. App’x 572, 576 (9th Cir. 2014) (“a district
court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims that are
brought in conjunction with claims that are preempted by the
LMRA” (citing Ellis v. Gelson’s Markets, 1 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir.
1993)).
As detailed below, the evidence is undisputed that
Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim
for wrongful termination.
A.
The Undisputed Material Facts.
The following are the undisputed material facts.
See
ECF No. 31, Defendant’s Concise Statement of Facts (“Def.’s
Stmnt.”), at 2-6; ECF No. 34, Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s
Concise Statment (“Pl.’s Stmnt.”), at 3-4.
Plaintiff was hired by Defendant on April 25, 2005, as
a full-time Healthcare Technician in the Progressive Care Unit
(“PCU”).
ECF No. 31, Def.’s Stmnt., ¶ 1; ECF No. 34, Pl.’s
Stmnt., ¶ 1.
As a Healthcare Technician, Plaintiff was
responsible for assisting Registered Nurses (“RN”), attending to
the elimination needs of patients, recording patients’ urine
output measurements, and reporting the measurements to the RN on
duty.
¶ 2.
ECF No. 31, Def.’s Stmnt., ¶ 2; ECF No. 34, Pl.’s Stmnt.,
Plaintiff’s supervisor for the relevant time period was
8
Edna Gappe, Patient Care Coordinator of the PCU and Acute
Hemodialysis.
ECF No. 31, Def.’s Stmnt., ¶ 3; ECF No. 34, Pl.’s
Stmnt., ¶ 3.
Defendant’s internal “House Rules” require employees
“to behave with the highest professional standards and code of
conduct.”
ECF No. 31, Def.’s Stmnt., ¶ 4; ECF No. 34, Pl.’s
Stmnt., ¶ 4.
An employee who violates any of the House Rules
“may be subject to discipline up to and including termination
with or without prior notice, warnings or suspension.”
Id.
Specific conduct that may lead to disciplinary action includes:
1. Violation of Defendant’s policies, procedures, rules or
regulations; 2. Insubordination; refusal to obey instructions;
failure to perform work as required or assigned; willful slowdown
of work processes; 3. Falsification or dishonesty on any form
including falsification of any documents, records or reports.
Id.
Plaintiff was aware of the House Rules and understood that
she was required to follow the House Rules and that she could be
subject to discipline, including termination, for violating any
of the House Rules.
ECF No. 31, Def.’s Stmnt., ¶ 5; ECF No. 34,
Pl.’s Stmnt., ¶ 5.
The incident at issue in this action involves a patient
in the PCU, who is referred to by the parties as “Patient X.”
ECF No. 31, Def.’s Stmnt., ¶ 7; ECF No. 34, Pl.’s Stmnt., ¶ 7.
Patient X was transferred to the PCU on or around July 30, 2014.
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ECF No. 31, Def.’s Stmnt., ¶ 8; ECF No. 34, Pl.’s Stmnt., ¶ 8.
Patient X received hemodialysis and was given a suprapubic
catheter.
Id.
It was not uncommon for Patient X to have no
urine output for days, because she was receiving hemodialysis
three times a week.
Id.
Ms. Gappe and RN Nicole Navarro were
familiar with Patient X’s medical condition and were aware that
Patient X had been producing minimal to no urine, having cared
for Patient X upon her transfer to the PCU.
Id.
In the week
leading up to August 8, 2014, Patient X’s medical records
indicated low urine output of no more than 5-10 mL per shift,
with an occasional 20 mL from a catheter.
Id.
On August 8, 2014, Plaintiff and RN Marlene Roesener
were assigned to care for Patient X during the day shift, from
approximately 6:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.
¶ 9; ECF No. 34, Pl.’s Stmnt., ¶ 9.
ECF No. 31, Def.’s Stmnt.,
Plaintiff was aware that
Patient X was on hemodialysis, had low urine output, was wearing
a diaper, and had a suprapubic catheter, which emptied into a leg
bag.
Id.
During her shift, Plaintiff was responsible for
regularly checking on Patient X and documenting the amount of
urine output she observed at each check.
Id.
Plaintiff alleges that she checked on Patient X at 8:45
a.m., 10:45 a.m., and 1:30 p.m.
ECF No. 31, Def.’s Stmnt., ¶ 10;
ECF No. 34, Pl.’s Stmnt., ¶ 10.
At each check, Plaintiff claims
that she observed that Patient X’s diaper was saturated with
10
urine, changed Patient X’s diaper, and recorded a “large amount”
of urine on Patient X’s Intake & Output (“I&O”) Worksheet.
Id.
Plaintiff also claims that she observed that Patient X’s catheter
was not working.
Id.2
Plaintiff further claims to have reported
to RN Roesener that Patient X had a large amount of urine output
and that Patient X’s catheter was not working.
Id.
At approximately 6:00 p.m., RN Navarro reviewed Patient
X’s I&O Worksheet completed by Plaintiff and noticed that
Plaintiff had documented that Patient X had outputted large
amounts of urine three times that day.
ECF No. 31, Def.’s
Stmnt., ¶ 12; ECF No. 34, Pl.’s Stmnt., ¶ 12.
RN Navarro became
suspicious of Patient X’s I&O Worksheet’s accuracy, because she
knew that Patient X was a hemodialysis patient with renal failure
who typically had little to no urine output.
Id.
RN Navarro
checked Patient X again and found no leakage from the catheter.
Id.
Because RN Navarro did not believe that the information on
the I&O Worksheet could be accurate, she reported the issue to
her supervisor, Ms. Gappe.
Id.
RN Navarro informed Ms. Gappe
that the documented urine output for Patient X was incorrect
based on Patient X’s medical condition and recent urine output
2
Plaintiff notes in her Concise Statement, that she
disputes Defendant’s characterization of the catheter as “broken”
and states that Plaintiff told RN Roesener that the catheter “is
not working.” See ECF No. 34. Accordingly, the Court uses
Plaintiff’s “is not working” language here instead of Defendant’s
“broken” statement.
11
history.
Id.
RN Navarro confirmed with Ms. Gappe that Patient
X’s catheter was still intact and that there was no urine leaking
from the catheter.
Id.
For the remainder of her shift, RN
Navarro observed Patient X and noted that there continued to be
little to no urine output.
Id.
The next morning, on August 9, 2014, Ms. Gappe met with
RN Roesener regarding Patient X’s urine output from the day
before.
ECF No. 31, Def.’s Stmnt., ¶ 13; ECF No. 34, Pl.’s
Stmnt., ¶ 13.
RN Roesener informed Ms. Gappe that Patient X had
not produced large amounts of urine during her shift the day
before.
Id.
RN Roesener confirmed that there had been no
problem with Patient X’s catheter the day before.
Id.
RN
Roesener also confirmed that from her own observations of Patient
X the day before, Patient X was outputting little to no urine.
Id.
Ms. Gappe questioned Plaintiff about Plaintiff’s urine
output measurements for Patient X on the I&O Worksheet.
ECF No.
31, Def.’s Stmnt., ¶ 14; ECF No. 34, Pl.’s Stmnt., ¶ 14.
Plaintiff informed Ms. Gappe that at each of her three check-ins
with Patient X the day before, Plaintiff estimated that Patient X
had outputted over 200 mL of urine, or, in other words, that
Patient X had outputted over 600 mL of urine during Plaintiff’s
shift.
Id.
saturated.
Plaintiff claimed that Patient X’s diaper had been
Id.
Plaintiff claimed that she had completed Patient
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X’s I&O Worksheet based on her observations of Patient X at three
separate times, but that she did not show Patient X’s saturated
diapers to RN Roesener.
Id.
Plaintiff was suspended from September 16 through
September 22, 2014.
ECF No. 31, Def.’s Stmnt., ¶ 15; ECF No. 34,
Pl.’s Stmnt., ¶ 15.
Ms. Gappe investigated Patient X’s I&O
Worksheet and determined that Patient X’s catheter was intact and
that there were no changes in Patient X’s condition.
Id.
Ms.
Gappe concluded that the large amounts of urine output reported
by Plaintiff on Patient X’s I&O Worksheet were not possible for
Patient X.
Id.
On or around September 12, 2014, Defendant’s senior
leadership team met regarding the allegations against Plaintiff
and decided to terminate Plaintiff’s employment after taking into
account the investigation findings against Plaintiff.
ECF No.
31, Def.’s Stmnt., ¶ 16; ECF No. 34, Pl.’s Stmnt., ¶ 16.
The
final conclusion was that on August 8, 2014, Plaintiff had
falsified the urine output data for Patient X, in violation of
Defendant’s House Rules.
was discharged.
B.
Id.
On September 23, 2014, Plaintiff
Id.
Based on the Undisputed Material Facts, Defendant
is Entitled to Summary Judgment.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a
party is entitled to summary judgment “if the movant shows that
13
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
P. 56(a).
Fed. R. Civ.
“A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial
burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and of
identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery
responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.”
Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d
978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).
“When the moving party has carried its
burden under Rule 56, its opponent must do more than simply show
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts
[and] . . . come forward with specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986) (footnote
omitted) (citations omitted).
Hawaii law recognizes a public policy exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine.
Employees who are wrongfully
discharged in violation of a “clear mandate of public policy” can
bring claims against their employers, which are called “Parnar
claims” because the Hawaii Supreme Court first recognized the
claim in Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625 (Haw.
1982).
To prevail on a Parnar claim Plaintiff must demonstrate
that: (1) the termination violated a clear mandate of public
policy; (2) Plaintiff engaged in a protected activity such as
14
refusing to commit an unlawful act, performing an important
public obligation, or exercising a statutory right; and (3)
Plaintiff was terminated because of this protected activity.
Id.
at 631; Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1067; see also Cambron v.
Starwood Vacation Ownership, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1139-40
(D. Haw. 2013).
As discussed in detail below, Defendant is
entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for termination
in violation of public policy because, based on the undisputed
facts, Plaintiff did not engage in a protected activity.
In Parnar, the Hawaii Supreme Court stated that courts
must “inquire into whether the employer’s conduct contravenes the
letter or purpose of a constitutional, statutory, or regulatory
provision or scheme.”
Parnar, 652 P.2d at 630-31.
Here,
Plaintiff’s Complaint states generally that “Hawaii Department of
Health rules, regulations, and law” required Plaintiff to
“document[] her observations about patients.”
ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 6.
Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated “for medical reporting,
and recording observations of a patient, and providing clean bed
linens for a patient.”
Id. ¶ 8.
In her Opposition to the
present Motion, Plaintiff specifically relies on Hawaii
Administrative Rules Section 11-93-21(c) as the statement of
public policy that Defendant purportedly violated by terminating
her.
See ECF No. 33 at 2.
This regulation is part of Chapter 93
of the Hawaii Department of Health’s regulations that apply to
15
“Broad Service Hospitals.”
The purpose of Chapter 93 “is to
establish minimum requirements for the protection of the health,
welfare, and safety of patients, hospital personnel, and the
general public in hospitals.”
Haw. Admin. R. § 11-93-1.
The
subsection that Plaintiff relies on addresses medical records and
provides:
The
medical
records
shall
clearly
and
accurately document a patient’s identity, the
diagnosis of the patient’s illness, treatment,
orders by medical staff, observations, and
conclusion concerning the patient.
Haw. Admin. R. § 11-93-21(c).
Plaintiff argues that she was
terminated for accurately recording her observations of Patient
X.
See ECF No. 33 at 2-3.
For purposes of this Motion, the
Court assumes, without finding, that Hawaii Administrate Rule
Section 11-93-21(c) qualifies as a “clear mandate of public
policy.”
See Parnar, 652 P.2d at 631.
Next, the Court must consider whether Plaintiff has
engaged in a protected activity.
As noted above, courts have
held that a Parnar claim “exists only when a plaintiff has
engaged in one of a selected few protected activities” such as
“refusing to commit an unlawful act,” “performing an important
public obligation,” or “exercising a statutory right or
privilege.”
Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1067 (quoting Smith v.
Chaney Brooks Realty, Inc., 865 P.2d 170, 173-74 (Haw. Ct. App.
1994)).
Here, the activity at issue is Plaintiff recording her
16
observations of Patient X.
For the reasons discussed below, the
Court finds that the act of Plaintiff recording her observations
of Patient X is not a “protected activity” sufficient to support
a Parnar claim.
See id.
Here, there is no evidence that Plaintiff was “refusing
to commit an unlawful act,” “performing an important public
obligation,” or “exercising a statutory right or privilege.”
Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1067.
See
First, there is no evidence that
Plaintiff refused to commit an unlawful act.
As noted above,
there is no dispute that Plaintiff documented her observations
concerning Patient X.
See ECF No. 31, Def.’s Stmnt., ¶ 10; ECF
No. 34, Pl.’s Stmnt., ¶ 10.
There is no evidence that Defendant
prevented Plaintiff from documenting her observations or
attempted to prevent Plaintiff from documenting her observations.
Second, Plaintiff was not performing an important public
obligation.
See Smith, 865 P.2d at 174 (explaining that such
activities included jury duty and whistle blowing).
The activity
that Plaintiff engaged in was part of her regular job
responsibilities.
See ECF No. 31, Def.’s Stmnt., ¶ 9; ECF No.
34, Pl.’s Stmnt., ¶ 9.
Plaintiff does not cite, and the Court
has been unable to find, any case where a court has allowed a
Parnar claim based on an employee performing their regular job
duties.
Third, Plaintiff was not exercising a statutory right or
privilege.
Although the particular job task that Plaintiff was
17
performing is related to a regulatory requirement, as noted by
Defendant in its Reply, many jobs have duties with regulatory
underpinnings.
See ECF No. 35 at 5 (citing Hawaii Administrative
Rules regarding cleanliness requirements for tattoo parlors).
However, these job duties are not statutory rights or privileges.
Under Hawaii law, Parnar claims are reserved for a “narrow class
of cases” where the plaintiff has “engaged in one of a selected
few activities.”
Parnar, 652 P.2d at 631; Villiarimo, 281 F.3d
at 1067 (affirming the district court’s order granting summary
judgment on a Parnar claim that was based on an employee’s action
of authorizing an outside agency to review his employment
records).
Based on the undisputed facts, Plaintiff did not
engage in a protected activity, but was instead performing the
regular requirements of her job.
Because Plaintiff cannot
establish this required element, Defendant is entitled to summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful termination in
violation of public policy.
CONCLUSION
1.
Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress is preempted by Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act and is DISMISSED.
Plaintiff is granted
leave to file an amended complaint no later than May 1, 2017.
The deadline to file dispositive motions is extended to June 16,
2017.
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2.
The Court GRANTS Defendant Kuakini Medical Center’s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s Claim for
Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, APRIL 10, 2017.
_____________________________
Richard L. Puglisi
United States Magistrate Judge
BALD v. KUAKINI MEDICAL CENTER; CIVIL NO. 15-00525 RLP; MEMORANDUM
OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL
INFLICTION OF EMOTION DISTRESS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND AND GRANTING
DEFENDANT KUAKINI MEDICAL CENTER’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AS TO PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF
PUBLIC POLICY
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