Inoshita v. USA

Filing 3

ORDER : (1) DISMISSING DEFENDANT-PETITIONER'S MOTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255TO VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR CORRECT SENTENCE BY A PERSON IN A FEDERAL CUSTODY; AND (2) GRANTING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY re 1 as to Gregg Inoshita - Sig ned by CHIEF JUDGE J. MICHAEL SEABRIGHT on 5/20/2016. "Based on the foregoing, the court finds that Inoshita waived his right to collaterally attack his sentence, and bank robbery under § 2113(a) remains a crime of viole nce. Accordingly, the court DENIES Inoshitas § 2255 Motion, but GRANTS a certificate of appealability. See Fed. R. App. P. 22(b); Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts." (CR 15-00159 JMS; CV 16-00032 JMS-KSC) (emt, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
vs.
)
)
GREGG INOSHITA,
)
)
Defendant-Petitioner.
)
)
)
_______________________________ )

Cr. No. 15-00159 JMS
Civ. No. 16-00032 JMS-KSC
ORDER: (1) DISMISSING
DEFENDANT-PETITIONER’S
MOTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255
TO VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR
CORRECT SENTENCE BY A
PERSON IN A FEDERAL
CUSTODY; AND (2) GRANTING A
CERTIFICATE OF
APPEALABILITY

ORDER: (1) DISMISSING DEFENDANT-PETITIONER’S MOTION
UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255 TO VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR CORRECT
SENTENCE BY A PERSON IN A FEDERAL CUSTODY; AND
(2) GRANTING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant-Petitioner Gregg Inoshita (“Inoshita”) pled guilty to bank
robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). In his Plea Agreement, he stipulated
that he was a career offender under the United States Sentencing Guidelines
(“USSG” or “guideline(s)”) based on his three prior § 2113(a) convictions. He
now moves, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct
Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (“§ 2255 Motion”) on the grounds that
he is “innocent” of being a career offender.

Specifically, Inoshita argues that a § 2113(a) bank robbery conviction
no longer counts as a crime of violence under the guidelines in light of Johnson v.
United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (“Johnson I”), Descamps v. United States, 133
S. Ct. 2276 (2013), and Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015)
(“Johnson II”). Consequently, Inoshita contends that he is “actually innocent of
being a career offender under the Guidelines,” and the court’s use of an
“unconstitutionally and illegally determined starting point for the determination of
his sentence . . . skewed his resulting sentence.” Id.
The court decides the § 2255 Motion under Local Rule (“LR”) 7.2(d)
without a hearing. Because Inoshita waived his right to bring this motion, and
because bank robbery under § 2113(a) remains a crime of violence, the court
DENIES Inoshita’s § 2255 Motion, but GRANTS a certificate of appealability.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Guilty Plea
In April 1, 2015, Inoshita pled guilty to a one-count Information

charging him with bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).1 Doc. Nos. 8,
1

Pursuant to § 2113(a), bank robbery is committed by a person who:
[B]y force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to
take, from the person or presence of another, or obtains or attempts
to obtain by extortion any property or money or any other thing of
value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or
possession of, any bank[.]
2

9. Prior to the instant offense, Inoshita had been convicted of three other
§ 2113(a) bank robberies. Doc. No. 17, Presentence Report (“PSR”) at 7-9. In his
Plea Agreement -- which was accepted by the court at sentencing on July 20,
2015, Doc. No. 14 -- Inoshita stipulated that he “is a Career Offender pursuant to
USSG § 4B1.1[.]” Doc. No. 9, Plea Agreement ¶ 10(b). Under USSG § 4B1.1(a),
a defendant is a career offender if: (1) he “was at least eighteen years old” when
the instant offense occurred; (2) “the instant offense of conviction is a felony that
is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense;” and (3) he has “at
least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled
substance offense.” USSG § 4B1.1(a).
In turn, USSG § 4B1.2(a) defines a crime of violence as a crime that
either (a) “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person of another,” or (b) is “burglary of a dwelling, arson, or
extortion, involves use of explosives,” or (c) “otherwise involves conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” These three clauses
are referred to as the “elements clause,” the “enumerated offenses clause,” and the
“residual clause,” respectively.2

2

In light of Johnson II, the United States Sentencing Commission has published a
proposed amendment to §4B1.2, effective August 1, 2016. If enacted, the new guideline will
(continued...)
3

In addition, Inoshita expressly waived his right to appeal or otherwise
challenge his sentence except (1) if it exceeded the statutory maximum or
guideline range, as determined by the court, or (2) on the basis of ineffective
assistance of counsel:
13. Defendant is aware that he has the right to appeal his
conviction and the sentence imposed under Title 18,
United States Code, Section 3742(a). Defendant
knowingly waives, except as indicated in subparagraph
“b” below, the right to appeal his conviction, the right to
appeal any sentence imposed within the maximum
provided in the statute(s) of conviction, and the right to
appeal the manner in which that sentence was
determined on any of the grounds set forth in Section
3742, or on any ground whatever, in exchange for the
concessions made by the prosecution in this plea
agreement.
a. The Defendant also waives his right to
challenge his conviction, the right to challenge the
sentence imposed, and the right to challenge the manner
in which it was determined in any collateral attack,
including, but not limited to, a motion brought under
Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255, except that
Defendant may make such a challenge (1) as indicated in
subparagraph “b” below, or (2) based on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
b. If the Court imposes a sentence greater than
specified in the guideline range determined by the Court
to be applicable to the Defendant, Defendant retains the
2

(...continued)
delete the residual clause and instead define “crime of violence” to include a greater number of
enumerated offenses, including robbery. See
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/reader-friendlyamendments/20160121_RF.pdf (last accessed May 20, 2016).
4

right to appeal the portion of his sentence greater than
specified in that guideline range and the manner in which
that portion was determined under Section 3742 and to
challenge that portion of his sentence in a collateral
attack.
Plea Agreement ¶ 13(a) & (b). The Assistant United States Attorney and the court
explained these waivers to Inoshita during the change of plea proceeding. Doc.
No. 26 at 15-17. The court also found that Inoshita was competent to understand
the proceedings and that his guilty plea was voluntary. Id. at 28.
After the change of plea hearing, but prior to sentencing, the United
States Supreme Court ruled that the residual clause of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”)3 is void for
vagueness. Johnson II, 135 S. Ct. at 2557.
B.

Sentencing
In light of Johnson II, at the outset of Inoshita’s sentencing hearing

on July 20, 2015, this court raised the issue of whether the instant offense and
Inoshita’s prior offenses still qualify as crimes of violence. Doc. No. 18,
Sentencing Tr. at 2-3. Specifically, the court inquired whether Inoshita’s bank
robbery convictions fell under the residual clause or the elements clause of the
guidelines. The parties responded as follows:

3

The ACCA’s residual clause is identical to the guideline’s residual clause.
5

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, I did do the research and
our office -- our analysis is that unfortunately, Johnson
does not seem to apply to Mr. Inoshita’s either current
offense or the priors.
[GOVERNMENT COUNSEL]: I would agree with that,
Your Honor. This isn’t a residual clause type case.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Correct.
Id. at 3. This court then discussed United States v. Selfa, 918 F.2d 749, 751 (9th
Cir. 1990), which addressed whether a bank robbery under § 2113(a) qualified as a
crime of violence under the elements clause, not the residual clause. See
Sentencing Tr. at 4. Selfa noted that bank robbery must be committed “by force
and violence or intimidation,” and that “intimidation” under § 2113(a) means
“wilfully to take, or attempt to take, in such a way that would put an ordinary,
reasonable person in fear of bodily harm.” 918 F.2d at 751 (citing United States v.
Hopkins, 703 F.2d 1102, 1103 (9th Cir. 1983) (other citation omitted). Thus, Selfa
held that “persons convicted of robbing a bank ‘by force and violence’ or
‘intimidation’ under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) have been convicted of a crime of
violence within the meaning of Guideline Section 4B1.1.” 918 F.2d at 751
(quoting § 2113(a)).
After noting that Selfa did “not apply[] the residual clause,” but
instead determined that § 2113(a) “has an element” the “use, attempted use or
6

threatened use of physical force against the person of another,” this court stated
that Selfa appears to “foreclose any argument that [Inoshita is] not a career
offender.” Sentencing Tr. at 4-5. The parties responded:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I agree with that.
[GOVERNMENT COUNSEL]: Same here, Your Honor.
Id. at 5.
This court granted Inoshita’s request for a variance from the career
offender guideline range of 151 to 188 months, and sentenced him, in part, to a
term of imprisonment of 120 months. Id. at 5-6, 13-14.
C.

The § 2255 Motion
Inoshita did not appeal his conviction or sentence. Instead, he filed

the instant § 2255 Motion arguing that the parties and the court were all wrong in
determining that a § 2113(a) bank robbery qualified as a crime of violence. More
specifically, Inoshita claims that (1) he was “unconstitutionally and illegally
deemed a career offender” because the guideline’s “residual clause is
unconstitutionally vague and may not be used to classify [him] as a career
offender,”4 and (2) “[r]ecent Supreme Court cases also make clear that federal

4

Neither the court nor the parties relied on the residual clause. In fact, the residual
clause is irrelevant to this case -- Inoshita was classified as a career offender solely under the
elements clause.
7

bank robbery . . . does not count as a crime of violence” under either § 4B1.2’s
elements clause or residual clause. Doc. No. 19, § 2255 Motion at 4. The
Government filed a Response on April 1, 2016, Doc. No. 23, and Inoshita filed a
Reply on April 5, 2016. Doc. No. 24.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of
Congress . . . may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside
or correct the sentence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Section 2255 authorizes the court
to grant relief if it concludes “that the sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction
to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum
authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack[.]” Id.
A court may dismiss a § 2255 motion if “it plainly appears from the
motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving
party is not entitled to relief.” Rule 4(b), Rules Governing Section 2255
Proceedings for the United States District Courts. And a court need not hold an
evidentiary hearing if the issues can be conclusively decided on the basis of the
evidence in the record. See United States v. Mejia Mesa, 153 F.3d 925, 929 (9th
Cir. 1998) (noting that a “district court has discretion to deny an evidentiary
8

hearing on a § 2255 claim where the files and records conclusively show that the
movant is not entitled to relief”).
IV. DISCUSSION
A.

Inoshita Waived His Right to Collaterally Attack His Sentence
A defendant may waive his right to appeal and collaterally attack a

conviction and sentence. See United States v. Leniear, 574 F.3d 668, 672 & n.3
(9th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir.
1993). A waiver, pursuant to a plea agreement, is enforceable if (1) the language
of the waiver encompasses the basis of the challenge, and (2) the waiver was
knowingly and voluntarily made. United States v. Medina Carrasco, 815 F.3d
457, 461 (9th Cir, 2015); see Vasquez v. United States, 2016 WL 544467, at *3
(D. Haw. Feb. 10, 2016) (citations omitted).
Here, Inoshita does not, and cannot, dispute that his waiver was
knowing and voluntary, and that the language of the plea agreement encompasses
the basis of his challenge. Inoshita admitted to committing bank robbery in
violation of § 2113(a), and stated that he understood he could be sentenced up to a
statutory maximum 20-year term of imprisonment. See Plea Agreement ¶¶ 1, 6, 7;
see also Doc. No. 26, Plea Tr. at 7-9, 12. The parties stipulated that Inoshita was a
career offender as defined by the guidelines, and reaffirmed this during both the
9

plea and sentencing hearings. See Plea Agreement ¶ 10(b); Plea Tr. at 14, 21;
Sentencing Tr. at 4-5. Further, Inoshita affirmed his understanding that the
guideline range of imprisonment would therefore be enhanced, and that he could
be sentenced above the guideline range up to the maximum permitted by law. Plea
Tr. at 21-22. And the Plea Agreement unambiguously waives his right to bring
“any collateral attack” or challenge a sentence within the statutory maximum or
the manner in which it was determined, except on the grounds of (1) ineffective
assistance of counsel, or (2) the sentence imposed exceeded the applicable
guideline range as determined by the court. Plea Agreement ¶ 13; see also Plea
Tr. at 15-17 (affirming Inoshita’s understanding of the same). In sum, Inoshita’s
waiver encompasses the right to file a § 2255 motion, except under circumstances
not applicable in this case,5 and he made the waiver knowingly and voluntarily.
Thus, Inoshita’s waiver is valid.
Inoshita, however, argues that the waiver is unenforceable for two
reasons. First, he argues that the sentence is illegal because the enhanced starting
point for determining his sentence, based on an erroneous determination that he
was a career offender, violated his constitutional right to due process. See § 2255
5

Inoshita was sentenced to 120 months imprisonment, well below both the statutory
maximum of 20 years imprisonment and the applicable guideline range of 151 to 188 months.
Doc. No. 15, Judgment; Doc. No. 17, PSR ¶¶ 61 (specifying statutory maximum term of
imprisonment under § 2113(a) & 62 (setting forth applicable guideline range).
10

Motion at 4. Second, he argues that the Plea Agreement should not be enforced if
such enforcement would result in manifest injustice. See Reply at 12.
In the Ninth Circuit, a valid waiver will not be enforced if “the
sentence violates the law.” United States v. Bibler, 495 F.3d 621, 624 (9th Cir.
2007).6 “A sentence is illegal if it exceeds the permissible statutory penalty for the
crime or violates the Constitution.” Id. Because Inoshita was sentenced to a term
of imprisonment below the statutory maximum, his sentence would only be illegal
if it violates the Constitution. See United States v. Mendez Gonzalez, 697 F.3d
1101, 1104 (9th Cir. 2012) (determining that a sentence below the statutory
maximum is not illegal and cannot excuse a valid waiver of appeal).
Further, Inoshita makes no credible argument that his sentence was
unconstitutional. The court and parties never relied on the residual clause, making
Johnson II irrelevant. And even if the court misapplied the career offender
provision, such an error would be a guideline -- not constitutional -- error. See
Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1321 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(reasoning that “Gilbert’s claim that a sentencing guidelines provision was

6

Additional reasons a valid plea agreement will not be enforced in the Ninth Circuit, not
relevant here, include: “1) a defendant’s guilty plea failed to comply with [Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure] 11; 2) the sentencing judge informs a defendant that [he] retains the right to
appeal; [and] 3) the sentence does not comport with the terms of the plea agreement[.]” Bibler,
495 F.3d at 624.
11

misapplied to him is not a constitutional claim. If it were, every guideline error
would be a constitutional violation.”); see also United States v. Medina Carrasco,
815 F.3d 457, 462-63 (9th Cir. 2015) (enforcing waiver of crime of violence
guideline determination, because “[t]he whole point of a waiver . . . is the
relinquishment of claims regardless of their merit”) (citing United States v.
Nguyen, 235 F.3d 1179, 1184 (9th Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by
United States v. Rahman, 642 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir. 2011)); Hawkins v. United
States, 724 F.3d 915, 916-18 (7th Cir. 2013).
Thus, Inoshita’s sentence is not illegal, and as discussed below, his
classification as a career offender was not in error. Accordingly, enforcing
Inoshita’s valid waiver will not result in a miscarriage of justice.
B.

In Any Event, Inoshita’s Designation as a Career Offender Was
Correct
Even if Inoshita had not waived the right to collaterally attack his

sentence, his claim that a § 2113(a) bank robbery is no longer a crime of violence
fails.
Inoshita asserts two arguments supporting his contention that bank
robbery by intimidation under § 2113(a) is no longer a crime of violence:
(1) “intimidation exceeds” the “elements/force clause’s focus on a narrow range of
conduct[;]” and (2) “intimidation’s use of a hypothetical reasonable person
12

standard (in lieu of requiring that any actual person be intimidated) . . . fails to
match the actual use, threat, or attempt ‘against the person of another’ that the
elements/force clause requires.” Reply at 4. Through both of these arguments,
Inoshita contends that recent Supreme Court caselaw has undermined Selfa to the
extent it is no longer good law.
“Where the reasoning or theory of . . . prior circuit authority is clearly
irreconcilable with the reasoning or theory of intervening higher authority . . . [the
court] should reject the prior circuit opinion as having been effectively overruled.”
Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Here, however,
there is insufficient caselaw to raise a serious question concerning Selfa’s
continued validity.
1.

Johnson I’s Definition of Force Is Consistent with Selfa’s
Definition of Intimidation under § 2113(a)
Inoshita first argues that Johnson I narrowed the range of conduct

that satisfies the elements clause. Johnson I held that “the phrase ‘physical force’”
in the ACCA’s definition of a “violent felony”7 “means violent force -- that is
force, capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.” 559 U.S. at
140 (emphasis omitted). Inoshita argues that this definition of physical force is

7

The ACCA’s definition of a violent felony is identical to the guidelines crime of
violence “elements clause.”
13

irreconcilable with Selfa. The court disagrees.
Johnson I’s definition of physical force is strikingly similar to Selfa’s.
Johnson I requires force “capable of causing physical pain or injury to another
person.” 559 U.S. at 140. And this force need not be actual force, but can be
threatened -- that is, the threatened use of force capable of causing physical pain or
injury to another. See § 4B1.2(a)(1). Selfa defined “intimidation” under
§ 2113(a) to mean “wilfully to take, or attempt to take in such a way that would
put an ordinary, reasonable person in fear of bodily harm.” 918 F.2d at 751.
Force that would put a reasonable person in fear of bodily harm (Selfa) and the
threatened use of force capable of causing physical pain or injury (Johnson I) are
functionally equivalent. Johnson I and Selfa are not inconsistent.
The Fourth Circuit similarly determined that Johnson I did not
undermine “earlier authorities concluding that § 2113(a) bank robbery” by
intimidation “is a crime of violence.” United States v. McNeal, __ F.3d __, 2016
WL 1178823, at *11 (4th Cir. Mar. 28, 2016). In part, McNeal reasoned that
“intimidation in § 2113(a) simply means ‘the threat of the use of force,’” id. (citing
United States v. Presley, 52 F.3d 64, 69 (4th Cir. 1995)), and that “conduct will be
deemed a threat if it was calculated to create the impression that any resistance by
the teller would be met with physical force.” Id. (citing United States v. Smith,
14

131 F.3d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 1997)). And Johnson I’s requirement that the force
threatened must be capable of causing physical pain or injury is entirely consistent
with long-standing precedent that “intimidation occurs ‘when an ordinary person
in the teller’s position reasonably could infer a threat of bodily harm from the
defendant’s acts.’” Id. (citing United States v. Wagstaff, 865 F.2d 626, 627 (4th
Cir. 1989)).
2.

Intimidation under Selfa’s Hypothetical Reasonable Person
Standard Satisfies the Purposeful Conduct Required under the
Elements Clause
Inoshita further argues that after Descamps and Johnson II, when

determining whether a § 2113(a) bank robbery is a crime of violence, the court
must limit its analysis to comparing the statutory elements without reference to the
particular facts of an offense, such as whether specific conduct would engender
fear in a hypothetical, reasonable person. Stated differently, Inoshita argues, for
the first time in his Reply, that the use, or threat, or attempt to use force required
by the elements clause must “consist of purposeful, not merely reckless, conduct.”
Reply at 4. He relies, in part, on Leocal v. Ashcroft, 541 U.S. 1, 9 (2004), which
held that the elements clause’s use of physical force “most naturally suggests a
higher degree of intent than negligent or merely accidental conduct.” From this,
Inoshita argues that the elements clause requires an offense element requiring that
15

a defendant actually engage in the use, or attempted or threatened use, of physical
force. Thus, according to Inoshita, Selfa’s hypothetical, reasonable person test
falls short. And Inoshita further argues that because the statutory element of
intimidation, as defined by Selfa, could be met without the actual, purposeful use,
attempted use, or threatened use of violent physical force, Selfa’s holding that a
bank robbery by intimidation under § 2113(a) is a crime of violence is
irreconcilable with recent law and no longer binding.
First, the court does not consider arguments raised for the first time in
reply. See United States v. Mejia Pimental, 477 F.3d 1100, 1105 n.9 (9th Cir.
2007) (“Because he raised this issue for the first time in his Reply Brief, we
consider it waived.”).
Second, even if the court did entertain the argument, while certainly
creative, Inoshita again fails to demonstrate an irreconcilable conflict with Selfa.
This is so primarily because a conviction under § 2113(a) does require proof of
intentional conduct that is tied to intimidation. Section 2113(a) bank robbery is a
general intent crime -- that is, as an element, it requires proof that “the defendant
possessed knowledge with respect to the actus reus of the crime (here, the taking
of property of another by . . . intimidation).” Carter v. United States, 530 U.S.
255, 268 (2000). Put differently, to be convicted of a § 2113(a) bank robbery, a
16

defendant must act purposefully by knowingly entering a bank and intending to
rob it by intimidation. See McNeal, __ F.3d __, 2016 WL 1178823, at *12 (“[T]o
secure a conviction of bank robbery ‘by intimidation,’ the government must prove
not only that the accused knowingly took property, but also that he knew that his
actions were objectively intimidating.”). And Selfa defines § 2113(a) intimidation
to include the very type of threat which is inherent in a defendant’s act of robbing
a bank -- “wilfully to take, or attempt to take, in such a way that would put an
ordinary, reasonable person in fear of bodily harm.” Selfa, 918 F.2d at 751.
Simply put, negligent or reckless conduct isn’t enough -- instead, a defendant must
act purposefully by knowingly entering a bank and intending to rob it by
intimidation.
In sum, the court finds that bank robbery under § 2113(a) remains a
“crime of violence” and therefore, Inoshita’s designation and sentence as a career
offender were not in error.8
///
///

8

Inoshita “urge[s] this Court to allow [him] to amend his § 2255 motion to add a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel” based on counsel’s statement that he was a career offender
in the event such statement forecloses the instant claim. See Reply at 13-15. Because the court
finds no error in classifying Inoshita a career offender, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
would fail.
17

V. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the court finds that Inoshita waived his right
to collaterally attack his sentence, and bank robbery under § 2113(a) remains a
crime of violence. Accordingly, the court DENIES Inoshita’s § 2255 Motion, but
GRANTS a certificate of appealability. See Fed. R. App. P. 22(b); Rule 11(a),
Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, May 20, 2016.

/s/ J. Michael Seabright
J. Michael Seabright
Chief United States District Judge

United States of America v. Inoshita, Cr. No. 15-00159 JMS, Civ. No. 16-00032 JMS-KSC,
Order: (1) Dismissing Defendant-Petitioner’s Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set
Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in a Federal Custody; and (2) Granting a Certificate of
Appealability

18