Ricks v. Matayoshi

Filing 140

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE Nos. 1, 3, AND 4 (ECF Nos. 72 , 74 , 75 ) AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE Nos. 1 AND 2 (ECF Nos. 76 , 77 ) re 119 - Signed by JUDGE HELEN GILLMOR on 4/12/2017. (emt, )< FONT SIZE=1>CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
MARIA THERESE RICKS, as
Guardian Ad Litem for her
minor son, M.R.,

)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
KATHRYN MATAYOSHI, in her
)
official capacity as
)
Superintendent of the State of )
Hawaii Department of
)
Education,
)
)
Defendant.
)
)
______________________________

CIV. NO. 16-00044 HG-KSC

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS IN LIMINE Nos. 1, 3, and 4
(ECF Nos. 72, 74, 75)
and
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS IN LIMINE Nos. 1 and 2
(ECF Nos. 76, 77)

The single count at trial is Plaintiff’s claim against
Defendant Kathryn Matayoshi in her official capacity as
Superintendent of the State of Hawaii Department of Education
alleging a violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
29 U.S.C. § 794.
Both Parties have filed Motions in Limine seeking to
exclude evidence at trial.

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I.

Defendant’s Motions in Limine
Def.’s Motion No. 1 (ECF No. 72):

Motion to Exclude
Lay Witness
Testimony of
Christina Juan,
Collyn Chang, and
Crystal Amelang

Def.’s Motion No. 3 (ECF No. 74):

Motion to Exclude
Evidence of or
Reference to Other
Litigation in Which
the Hawaii
Department of
Education Was a
Party

Defendant’s Motions No. 1 and 3 seek to preclude
Plaintiff from introducing evidence and testimony about
litigation and incidents of abuse alleged against the Hawaii
Department of Education.
Plaintiff opposes the Defendant’s Motions.

Plaintiff

states that she intends to call the following three witnesses:
(1)

Christina Juan, Principal of the Hawaii School for
the Deaf and Blind;

(2)

Collyn Chang, who claims her daughter was physically
abused at a Hawaii Department of Education school;
and,

(3)

Crystal Amelang, who Plaintiff describes as being a
classroom aid who witnessed abuse of other special
needs children.

(Pla.’s Opp. at p. 2, ECF No. 92).

2

Plaintiff claims that

the three witnesses’ testimony is relevant to a “pattern and
practice of using physical restraint and abusing special needs
children at DOE schools.”

(Id.)

Plaintiff believes evidence

of other litigation is relevant to her case.

(Pla.’s Opp. at

pp. 3-4, ECF No. 94).
Plaintiff has not established that the testimony of any
of the three witnesses is relevant.

Evidence is relevant if

it has a tendency to make a fact more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence, and if the
fact is of consequence in determining the action.

Fed. R.

Evid. 401.
None of the three witnesses identified by the Plaintiff
have knowledge of a fact that is of consequence in determining
the action with respect to M.R.

The only issue in this case

is if the Defendant violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act with respect to M.R.

This is not a class action.

The

facts of this case are limited to M.R.
A lay witness may testify to a matter only if she has
personal knowledge of it.

Fed. R. Evid. 602.

The lay

witness’s opinion must be rationally connected to personal
knowledge and helpful to the trier of fact.

Fed. R. Evid.

701.
A witness has personal knowledge only when testifying

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about events perceived through physical senses or when
testifying about opinions rationally based on personal
observations and experience.

United States v. Durham, 464

F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Simas, 937
F.2d 459, 464 (9th Cir. 1991).

Plaintiff does not claim

that any of the three witnesses have any personal knowledge
regarding M.R.

None of the three witnesses claim to have

personally observed any events with respect to M.R.

None of

the witnesses are alleged to have personal knowledge about
M.R.’s treatment at Koko Head Elementary School.

Testimony as

to the experiences of students at other schools operated by
the Department of Education is not admissible as it is not
helpful to the jury deciding the facts of this case.

Calif.

Foundation for Indep. Living Ctrs. v. Cnty of Sacramento, 142
F.Supp.3d 1035, 1045 (E.D. Cal. 2015).
The testimony concerning other incidents or allegations
of abuse is also not admissible because its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, and undue delay.
Fed. R. Evid. 403; Duran v. City of Maywood, 221 F.3d 1127,
1133 (9th Cir. 2000); Amatucci v. Delaware Hudson Ry. Co., 745
F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1984) (evidence of injuries suffered by
other employees of the defendant had no probative value on the

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issues before the jury and should not have been admitted).
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to introduce the
evidence to attempt to prove the Defendant State of Hawaii
Department of Education’s propensity to engage in abuse,
Plaintiff may not use other acts evidence to attempt to prove
propensity to engage in wrongful conduct on a particular
occasion.

Fed. R. Evid. 404(a); Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1);

Gates v. Rivera, 993 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1993) (Rule 404
applies in both civil and criminal cases).
Plaintiff has not established that evidence of other
lawsuits or litigation involving the State of Hawaii
Department of Education is relevant to any material facts in
this lawsuit.

Evidence of the nature suggested by Plaintiff

regarding other litigation is irrelevant and unfairly
prejudicial.

Mathis v. Phillips Chevrolet, Inc., 269 F.3d

771, 776 (7th Cir. 2001); Reddy v. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc., 2015
WL 4648008, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2015); In re
Homestore.com, Inc., 2011 WL 291176, *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25,
2011) (finding evidence of other litigation is irrelvant and
carries a high risk of prejudice).

Such evidence would

mislead the jury, confuse the issues, and cause undue delay.
Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 1 (ECF No. 72) is

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GRANTED.
Plaintiff is precluded from calling witnesses Christina
Juan, Collyn Chang, and Crystal Amelang to testify at trial.
Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 3 (ECF No. 74) is
GRANTED.
Plaintiff is precluded from introducing evidence or
reference to other cases and litigation involving the State of
Hawaii Department of Education or its employees.

Def.’s Motion No. 4 (ECF No. 75):

Motion to Exclude
Evidence of Hawaii
Revised Statutes §§
302A-114.3 and
302A-1141.4

Defendant seeks to preclude evidence of Hawaii statutes
that went into effect after the dates in which Plaintiff
alleges M.R. was denied meaningful access to a public
education.
Plaintiff may not rely on the newly enacted Hawaii
statute as it was not in effect at the time M.R. was enrolled
in Hawaii public school.

Evidence of a statute or legal

standard that is not applicable to the case at issue is not
relevant and is therefore inadmissible.

G. v. Hawaii Dept. Of

Human Srvcs., 703 F.Supp.2d 1112, 1123 (D. Haw. 2010); Results

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ByIQ LLC v. Netcapital.com LLC, 2013 WL 4835838, *3 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 11, 2013).

Act 206, codified at Haw. Rev. Stat. §§

302A-1141.3-.4, was not applicable to the Defendant during the
time frame that is relevant to the case.

The statute is not

applicable to the action before the Court and may not be
introduced at trial.
The evidence is also inadmissible because it is
prejudicial and would mislead the jury and confuse the issues.
Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 4 (ECF No. 75) is
GRANTED.
Plaintiff is precluded from introducing evidence or
reference to Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 302A-1141.3-.4 at trial.

II.

Plaintiff’s Motions in Limine
Pla.’s Motion No. 1 (ECF No. 76):

Motion to Exclude
Testimony of Casey
Ricks

Plaintiff seeks to exclude the testimony of the father of
M.R., Casey Ricks, Plaintiff’s ex-husband.

Plaintiff claims

his testimony would result in unfair prejudice due to the
couple’s divorce and the nature of their relationship.
Defendant opposes the Motion and seeks to call Casey Ricks at
trial as he has personal knowledge of disputed facts in this

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case.
Federal Rule of Evidence 602 provides that a lay witness
may testify about matters on which he has first-hand
knowledge.

Fed. R. Evid. 602.

Federal Rule of Evidence 701

provides that a lay witness may provide opinion testimony when
the witness’s opinion is rationally connected to the witness’s
personal perceptions.

United States v. Garrido, 596 F.3d 613,

616-17 (9th Cir. 2010) (witness did not have to be a weapons
expert to provide lay opinion testimony that he observed
defendant carrying a gun); United States v. Beck, 418 F.3d
1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2005) (lay witness’s eyewitness testimony
is admissible pursuant to Rule 701 when it is based upon
personal observations and recollection of concrete facts).
Casey Ricks’ testimony is highly relevant to the central
issues in this case.

Casey Ricks can testify regarding M.R.

and his needs between 2013 and 2015 based on his personal
observations and his recollection of concrete facts.

Dorn v.

Burlington No. Santa Fe R.R. Co., 397 F.3d 1183, 1192-93 (9th
Cir. 2005).

Casey Ricks can testify as to his knowledge and

opinions about his son, and his observations regarding the use
of the Rifton chair.

United States v. Whittemore, 776 F.3d

1074, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 2015); Ostad v. Oregon Health Sciences
Univ., 327 F.3d 876, 886 (9th Cir. 2003).

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Casey Ricks can

offer testimony as to personal interactions with Department of
Education employees.

Strong v. Valdez Fine Foods, 724 F.3d

1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2013).
Plaintiff argues that she will be prejudiced by Casey
Ricks’ testimony as a result of their divorce and acrimonious
relationship.

Defendant agrees that it will not seek

testimony from Casey Ricks as to the divorce or his current
relationship with Plaintiff.
90).

(Def.’s Opp. at p. 3, ECF No.

Limitation of the testimony to relevant information will

avoid prejudicial testimony.

Rhead v. Mundy, 2005 WL 5994165,

*6-*7 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2005).
Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 1 (ECF No. 76) is
DENIED.

Pla.’s Motion No. 2 (ECF No. 77):

Motion to Exclude
Hearsay Statements
of Jenny Zaboori

Plaintiff seeks to exclude all testimony as to the
opinions, recommendations, or oral remarks of Jenny Zaboori
until and unless Ms. Zaboori is called to testify as a
witness.
Ms. Zaboori is an occupational therapist who provided
services with respect to M.R. at Koko Head Elementary School.
Plaintiff’s Motion is premature.
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Plaintiff has not

established that all testimony concerning Ms. Zaboori and her
opinions, recommendations, and oral remarks would be
inadmissible.
Plaintiff may raise an objection at trial to the extent
she believes Defendant intends to offer inadmissible hearsay
evidence about Ms. Zaboori pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 802.
Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 2 (ECF No. 77) is
DENIED.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 1 (ECF No. 72) is
GRANTED.
Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 3 (ECF No. 74) is
GRANTED.
Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 4 (ECF No. 75) is
GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 1 (ECF No. 76) is
DENIED.
//
//
//
//

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Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 2 (ECF No. 77) is
DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 12, 2017, Honolulu, Hawaii.

________________________________
Helen Gillmor
United States District Judge

Maria Therese Ricks, as Guardian Ad Litem for her minor son,
M.R. v. Kathryn Matayoshi, in her official capacity as
Superintendent of the State of Hawaii Department of Education,
Civ. No. 16-00044 HG-KSC; ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS
IN LIMINE Nos. 1, 3, and 4 (ECF Nos. 72, 74, 75) and DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS IN LIMINE Nos. 1 and 2 (ECF Nos. 76, 77)
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