Rohr v. Crime Victims Compensation Commission

Filing 150

ORDER: 1) GRANTING DEFENDANT'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND 2) DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT re 134 , 137 - Signed by JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI on 7/22/2019. On the basis of the foregoing, Defendant's Second Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on March 6, 2019, is HEREBY GRANTED, and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on March 8, 2019, is HEREBY DENIED. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk's Office to e nter final judgment in favor of Defendant on August 20, 2019, unless Plaintiff files a motion for reconsideration of this Order by August 19, 2019. (emt, )COURT'S CERTIFICATE of Ser vice - Claudia Rohr served by First Class Mail to the address of record listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) on July 22, 2019. Registered Participants of CM/ECF received the document electronically to the email addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF HAWAII

CLAUDIA ROHR,

CIV. NO. 16-00162 LEK-RT
Plaintiff,

vs.
CRIME VICTIMS COMPENSATION
COMMISSION, OF THE STATE OF
HAWAI'I;
Defendant.

ORDER: 1) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT; AND 2) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On March 6, 2019, Defendant Crime Victims Compensation
Commission of the State of Hawaii (“Defendant” and “Commission”)
filed its Second Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defendant’s
Motion”), and on March 8, 2019, pro se Plaintiff Claudia Rohr
(“Plaintiff”) filed her Motion for Summary Judgment
(“Plaintiff’s Motion”).1

[Dkt. nos. 134, 137.]

On March 25,

2019, Defendant filed its memorandum in opposition to
Plaintiff’s Motion, and Plaintiff filed her memorandum in
opposition to Defendant’s Motion.

1

[Dkt. nos. 141, 143.]

On

On March 25, 2019, Plaintiff filed her Errata to
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Filed
March 8, 2019, and on April 15, 2019, Plaintiff filed her Second
Errata to Concise Statement of Material Facts in Support of
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (“Second Errata”). [Dkt.
no. 142, 146.]

April 11, 2019, Plaintiff and Defendant filed their respective
replies.

[Dkt. nos. 144, 145.]

The Court finds Defendant’s

Motion and Plaintiff’s Motion (collectively, “the Motions”)
suitable for disposition without a hearing pursuant to Rule
LR7.2(d) of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States
District Court for the District of Hawaii (“Local Rules”).
Defendant’s Motion is granted, and Plaintiff’s Motion is denied
for the reasons set forth below.
BACKGROUND
The factual and procedural background of this case is
set forth in this Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment and Denying Plaintiff’s Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment, filed September 29, 2017 (“Summary Judgment Order”),
and order denying Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the
Summary Judgment Order, filed on January 16, 2018.
nos. 94, 112.]

[Dkt.

The Court will only discuss the facts relevant

to the Motions.
On June 6, 2016, Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint
as the sole beneficiary on behalf of her deceased husband,
Scott Leland Andrews (“Andrews”),2 alleging a single claim -

2

This Court takes judicial notice that, on December 23,
2015, the Hawai`i Intermediate Court of Appeals (“ICA”) granted
Plaintiff’s motion for substitution of parties in Andrews v.
Crime Victim Compensation Commission, CAAP-12-0001109. See
infra, Discussion, Section I; Pltf.’s Concise Statement of
(. . . continued)
2

violation of Title II, Part A of the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (“ADA”), as amended by the Americans with
Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12131-34, and its implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 35
(“Title II Claim”).3

[Dkt. no. 14 at ¶¶ 61-65.]

On January 4,

2017, Defendant filed its motion for summary judgment, and on
March 14, 2017, Plaintiff filed her cross motion for summary
judgment.

[Dkt. nos. 44, 65.]

This Court granted Defendant’s

summary judgment motion after concluding Plaintiff lacked
standing to allege a claim on behalf of Andrews, and denied
Plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment.
Judgment Order at 17-18.]

[Summary

Judgment was issued in favor of

Defendant on January 16, 2018.

[Dkt. no. 113.]

On February 14,

2018, Plaintiff filed her Notice of Appeal, and on December 3,
2018, the Ninth Circuit issued its memorandum disposition
reversing the Summary Judgment Order, and remanding the case for
this Court to “consider in the first instance whether summary
judgment is appropriate on an alternate basis.”

[Dkt. no. 123

Material Facts in Supp. of Cross Motion for Summary Judgment
(“Pltf.’s CSOF”), filed 3/14/17 (dkt. no. 66), Decl. of Claudia
Rohr (“Pltf.’s Decl.”), Exh. E (Order Granting Motion for
Substitution of Parties).
3

Plaintiff filed an errata to the Amended Complaint on
August 10, 2016. Dkt. no. 21; and see 11/23/16 Order at 2-11
(discussing the factual allegations of the Amended Complaint).
3

at 2.4]

The Ninth Circuit issued its Mandate on December 26,

2018, and on December 27, 2018, this Court directed the parties
to file their respective summary judgment motions.
126 (Mandate), 128 (entering order).]

[Dkt. nos.

The Court now considers

anew whether summary judgment is appropriate.
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Andrews
was assaulted three times from 2007 to 2008, and the assaults
aggravated his pre-existing depression and/or bipolar disorder
and anxiety.

[Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 13-19; Pltf.’s Decl. at

¶¶ 26-30 (discussing the assaults and Andrews’s injuries).5]
Andrews submitted an application to the Commission on
December 7, 2009, for compensation for his medical and ambulance
bills resulting from the April 21, 2008 assault (“4/21/08
Application”), and the December 12, 2008 assault (“12/12/08
Application”).

[Amended Complaint at ¶ 21; Pltf.’s Decl.,

4

The memorandum disposition is also available at 744 F.
App’x 441.
5

Local Rule 56.1(g) states: “For purposes of a motion for
summary judgment, material facts set forth in the moving party’s
concise statement will be deemed admitted unless controverted by
a separate concise statement of the opposing party.” Plaintiff
did not file any separate concise statement of material facts,
and instead appears to rely upon Plaintiff’s CSOF in support of
both her memorandum in opposition to Defendant’s Motion, and
Plaintiff’s Motion. See, e.g., Pltf.’s Mem. in Opp. at 3, 8,
11; Pltf.’s Motion at 3-4, 11, 13. Plaintiff’s CSOF does not
directly address each of the statements of fact in Defendant’s
CSOF, however the Court will address this further, infra.
Additionally, the Court takes note of the changes stated in
Plaintiff’s Second Errata as it applies to Plaintiff’s CSOF.
4

Exh. Q (4/21/08 Application), Exh. R (12/12/08 Application).]
The 4/21/08 Application was assigned Case Number 09-0857 (“Case
857”), and the 12/12/08 Application was assigned Case Number 090858 (“Case 858”).

[Pltf.’s Decl., Exh. Q at 1, Exh. R at 1.]

The Commission denied Andrews’s 4/21/08 Application as
untimely in Case 857, but voted to pay Andrews’s medical bills
submitted with the 12/12/08 Application in Case 858.

[Amended

Complaint at ¶¶ 36, 39, 43, 46; Pltf.’s Decl., Exh. H (minutes
of the Commission’s vote on the two applications), Exh. I
(Commission Decision and Order in Case 858, dated 6/30/11).]
Plaintiff alleges the Commission’s separate Decision and Order
in Case 857 and 858 were “served upon Andrews” at some point
prior to August 5, 2011.

[Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 43, 53.]

Andrews appealed the Commission’s decisions as to both
applications to the Third Circuit Court of the State of Hawai`i
(“state court”), and the appeals were consolidated in Andrews v.
State of Hawaii Crime Victims Compensation Commission, Civil
No. 11-1-299 (“State Action”).6

[Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 43, 53;

Pltf.’s Decl., Exh. G (Decision & Order (1) Granting Appellee

6

Andrews filed separate appeals from the Commission’s
decisions in Case 857 and Case 858 under Civil No. 11-1-299 and
Civil No. 11-1-300, respectively, but the appeals were
consolidated at a later point under Civil No. 11-1-299. See,
e.g., Pltf.’s Decl., Exh. F (Def.’s motion to dismiss and/or
strike Plaintiff’s filing in the State Action, filed 8/24/12) at
1 (noting consolidated Civil Nos. 11-1-299 and 11-1-300).
5

Crime Victim Compensation Commission’s Motion to Dismiss and
(2) Dismissing Filings by Appellant Scott Andrews, filed
10/30/12 in State Action).]

On October 30, 2012, the state

court issued a decision and order dismissing Andrews’s appeal of
the Commission’s decisions due to the state court’s limited
scope of appeal pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. § 351-17(b), and
“the concomitant lack of jurisdiction to hear the appeal beyond
any claims that the Commission’s order or decision was in excess
of the Commission’s authority or jurisdiction.”
Exh. G at 8.]

[Pltf.’s Decl.,

The ICA affirmed the state court’s judgment on

September 30, 2015 and issued the Judgment on Appeal on
December 23, 2015.

[Def.’s Concise Statement of Material Facts

in Supp. of Motion (“Def.’s CSOF”), filed 3/6/19 (dkt. no. 135),
Decl. of Kendall J. Moser (“Moser Decl.”), Exhs. B (Summary
Dispo. Order filed in Andrews v. Crime Victim Compensation
Commission, No. CAAP-12-0001109), C (Judgment on Appeal, filed
in same).]

On April 5, 2016, the Hawai`i Supreme Court rejected

Plaintiff’s application for a writ of certiorari.

[Id.,

Exh. D.]
Plaintiff wrote a letter dated March 31, 2016
regarding the 4/21/08 Application (“3/31/16 Letter”) in
Case 857, and a letter dated April 1, 2016 regarding the
12/12/08 Application (“4/1/16 Letter”) in Case 858, to various
Commission personnel and various Department of the Attorney
6

General personnel.
(4/1/16 Letter).]

[Pltf.’s Decl., Exhs. X (3/31/16 Letter), Y
In the 3/31/16 Letter, Plaintiff stated the

Commission discriminated against Andrews based on his disability
by “refusing to accept Andrews’ treating psychiatrist’s
determination that Andrews was unable to file an application
with the Commission within 18 months of the April 21, 2008
assault due to psychological trauma of crime victimization on
top of pre-existing diagnosed psychiatric disability, [and]
refusing to grant a reasonable accommodation.”
Exh. X at 2.]

[Pltf.’s Decl.,

The 3/31/16 Letter also argued the Commission

used “too high a standard in their rule allowing for a late
application for good cause” and “excessive, intrusive
documentation requirement that had the effect of exacerbating
psychological trauma from crime victimization.

Defeating

accomplishment of the objectives of the Commission’s program
with respect to Scott Andrews.”

[Id. at 3.]

In the 4/1/16 Letter, Plaintiff requested “a
reasonable accommodation and/or reasonable modification of the
Commission’s procedures” by re-opening Case 858 to, inter alia,
correct the decision in Case 858 and the improper reduction of
the benefits that the Commission had voted to award Andrews, and
authorize compensation for certain medical expenses excluded

7

from Andrews’s award.

[Pltf.’s Decl., Exh. Y at 2-3.7]

Plaintiff alleges she submitted these letters “[b]efore the
State court proceedings were closed and while the adverse
decisions and orders were inconclusive.”
¶ 55.]

[Amended Complaint at

Pamela Ferguson-Brey, the Commission’s Executive

Director, responded in a letter dated April 5, 2016
(“Commission’s 4/5/16 Letter”).

[Pltf.’s Decl., Exh. Z.]

The

Commission’s 4/5/16 Letter acknowledged receipt of the 3/31/16
Letter, and the 4/1/16 Letter, and stated that the issues raised
in Plaintiff’s letters “were raised and considered in the
Commission hearing, the circuit court, and/or the appellate
courts,” and the cases were closed in light of the denial of
Plaintiff’s application for a writ of certiorari.
The instant case followed.

[Id.]

Plaintiff alleges the

Commission’s denial of Andrews’s application in Case 857 was
discriminatory because the Commission
screened out Andrews from participating in and
benefitting from the [Commission’s] program and
services using qualifying criteria that tended to
screen out applicants with posttraumatic stress
issues from crime victimization that would
substantially limit the applicant’s ability to
think about and communicate about the traumatic
incident and take the steps needed to fill out an

7

The excluded medical expenses include: “$357.00 Hilo
Hospital (service 12/13/2008), $182.28 HEPA (Dr. Morrisonservice 12/13/2008), and $543.72 (Dr. Pollard-Service
12/12/2008).” [Pltf.’s Decl., Exh. Y (emphases omitted).]
8

application and file within 18 months from the
traumatic incident. . . .
[Amended Complaint at ¶ 28.]

Sonja McCullen, the Commission’s

investigator, allegedly “utilized rules, policies, practices,
and procedures that required too high of standard [sic] of proof
of disability” that “subjected Andrews to greater scrutiny than
others, public stigmatization, and loss of psychiatric
information privacy rights,” thereby discriminating against
Andrews on the basis of his disability.

[Id. at ¶¶ 25, 28.]

With regard to Case 858, Plaintiff alleges the Commission
reduced Andrews’s payment award without reason and in a
discriminatory manner, and “applied the laws under which the
Commission functions differently to Andrews.”

[Id. at ¶ 49.]

Plaintiff alleges Andrews did not discover the details of the
discriminatory acts in both Case 857 and Case 858 until sometime
after February 12, 2013, because the Commission’s records were
filed under seal in the State Action, and only became available
after the records were transmitted to the ICA.
54.]

[Id. at ¶¶ 37,

Plaintiff seeks various forms of declaratory and

injunctive relief for her Title II Claim, an award of
compensatory damages, and any other appropriate relief.

[Id. at

pgs. 28-31.]
Defendant contends summary judgment is appropriate for
the following reasons: Plaintiff’s claims are barred by res
9

judicata, collateral estoppel, and/or the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine;8 Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages are barred by
the Eleventh Amendment; and Plaintiff’s claims are barred by a
two-year statute of limitations.

Plaintiff argues she is

entitled to summary judgment on her sole claim because there are
no genuine issues of material fact that Defendant discriminated
against Andrews based on his disability.
DISCUSSION
I.

Preliminary Matters
First, Plaintiff did not file a separate concise

statement of material facts to either support Plaintiff’s Motion
or dispute the statements of material facts in Defendant’s CSOF.
However, she relies upon Plaintiff’s CSOF, filed on March 14,
2017, in both Plaintiff’s Motion and her memorandum in
opposition.

See, e.g., Pltf.’s Motion at 3-4, 11, 13; Pltf.’s

Mem. in Opp. at 3, 8, 11.

In deciding not to file a concise

statement in support of Plaintiff’s Motion, Plaintiff explained
she was guided by Local Rule 10.2(d) which discourages
“submitting multiple copies of the same exhibit.”
reply at 4.]

[Pltf.’s

The United States Supreme Court has instructed

that “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation and
8

See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923);
D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
10

internal quotation marks omitted).

Given the Supreme Court’s

instructions regarding all pro se filings, the Court will
consider Plaintiff’s CSOF as to both Motions.
Second, the Moser Declaration, which seeks to
authenticate Defendant’s Exhibits A through D, is unsigned.
[Def.’s CSOF, Moser Decl. at ¶¶ 3-6, pg. 3.]

“An unsigned

declaration violates both 28 U.S.C. § 1746 and[Local] Rule 7.6.”
Quinones v. UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 250 F. Supp. 3d 692, 697 n.7
(D. Hawai`i 2017), reconsideration denied, CIVIL NO. 14-00497
LEK-RLP, 2017 WL 2802721 (D. Hawai`i June 28, 2017).9

Because

the Moser Declaration does not meet the requirements of § 1746,
and Local Rule 7.6, it cannot authenticate Defendant’s exhibits
submitted in support of Defendant’s Motion.
This Court may, however, take judicial notice of facts
that are “generally known” or “can be accurately and readily
determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned” and is not subject to reasonable dispute.
R. Evid. 201(b).

See Fed.

Matters of public record are not subject to

reasonable dispute.

See United States v. Raygoza-Garcia, 902

F.3d 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 2018) (“A court may take judicial
notice of undisputed matters of public record, which may include
court records available through PACER.” (citations omitted)).
9

On July 28, 2017, an appeal was filed as to 2017 WL
2802721.
11

“A court may take judicial notice of its own records in other
cases, as well as the records of an inferior court in other
cases.”

In re Korean Air Lines Co., 642 F.3d 685, 689 n.1 (9th

Cir. 2011) (citation, brackets, and internal quotation marks
omitted)); but see Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899
F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018) (“a court cannot take judicial
notice of disputed facts contained in such public records”
(citation omitted)).
The Court will consider the exhibits attached to the
Moser Declaration because those exhibits are: Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint filed in the instant action; [Moser Decl.,
Exh. A;] the Summary Disposition Order and Judgment on Appeal
from the ICA in the State Action; [id., Exhs. B, C;] and the
order from the supreme court rejecting Plaintiff’s application
for writ of certiorari, [id., Exh. D].

This Court will take

judicial notice of the existence of these documents, and, where
appropriate, judicial notice of adjudicative facts.

See Rule

201.
II.

Defendant’s Motion
A.

Statute of Limitations
Defendant argues this Court previously ruled that the

two-year statute of limitations applied to Plaintiff’s Title II
Claim, therefore it is time-barred.

[Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of

Motion at 13-14 (citing Court’s Order Denying Def.’s Motion to
12

Dismiss Amended Complaint Filed on June 6, 2016, filed 11/23/16
(“11/23/16 Order”) (dkt. no. 34) at 13).10]

Defendant also

argues the Hawai`i State Tort Liability Act, Haw. Rev. Stat.
§ 662-4 contains a two-year statute of limitations for actions
against the State.11
First, Defendant’s reliance upon the 11/23/16 Order is
incorrect because this Court issued a subsequent order
withdrawing that portion of the 11/23/16 Order.

See Order

Granting in Part and Denying in Part Pltf.’s Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order Denying Def.’s Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint Filed July 6, 2016, filed 2/28/17
(“Reconsideration Order”) (dkt. no 59).12

The Reconsideration

Order states:
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint states a plausible
argument that the four-year statute of
limitations period pursuant to [28 U.S.C.] § 1658
may apply to her claim because Andrews may have
been a person with disabilities under the ADAAA,
but he may not have been under the ADA and the
case law interpreting it prior to the ADAAA.

10

The 11/23/16 Order is also available at 2016 WL 6996980.

11

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 662-4 provides: “A tort claim against
the State shall be forever barred unless action is begun within
two years after the claim accrues, except in the case of a
medical tort claim when the limitation of action provisions set
forth in section 657-7.3 shall apply.”
12

The Reconsideration Order is also available at 2017 WL

776106.
13

This Court therefore GRANTS Plaintiff’s
Motion for Reconsideration insofar as this Court
WITHDRAWS the portion of the 11/23/16 Order
concluding that the two-year statute of
limitations period in Haw. Rev. Stat. § 657-7
applies to Plaintiff’s claim. This Court must
make findings of fact regarding Andrews’s alleged
disabilities to determine which limitations
period applies, and therefore the issue is not
appropriate in ruling on a motion to dismiss.
[Reconsideration Order at 9-10 (some emphases in original)
(citation omitted).]
Defendant has not submitted any evidence that
Andrews’s disability falls under either the ADA or the ADAAA,
therefore the Court cannot conclude whether the two- or fouryear statute of limitations applies.
Second, federal claims look to state statutes of
limitations “‘unless there is a federal statute of limitations
or a conflict with federal policy.’”

Bd. of Trs. of W.

Conference of Teamsters Pension Tr. Fund v. H.F. Johnson Inc.,
830 F.2d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added) (quoting
South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498, 106
S. Ct. 2039, 2044, 90 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1986)).

As stated in this

Court’s Reconsideration Order, if Plaintiff’s Title II Claim was
made possible by the ADAAA, then the four-year catch-all statute
of limitations under § 1658 would apply.
at 9.]

[Reconsideration Order

If Plaintiff’s claim arises under the ADA, then “we

borrow the statute of limitations applicable to the most
14

analogous state-law claim.”

See Sharkey v. O’Neal, 778 F.3d

767, 770 (9th Cir. 2015) (stating the four-year catch-all
statute of limitations was inapplicable where the plaintiff did
not contend that his claim was made possible by the post-1990
enactment of the ADAAA).

This district court has held Hawaii’s

two-year statute of limitations under Haw. Rev. Stat. § 657-7
applies to an ADA claim.

See Imamoto v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Civil

No. 08–00137 JMS/KSC, 2008 WL 4657811, at *4 (D. Hawai`i
Oct. 21, 2008).

Again, since Defendant has not addressed

whether Plaintiff’s claim arises under either the ADA or the
ADAAA, the Court cannot conclude whether it must borrow Hawaii’s
two-year, or apply § 1658’s four-year, statute of limitations to
Plaintiff’s claim.
However, even if the longer four-year limitations
period under § 1658 does apply, this Court must consider the
date that Plaintiff’s claim accrued.

“A federal claim accrues

when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury
that is the basis of the action.”
568, 574 (9th Cir. 2012).

Pouncil v. Tilton, 704 F.3d

The Ninth Circuit has stated that

“the ‘discovery rule,’ which postpones the beginning of the
limitations period from the date the plaintiff is actually
injured to the date when he discovers (or reasonably should
discover) he has been injured, . . . is already incorporated

15

into federal accrual law.”

Lukovsky v. City & Cty. of S.F., 535

F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
Defendant argues that, in Case 857, Plaintiff knew by
August 5, 2011 that Andrews’s request for an extension of the
application period was denied because the Amended Complaint
alleges “[t]he July 30 2011 adverse Commission Decision and
Order for CVCC Case No. 09-0857 was served upon Andrews and on
August 5, 2011 Andrews timely appealed to the Third Circuit
Court of Hawaii.”

[Amended Complaint at ¶ 43 (emphases added).]

The thrust of Defendant’s argument is that Plaintiff has
judicially admitted that Andrews received notice of his injury,
i.e., the denial of his untimely application in Case 857, and
therefore knew of, or had reason to know of, his injury on or
before August 5, 2011.13
To the extent the basis of Plaintiff’s claim as to
Case 857 is that Andrews was “screened out” from benefitting
from the Commission’s program and services, and was subjected to
certain practices that required “too high a proof of disability,
. . . overly broad documentation,” see Amended Complaint at
¶ 28, there is no question of material fact that Andrews knew or
13

“Judicial admissions are formal admissions in the
pleadings which have the effect of withdrawing a fact from issue
and dispensing wholly with the need for proof of the fact,” and
unless amended, are binding on the party who made them. Am.
Title Ins. Co. v. Lacelaw Corp., 861 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir.
1988) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
16

had reason to know at least by August 5, 2011, that his request
for accommodation based on his disability had been denied, and
that he was denied the benefits of the Commission’s program.
Plaintiff alleges Andrews “was invited by letter from the
Commission to appeal the [Case 857] Administrative Decision and
Order” and Andrews participated in a June 23, 2011 hearing de
novo before the Commission.

[Id. at ¶¶ 38-39.]

The Commission

“restricted the inquiry into more evidence of good cause for
Andrews submitting a late application.”
quotation marks omitted).]

[Id. at ¶ 39 (internal

Both Andrews and Plaintiff had an

opportunity to present Andrews’s patient records, including a
Hilo Medical Hospital report concerning his high blood pressure,
vertigo, and breathing problems, and to explain how Andrews’s
blood pressure rose when talking to police about the April 21,
2008 assault in the emergency room.

[Id. at ¶ 40.]

Andrews

explained to the Commission that, during the application period,
he was “so traumatized, anxious and hypervigilant” that he
remained at home at all times, and had blood pressure and
breathing problems that were life-threatening, and precluded him
from thinking about filing an application.

[Id.]

Nevertheless,

the Commission denied Andrews’s request to accept his late
application, and this decision was served upon Andrew prior to
August 5, 2011.

17

Plaintiff has not attempted to correct or amend these
allegations.

In her memorandum in opposition, she only argues

the Amended Complaint raises “issues of fact as to Plaintiff’s
and Andrews’s diligence and the timing of their discovery of the
cause of action, particularly in light of Plaintiff’s allegation
that they were denied access to the records for the cases before
the Commission.”
Order at 14).]

[Pltf.’s Mem. in Opp. at 17 (citing 11/23/16

She raises no arguments and points to no

specific portion of the Commission’s unsealed records that gave
rise to her claim, and relies exclusively on her pleadings to
raise a genuine issue of material fact.

Plaintiff cannot simply

rely on her pleadings to create a genuine issue of material fact
on a motion for summary judgment.

See Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c)(1)(A); Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975,
987 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that, after the moving party meets
its burden on summary judgment, the nonmoving party must show,
“beyond the pleadings, that there is a genuine issue for trial”
(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S. Ct.
2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986) (emphasis added))).

Instead, the

judicial admissions in the Amended Complaint support findings
that: Andrews made a request for a reasonable accommodation to
file a late application based on his disability; he appealed the
Commission’s denial of his request at a June 23, 2011 de novo
hearing; but he received the Commission’s July 30, 2011 adverse
18

decision denying his request prior to August 5, 2011.

Thus, at

the latest, Andrews was aware that he was injured - i.e., denied
the benefits of the Commission’s program despite his request for
a reasonable accommodation – and his claim accrued, on or before
August 5, 2011.

See Alexopulos ex rel. Alexopoulos v. S.F.

Unified Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 551, 554 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding
that the plaintiff’s claims accrued on the date the plaintiff
knew her son was excluded from school); Frame v. City of
Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 238 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“Drawing
from the text of § 12132, an injury occurs (and a complete and
present cause of action arises) under Title II when a disabled
individual has sufficient information to know that he has been
denied the benefits of a service, program, or activity of a
public entity.”); C.C. v. Rocklin Unified Sch. Dist., No. 2:17cv-02645-MCE-AC, 2019 WL 803904, at *4-5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 21,
2019) (ruling that the date the plaintiff learned of the
revocation of her interdistrict transfer permit was the date her
claim accrued).
Even considering the record in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff,14 there is no triable issue of material
fact that Andrews knew or had reason to know he was injured by

14

On a motion for summary judgment, the court must “view[]
the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”
Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 976 (9th Cir. 2013).
19

August 5, 2011, and that his injury was due to the Commission’s
decision not to allow him to file a late application based on
his disability.

Applying either the two-year or four-year

statute of limitations, Plaintiff’s claim based on the denial of
Andrews’s late application in Case 857 is time-barred.
With regard to the portion of Plaintiff’s claim based
on Case 858, Defendant argues Plaintiff knew of her claim by
April 24, 2013, when the Commission’s records were unsealed.
[Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Motion at 14 (citing Amended Complaint
at ¶¶ 46-48).]

Indeed, in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff

alleges the Commission “voted to agree that Andrews was a victim
of a [Haw. Rev. Stat. §] 351-32 enumerated crime and voted to
agree to pay his medical bills,” but the agency minutes
reflecting this vote were not provided to Andrews until
April 24, 2013.

[Amended Complaint at ¶ 46.]

Plaintiff alleges

Ms. McCullen drafted the Commission Decision and Order, and
“failed to include former Chair Lisa Dunn’s, former
Commissioners Dew Kaneshiro’s and Tom Watts’ decision, or the
conclusions of law and findings of fact incorporated therein,
agreed to by vote and recorded in the agency minutes,” and
“reduced the award to partial payment . . . without notice or
authorization, and thereby actively restricted Andrews’ access
to full and meaningful opportunity for crime victim compensation

20

and the due process procedures offered others.”

[Id. at ¶¶ 48-

49.]
Like Case 857, Plaintiff alleges Andrews was served
with a copy of the June 30, 2011 Commission Decision and Order
in Case 858 at some point prior to August 5, 2011, when Andrews
filed his appeal of the Commission’s decision in state court.15
[Id. at ¶ 53.]

In the June 30, 2011 decision, the Commission

noted Andrews’s application had been initially denied because
the Commission found that Andrews was “not a victim of a crime
for which compensation may be ordered,” and that two subsequent
de novo hearings took place on May 4, 2011 and June 23, 2011.
[Pltf.’s Decl., Exh. I at 818 (quotations omitted).]

The

Commission noted Andrews had presented evidence that he incurred
$2,483.27 in medical expenses for services rendered by the Hilo
Medical Center and Hawaii Emergency Physicians Associated as a
result of the injuries he sustained on December 12, 2008 related
to bruises on his chest and thigh, but there was a $744.98
adjustment by the medical providers.

[Id. at 819.]

The

Commission cited to Haw. Rev. Stat. § 351-31(c)-(d) (explaining
15

The Amended Complaint alleges
and Order in Case 858 is dated “July
appears to be a typographical error.
¶ 53. Plaintiff submitted a copy of
and Order for CVCC Case No. 09-0858”
Declaration, which is dated June 30,
Exh. I at 821.]

21

the Commission’s Decision
30, 2011,” however this
See Amended Complaint at
the “Commission Decision
as Exhibit I to Plaintiff’s
2011. [Pltf.’s Decl.,

how the Commission determines whether to make an award for
compensation and if any reduction in an award would apply),16 and
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 351-32 (identifying the “crimes to which
part III of [Haw. Rev. Stat. Chapter 351] applies”).17
819-20.]

[Id. at

Finally, the Commission found:
After considering the evidence and testimony
presented, the Commission finds that the
Applicant demonstrated that he had a bruise on
his chest and a bruise on his thigh following the
December 12, 2008 incident.
However, the Commission is limiting the
award to the December 12, 2008 medical treatment
of the two bruises inasmuch as (1) there is

16

The Commission’s conclusions of law stated, in relevant

part:
HRS § 341-31(c) provides that “[i]n
determining whether to make an award for
compensation, the Commission may consider any
circumstances it determines to be relevant, and
shall consider the behavior of the Applicant, and
whether the Applicant bears any share of
responsibility for the crime which caused injury
or death and the commission shall reduce the
amount of compensation in proportion to the
amount of responsibility for the crime which
caused the victim’s injury of death . . . .”
HRS § 351-31(d) provides that “[n]o order
may be made under this section unless the
commission finds that: (1) The act or omission
did occur; and (2) The injury or death of the
victim resulted from the act or omission.”
[Pltf.’s Decl., Exh. I at 819-20.]
17

Sections 351-31 and 351-33 were amended in 2019. See
2019 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 237, §§ 1-2. All citations to § 351-31
refer to the statute in effect in 2011.
22

insufficient evidence to determine whether Mr. L-- or any other individuals present caused these
bruises and (2) the Applicant bore a share of
responsibility for the December 12, 2008
incident.”
[Id. at 820 (emphases added).]

The Commission awarded Andrews

$1,738.29, to be paid to Hilo Medical Center and Hawaii
Emergency Physicians Associated, and Commission Chair Lisa A.
Dunn signed the decision.

[Id. at 820-21.]

Based on the information in Plaintiff’s Exhibit I,
Andrews and Plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury
that forms the basis of her Title II Claim as to Case 858 as of
August 5, 2011.

The June 30, 2011 decision informed Andrews

that the Commission voted to award Andrews payment pursuant to
Haw. Rev. Stat. Chapter 351, and that his award would be reduced
due to “insufficient evidence” as to who caused Andrews’s
bruises, and the Commission’s findings that Andrews “bore a
share of responsibility for the December 12, 2008 incident.”
[Id. at 820.]

Moreover, Andrews was aware the Commission

decided to award payment for certain medical expenses only,
which appears to be a calculation of the noted medical expenses
submitted by Andrews in the amount of $2,483.27, less the
$744.98 adjustment.

[Id. at 819-20.]

Although Plaintiff

alleges she “did not discover the discrimination . . . until she
had access to the un-redacted version of the consolidated second
record on appeal,” she was fully aware of Andrews’s injury,
23

i.e., that his award would be reduced due to his potential
involvement in the December 12, 2008 incident and limited to
certain medical expenses, upon receipt of the Commission’s
June 30, 2011 decision.
657 F.3d at 238.

See Alexopulos, 817 F.2d at 554; Frame,

Since Plaintiff judicially admitted the

June 30, 2011 decision in Case 858 was served on Andrews before
he filed his appeal in the State Action on August 5, 2011,
[Amended Complaint at ¶ 53,] Andrews knew or had reason to know
of his injury by that date.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Stanley v. Trustees of
California State University, 433 F.3d 1129 (9th Cir. 2006),
supports this reasoning.

The plaintiff in Stanley alleged she

was sexually harassed by her professor while attending
California State University, Sacramento (“University”), which
caused her to withdraw and return to the program multiple times
between the spring of 1999 and the fall of 2000.

Id. at 1132.

In September 2000, the plaintiff submitted a formal complaint of
sexual harassment to the University; in April 2001, the
plaintiff filed a claim with the California State Board of
Control seeking compensation for the sexual harassment and the
University’s failure to act on her complaints; and, on May 23,
2002, she filed her action in federal court alleging a hostile
environment sexual harassment claim, under 20 U.S.C. § 1682
(“Title IX”), based on the same factual allegations.
24

Id.

On appeal, the plaintiff argued the district court
incorrectly applied the applicable statute of limitations to her
Title IX claim.

The Ninth Circuit disagreed, explaining: “[T]he

touchstone for determining the commencement of the limitations
period is notice: a cause of action generally accrues when a
plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the
basis of his action.”

Id. at 1136 (alteration in Stanley)

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

In review of the

plaintiff’s arguments, the Ninth Circuit held that it was
“unnecessary to determine exactly when [the plaintiff] had
notice, because she certainly had reason to know of the injury
upon which her action was based when she filed a complaint
alleging virtually identical claims with the State Board of
Control on April 27, 2001.”

Id.

In the instant case, Plaintiff sought de novo hearings
in both Case 857 and 858 upon notice that Andrews’s applications
were denied.

[Pltf.’s Decl., Exh. AA (Crime Victim Compensation

Commission Appeal Hearing Script, dated June 23, 2011, noting
appeals in Case No. 09-856, Case 857, and Case 858).]

After the

Commission rejected Andrews’s request for modification of the
deadline to submit his claim in Case 857 based on his
disability, and Andrews received a reduced award in Case 858,
like the plaintiff in Stanley, Andrews filed a complaint
appealing those decisions to the state court.
25

At that point,

Andrews and Plaintiff were fully aware of Andrews’s injury, as
evidenced by their attempt to appeal the Commission’s decisions
to the state court.

Because there is no genuine issue of

material fact that Andrews was aware of his injury by August 5,
2011, the Court concludes his claim accrued as of this date.
1.

Tolling

Plaintiff argues equitable tolling applies to her
claim because she did not discover the discriminatory acts until
she received the Commission’s unsealed records, and she
mistakenly filed her complaint with the incorrect agency.
[Pltf.’s Mem. in Opp. at 18-20.]

With regard to a federal claim

that borrows a state’s statute of limitations, the state’s
tolling laws apply.

See TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 992

(9th Cir. 1999) (Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y. v. Tomanio,
446 U.S. 478, 485-86 (1980)).

Because it is not clear at this

stage of the case whether the ADA or ADAAA gave rise to
Plaintiff’s claim, and a claim under the ADA would borrow
Hawaii’s two-year statute of limitations while § 1658 would
apply to a claim under the ADAAA, this Court must consider both
state and federal tolling provisions.

The Hawai`i Supreme Court

has stated: “‘Equitable tolling’ is defined as ‘[t]he doctrine
that the statute of limitations will not bar a claim if the
plaintiff, despite diligent efforts, did not discover the injury
until after the limitations period had expired.’”
26

Narmore v.

Kawafuchi, 112 Hawai`i 69, 75 n.15, 143 P.3d 1271, 1277 (2006)
(alteration in Narmore) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 579 (8th
ed. 2004)).

Under federal tolling provisions, “a litigant

seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two
elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,
and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way.”
Redlin v. United States, 921 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 2019)
(citation and quotation marks omitted).

This doctrine cannot be

applied “to avoid the consequence of one’s own negligence and
does not apply when a late filing is due to claimant’s failure
to exercise due diligence in preserving his legal rights.”

Id.

(citation and quotation marks omitted).
In the instant case, equitable tolling under either
state or federal law would not save Plaintiff’s claim.
Plaintiff had notice of Andrews’s injury by August 5, 2011 when
she filed the State Action, but was not diligent because she did
not attempt to assert her Title II Claim until April 5, 2016.
[Complaint (dkt. no. 1).]

Although she argues she diligently

pursued the Commission’s records that were previously sealed in
the State Action, which led to the discovery of the Commission’s
alleged discrimination, her efforts were misguided.

As

discussed above, none of those records were necessary for
Andrews or Plaintiff to file a Title II Claim because the
Commission’s adverse decisions in Case 857 and Case 858 provided
27

ample notice of the cause of action.

Further, because

Plaintiff’s claim did not require access to the Commission’s
records, no extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant
equitable tolling.
To the extent Plaintiff argues she “filed a defective
pleading in the wrong court during the statute of limitations,”
see Pltf.’s Mem. in Opp. at 20, she has not submitted a record
of this filing to support her claim.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Even if Plaintiff’s argument could be construed as a statement
made based upon her personal knowledge, Plaintiff did not
explain when the alleged erroneous filing was made and if it
would have fallen within either statute of limitations, which
court it was filed in, or if it actually plead a Title II Claim.
The Court therefore rejects Plaintiff’s assertions that
equitable tolling applies.
2.

Continuing Violation

Nor is there a continuing violation that would make
Plaintiff’s claim timely.

“The continuing violations doctrine

extends the accrual of a claim if a continuing system of
discrimination violates an individual’s rights up to a point in
time that falls within the applicable limitations period.”
Douglas v. Cal. Dep’t of Youth Authority, 271 F.3d 812, 822 (9th
Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
This district court has recognized that “‘[t]he continuing
28

violations doctrine extends the accrual of a claim if
a continuing system of discrimination violates an individual’s
rights up to a point in time that falls within the applicable
limitations period.’”

Toma v. Univ. of Hawaii, 304 F. Supp. 3d

956, 964 (D. Hawai`i 2018) (emphasis in Toma) (quoting Douglas
v. Cal. Dep’t of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d 812, 822 (9th Cir. 2001)
Plaintiff’s 2016 letters to the Commission asking that
it voluntarily provide a reasonable accommodation for Andrews’s
prior applications, and the Commission’s denial of these
letters, see Pltf.’s Decl., Exhs. X, Y, Z, was not a discreet
act that would create either a new cause of action or a
continuing violation.

“A ‘refusal to undo a discriminatory

decision is not a fresh act of discrimination.’”

Conway v.

Standard Ins., 23 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1200 (E.D. Wash. 1998)
(quoting Martin v. Southwestern Virginia Gas Co., 135 F.3d 307,
310 (4th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted)).

Moreover, “a mere

continuing impact from past violations is not actionable.”

Knox

v. Davis, 260 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in Knox)
(citations and quotation marks omitted) (holding that the
defendant’s repeated denials of the plaintiff’s privileges with
her clients was a continuing effect of her original suspension).
The Court therefore finds the continuing violation
doctrine does not preclude application of either the two-year or
four-year statute of limitations to Plaintiff’s claim.
29

Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of
Defendant because there is no genuine issue of material fact
that Plaintiff was aware of Andrews’s injury that gave rise to
the instant action, by August 5, 2011.

Under either the two-

year of four-year statute of limitations, Plaintiff’s Title II
Claim would be time-barred.
B.

The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Even if Plaintiff’s claim was not time-barred, this

Court would grant Defendant’s Motion based on the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine.
“The Rooker—Feldman doctrine provides that
federal district courts lack jurisdiction to
exercise appellate review over final state court
judgments.” Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474
F.3d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 2007) (some citations
omitted) (citing Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413, 415–16, 44 S. Ct. 149, 68 L. Ed.
362 (1923)); District of Columbia Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482–86, 103 S.
Ct. 1303, 75 L. [Ed. 2d 206 (1983)].
“Essentially, the doctrine bars ‘state-court
losers complaining of injuries caused by statecourt judgments rendered before the district
court proceedings commenced’ from asking district
courts to review and reject those judgments.”
Id. (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S. Ct. 1517,
161 L. Ed. 2d 454 (2005)).
In re Price, 589 B.R. 690, 698 (D. Hawai`i 2018) (alteration in
Price) (citation omitted) (ruling that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine did not preclude the plaintiff’s federal claims because
the federal action did not seek review of the state court’s
30

judgment).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to both final

decisions and interlocutory orders.

G.C. & K.B. Invs., Inc. v.

Wilson, 326 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
The doctrine bars both direct appeals of a state court judgment,
and de facto appeals.

Fowler v. Guerin, 899 F.3d 1112, 1119

(9th Cir. 2018) (citing Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th
Cir. 2013)).

However,

This doctrine occupies “narrow ground,” Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S.
280, 284, 125 S. Ct. 1517, 161 L. Ed. 2d 454
(2005), . . . and “does not preclude a plaintiff
from bringing an ‘independent claim’ that, though
similar or even identical to issues aired in
state court, was not the subject of a previous
judgment by the state court,” Cooper v. Ramos,
704 F.3d 772, 778 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 532, 131 S. Ct.
1289, 179 L. Ed. 2d 233 (2011)).
Id.
Although the clearest case for the application of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine is one where “a federal plaintiff
asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a
state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based
on that decision,” under certain circumstances it may still
apply.

See Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859

(9th Cir. 2008).

The Ninth Circuit has stated:

Rooker–Feldman may also apply where the parties
do not directly contest the merits of a state
court decision, as the doctrine “prohibits a
federal district court from exercising subject
matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de
31

facto appeal from a state court judgment.”
Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th
Cir. 2004) (citing Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334
F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003)). A federal action
constitutes such a de facto appeal where “claims
raised in the federal court action are
‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s
decision such that the adjudication of the
federal claims would undercut the state ruling or
require the district court to interpret the
application of state laws or procedural rules.”
Bianchi, 334 F.3d at 898. In such circumstances,
“the district court is in essence being called
upon to review the state court decision.”
Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16, 103 S. Ct. 1303.
Id.
Plaintiff argues the instant action is not an appeal
of the State Action because it alleges discrimination under
Title II, which was not at issue in the State Action.

This

Court disagrees because the label of Plaintiff’s claims in her
state and federal proceedings do not necessarily govern the
application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
“[A federal court] cannot simply compare the
issues involved in the state-court proceeding to
those raised in the federal-court plaintiff’s
complaint.” Kenmen Eng’g v. City of Union, 314
F.3d 468, 476 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing other
circuits’ authority in accord).[18] Rather, under
Rooker–Feldman, “we must pay close attention to
the relief sought by the federal-court
plaintiff.” Id.
Bianchi, 334 F.3d at 900 (emphases in Bianchi).

18

Kenmen was overruled in part on other grounds by Exxon
Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291-92, and Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459,
465-66 (2006).
32

Here, Plaintiff requests the same relief in the
instant action as the State Action, which was an appeal of the
Commission’s decisions in Case 857 and Case 858.

For example,

Plaintiff asks this Court to order Defendant to take corrective
action in Case 857 by, inter alia, providing a new hearing “on
the merits” to permit Plaintiff to present new evidence, and to
have Defendant “withdraw the June 30, 2011 Commission Decision
and Order and replace it with a new unbiased version.”
Complaint, Prayer for Relief at ¶ C.]

[Amended

Plaintiff seeks similar

corrective measures in Case 858, to have Defendant “redraft the
Commission Decision and Order and correct the award of the
victim compensation.”

[Id. at ¶ D.]

In other words, Plaintiff

is again seeking a review of the Commission’s decisions to
obtain a different outcome than what was achieved in the State
Action, but doing so in the guise of a Title II Claim.

Nor is

Plaintiff’s request for declaratory and compensatory relief, or
an order to force the Commission to comply with Title II, in any
way different than her state court appeal of the Commission’s
decisions.

[Id. at ¶¶ A, B.]

The gravamen of her request is

based on a review of Andrews’s individual applications, not a
general challenge of the Commission’s procedures.

See Feldman,

460 U.S. at 482-486 (discussing the distinction between a
general challenge to the validity of a state bar rule which the
district court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear, and a
33

particular challenge to a state court decision).

If this Court

were to rule in favor of Plaintiff and grant her requested
relief, it would impermissibly overturn the state court’s ruling
that “an appeal based solely on the Commission’s decisions on
the facts to grant or deny an award should not be reviewable.”
See Pltf.’s Decl., Exh. G at 4 (emphasis added); Bianchi, 334
F.3d at 900 (“we cannot grant the relief [the plaintiff] seeks
without ‘undoing’ the decision of the state court”).

In doing

so, this Court would trespass upon subject matter jurisdiction
reserved solely for the United States Supreme Court.

See Exxon

Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292 (citations omitted) (holding that 28
U.S.C. § 1257 “vests authority to review a state court’s
judgment solely” with the United States Supreme Court).

Thus,

even if Plaintiff’s claim were not time-barred, this Court would
lack subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claim based
on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, Defendant’s Second
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on March 6, 2019, is HEREBY
GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on
March 8, 2019, is HEREBY DENIED.

The Court DIRECTS the Clerk’s

Office to enter final judgment in favor of Defendant on
August 20, 2019, unless Plaintiff files a motion for
reconsideration of this Order by August 19, 2019.
34

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAI`I, July 22, 2019.

CLAUDIA ROHR VS. CRIME VICTIMS COMPENSATION COMMISSION; CV 1600162 LEK-RT; ORDER: (1) GRANTING DEFENDANT'S SECOND MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND (2) DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

35