Rohr v. Crime Victims Compensation Commission

Filing 59

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION OR RECONSIDERATION OF THE ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED JULY 6, 2016 re 37 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI on 02/28/2017. (eps, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications served by first class mail on February 28, 2017

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
CLAUDIA ROHR,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
CRIME VICTIMS COMPENSATION
)
COMMISSION of the State of
)
Hawai`i,
)
)
)
Defendant.
_____________________________ )

CIVIL 16-00162 LEK-KSC

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED JULY 6, 2016
On November 23, 2016, this Court issued its Order
Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint Filed on
June 6, 2016 (“11/23/16 Order” and “Motion to Dismiss”).
nos. 17 (Motion to Dismiss), 34 (11/23/16 Order).]

[Dkt.

On

December 8, 2016, pro se Plaintiff Claudia Rohr (“Plaintiff”)
filed a motion seeking reconsideration of part of the 11/23/16
Order (“Motion for Reconsideration”).

[Dkt. no. 37.]

On

December 27, 2016, Defendant Crime Victims Compensation
Commission (“Defendant”) filed its memorandum in opposition, and
Plaintiff filed her reply on January 13, 2017.
49.]

[Dkt. nos. 42,

The Court has considered the Motion for Reconsideration as

a non-hearing matter pursuant to Rule LR7.2(e) of the Local Rules
of Practice of the United States District Court for the District
of Hawai`i (“Local Rules”).

After careful consideration of the

motion, supporting and opposing memoranda, and the relevant legal
authority, Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is HEREBY
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART for the reasons set forth
below.

Specifically, this Court GRANTS the Motion for

Reconsideration insofar as this Court HEREBY WITHDRAWS the
portion of the 11/23/16 Order concluding that a two-year statute
of limitations period applies to Plaintiff’s claim.

The Motion

for Reconsideration is DENIED in all other respects.
BACKGROUND
The relevant background is set forth in the 11/23/16
Order, and this Court only repeats the events that are relevant
to the Motion for Reconsideration.
On June 6, 2016, Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint,
and she filed an errata to the Amended Complaint on August 10,
2016.

[Dkt. nos. 14, 21.]

Plaintiff filed another errata to the

Amended Complaint on December 8, 2016.

[Dkt. no. 36.]

The Amended Complaint alleges a single claim –
violation of Title II, Part A of the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (“ADA”), as amended by the Americans with
Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12131-34; and its implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 35.
[Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 61-65.]
In the Motion to Dismiss, Defendant sought dismissal of
the Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the

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ground that Plaintiff’s claim was time-barred.

In the 11/23/16

Order, this Court concluded that the two-year statute of
limitations period in Haw. Rev. Stat. § 657-7 applied to
Plaintiff’s claim.

[11/23/16 Order at 12-13.]

Although this

Court agreed with Defendant that a possible statute-oflimitations defense was apparent on the face of the Amended
Complaint, this Court found that there were issues of fact
regarding Plaintiff’s and Scott Andrews’s diligence and the
timing of their discovery of the cause of action.
therefore denied Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

This Court

[Id. at 14-15.]

In the Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff argues
that this Court erred in concluding that the two-year statute of
limitations applies.

Plaintiff argues that the four-year statute

of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 1658 applies because her claim
would not have been possible under the ADA, prior to the ADAAA.
STANDARD
This Court has previously stated that a motion for
reconsideration
“must accomplish two goals. First, a motion for
reconsideration must demonstrate reasons why the
court should reconsider its prior decision.
Second, a motion for reconsideration must set
forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature
to induce the court to reverse its prior
decision.” See Davis v. Abercrombie, Civil No.
11-00144 LEK-BMK, 2014 WL 2468348, at *2 (D.
Hawaii June 2, 2014) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). . . . “Mere disagreement
with a previous order is an insufficient basis for
reconsideration.” Davis, 2014 WL 2468348, at *3
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n.4 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Riley v. Nat’l Ass’n of Marine Surveyors, Inc., Civil No. 1400135 LEK-RLP, 2014 WL 4794003, at *1 (D. Hawai`i Sept. 25,
2014).

Local Rule 60.1 states, in relevant part:
Motions for reconsideration of interlocutory
orders may be brought only upon the following
grounds:
(a) Discovery of new material facts not
previously available;
(b)

Intervening change in law;

(c)

Manifest error of law or fact.

Motions asserted under Subsection (c) of this rule
must be filed and served not more than fourteen
(14) days after the court’s written order is
filed. . . .
DISCUSSION
I.

Timeliness of the Motion for Reconsideration
Defendant first argues that Plaintiff’s Motion for

Reconsideration is untimely because Plaintiff failed to file it
within fourteen days after this Court issued the 11/23/16 Order.
Fourteen days after November 23, 2016 was December 7, 2016.
Plaintiff filed the Motion for Reconsideration on December 8,
2016.
Local Rule 6.1 states, in relevant part, that “[u]nless
otherwise specified in these rules, time periods prescribed or
allowed shall be computed in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 6
and other applicable court rules.”
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d) states,

in relevant part: “When a party may or must act within a
specified time after being served and service is made under
Rule 5(b)(2)(C) (mail) . . . 3 days are added after the period
would otherwise expire under Rule 6(a).”

Because the district

court served Plaintiff with the 11/23/16 Order by mail, pursuant
to Rule 6(d), Plaintiff had three additional days to file her
motion for reconsideration.

Thus, her motion was due not more

than seventeen days after November 23, 2016.

Seventeen days

after November 23 was Saturday, December 10, 2016.

Pursuant to

Local Rule 6.1, the deadline had to be a business day and was
therefore Friday, December 9, 2016.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, filed
December 8, 2016, was therefore timely.
II.

December 8, 2016 Errata to the Amended Complaint
Plaintiff filed her second errata to the Amended

Complaint after this Court issued the 11/23/16 Order.

In the

Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff states that she agrees with
the 11/23/16 Order’s recitation of the factual allegations in
this case, except for “a few clarifications needed” in light of
the second errata.

[Motion for Reconsideration at 3.]

She

points out that a date this Court cited on page 8 of the 11/23/16
Order and a date cited on page 10, footnote 3, are corrected in
the second errata.

[Id.]

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This Court acknowledges the changes that Plaintiff made
in the second errata, but this Court CONCLUDES that the changes
in those dates do not affect the merits of the issues addressed
in the 11/23/16 Order and, therefore, the filing of the second
errata does not warrant reconsideration of the 11/23/16 Order.
III. Statute of Limitations
Plaintiff argues that this Court erred when it
concluded that the two-year statute of limitations in Haw. Rev.
Stat. § 657-7 applies to Plaintiff’s claim because 28 U.S.C.
§ 1658(a) applies.

Section 1658(a) states: “Except as otherwise

provided by law, a civil action arising under an Act of Congress
enacted after the date of the enactment of this section may not
be commenced later than 4 years after the cause of action
accrues.”

The United States Supreme Court has stated that “a

cause of action ‘aris[es] under an Act of Congress enacted’ after
December 1, 1990 — and therefore is governed by § 1658’s 4–year
statute of limitations — if the plaintiff’s claim against the
defendant was made possible by a post–1990 enactment.”

Jones v.

R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 382 (2004).
The ADA was originally enacted on July 26, 1990.
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101–336, 104 Stat. 327. The Rehabilitation
Act was originally enacted on September 26, 1973.
But Congress amended both of these acts after
December 1, 1990. On September 25, 2008, Congress
enacted the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”),
Pub. L. No. 110–325, 122 Stat. 3553. This act
revised the definition of “disability” for both
the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. See id. § 4,
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122 Stat. at 3555; id. § 7, 122 Stat. at 3558
(redefining a person with a disability for
Rehabilitation Act purposes in terms of the
revised definition of disability for the amended
ADA).
Under Jones, the statute of limitations that
applies to Dickinson’s first four claims for
relief turns on whether her ADA and Rehabilitation
Act claims were “made possible” by the ADAAA’s
revised definition of disability. Jones, 541 U.S.
at 382, 124 S. Ct. 1836. Before the ADA was
amended in 2008, it defined the disability of an
individual, in relevant part, as “a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such
individual.” ADA § 3(2)(A), 104 Stat. at 329–30
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)). The
act itself contained no further definition of
“physical or mental impairment,” “substantially
limits,” or “major life activities.” See id.
Before the ADAAA’s enactment, the federal
courts had interpreted these key terms of the
definition of disability. . . .
Dickinson v. Univ. of N. Carolina, 91 F. Supp. 3d 755, 764
(M.D.N.C. 2015) (some citations omitted).

The district court

went on to discuss the holdings in Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky,
Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), and their progeny.
Dickinson, 91 F. Supp. 3d at 764-65.
After passage of the ADAAA, however, these
cases no longer reflect current law. See Jacobs
v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562,
573–74 (4th Cir. 2015) (observing that “[i]n
enacting the ADAAA, Congress abrogated earlier
inconsistent caselaw”). In passing the ADAAA,
Congress explicitly expressed, in its “purposes”
section, its disagreement with the Supreme Court’s
interpretations of the ADA in Toyota and Sutton,
and the applications of those cases by the lower
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federal courts. ADAAA § 2(b)(2)-(5), 122 Stat. at
3554. Congress enacted several “rules of
construction” intended to overrule these cases:
The definition of “disability” in paragraph
(1) shall be construed in accordance with the
following:
(A) The definition of disability in
this Act shall be construed in favor of
broad coverage of individuals under this
Act, to the maximum extent permitted by
the terms of this Act.
(B) The term “substantially limits”
shall be interpreted consistently with
the findings and purposes of the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008.
(C) An impairment that substantially
limits one major life activity need not
limit other major life activities in
order to be considered a disability.
(D) An impairment that is episodic or
in remission is a disability if it would
substantially limit a major life
activity when active.
(E)(i) The determination of whether an
impairment substantially limits a major
life activity shall be made without
regard to the ameliorative effects of
mitigating measures such as . . . .
Id. § 4, 122 Stat. at 3555–56 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 12102(4)); see also Carmona v. Sw.
Airlines Co., 604 F.3d 848, 855 (5th Cir. 2010)
(“These amendments would be very favorable to
Carmona’s case if they are applicable, because
they make it easier for a plaintiff with an
episodic condition like Carmona’s to establish
that he is an ‘individual with a disability.’”).
Id. at 765–66 (alterations in Dickinson) (some citations
omitted).

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In the instant case, Plaintiff alleges that Andrews was
an individual with disabilities under the ADAAA, [Amended
Complaint at ¶ 19,] because: “[p]rior to 2007 Andrews had preexisting psychiatric impairment for which he was prescribed
medication – reoccurring major depression or bipolar disorder and
anxiety, diagnosed by his treating psychiatrist . . . .

Major

depressive mood disorders are reoccurring or episodic in nature
and can be controlled with medication.”

[Id. at ¶ 13.]

Further,

he “suffered psychological trauma from being a victim of crime
with posttraumatic stress (PTSD) issues on top of reoccurring
major depression and anxiety.”

[Id. at ¶ 15.]

In considering

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, this Court assumes that all of the
factual allegations in the Amended Complaint are true, although
it is “‘not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as
a factual allegation.’”

See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555,
127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)).
This Court CONCLUDES that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
states a plausible argument that the four-year statute of
limitations period pursuant to § 1658 may apply to her claim
because Andrews may have been a person with disabilities under
the ADAAA, but he may not have been under the ADA and the case
law interpreting it prior to the ADAAA.

See id. at 678 (“To

survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient

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factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570, 127 S. Ct. 1955)).
This Court therefore GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration insofar as this Court WITHDRAWS the portion of
the 11/23/16 Order concluding that the two-year statute of
limitations period in Haw. Rev. Stat. § 657-7 applies to
Plaintiff’s claim.

This Court must make findings of fact

regarding Andrews’s alleged disabilities to determine which
limitations period applies, and therefore the issue is not
appropriate in ruling on a motion to dismiss.
This Court emphasizes that this Order does not affect
the 11/23/16 Order insofar as, even if this Court ultimately
concludes that a two-year statute of limitations period applies
to Plaintiff’s claim, there are issues of fact as to when the
statute of limitations began to run, and whether some type of
tolling may be available.

[11/23/16 Order at 14.]
CONCLUSION

On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiff’s December 8,
2016 Motion for Reconsideration of the Order Denying Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint Filed July 6, 2016, is HEREBY
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

The Motion for

Reconsideration is GRANTED insofar as this Court HEREBY WITHDRAWS
the portion of its November 23, 2016 order concluding that a two-

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year statute of limitations period applies to Plaintiff’s claim.
The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED in all other respects.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, February 28, 2017.

/s/ Leslie E. Kobayashi
Leslie E. Kobayashi
United States District Judge

CLAUDIA ROHR VS. CRIME VICTIMS COMPENSATION COMMISSION; CIVIL 1600162 LEK-KSC; ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED JULY 6,
2016

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