Plotkins v. Real Property Assessment Division

Filing 26

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF NO. 8 ) WITH PREJUDICE - Signed by JUDGE HELEN GILLMOR on 7/20/2016. "Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 8 ) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Com plaint (ECF No. 1 ) is DISMISSED WITHPREJUDICE. The Clerk of the Court is ordered to close the case." (emt, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Pierre A. Plotkins shall be served by first class mail at the address of record on July 21, 2016.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
PIERRE A. PLOTKINS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
REAL PROPERTY ASSESSMENT
DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE, COUNTY OF KAUAI,
Defendant.

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Civ. No. 16-00163 HG-KSC

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 8)
WITH PREJUDICE

Plaintiff Pierre A. Plotkins has filed a Complaint against
the Real Property Assessment Division of the Department of
Finance for the County of Kauai.

Plaintiff claims that the

County of Kauai improperly denied his requests for a home
exemption credit that resulted in him having to pay higher
property taxes than he should owe.
Plaintiff asserts the County initiated foreclosure
procedures as a result of Plaintiff’s failure to pay his property
taxes.

Plaintiff claims that the County took his property in

violation of the Due Process Clause of the 5th and 14th
Amendments to the United States Constitution.
The County of Kauai has filed a Motion to Dismiss asserting

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that Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred from being litigated in
federal court because his claims were already adjudicated by
Hawaii State Courts.

The County asserts that Plaintiff already

challenged the issues relating to the home exemption credit and
the calculation of his property taxes before the Tax Appeal Court
of the State of Hawaii in 2007 and 2011.

The County states the

Plaintiff also filed a proceeding in the Fifth Circuit Court of
the State of Hawaii for removal of his property tax lien filed on
April 4, 2012, which was denied and dismissed on December 27,
2012.
The Court finds that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction
over Plaintiff’s Complaint as his claims are barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.

413, 415-16 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983).
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 8) is GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 15, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Complaint.

(ECF No.

1).
On May 9, 2016, Defendant filed DEFENDANT REAL PROPERTY
ASSESSMENT DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, COUNTY OF KAUAI’S
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MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT FILED APRIL 15, 2016.

(ECF No. 8).

On May 10, 2016, the Court issued a briefing schedule
indicating Plaintiff was to file his Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss on or before May 24, 2016.

(ECF No. 9).

On May 18, 2016, Defendant filed an Errata to its Motion to
Dismiss.

(ECF No. 11).

On May 31, 2016, Plaintiff filed his Opposition to
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

(ECF No. 14).

On the same date, Plaintiff filed a Request for an Extension
of Time requesting the Court to accept the late filing of his
Opposition.

(ECF No. 14-6).

On June 2, 2016, the Court issued a Minute Order granting
Plaintiff’s Request for an Extension of Time and accepted the
late filing of Plaintiff’s Opposition.

(ECF No. 17).

The Court

also permitted Defendant additional time to file its Reply and
continued the hearing.

(Id.)

On June 13, 2016, Plaintiff filed a document entitled,
“PLAINTIFFS’ PIERRE A PLOTKINS NON-HEARING MOTION FOR EXCUSE FOR
ELECTRONIC SUBMITTAL AND DELAYED MAIL FILINGS FROM CANADA.”

(ECF

No. 18).
On June 22, 2016, the Court issued a Minute Order denying
Plaintiff’s Motion (ECF No. 18) as moot because Plaintiff’s
filing had already been accepted by the Court and Plaintiff did
not have any other pending documents for the Court to review.

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(ECF No. 22).
On July 12, 2016, Plaintiff filed a document entitled,
“PLAINTIFF RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT MOTION TO DISMISS
COMPLAINT ADDENDUM.”

(ECF No. 24).

On July 20, 2016, the Court held a hearing on Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff claims that between 1996 and 2009, the Defendant
Real Property Assessment Division, Department of Finance, County
of Kauai (“Defendant County”) denied his request for a home
exemption credit when assessing his real property taxes.
(Complaint at ¶¶ 1-2, ECF No. 1).
Plaintiff asserts that after new rules, regulations, and
procedures were promulgated in May 2010, he was still denied a
home exemption without due process.

(Id. at ¶¶ 3-4).

Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant County filed
“illegitimate” liens against his property in 2010 and 2012 which
resulted in foreclosure proceedings being initiated against him
in May 2015.

(Id. at ¶¶ 5-6).

Plaintiff has already challenged the denial of his home
exemption requests, the calculation of his property taxes by the
Defendant County, and the liens filed against his property in
three separate proceedings in Hawaii State Courts.

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Case No. 07-0108 in the Tax Appeal Court of the State of Hawaii
On November 30, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal to
Tax Appeal Court in Case No. 07-0108, with the Tax Appeal Court
of the State of Hawaii, challenging the denial of his home
exemption requests and challenging the calculation of his
property taxes.

(Notice of Appeal to Tax Court, Case No. 07-

0108, dated November 30, 2007, attached as Ex. 1 to Def.’s
Motion, ECF No. 11-2).
On January 7, 2014, the Tax Appeal Court of the State of
Hawaii issued a Judgment, finding in favor of Plaintiff Plotkins
as to his home exemption claims and in favor of the County of
Kauai as to the property tax claims.

(Judgment in 07-0108, dated

January 7, 2014, attached as Ex. 2 to Def.’s Motion to Dismiss,
ECF No. 11-3).
Case No. 11-1-0001 in the Tax Appeal Court of the State of Hawaii
On January 5, 2011, while Plaintiff’s appeal in Case No. 070108 was pending before the Tax Appeal Court, Plaintiff filed
another Notice of Appeal to Tax Appeal Court in Case No. 11-10001, with the Tax Appeal Court of the State of Hawaii.

(Notice

of Appeal to Tax Court, Case No. 07-0108, dated January 5, 2011,
attached as Ex. 3 to Def.’s Motion, ECF No. 8-5).

Case No. 11-1-

0001 challenged a decision by the Board of Review, County of
Kauai, that denied Plaintiff’s challenge to his property tax
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assessments for the year 2010-2011.

(Id.)

On February 16, 2012, the Tax Appeal Court of the State of
Hawaii issued a Judgment, finding against Plaintiff and in favor
of the County of Kauai.

(Judgment in 11-1-0001, dated February

16, 2012, attached as Ex. 4 to Def.’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No.
8-6).
Case No. 12-1-0012 in the Circuit Court of the Fifth Circuit,
State of Hawaii

On April 4, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Petition for Removal of
Property Tax Lien in the Circuit Court of the Fifth Circuit,
State of Hawaii.

(Petition for Removal of Property Tax Lien in

Case No. 12-1-0012, dated April 4, 2012, attached as Ex. 5 to
Def.’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 11-4).

Plaintiff’s Petition

challenged the denial of his claims for home exemption credits
between 1996 and 2006, the assessment of his property taxes by
the County of Kauai, the decisions by the Tax Appeal Court of the
State of Hawaii, and the real property tax liens imposed by the
County of Kauai.

(Id.)

On December 27, 2012, the Circuit Court of the Fifth Circuit
State of Hawaii issued an Order Granting Respondent County of
Kauai Department of Finance’s Motion to Dismiss Petitioner’s
Petition for Removal of Property Tax Lien Filed on April 26,
2012.

(Order Granting the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss in Case

No. 12-1-0012, dated December 27, 2012, attached as Ex. 6 to
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Def.’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 11-5).
On the same date, the Circuit Court of the Fifth Circuit,
State of Hawaii, issued an Order Denying Petitioner’s Petition
for Removal of Property Tax Lien Filed on April 4, 2012.

(Order

Denying the Petition in Case No. 12-1-0012, dated December 27,
2012, attached as Ex. 7 to Def.’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 116).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A plaintiff has the burden of proving that subject-matter
jurisdiction does in fact exist.

Thornhill Publ’g Co., Inc. v.

Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) requires that a
case must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
when the Court lacks a constitutional or statutory basis to
adjudicate the controversy.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); Leeson v.

Transamerica Disability Income Plan, 671 F.3d 969, 975 (9th Cir.
2012).
A challenge to the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction may
be “facial or factual.”

Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d

1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004).

In a facial attack, the party

challenging jurisdiction argues that the allegations contained in
a complaint are insufficient “on their face” to invoke federal
jurisdiction.

Id.

A facial challenge, therefore, mirrors a
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traditional motion to dismiss analysis.
The Court must take all allegations contained in the
pleading “to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in [its]
favor.”

Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004).

ANALYSIS
The Court construes Plaintiff’s pleadings liberally because
he is proceeding pro se.

Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137

(9th Cir. 1987) (“The Supreme Court has instructed the federal
courts to liberally construe the ‘inartful pleading’ of pro se
litigants.” (citing Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982)
(per curiam))).
I.

Judicial Notice

The Defendant Real Property Assessment Division, Department
of Finance, County of Kauai (“Defendant County”) asks the Court
to take judicial notice of various documents related to the state
court actions filed by the Plaintiff.
The Court may consider exhibits attached to the Complaint
and documents whose contents are incorporated by reference in the
Complaint without converting a motion to dismiss to a motion for
summary judgment.

Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688

(9th Cir. 2001).
The Court may also consider matters that are the proper
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subject of judicial notice pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence
201.

Lee, 250 F.3d at 688-89; Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &

Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (stating that courts must
consider the complaint in its entirety as well as other sources
courts ordinarily examine when ruling on motions to dismiss, in
particular documents incorporated into the complaint by
reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial
notice).
Exhibits 1 through 7 attached to Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss are state court records from the three proceedings that
Plaintiff filed in Hawaii State Courts.

The evidence bears

directly on whether the Court can properly exercise jurisdiction
over this case.
It is well established that federal courts may take judicial
notice of related state court orders and proceedings in deciding
a Motion to Dismiss.

ScripsAmerica, Inc. v. Ironridge Global

LLC, 56 F.Supp.3d 1121, 1136 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (citing United
States v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007)).
Defendant’s Request for the Court to take judicial notice of
Exhibits 1 through 7 is GRANTED.

II.

The Court is Without Subject Matter Jurisdiction Pursuant to
the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The origin of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine can be traced to

the two United States Supreme Court decisions bearing their
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names.

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16

(1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983).
In Rooker, an unsuccessful state court plaintiff filed suit
in federal district court, alleging that the state court decision
rested upon an unconstitutional state statute.

The United States

Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling that it had no
jurisdiction over the matter, stating that the jurisdiction of
federal district courts is strictly original.
416.

Rooker, 63 U.S. at

The United States Supreme Court explained that once the

state court has rendered a decision, even if incorrect, only the
United States Supreme Court can reverse or modify that judgment.
Id. at 415-16.
In Feldman, the plaintiffs filed a petition with the
District of Columbia seeking a waiver of a bar admission rule.
460 U.S. at 462.

The plaintiffs proceeded to federal district

court after having received an adverse ruling.

The United States

Supreme Court ruled that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the denial of their petitions to be admitted to
the bar, even though the challenges alleged that the state
court’s action was unconstitutional.

Id. at 476.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine rests upon the principle that
federal district courts are without the authority to exercise
appellate review of the state judicial process.

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Henrichs v.

Valley View Development, 474 F.3d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 2007).
The United States Supreme Court has explained that the dual
system of federal and state courts could not function if state
and federal courts were free to fight each other for control of a
particular case.

Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of

Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970) (citing Oklahoma
Packing Co. v. Gas Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9 (1940)).

The Rooker-

Feldman doctrine serves to prevent needless friction between
state and federal courts.

Id.; Henrichs, 474 F.3d at 613.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars any suit in federal court
that seeks to disrupt or undo a prior state court judgment.
Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 2003).

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complaint challenging a state court’s factual or legal conclusion
constitutes a forbidden de facto appeal under Rooker-Feldman.
Manufactured Home Communities, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 420 F.3d
1022, 1030 (9th Cir. 2005).
There are exceptions to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

The

Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to a general
constitutional challenge, meaning one that does not require
review of a state court decision.

Worldwide Church of God v.

MacNair, 805 F.2d 888, 891 (9th Cir. 1986).

If the federal

constitutional claim is inextricably intertwined with the state
court ruling, however, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to bar
the party’s claims.

Doe & Associates Law Offices v. Napolitano,

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252 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001) (“If the federal
constitutional claims presented to the district court are
‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s judgment, then
Doe is essentially asking the district court to review the state
court’s decision, which the district court may not do.”); Cooper
v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777-78 (9th Cir. 2012).
The entire basis of Plaintiff’s Complaint is that he
believes that the County of Kauai improperly taxed his real
property and that the Hawaii State Courts did not rule in his
favor when he challenged the tax assessments on his property.
Plaintiff does not dispute that he already adjudicated his
claims in Hawaii State Court.

Plaintiff stated in his Opposition

that “[b]oth the County Board of Review, and the Hawaii State Tax
Appeal Court, have abdicated their responsibilities, as did the
Hawaii State Circuit Court, which was mislead by the County, and
failed to properly deal with the issue of illegitimate liens.”
(Opposition at p. 3, ECF No. 14).
Plaintiff requests that the federal District Court overturn
the decisions of the Hawaii State Courts.
ECF No. 14).

(Opposition at p. 8,

Plaintiff seeks a judgment from this Court finding

that the Hawaii State Courts improperly determined that there was
a legitimate lien on his real property for his failure to pay his
property taxes and that there was a basis for bringing a
foreclosure action.

(Id.; Complaint at p. 3, ECF No. 1).

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The District Court is barred from ruling on Plaintiff’s
Complaint because of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Ruling in

favor of Plaintiff’s Complaint would effectively reverse and void
the decisions of the Hawaii State Courts.

Cooper, 704 F.3d at

781-82.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine divests federal district courts
of jurisdiction to conduct review of state court judgments even
when the state court decision is challenged as unconstitutional.
Rooker, 63 U.S. at 416; Worldwide Church of God, 805 F.2d at 891.
If Plaintiff believes that the Hawaii state judicial proceedings
violated his constitutional rights, his recourse is to appeal the
decisions through the Hawaii state courts and, if still
unsatisfied, seek review in the United States Supreme Court.

See

Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004).
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No.
8) is GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
Amendment is not permitted as granting leave to amend would
be futile in light of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Read v. de

Bellefeuille, 577 Fed. Appx. 647, 647-48 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en
banc)).

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CONCLUSION
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 8) is GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
The Clerk of the Court is ordered to close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

Honolulu, Hawaii, July 20, 2016.

___________________________________
Helen Gillmor
United States District Judge

Pierre A. Plotkins vs. Real Property Assessment Division,
Department of Finance, County of Kauai; Civ. No. 16-00163 HG-KSC;
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 8) WITH
PREJUDICE
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