Sawaguchi v. Colvin

Filing 32

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL AND AFFIRMING THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S OCTOBER 31, 2014 DECISION. Signed by JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI on 04/28/2017. -- Plaintiff's appeal of the Administrative Law Judge 9;s October 31, 2014 Decision is HEREBY DENIED, and the Decision is HEREBY AFFIRMED. There being no remaining issues in this case, the Court DIRECTS the Clerk's Office to enter judgment and close the case on May 19, 2017, unless Plaintiff files a motion for reconsideration of this Order by May 15, 2017. (eps, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
JOHN CHARLES SAWAGUCHI,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
)
Commissioner of Social
)
Security,
)
)
)
Defendant.
_____________________________ )

CIVIL 16-00255 LEK

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL AND AFFIRMING
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’S OCTOBER 31, 2014 DECISION
Before this Court is Plaintiff John Charles Sawaguchi’s
(“Plaintiff”) Complaint for Review of Social Security Disability
Benefits Determinations (“Complaint”), filed on May 20, 2016, in
which he appeals from the Administrative Law Judge Tamara TurnerJones’s (“ALJ”) October 31, 2014 Decision (“Appeal”).

The ALJ

issued the Decision after conducting a hearing on August 12,
[Administrative Record (“AR”) at 11.1]

2014.

The ALJ ultimately

concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled, for purposes of the
Social Security Act (“SSA”), from March 24, 2010 through the date
of the Decision.

1

[Decision at 15.]

The Decision is AR pages 11-25. All subsequent citations
to the Decision refer to the page numbers of the Decision itself.

On September 23, 2016, Plaintiff filed his Opening
Brief.2

[Dkt. no. 22.]

Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin,

Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”), filed her
Answering Brief on November 29, 2016, and Plaintiff filed his
Reply Brief on December 15, 2016.

[Dkt. nos. 24, 25.]

This

Court heard oral argument in this matter on January 23, 2017.

On

March 29, 2017, this Court issued an entering order ruling on the
Appeal (“3/29/17 EO Ruling”).

[Dkt. no. 31.]

supersedes the 3/29/17 EO Ruling.

The instant Order

After careful consideration of

the Appeal, the parties’ briefs, the arguments of counsel, and
the relevant legal authority, Plaintiff’s Appeal is DENIED and
the ALJ’s Decision is AFFIRMED.
BACKGROUND
I.

Factual Background
On October 26, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Title II

application for disability insurance benefits, alleging a
disability beginning December 29, 2006.
and Plaintiff requested a hearing.

The claim was denied,

Administrative Law Judge

Dean K. Franks (“2009 ALJ”) held a hearing on December 11, 2009
(“2009 Hearing”), and issued a Decision on December 23, 2009

2

On January 20, 2017, Plaintiff filed an amended version of
his Opening Brief to correct erroneous citations to the
Administrative Record. [Dkt. no. 29.]
2

(“2009 Decision”).

[AR at 94.3]

The 2009 ALJ noted that

Plaintiff had past relevant work as a union business
representative/benefits clerk, recycler, furniture driver,
forklift driver, and kitchen/interior designer.

[2009 Decision

at 9.]
The 2009 ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was disabled, as
defined by the SSA, from October 18, 2007 through March 31, 2009.
However, the 2009 ALJ found that Plaintiff had the ability to
return to work as of April 1, 2009 through the date of the 2009
Decision, as a result of an exercise program to increase his back
and leg strength.4

[Id. at 10.]

Thus, the 2009 ALJ concluded

that Plaintiff’s disability ended on April 1, 2009.

[Id. at 12.]

On January 20, 2012, Plaintiff filed another Title II
application for disability insurance benefits, alleging a
disability beginning March 24, 2010.
initially and on reconsideration.

The claim was denied,

On October 9, 2013, Plaintiff

filed a written request for a hearing.

At the August 12, 2014

hearing (“2014 Hearing”), Plaintiff was represented by

3

The 2009 Decision is AR pages 94 to 105. All subsequent
citations to the 2009 Decision refer to the page numbers of the
2009 Decision itself.
4

Although the 2009 ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medical
improvement made it possible for him to return to work as of
April 1, 2009, Plaintiff apparently did not do so. See 2009
Decision at 5 (finding that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since October 18, 2007).
3

Frank Ury, Esq.

David Dettmer, an impartial vocational expert

(“VE”), participated in the 2014 Hearing by telephone.

[Decision

at 1.]
The ALJ concluded that, for purposes of the current
application for benefits, res judicata applied to the previously
adjudicated period.

As to the period after the adjudicated

period in the 2009 Decision, the ALJ declined to adopt the 2009
ALJ’s analysis and concluded that the 2009 Decision was not
entitled to res judicata effect.

The ALJ concluded that the

presumption of continuing disability had been rebutted by a
showing of changed circumstances relating to the issue of
disability.

The new, material evidence included Plaintiff’s

testimony at the 2014 Hearing and medical records after the date
of the 2009 Decision.

[Id. at 1-2.]

In the instant Appeal, Plaintiff agrees with the ALJ’s
findings in step one through four of the five-step sequential
analysis to determine whether a claimant is disabled.
Brief at 5.]

[Opening

Thus, the Court will only discuss the ALJ’s

findings as to those steps to the extent they are relevant to the
issue in the Appeal.
At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 24, 2010.
[Decision at 4.]

At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had

the following impairments that were considered severe: “post-

4

concussion syndrome; obesity; chronic pain syndrome; plantar
fasciitis; degenerative joint disease; cervical, thoracic, and
lumbar strain/sprain; right knee arthritis; affective disorder;
status post carpal tunnel release; and anxiety disorder, not
otherwise specified.”

[Id. (citation omitted).]

At step three,

the ALJ found that none of Plaintiff’s impairments, either
individually or in combination, met or medically equaled the
severity of one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1.

[Id. at 4-5.]

At step four, the ALJ

found that Plaintiff had
the residual functional capacity [(“RFC”)] to
perform less than a full range of sedentary work
as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a). Specifically,
the claimant can lift and/or carry up to 10
pounds; can stand and/or walk for two hours out of
an eight-hour workday with customary breaks; can
sit for six hours out of an eight-hour workday
with customary breaks; would need to alternate
positions between sitting and standing at one hour
intervals for one to five minutes at the
workstation; can occasionally kneel, stoop, crawl,
and crouch; can occasionally climb ramps and
stairs; can never climb ladders, ropes or
scaffolds; can frequently use the upper
extremities for fine and gross manipulations as
well as reaching in all directions; should avoid
unprotected heights and dangerous moving
machinery; [would] need to avoid concentrated
exposure to bright, blinking lights or prolonged
direct sunlight due to headaches or migraines; can
sustain concentration and attention, persistence
and pace in two hour blocks of time to complete a
normal workday; due to a low tolerance for stress,
the individual would need a work environment that
does not involve fast paced production or assembly
line work, such as that involving a conveyor belt;
would be able to interact and respond
appropriately to supervisors and co-workers, but
5

would need only occasional direct contact with the
general public; she [sic] would be unable to do
complex or detailed tasks, but would remain
capable of understanding, remembering, and
carrying out simple instructions.
[Id. at 6.]

The ALJ also found that Plaintiff was unable to

perform any of his past relevant work.

[Id. at 13.]

At step five, the ALJ noted that, Plaintiff was within
the category of “a younger individual age 18-44” on the alleged
onset date, but, as of the date of the Decision, he was within
the category of “a younger individual age 45-49.”

[Id.]

Plaintiff “has at least a high school education and is able to
communicate in English.”

[Id.]

The ALJ concluded that she did

not have to address whether Plaintiff had transferrable job
skills because, based on the Medical-Vocational Rules, Plaintiff
was not disabled, regardless of whether or not he had
transferrable job skills.

[Id. at 13-14.]

The ALJ found that,

in light of Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC,
he “would be able to perform the requirements of representative
occupations such as:” office helper, hand packager, and order
clerk.

[Id. at 14.]

The ALJ found that these jobs existed in

significant numbers in the national economy, even taking into
account the partial erosion of the sedentary occupational base
because Plaintiff has to be able to alternate between sitting and
standing positions.

[Id.]

The ALJ therefore concluded that

Plaintiff was “capable of making a successful adjustment to other

6

work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy”
and that he was not disabled for purposes of the SSA.

[Id. at

15.]
Plaintiff requested that the Appeals Council review the
ALJ’s Decision.

[AR at 7.]

On March 22, 2016, the Appeals

Council denied his request for review, rendering the ALJ’s
Decision the Commissioner’s final decision.

[AR at 1-3.]

The

instant Appeal followed.
The sole issue in the Appeal is whether the ALJ erred
because she did not give sufficient weight to the Department of
Veterans Affairs (“VA”) decision that Plaintiff is unemployable
because of his service-connected disabilities.

Plaintiff points

to the VA Rating Decision dated November 11, 2013 (“11/11/13 VA
Decision”).

[AR at 322-24 (11/11/13 VA Decision); AR at 325-28

(letter to Plaintiff transmitting and explaining effect of the VA
decision).]

The 11/11/13 VA Decision states that Plaintiff

served in the Air Force from June 3, 1992 to August 21, 1992.
[AR at 322.]

It concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to

individual unemployment – i.e. his unemployability rating is one
hundred percent – effective May 31, 2013, because he “is unable
to secure or follow a substantially gainful occupation as a
result of service-connected disabilities.”

[AR at 323, 326.]

Specifically, the VA assigned the following ratings:
A 20 percent evaluation is assigned for
degenerative joint disease, right ankle.
7

An

evaluation of 20 percent is assigned for marked
limited motion of the ankle.
A 20 percent evaluation is assigned for
degenerative joint disease, left ankle. An
evaluation of 20 percent is assigned for marked
limited motion of the ankle.
A 10 percent evaluation is assigned for
degenerative joint disease, status post shin
splints with stress reaction distal femurs, right
knee. An evaluation of 10 percent is granted for
malunion of the tibia and fibula with slight knee
or ankle disability. A higher evaluation of 20
percent is not warranted in the absence of
moderate knee or ankle disability.
A 10 percent evaluation is assigned for
degenerative joint disease, left foot. An
evaluation of 10 percent is assigned whenever foot
injury results in moderate symptoms. A higher
evaluation of 20 percent is not warranted unless
foot injury results in moderately severe symptoms.
A 10 percent evaluation is assigned for
degenerative joint disease, right foot. An
evaluation of 10 percent is assigned whenever foot
injury results in moderate symptoms. A higher
evaluation of 20 percent is not warranted unless
foot injury results in moderately severe symptoms.
A 10 percent evaluation is assigned for
degenerative joint disease, status post shin
splints with stress reaction distal femurs, left
knee. An evaluation of 10 percent is granted for
malunion of the tibia and fibula with slight knee
or ankle disability. A higher evaluation of 20
percent is not warranted in the absence of
moderate knee or ankle disability.
[AR at 323-24.]

The 11/11/13 VA Decision states that Plaintiff’s

“overall or combined rating is 60%.

We do not add the individual

percentages of each condition to determine your combined rating.

8

We use a combined rating table that considers the effect from the
most serious to the least serious conditions.”

[AR at 326.]

Plaintiff argues that he received a thirty percent
disability rating for his right lower extremity and the same for
his left lower extremity, and the testimony at the 2014 Hearing
before the ALJ addressed his upper and lower extremities.

He

testified that he “had bilateral shin splints since 1992 that
have never gone away . . . [a]nd it’s from my, my upper legs, my
upper, you know, above my knees all the way to my toes.”
42, 2014 Hrg. Trans. at 9.5]

[AR at

He also testified that his

treatment for his lower extremities consists of shots for his
lower extremities every three months.

He gets Synvisc,

corticosteroids, Lidocaine, and Prilocaine.
18-19.]

[2014 Hrg. Trans. at

Ultimately, the ALJ
considered, and afforded some weigh[t to
Plaintiff’s] V.A. disability rating. Of
significance, the undersigned notes that the V.A.
uses a different standard for determining
disability. Furthermore, [Plaintiff] was never
assessed with a more than 20% rating for
degenerative joint disease of the right ankle, the
impairment [Plaintiff] alleges significantly
impairs his mobility.

[Decision at 12 (citation omitted).]
In support of his request for Appeals Council review,
Plaintiff argued that the ALJ applied the wrong standard in

5

The 2014 Hearing Transcript is AR pages 32-63. All
subsequent citations to the 2014 Hearing Transcript refer to the
page numbers of the transcript itself.
9

considering his VA rating.

The ALJ should have given the VA

rating “great weight,” unless she gave an adequate explanation
why it was not entitled to great weight.

Plaintiff argued that

the ALJ’s explanation was not sufficient.
Plaintiff makes the same arguments in the instant
Appeal.

Plaintiff urges this Court to reverse the ALJ’s

conclusion that he is not disabled, conclude that he is disabled,
and remand the case for the immediate award of benefits.

In the

alternative, he asks this Court to remand the case for a new
administrative hearing.

Plaintiff also asks for an award of

reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d), as well as any other appropriate relief.
STANDARD
A district court has jurisdiction pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review final decisions of
the Commissioner of Social Security. A final
decision by the Commissioner denying Social
Security disability benefits will not be disturbed
by the reviewing district court if it is free of
legal error and supported by substantial evidence.
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420
F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2005). “Substantial
evidence means more than a scintilla but less than
a preponderance.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273,
1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).[6] It
is also “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Id. Finally, “[w]here the evidence
may reasonably support more than one

6

Smolen has been superseded on other grounds by 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1529(c)(3). See, e.g., Bachli v. Colvin, Case No. EDCV 141480 FFM, 2016 WL 625249, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016).
10

interpretation, [the court] may not substitute
[its] judgment for that of the Commissioner.”
Verduzco [v. Apfel], 188 F.3d [1087,] 1089 [(9th
Cir. 1999)].
. . . .
“To establish a claimant’s eligibility for
disability benefits under the Social Security Act,
it must be shown that: (a) the claimant suffers
from a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment that can be expected to result in death
or that has lasted or can be expected to last for
a continuous period of not less than twelve
months; and (b) the impairment renders the
claimant incapable of performing the work that the
claimant previously performed and incapable of
performing any other substantial gainful
employment that exists in the national economy.”
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); Tackett v. Apfel, 180
F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). A claimant must
satisfy both requirements in order to qualify as
“disabled” under the Social Security Act.
Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098.
The Social Security regulations set forth a
five-step sequential process for determining
whether a claimant is disabled. Ukolov, 420 F.3d
at 1003; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. “If a claimant
is found to be ‘disabled’ or ‘not disabled’ at any
step in the sequence, there is no need to consider
subsequent steps.” Ukolov, 420 F.3d at 1003
(citations omitted in original). The claimant
bears the burden of proof as to steps one through
four, whereas the burden shifts to the
Commissioner for step five. Tackett, 180 F.3d at
1098.
The five steps of the disability evaluation
process are as follows:
(i) At the first step, we consider your work
activity, if any. If you are doing
substantial gainful activity, we will find
that you are not disabled.
(ii) At the second step, we consider the
medical severity of your impairment(s). If
11

you do not have a severe medically
determinable physical or mental impairment
that meets the duration requirement in
§ 404.1509, or a combination of impairments
that is severe and meets the duration
requirement, we will find that you are not
disabled.
(iii) At the third step, we also consider the
medical severity of your impairment(s). If
you have an impairment(s) that meets or
equals one of our listings in appendix 1 of
this subpart and meets the duration
requirement, we will find that you are
disabled.
(iv) At the fourth step, we consider our
assessment of your residual functional
capacity and your past relevant work. If you
can still do your past relevant work, we will
find that you are not disabled.
(v) At the fifth and last step, we consider
our assessment of your residual functional
capacity and your age, education, and work
experience to see if you can make an
adjustment to other work. If you can make an
adjustment to other work, we will find that
you are not disabled. If you cannot make an
adjustment to other work, we will find that
you are disabled.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (internal citations omitted).
Saragena v. Colvin, CIV. NO. 16-00322 BMK, 2017 WL 548911, at
*1–2 (D. Hawai`i Feb. 10, 2017).
DISCUSSION
The VA has rated Plaintiff’s unemployability as one
hundred percent and his overall or combined service-connected
disability as sixty percent.
326.]

[11/11/13 VA Decision, AR at 323,

The Ninth Circuit has stated:

12

The ALJ must “ordinarily give great weight to
a VA determination of disability.” [McCartey v.
Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002).]
While a VA disability decision “does not
necessarily compel the SSA to reach an identical
result, . . . the ALJ must consider the VA’s
finding in reaching his decision,” because of the
similarities between the VA disability program and
the Social Security disability program. Id.
However, because the two federal programs are not
identical, “the ALJ may give less weight to a VA
disability rating if he gives persuasive,
specific, valid reasons for doing so that are
supported by the record.” Id. (emphasis added).
Hiler v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir. 2012) (ellipse and
emphasis in Hiler).
In McCartey, the Ninth Circuit held that the ALJ erred
in disregarding the claimant’s VA disability rating.
1076.

298 F.3d at

However, in McCartey, the ALJ’s decision did not even

mention the VA rating, and the ALJ failed to discuss the
condition that was the primary basis for the VA’s rating.
1073, 1075.

Id. at

In contrast, the ALJ in the instant case expressly

addressed the 11/11/13 VA Decision.

The ALJ “considered, and

afforded some weigh[t]” to it, [Decision at 12,] although the ALJ
did not acknowledge the general rule that a VA disability
decision is entitled to “great weight.”

After stating that she

accorded the 11/11/13 VA Decision “some” weight, the ALJ noted
that “the V.A. uses a different standard for determining
disability” and that Plaintiff “was never assessed with a more
than 20% rating for degenerative joint disease of the right
ankle, the impairment [Plaintiff] alleges significantly impairs
13

his mobility.”

[Id.]

Thus, the ALJ did address the 11/11/13 VA

Decision, accorded it “some” weight, and gave two reasons why the
VA decision was not entitled to more weight.

The instant case is

therefore distinguishable from McCartey.
Nevertheless, the Decision could have been better
crafted, with a more detailed discussion of the ALJ’s
responsibility to give “persuasive, specific, valid reasons” –
supported by the record – why she did not give the 11/11/13 VA
Decision “great weight.”

In considering Plaintiff’s Appeal, this

Court must determine whether the limited analysis in the Decision
is sufficient to constitute “persuasive, specific, valid
reasons.”
First, the ALJ was correct that a VA unemployability
rating and a VA disability rating are not equivalent to a
disability determination for purposes of the SSA.

However, that

alone is not a sufficient reason to depart from the general rule
that a VA disability decision is entitled to “great weight.”

See

Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1236 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the fact the rules governing the SSA and the VA differ “is
not a persuasive, specific, valid reason for discounting the VA
determination” (brackets, internal quotation marks, and citation
omitted)).
Second, the ALJ explained that, in spite of the VA’s
ultimate rating of Plaintiff, and in spite of the fact that

14

Plaintiff alleged that it was a significant impairment, the VA
never assigned more than a twenty percent rating to the
degenerative joint disease in Plaintiff’s right ankle.

In

addition to this specific example the ALJ cited as a reason for
only according the 11/11/13 VA Decision “some” weight, the ALJ
conducted a thorough review of the medical records that were the
basis of the VA ratings decision.

In particular, the ALJ

discussed numerous instances where the VA records showed that
Plaintiff’s medical examinations did not support the severity of
his medical complaints and that his conditions were being
effectively managed.

For example, the ALJ noted the following

from the VA medical records:
-“[B]y late 2011 he was reporting difficulty walking and began to
use a walking stick. Nevertheless, muscle strength was
recorded at 5/5. He was noted to have plantar fasciitis,
improved, degenerative joint disease of the ankle, and
neuralgia. He was casted with a new custom orthotic.”
[Decision at 10 (citing AR at 766).]
-Tripler Army Medical Center (“Tripler”) records stated that
“October 2011 images of [Plaintiff’s] bilateral tibia/fibula
taken in response to pain complaints showed no acute osseous
injury. Bilateral ankle images showed only minimal
degenerative or post-traumatic changes. Bilateral hip xrays were also normal; as were images of the knees apart
from moderate degenerative changes.” [Id. (citing AR at
783-85, 787-89).] As to one of the Tripler records, the ALJ
noted, “[d]espite significant physical complaints, physical
examination findings were generally normal.” [Id. (citing
AR at 865).7]

7

The record that the ALJ referred to is an August 11, 2011
record from the Tripler Orthopedic Clinic when Plaintiff
“present[ed] with a chronic issue of bilateral hip pain.” [AR at
(continued...)
15

-Tripler records from early 2012 showed that, “[a]lthough
[Plaintiff] continued to present for treatment reporting
significant pain, physical examination findings were
generally mild and included findings of no acute distress,
orientation x 4, and ambulation to the treatment room.
Records from this period indicate the [Plaintiff’s]
condition was good and stable.” [Id. at 10-11 (citing AR at
804, 813).]
-“In January 2013 [Plaintiff] reported a humming and burning
sensation in his legs bilaterally. He was diagnosed with a
differential diagnosis of peripheral
neuropathy/radiculopathy; and a NCS/EMG was ordered. The
EMG/NCS findings noted normal findings with no evidence of
peripheral neuropathy.” [Id. at 11 (citing AR at 1097-98).]
-“Updated April 2013 bilateral ankle x-rays showed no significant
joint or bony abnormality and stable findings since
September 2010. Bilateral foot images were also benign.”
[Id. (citing AR at 1103-06).]
The ALJ also discussed the disability forms submitted
by Eddie Soliai, M.D., a VA physician.

The ALJ ultimately

“afforded only some weight” to Dr. Soliai’s “total and permanent
disability form and disability statement.”
at 1290-91, 1448-49).]

[Id. at 12 (citing AR

The ALJ reasoned that:

[Dr. Soliai] indicates [Plaintiff’s] primary basis
of disability is fibromyalgia; however, the
records failed to objectively demonstrate a
diagnosis of fibromyalgia. Fibromyalgia is a
disorder defined by the American College of
Rheumatology (ACR) and the Social Security

7

(...continued)
865.] According to Plaintiff, “his hip felt like it ‘exploded’,
while running one day in May” and he described the pain since
then as six or seven on a scale of one to ten. [Id.] The
physician assistant recommended physical therapy, but noted that
the etiology of the hip pain was unknown, and “it [did] not
appear that he [had] any significant arthritis in his hip joints,
he [had] slight weakness with adduction; however, most of his
physical exam [was] otherwise normal.” [Id.]
16

Administration recognizes it as medically
determinable if there are signs that are
clinically established by the medical record. The
signs are primarily the tender points. The ACR
defines the disorder in patients as “widespread
pain in all four quadrants of the body for a
minimum duration of 3 months and at least 11 of
the 18 specified tender points which cluster
around the neck and shoulder, chest, hip, knee,
and elbow regions.” Other typical symptoms, some
of which can be signs if they have been clinically
documented over time, are irritable bowel
syndrome, chronic headaches, temporomandibular
joint dysfunction, sleep disorder, severe fatigue,
and cognitive dysfunction.
Based on the above-described criteria, the
undersigned finds fibromyalgia is not a medically
determinable impairment in this case because there
are no such signs documented in the medical
record. Furthermore, [Plaintiff’s] significant
activities of daily living, including riding a
bike, swimming, gardening, walking 3000 steps
daily and more, all performed during the period at
issue, illustrate that pain associated with his
medical condition does not render him disabled.
[Id.]
Reading the ALJ’s Decision as a whole, this Court
CONCLUDES that – although it is not clearly stated in the ALJ’s
discussion of the 11/11/13 VA Decision – the ALJ declined to give
the 11/11/13 VA Decision “great weight” because the VA decision
was not adequately supported by the VA medical records.

This

Court agrees with the ALJ’s interpretation of the VA medical
records and this Court concludes that the inferences the ALJ drew
from the VA records were reasonable.

This Court therefore

CONCLUDES that the VA medical records support the ALJ’s rejection
of the 11/11/13 VA Decision.
17

The lack of medical support for the 11/11/13 VA
Decision, when considered in light of the differences between VA
disability standard and the SSA disability standard, constitutes
a “persuasive, specific, valid reason[],” supported by the
record, why the 11/11/13 VA Decision is not entitled to “great
weight.”

This Court therefore CONCLUDES that the ALJ did not err

when she afforded only “some” weight to the 11/11/13 VA Decision.
Further, this Court CONCLUDES that the ALJ’s Decision is
supported by substantial evidence and is not based on legal
error.8

See § 405(g); Ukolov, 420 F.3d at 1004.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiff’s appeal of

the Administrative Law Judge’s October 31, 2014 Decision is
HEREBY DENIED, and the Decision is HEREBY AFFIRMED.

There being

no remaining issues in this case, the Court DIRECTS the Clerk’s
Office to enter judgment and close the case on May 19, 2017,
unless Plaintiff files a motion for reconsideration of this Order
by May 15, 2017.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, April 28, 2017.

8

Because Plaintiff has failed to identify any ground that
warrants reversal of the ALJ’s Decision, it is not necessary to
address either Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the scope of
remand or Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs.
18

/s/ Leslie E. Kobayashi
Leslie E. Kobayashi
United States District Judge

JOHN CHARLES SAWAGUCHI VS. CAROLYN W. COLVIN; CIVIL 16-00255 LEKKSC; ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL AND AFFIRMING THE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’S OCTOBER 31, 2014 DECISION

19