Oyadomari v. Hoffman et al

Filing 6

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED AS TIME-BARRED -- This Court therefore ORDERS Plaintiff to show cause why this Court should not dismiss the Complaint as barred by the applicable statu te of limitations. This Court ORDERS Plaintiff to file a statement responding to this Order to Show Cause by August 12, 2016 Signed by JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI on 07/28/2016. (eps)CERTIFICATE OF SE RVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry Modified on 7/28/2016: Plaintiff served with ECF NO. 7 via First Class Mail on 07/28/2016 (eps ).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
CIVIL 16-00262 JMS-RLP

WILLIAM K. OYADOMARI,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
ACOS CHUN, MIKE, MICHAEL, et )
al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
_____________________________ )

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED AS TIME-BARRED
On May 25, 2016, pro se Plaintiff William K. Oyadomari
(“Plaintiff”) filed his Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights
(“Complaint”) and, on June 2, 2016, he filed his Application to
Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs
(“Application”).

[Dkt. nos. 1, 4.]

Plaintiff brings claims

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his rights under
the United States Constitution.

[Complaint at 4.]

Because Plaintiff has applied to proceed without
prepaying fees and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), this
Court must screen the Complaint and dismiss any claim that it
concludes: “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

See

DISCUSSION
I.

Claims Against Defendant Hoffman
This Court has conducted a preliminary screening of the

Complaint, and it appears that Plaintiff fails to state a claim
against Defendant Nick Hoffman, who Plaintiff identifies as the
“Warden/Dean” of O.C.C.C.,1 and who Plaintiff sues in his
official and individual capacity (“Defendant Hoffman”).

See Omar

v. Sea–Land Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987) (“A
trial court may dismiss a claim sua sponte under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).

Such a dismissal may be made without notice where the

claimant cannot possibly win relief.” (citations omitted));
Alexio v. Obama, CIV. NO. 15-00507 JMS-BMK, 2015 WL 9216562, at
*3 (D. Hawai`i Dec. 16, 2015) (“the court may dismiss a complaint
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if it fails
to ‘contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face’” (citations and
some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009))).

Plaintiff has not plead

sufficient factual allegations regarding how Defendant Hoffman
allegedly violated his constitutional rights.

See Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to
. . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-

1

This Court assumes that Plaintiff is referring to the Oahu
Community Correctional Center (“OCCC”).
2

official defendant, through the official’s own individual
actions, has violated the Constitution.”).
This Court is therefore inclined to dismiss Plaintiff’s
claims against Defendant Hoffman, with leave to amend.

See Lucas

v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Unless it
is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect . . . a
pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s
deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of
the action.”).

This Court EMPHASIZES that this is merely an

inclination based on its preliminary review of Plaintiff’s
Complaint.

If Plaintiff can address the issue regarding the

timeliness of his claims, discussed in Section III, this Court
will conduct a full screening of Plaintiff’s claims.
II.

Other Defendants
Plaintiff also sues:

1)

“Michael” and a “Mike” – each in their official and
individual capacities – both of whom Plaintiff identifies as
“Head Shift Supervisor” of the adult corrections officers
(“ACOs”) for OCCC, Module 7 and Annex 2; [Complaint at 1-3;]

2)

“Watson” – in his official and individual capacities – who
Plaintiff identifies as a “prisoners Transporter” for OCCC;
[id. at 3;] and

3)

“Chun” – in his official and individual capacities – who
Plaintiff identifies as both the “Dean/Warden” of OCCC and
an ACO [id. at 1, 3].

Based on this Court’s preliminary review, Plaintiff’s Complaint
may state a claim against these defendants.

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However, even if

Plaintiff’s claims against them survive the screening process,
Plaintiff has not plead sufficient allegations about either
“Michael,” “Mike,” “Watson,” or “Chun” to identify any of them
for service.
If Plaintiff can address the timeliness issue, this
Court is inclined to allow Plaintiff’s claims against “Michael,”
“Mike,” “Watson,” and “Chun” to go forward, provided that he
amends his Complaint to include sufficient information to
identify them for service.

This Court EMPHASIZES that this is

merely an inclination based on its preliminary review of
Plaintiff’s Complaint.

If Plaintiff can address the timeliness

issue, this Court will conduct a full screening of Plaintiff’s
claims.
III. Timeliness
It appears from the face of the Complaint that all of
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are untimely.

Liberally construed,2

the Complaint alleges that the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s
claims related to the denial of clothing and adequate food
occurred in October 2010, and the incident in which “Watson”
allegedly struck Plaintiff at the Wahiawa courthouse occurred in
2

This Court must liberally construe Plaintiff’s pleadings
because he is proceeding pro se. See, e.g., Eldridge v. Block,
832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The Supreme Court has
instructed the federal courts to liberally construe the ‘inartful
pleading’ of pro se litigants.” (citing Boag v. MacDougall, 454
U.S. 364, 365, 102 S. Ct. 700, 701, 70 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1982) (per
curiam))).
4

2011.

[Complaint at 5.]
Because § 1983 does not have a specified statute of

limitations, “federal courts look to the law of the state in
which the cause of action arose and apply the state law of
limitations governing an analogous cause of action.”
Tilton, 704 F.3d 568, 573 (9th Cir. 2012).

Pouncil v.

This district court

has recognized that Haw. Rev. Stat. § 657-7 “is the applicable
personal injury statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim” in
Hawai`i.

Eager v. Honolulu Police Dep’t, CIVIL NO. 15-00098 JMS-

KSC, 2016 WL 471282, at *6-7 (D. Hawai`i Feb. 4, 2016) (citing
Pele Def. Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 597-98, 837 P.2d 1247, 1260
(1992)).

Section 657-7 establishes a two-year limitations period

after the cause of action accrued.

A § 1983 claim “accrues when

the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is
the basis of the action.”

Rosales-Martinez v. Palmer, 753 F.3d

890, 895 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
It appears from the face of the Complaint that
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims accrued in 2010 and 2011, but Plaintiff
did not file the Complaint until 2016.

Further, the Complaint

does not allege any basis for tolling the statute of limitations
under Hawai`i law.

See Eager, 2016 WL 471282, at *7 (discussing

cases holding that state law applies to the issue of whether the
statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is tolled).
Stat. § 657-13 states:

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Haw. Rev.

If any person entitled to bring any action
specified in this part (excepting actions against
the sheriff, chief of police, or other officers)
is, at the time the cause of action accrued,
either:
(1) Within the age of eighteen years; or,
(2) Insane; or,
(3) Imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in
execution under the sentence of a criminal
court for a term less than the person’s
natural life;
such person shall be at liberty to bring such
actions within the respective times limited in
this part, after the disability is removed or at
any time while the disability exists.
However, it appears from the face of the Complaint that § 657-13
does not apply because that section “does not apply to suits
against the sheriff or police or employees of the [Department of
Public Safety (“DPS”)].”

See Jones v. Waiawa Corr. Facility,

Civ. No. 09-00244, 2010 WL 2813777, at *5 (D. Hawai`i July 15,
2010).

All of the defendants named in the Complaint appear to be

either deputy sheriffs or DPS employees.
This Court therefore ORDERS Plaintiff to show cause why
this Court should not dismiss the Complaint as barred by the
applicable statute of limitations.

This Court ORDERS Plaintiff

to file a statement responding to this Order to Show Cause by
August 12, 2016.
This Court CAUTIONS Plaintiff that, if he fails to file
a response by August 12, 2016, or if his response fails to show a

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reason why his claims should not be dismissed as untimely, this
Court will enter an order dismissing Plaintiff’s claims and will
direct the Clerk’s Office to close this case.

In other words,

Plaintiff will have no remaining claims in this case.
In light of the issue regarding the timeliness of
Plaintiff’s claims, this Court will not rule on Plaintiff’s
Application at this time.

If Plaintiff can address the

timeliness issue, this Court will rule on the Application when it
conducts the full screening of the Complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, July 28, 2016.

/s/ Leslie E. Kobayashi
Leslie E. Kobayashi
United States District Judge

WILLIAM K. OYADOMARI VS. ACOS CHUN, MIKE, MICHAEL, ET AL; CIVIL
16-00262 LEK-RLP; ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED AS TIME-BARRED

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