Ruggles v. Ige et al

Filing 47

ORDER GRANTING STATE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR INJUNCTION; AND GRANTING LAU OLA DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF MICHAEL DOYLE RUGGLES' COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR INJUNCTION, FILED ON JUNE 9, 2016 re 11 Motion to Dismiss;re 15 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI on 01/31/2017. All of Plaintiff's claims against the State Defendants and the Lau Ola Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.Plaintiff's claims against the Unserved Defendants are HEREBY DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.This Court DIRECTS the Clerk's Office to close the case on February 15, 2017, unless Plaintiff files a motion for re consideration of this Order by February 14, 2017. (eps, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications served by first class mail on February 1, 2017

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
MICHAEL DOYLE RUGGLES,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
GOVERNOR DAVID IGE, etc., et )
al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
_____________________________ )

CIVIL 16-00304 LEK-KJM

ORDER GRANTING STATE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT
AND REQUEST FOR INJUNCTION; AND GRANTING LAU OLA DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF MICHAEL DOYLE RUGGLES’
COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR INJUNCTION, FILED ON JUNE 9, 2016
On August 12, 2016, Defendants Governor David Ige,
Virginia Pressler, M.D., and Douglas Chin, in their official and
individual capacities (collectively “State Defendants”) filed
their Motion to Dismiss Complaint and Request for Injunction
(“State Motion”).

[Dkt. no. 11.]

Also on August 12, 2016,

Defendants Richard Ha, Dylan Shropshire (“D. Shropshire”), and
Lau Ola LLC (collectively “Lau Ola Defendants”) filed their
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Michael Doyle Ruggles’ Complaint and
Request for Injunction, Filed on June 9, 2016 (“Lau Ola Motion”).
[Dkt. no. 15.]

On October 24, 2016, the Lau Ola Defendants filed

a statement of no position as to the State Motion, and the State
Defendants filed a statement of no position as to the Lau Ola
Motion.

[Dkt. nos. 23, 24.]

On November 1, 2016, pro se

Plaintiff Michael Doyle Ruggles (“Plaintiff”) filed a joint

memorandum in opposition to the State Motion and the Lau Ola
Motion (collectively “Motions to Dismiss”).

[Dkt. no. 28.]

The

Lau Ola Defendants filed their optional reply (“Lau Ola Reply”)
on November 14, 2016.

[Dkt. no. 34.]

On November 3, 2016, this Court issued an entering
order (“EO”) finding the Motions to Dismiss suitable for
disposition without a hearing.

[Dkt. no. 32.]

After careful

consideration of the Motion to Dismiss, supporting and opposing
memoranda, and the relevant legal authority, the State Motion is
HEREBY GRANTED, and the Lau Ola Motion is HEREBY GRANTED, for the
reasons set forth below.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his Complaint and Request for
Injunction (“Complaint”) on June 9, 2016.

Although Plaintiff has

made multiple attempts to file an amended complaint, the original
Complaint remains the operative pleading in this case.1
In the instant case, Plaintiff alleges that the State
of Hawai`i (“State”) medical marijuana dispensary scheme, created

1

On November 1, 2016, Plaintiff filed his Motion to Amend
Plaintiff’s Complaint (“First Motion to Amend”), which the
magistrate judge denied on November 7, 2016. [Dkt. nos. 26, 33.]
On November 14, 2016, Plaintiff filed a document titled “Amended
Complaint and Request for Injunction” (“Amended Complaint”).
[Dkt. no. 35.] This Court issued an EO striking the Amended
Complaint on November 16, 2016. [Dkt. no. 37.] On November 15,
2016, Plaintiff filed another Motion to Amend Plaintiff’s
Complaint (“Second Motion to Amend”), which the magistrate judge
denied on December 6, 2016. [Dkt. nos. 42, 46.]
2

pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. Chapter 329D (“Marijuana Dispensary
System”), violates federal law.

Plaintiff states that he is a

Hawai`i resident who owns property on the Island of Hawai`i, and
he has a valid recommendation from a licensed physician in
Hawai`i to use medical marijuana.

[Complaint at pg. 5.]

According to the Complaint, in April 2016, the State’s Department
of Health (“DOH”) selected Lau Ola and Defendant Hawaiian Ethos
LLC (“Hawaiian Ethos”) to receive commercial licenses to grow and
sell marijuana in medical marijuana dispensaries on the Island of
Hawai`i.

Ha and D. Shropshire are La Ola’s owners, and Defendant

Shelby Floyd is Hawaiian Ethos’s owner.

Plaintiff alleged that

La Ola’s and Hawaiian Ethos’s dispensaries were expected to open
within three to nine months.

[Id. at pgs. 4-5.]

According to the Complaint, Defendant Aloha Green LLC
(“Aloha Green”) “is a farming business that imports/exports plant
products to/from Hawaii,” and it conspired with Lau Ola to
produce and sell marijuana on the Island of Hawai`i.
4.]

[Id. at pg.

Defendant Steve Shropshire (“S. Shropshire”) is Aloha

Green’s registered agent, and D. Shropshire is “an owner,
manager, and employee of Aloha Green” who conspired with
S. Shropshire “to violate federal drug laws.”

[Id.]

Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant Effective Change LLC (“Effective Change”)
provides marijuana growing licenses for a fee, and those licenses
are necessary for businesses to operate under the Marijuana

3

Dispensary System.

[Id. at pg. 5.]

Plaintiff apparently has not

completed service on the other defendants besides the State
Defendants and the Lau Ola Defendants (collectively “the Unserved
Defendants”).2
Plaintiff alleges that: Governor Ige “is responsible
for the policies, procedures, and acts of the State of Hawaii”;
as the DOH Director, Dr. Pressler “is responsible for the
policies, procedures[,] and acts of the Hawaii Department of
Health, including licensing medical marijuana dispensaries”; and
Attorney General Chin “is responsible for overseeing the legal
compliance of the State of Hawaii and authorizing all enforcement
and implementation of Hawaii’s federally illegal marijuana
distribution scheme as it’s [sic] top legal organizer.”

[Id. at

pg. 4.]
Plaintiff alleges that Chapter 329D “purport[s] to
permit the production, trafficking, and sale of marijuana, in
violation of the federal Controlled Substances Act of 1970
[Id. at pg. 5.]

(CSA),” 21 U.S.C. § 801, et seq.

He alleges

that the growth and sale of marijuana, even pursuant to
Chapter 329D, constitutes a felony under the CSA because the CSA
preempts Chapter 329D.

[Id. at pg. 6.]

According to Plaintiff,

once a medical marijuana dispensary opens on the Island of

2

This Court will refer to the State Defendants, the Lau Ola
Defendants, and the Unserved Defendants collectively as
“Defendants.”
4

Hawai`i, he “and the value of his property will be irreparably
harmed in value and public perception, due to the presence of
massive federally illegal drug businesses in the community.”
[Id.]

He also alleges that, because he is a medical marijuana

patient, he has an interest in the “prevention of the medical
marijuana supply from being taken over by federally illegal large
scale businesses.”

[Id. at pg. 7.]

are irreparable harms.

Plaintiff alleges that these

[Id.]

The Complaint alleges the following claims: a claim
under the CSA seeking an injunction against the implementation or
enforcement of Chapter 329D and prohibiting “operating,
advertising, promoting, licensing, funding, or authorizing any
form of marijuana production or distribution” (“Count I”); [id.]
and a claim pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq., asserting
that Plaintiff’s business or property has been injured by the
Marijuana Dispensary System, which he alleges constitutes an
illegal enterprise for purposes of RICO (“Count II”) [id. at 78].

Further, although there is no numbered count associated with

the argument, Plaintiff asserts that Chapter 329D and the
Marijuana Dispensary System violate his rights under the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.
7.]

5

[Id. at 1,

Plaintiff therefore seeks the following relief: a
declaratory judgment that Chapter 329D and the Marijuana
Dispensary System violate the CSA and RICO and are preempted by
federal law; a declaratory judgment that the State regulations
regarding the Marijuana Dispensary System violate the CSA;
preliminary and permanent injunctions against the implementation
of the Marijuana Dispensary System and the enforcement of
Chapter 329D; and any other appropriate relief.
The State Motion urges this Court to dismiss
Plaintiff’s claims against the State Defendants because: 1) there
is no private right of action under either the Supremacy Clause
or the CSA; 2) government entities are not subject to RICO;
3) Plaintiff lacks standing because he has not suffered an
injury; 4) Plaintiff’s claims are not ripe because he only
alleges expected injuries that he believes will occur when the
marijuana dispensaries open; 5) Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive
relief are barred because he has not alleged a sufficient nexus
between the State Defendants’ actions and the alleged violation
of his rights; and 6) the State Defendants have qualified
immunity in their individual capacities.
The La Ola Motion argues that Plaintiff lacks standing
to bring the claims he asserts against them because: 1) there is
no implied right of action under the Supremacy Clause for
Plaintiff to enforce the CSA; and 2) the Complaint does not

6

allege that Plaintiff has suffered the type of damages necessary
to support a RICO claim.

The Lau Ola Defendants urge this Court

to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against them with prejudice because
amendment of Plaintiff’s claims would be futile.
STANDARDS
As relevant to the Motions to Dismiss, Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b) states that “a party may assert the following defenses
by motion: (1) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction;
. . . (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.”

“To survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955,
167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)).
A challenge to the Court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction may be “facial or factual.” Safe Air
for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th
Cir. 2004). In a facial attack, the party
challenging jurisdiction argues that the
allegations contained in a complaint are
insufficient “on their face” to invoke federal
jurisdiction. Id. A facial challenge, therefore,
mirrors a traditional motion to dismiss analysis.
The Court must take all allegations contained in
the pleading “to be true and draw all reasonable
inferences in [plaintiff’s] favor.” Wolfe v.
Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004).
Piedvache v. Ige, Civil No. 16-00138 DKW-RLP, 2016 WL 6516826, at
*2 (D. Hawai`i Nov. 2, 2016) (alterations in Piedvache).

7

DISCUSSION
I.

Supremacy Clause
Although the Complaint does not have a numbered count

alleging a claim under the Supremacy Clause, this Court liberally
construes the Complaint as asserting one.3

The Supremacy Clause

states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;
and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that “the Supremacy
Clause is not the ‘source of any federal rights,’ and certainly
does not create a cause of action.”

Armstrong v. Exceptional

Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1383 (2015) (some citations
and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Golden State
Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 107, 110 S. Ct. 444,
107 L. Ed. 2d 420 (1989)).

3

This Court must liberally construe Plaintiff’s pleadings
because he is proceeding pro se. See, e.g., Eldridge v. Block,
832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The Supreme Court has
instructed the federal courts to liberally construe the ‘inartful
pleading’ of pro se litigants.” (citing Boag v. MacDougall, 454
U.S. 364, 365, 102 S. Ct. 700, 701, 70 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1982) (per
curiam))).
8

Because the Supremacy Clause does not create a cause of
action, this Court CONCLUDES that Plaintiff’s claim asserting a
violation of the Supremacy Clause fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

The

Ninth Circuit has stated that, “[u]nless it is absolutely clear
that no amendment can cure the defect . . . a pro se litigant is
entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and an
opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action.”
Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995).

Lucas v.

Because this

Court CONCLUDES that it is absolutely clear that no amendment can
cure the defect in Plaintiff’s Supremacy Clause claim, this Court
GRANTS the State Motion and the Lau Ola Motion as to Plaintiff’s
Supremacy Clause claim.

Further, this Court’s analysis applies

to Plaintiff’s Supreme Clause claim against the Unserved
Defendants.

This Court therefore DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Supremacy

Clause claim WITH PREJUDICE as to all Defendants.
II.

Count I - CSA Claim
Marijuana is classified as a Schedule I
controlled substance under the Controlled
Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 812. As a Schedule I
controlled substance, marijuana, under federal
law, is deemed to have “no currently accepted
medical use in treatment[, and] [t]here is a lack
of accepted safety for use of the . . . substance
under medical supervision.” Id. § 812(b)(1)(B) &
(C).

Wilson v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2016) (alterations
in Wilson).

Plaintiff therefore asserts that Hawaii’s Marijuana

9

Dispensary System violates the CSA.

Both the State Defendants

and the Lau Ola Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s CSA claim fails
as a matter of law because there is no private right of action
under the CSA.
In Gonzaga University v. Doe, the Supreme Court
explained that “we have held that the question whether Congress
intended to create a private right of action is definitively
answered in the negative where a statute by its terms grants no
private rights to any identifiable class.”

536 U.S. 273, 283-84

(2002) (alterations, citations, and internal quotation marks
omitted).

The Supreme Court continued, “[f]or a statute to

create such private rights, its text must be phrased in terms of
the persons benefitted,” and, “even where a statute is phrased in
such explicit rights-creating terms, a plaintiff suing under an
implied right of action still must show that the statute
manifests an intent to create not just a private right but also a
private remedy.”

Id. (emphasis, citations, and internal

quotation marks omitted).
The Supreme Court has consistently distinguished
“explicit rights-creating” language from “statutory language
customarily found in criminal statutes . . . and other laws
enacted for the protection of the general public.”

Cannon v.

Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690 (1979); see also Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 289 (2001) (“Statutes that focus on the

10

person regulated rather than the individuals protected create ‘no
implication of an intent to confer rights on a particular class
of persons.’” (quoting California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287,
294, 101 S. Ct. 1775, 68 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1981))).

Further, the

Supreme Court has stated that “the ‘express provision of one
method of enforcing a substantive rule suggests that Congress
intended to preclude others.’”

Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1385

(quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 290, 121 S. Ct.
1511, 149 L. Ed. 2d 517 (2001)).

In addition to establishing

criminal offenses and penalties, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841-65, the CSA
also provides for administrative enforcement by the United States
Attorney General and – by delegation – the Department of Justice,
see 21 U.S.C. §§ 871-90.

This extensive criminal and

administrative enforcement scheme strongly suggests that Congress
intended to preclude private enforcement of the CSA.
Although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has not
expressly addressed the issue, the district courts within the
Ninth Circuit that have addressed it uniformly concluded that the
CSA does not create a private right of action.

See, e.g.,

Shmatko v. Arizona CVS Stores LLC, No. CV-14-01076-PHX-DGC, 2014
WL 3809092, at *2 (D. Ariz. Aug. 1, 2014); United States v. Real
Prop. & Improvements Located at 1840 Embarcadero, Oakland, Cal.,
932 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Creech v. Reinke,
No.1:12-cv-00173-EJL, 2012 WL 1995085, at *23-24 (D. Idaho

11

June 4, 2012); Dave v. Crowell & Moring LLP, No. CV 10-0172
GAF(PLAx), 2010 WL 1848147, at *11 n.11 (C.D. Cal. May 4, 2010).
Based on the clear, controlling precedent about the statutory
creation of private rights of action, and based on the language
of the statutes enacted pursuant to the CSA, this Court agrees
with those district courts and CONCLUDES that the CSA does not
create a private right of action to bring civil suits for
violations of the CSA.
Because the CSA does not create a private right of
action, this Court CONCLUDES that Count I fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, and it is absolutely clear that
no amendment can cure this defect in Plaintiff’s CSA claim.

This

Court therefore GRANTS the State Motion and the Lau Ola Motion as
to Count I.

Further, this Court’s analysis applies to

Plaintiff’s claim in Count I against the Unserved Defendants.
This Court therefore DISMISSES Count I WITH PREJUDICE as to all
Defendants.
III. Count II - RICO Claim
Count II alleges that Defendants are in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1962(c), which states:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or
associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or
indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity
or collection of unlawful debt.

12

18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) states, in relevant part, “Any person injured
in his business or property by reason of a violation of
section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate
United States district court and shall recover threefold the
damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a
reasonable attorney’s fee.”

Thus, it is possible for Plaintiff

to bring claims based on alleged RICO violations.
A.

Official Capacity Claims
The Ninth Circuit has held that “government entities

are incapable of forming [the] malicious intent necessary to
support a RICO action.”

Pedrina v. Chun, 97 F.3d 1296, 1300 (9th

Cir. 1996) (alteration in Pedrina) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff has sued the State

Defendants in both their individual and official capacities.
Plaintiff’s claims against the State Defendants in their official
capacities are actually claims against the State itself.

See

Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“[A]
suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is
not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the
official’s office.

As such, it is no different from a suit

against the State itself.” (citations omitted)).

This Court

CONCLUDES that, because the State is not capable of forming the
intent necessary to support a RICO claim, Plaintiff’s claims in
Count II against the State Defendants – in their official

13

capacities – fail as a matter of law.

This Court also CONCLUDES

that it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure this
defect in Plaintiff’s RICO claims against the State Defendants in
their official capacities.

This Court therefore GRANTS the State

Motion insofar as it DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims in Count II
against the State Defendants in their official capacities WITH
PREJUDICE.
B.

Standing
The State Defendants, in their individual capacities,

and the Lau Ola Defendants argue that this Court does not have
subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims in Count II
against them because he does not have standing.

See, e.g.,

Roberts v. Texas, Civ. No. 16-00013 HG-KSC, 2016 WL 2642995, at
*3 (D. Hawai`i May 9, 2016) (“A defendant may challenge a
plaintiff’s standing in a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.” (citing White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th
Cir. 2000))).
Article III of the United States Constitution
limits the power of the courts to the resolution
of actual “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S.
Const., art. III, § 2; Valley Forge Christian
Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471, 102 S. Ct. 752, 70
L. Ed. 2d 700 (1982). “[T]he irreducible
constitutional minimum of standing contains three
elements”: (1) injury in fact, (2) causation, and
(3) redressability. Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S. Ct. 2130,
119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992). Thus, the party seeking
14

to establish standing must show the “actual or
imminent” “invasion of a legally protected
interest” that is “fairly traceable to the
challenged action” and is “likely . . . to be
redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. at
560–61, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (emphasis added)
(alterations, citations, and quotation marks
omitted). The party seeking to establish
jurisdiction . . . bears the burden of
demonstrating standing. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v.
Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 & n.3, 126 S. Ct. 1854,
164 L. Ed. 2d 589 (2006); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561,
112 S. Ct. 2130. . . .
Ass’n of Pub. Agency Customers v. Bonneville Power Admin., 733
F.3d 939, 969–70 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasis omitted).
Specifically, to establish standing to bring a civil RICO claim,
the plaintiff “is required to show that the racketeering activity
was both a but-for cause and a proximate cause of his injury.
Proximate causation for RICO purposes requires ‘some direct
relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct
alleged.’”

Rezner v. Bayerische Hypo-Und Vereinsbank AG, 630

F.3d 866, 873 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing and quoting Holmes v. Sec.
Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268, 112 S. Ct. 1311, 117 L.
Ed. 2d 532 (1992)).
In addition, “[a]s with all questions of subject matter
jurisdiction except mootness, standing is determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint. . . .

The party invoking

the jurisdiction of the court cannot rely on events that unfolded
after the filing of the complaint to establish its standing.”
Wilbur v. Locke, 423 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations

15

and quotation marks omitted).4
In the instant case, Plaintiff alleges the following
injuries: he will be harmed by the negative perception created by
the marijuana dispensaries in his community; his property value
will decrease; and his supply source for his medical marijuana
will be taken over by illegal businesses.
7.]

[Complaint at pgs. 6-

However, when he filed the Complaint, Plaintiff merely

believed these injuries would occur when one or more medical
marijuana dispensaries opened in his community.

The Complaint

alleged that the dispensaries were expected to open within three
to nine months.

[Id. at pg. 5.]

In other words, no medical

marijuana dispensary had opened, and Plaintiff had not yet
suffered any of the injuries he believed would occur once a
dispensary opened.

This Court FINDS that Plaintiff’s alleged

injuries are not “concrete and particularized,” nor are they
“actual or imminent.”

See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.

Instead, the

anticipated decline in property value and impairment of
Plaintiff’s medical marijuana supply are purely “conjectural or
hypothetical.”

See id.

This Court therefore CONCLUDES that the

Complaint does not plead sufficient allegations that, if proven,
would establish an injury in fact.

This Court CONCLUDES that it

lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims in

4

Wilbur was abrogated on other grounds by Levin v. Commerce
Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. 413 (2010).
16

Count II against the State Defendants, in their individual
capacities, and the Lau Ola Defendants because Plaintiff failed
to plead a sufficient basis for his standing to bring those
claims.

In light of the fact that standing is determined at the

time of the filing of a complaint, this Court CONCLUDES that it
is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect in
Plaintiff’s RICO claim against the State Defendants in their
individual capacities and against the Lau Ola Defendants.

This

Court therefore GRANTS the State Motion insofar as it DISMISSES
Plaintiff’s claims in Count II against the State Defendants in
their individual capacities and the Lau Ola Defendants WITH
PREJUDICE.5
This Court’s analysis also applies to Plaintiff’s
claims in Count II against the Unserved Defendants.

This Court

therefore DISMISSES Count II WITH PREJUDICE as to the Unserved
Defendants.
This Court has dismissed Plaintiff’s claims Count II
against the State Defendants, in their individual capacities, the
Lau Ola Defendants, and the Unserved Defendants for lack of
standing.

The dismissal is WITH PREJUDICE, in other words,

Plaintiff does not have permission to file an amended complaint
in this case.

However, this Order does not prohibit Plaintiff

5

In light of this Court’s rulings, it is not necessary for
this Court to address the remaining arguments in the Motions to
Dismiss.
17

from filing a new RICO claim against those defendants in a
separate case, if events that occurred after the filing of the
Complaint – or events that occur in the future – give rise to an
injury in fact.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, the State Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss Complaint and Request for Injunction, filed
August 12, 2016, is HEREBY GRANTED, and the Lau Ola Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Michael Doyle Ruggles’ Complaint and
Request for Injunction, Filed on June 9, 2016, which they also
filed August 12, 2016, is HEREBY GRANTED.

All of Plaintiff’s

claims against the State Defendants and the Lau Ola Defendants
are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
In addition, Plaintiff’s claims against the Unserved
Defendants are HEREBY DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

There being no

remaining claims in this case, this Court DIRECTS the Clerk’s
Office to close the case on February 15, 2017, unless Plaintiff
files a motion for reconsideration of this Order by February 14,
2017.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

18

DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, January 31, 2017.

/s/ Leslie E. Kobayashi
Leslie E. Kobayashi
United States District Judge

MICHAEL DOYLE RUGGLES VS. GOVERNOR DAVID IGE, ET AL; CIVIL 1600304 LEK-KJM; ORDER GRANTING STATE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR INJUNCTION; AND GRANTING LAU OLA
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF MICHAEL DOYLE RUGGLES’
COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR INJUNCTION, FILED ON JUNE 9, 2016

19