Saragena v. Colvin

Filing 21

ORDER AFFIRMING FINAL DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY - Signed by MAGISTRATE JUDGE BARRY M. KURREN on 2/10/2017. "The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in the Commissioner's favor and to close this case." (emt, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications were served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII

REGINALDO SARAGENA,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
)
Commissioner of Social Security
)
)
Defendant.
)
)
______________________________ )

CIV. NO. 16-00322 BMK

ORDER AFFIRMING FINAL
DECISION OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY

ORDER AFFIRMING FINAL DECISION OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Before the Court is an appeal from a final decision by the
Commissioner of Social Security, which denied Plaintiff Reginaldo S. Saragena’s
(“Plaintiff”) concurrent applications for a period of disability, disability insurance
benefits, and supplemental security income benefits. For the reasons detailed
below, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s final decision.
BACKGROUND
On June 7, 2012, Plaintiff applied for a period of disability and
disability insurance benefits pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act.
(Complaint at 1.) Plaintiff also protectively filed an application for supplemental
security income pursuant to Title XVI of the Social Security Act. (Id.) In his

applications, Plaintiff alleged he was disabled as of June 14, 2010, but later amended
his disability date to January 2, 2013. (AR at 11.)
Plaintiff’s claims were initially denied on January 25, 2013. (Id.) He
thereafter requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), which
took place on August 12, 2014. (Id.) On October 31, 2014, the ALJ issued a
written opinion, concluding that Plaintiff was not disabled and denying his
applications for social security benefits. (Id. at 11-21.) The ALJ concluded that
Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: “hypertension; chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease (COPD), a history of left shoulder biceps tendon rupture and
shoulder SLAP lesion; and degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine.” (Id.
at 13.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform
“light work” and that he could no longer perform any of his past relevant work as a
construction worker, landscaper, or fish processor. (Id. at 14, 19.) However,
based on Plaintiff’s age (51 years old on the disability date), education (at least a
high school education), work experience (as a construction worker, landscaper, and
fish processor), and residual functional capacity (capacity to perform “light work”),
the ALJ concluded that “there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
national economy that the claimant can perform” – i.e., employment as a cashier,
office helper, or parking attendant. (Id. at 20-21.) As a result, the ALJ determined

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that Plaintiff is not disabled.
Plaintiff thereafter appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals Council,
which denied Plaintiff’s request for review on April 13, 2016. (AR at 1.)
Consequently, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security. (Id.)
On June 17, 2016, Plaintiff appealed the final agency decision to this
Court, contending that the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff was not disabled was not
supported by substantial evidence and was based upon incorrect legal standards.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to
review final decisions of the Commissioner of Social Security. A final decision by
the Commissioner denying Social Security disability benefits will not be disturbed
by the reviewing district court if it is free of legal error and supported by substantial
evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th
Cir. 2005). “Substantial evidence means more than a scintilla but less than a
preponderance.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations
omitted). It is also “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. Finally, “[w]here the evidence may
reasonably support more than one interpretation, [the court] may not substitute [its]

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judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Verduzco, 188 F.3d at 1089.
DISCUSSION
“To establish a claimant’s eligibility for disability benefits under the
Social Security Act, it must be shown that: (a) the claimant suffers from a
medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result
in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than twelve months; and (b) the impairment renders the claimant incapable of
performing the work that the claimant previously performed and incapable of
performing any other substantial gainful employment that exists in the national
economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th
Cir. 1999). A claimant must satisfy both requirements in order to qualify as
“disabled” under the Social Security Act. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098.
The Social Security regulations set forth a five-step sequential process
for determining whether a claimant is disabled. Ukolov, 420 F.3d at 1003; see 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520. “If a claimant is found to be ‘disabled’ or ‘not disabled’ at any
step in the sequence, there is no need to consider subsequent steps.” Ukolov, 420
F.3d at 1003 (citations omitted in original). The claimant bears the burden of proof
as to steps one through four, whereas the burden shifts to the Commissioner for step
five. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098.

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The five steps of the disability evaluation process are as follows:
(i) At the first step, we consider your work activity, if any. If you are
doing substantial gainful activity, we will find that you are not
disabled.
(ii) At the second step, we consider the medical severity of your
impairment(s). If you do not have a severe medically
determinable physical or mental impairment that meets the
duration requirement in § 404.1509, or a combination of
impairments that is severe and meets the duration requirement, we
will find that you are not disabled.
(iii) At the third step, we also consider the medical severity of your
impairment(s). If you have an impairment(s) that meets or equals
one of our listings in appendix 1 of this subpart and meets the
duration requirement, we will find that you are disabled.
(iv) At the fourth step, we consider our assessment of your residual
functional capacity and your past relevant work. If you can still
do your past relevant work, we will find that you are not disabled.
(v) At the fifth and last step, we consider our assessment of your
residual functional capacity and your age, education, and work
experience to see if you can make an adjustment to other work. If
you can make an adjustment to other work, we will find that you
are not disabled. If you cannot make an adjustment to other work,
we will find that you are disabled.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (internal citations omitted).
Plaintiff agrees with the ALJ’s findings as to steps one through four.
(Opening Brief (“OB”) at 5.) With respect to these steps, the ALJ found: (1)
Plaintiff was not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the disability date of
January 2, 2013; (2) Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: “hypertension;
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chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), a history of left shoulder biceps
tendon rupture and shoulder SLAP lesion; and degenerative disc disease of the
lumbar spine”; (3) Plaintiff’s impairments do not meet or medically equal any of the
listed impairments in the regulations; and (4) Plaintiff has the residual functional
capacity to perform “light work” and that he can no longer perform any of his past
relevant work as a construction worker, landscaper, or fish processor. (AR at
13-19.) With respect to step five, based on Plaintiff’s age (51 years old on the
disability onset date), education (at least a high school education), prior work
experience, and residual functional capacity to perform “light work”, the ALJ
concluded that “there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that the claimant can perform” – i.e., employment as a cashier, office
helper, or parking attendant. (Id. at 20-21.)
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints were not entirely credible. (OB at 12-15.) Specifically, the ALJ based
her credibility finding on the following determinations, which Plaintiff challenges:
(1) the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not receiving the kind of medical treatment
that one would expect a person with severe back problems to receive and (2) the ALJ
determined that Plaintiff’s credibility was suspect because he did not experience
muscle atrophy. (Id. at 14.)

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“In evaluating the credibility of pain testimony after a claimant
produces objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment, an ALJ may not
reject a claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on a lack of medical evidence
to fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676,
680 (9th Cir. 2005). In determining credibility, “an ALJ may engage in ordinary
techniques of credibility evaluation, such as considering claimant’s reputation for
truthfulness and inconsistencies in claimant’s testimony.” Id. The ALJ may also
consider the claimant’s daily activities, functional restrictions, and the treatments
undertaken. Id.; Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting the
ALJ may consider “whether the claimant engages in daily activities inconsistent
with the alleged symptoms”); Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995)
(noting that conservative treatment suggested “a lower level of both pain and
functional limitation”). “The ALJ must specify what testimony is not credible and
identify the evidence that undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Burch, 400 F.3d
at 680.
Here, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s findings that Plaintiff’s allegations
of symptoms were inconsistent with the conservative treatment undertaken and that
Plaintiff did not suffer from muscle atrophy, which is a common side effect of
prolonged or chronic pain. The ALJ based these findings on the medical evidence

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in the record, noting that Plaintiff “has not generally received the type of medical
treatment one would expect for a totally disabled individual.” (AR at 15.) For
example, the ALJ referred to Plaintiff’s medical record in noting Plaintiff’s
“infrequent trips to a doctor for the allegedly disabling symptoms,” that any
treatment has been “routine and conservative in nature, primarily in the form of
medications,” and the “lack of more aggressive treatment, such as surgical
intervention.” (Id.) The ALJ explained that “the credibility of claimant’s
allegations regarding the severity of his symptoms and limitations is diminished
because those allegations are greater than expected in light of the objective evidence
of record.” (Id.) Regarding muscle atrophy, the ALJ referred to Plaintiff’s
medical records in noting that there “is no evidence of atrophy in the claimant’s
lumbar spine, left upper extremity, or lower extremities.” (Id.) Although the ALJ
believed that Plaintiff suffered some degree of pain, the lack of muscle atrophy
indicated “the pain has not altered his use of those muscles to an extent that has
resulted in atrophy.” (Id. at 16.)
The Court notes that, in concluding that Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints of pain were “less than fully credible,” the ALJ relied in detail on
Plaintiff’s medical record and opinions by government doctors as well as Plaintiff’s
treating physician. (AR at 15-17.) The ALJ did not reject Plaintiff’s subjective

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complaints based solely on a lack of medical evidence to fully corroborate the
alleged severity of pain, but also considered the treatment that Plaintiff had
undertaken, as well as his daily activities and functional restrictions as outlined in
the record. Burch, 400 F.3d at 680; Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112 (daily activities);
Johnson, 60 F.3d at 1434 (conservative treatment). After thoroughly reviewing the
record, this Court is satisfied that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence and is free of legal error. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Ukolov, 420 F.3d at
1004. Accordingly, this Court “may not substitute [its] judgment for that of the
Commissioner” and affirms the ALJ’s decision to deny Plaintiff’s applications for
social security benefits. See Verduzco, 188 F.3d at 1089.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner of
Social Security’s denial of Plaintiff’s applications for a period of disability,
disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income benefits. The
Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in the Commissioner’s favor and to
close this case.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, February 10, 2017.

Reginaldo Saragena v. Carolyn W. Colvin, CIV. NO. 16-00322 BMK, ORDER AFFIRMING
FINAL DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY.

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