McAllister v. Adecco Group N.A. et al
Filing
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ORDER: (1) ADOPTING THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT TRANE U.S. INC.'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF TERMINATING SANCTIONS; AND (2) DENYING PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL OF THE ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S COUNTER MOTION, ECF NO. 330 . Signed by CHIEF JUDGE J. MICHAEL SEABRIGHT on 3/19/2018. (afc) Findings and Recommendation to Grant Trane U.S. Inc.'s Motion for Entry of Terminating Sanctions: ECF 330 . Motion for Issuance of Findings & Recommend ations regarding Entry of Terminating Sanctions: ECF 290 . Plaintiff's Appeal of the Order denying Plaintiff's Counter Motion: ECF 331 .Plaintiff's Counter-Motion for Terminating Sanctions: ECF 308 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipants registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications will be served by first class mail on March 20, 2018.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
WILLIS C. MCALLISTER,
CIV. NO. 16-00447 JMS-KJM
Plaintiff,
vs.
ADECCO GROUP N.A.; TRANE
SUPPLY CO.; CURTIS L. BRUNK;
GARRETT MOCK,
Defendants.
ORDER: (1) ADOPTING THE
FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT
TRANE U.S. INC.’S MOTION FOR
ENTRY OF TERMINATING
SANCTIONS; AND (2) DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL OF THE
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
COUNTER MOTION, ECF NO. 330
ORDER: (1) ADOPTING THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO
GRANT TRANE U.S. INC.’S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF TERMINATING
SANCTIONS; AND (2) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL OF THE
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S COUNTER MOTION, ECF NO. 330
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 28, 2018, Magistrate Judge Kenneth J. Mansfield issued
a Findings and Recommendation (“F&R”) to grant Defendant Trane U.S. Inc.’s
(“Trane”) Motion for entry of terminating sanctions, and an Order denying
Plaintiff Willis C. McAllister’s (“Plaintiff”) Counter Motion for terminating
sanctions against Trane. ECF No. 330. On March 14, 2018, Plaintiff filed an
Appeal objecting to all findings and contending that the law was misapplied. ECF
No. 331. The court construes the Appeal as both an Objection to the F&R and an
Appeal of the Order denying Plaintiff’s Counter Motion.
Pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(d), the court finds this matter suitable for
disposition without a hearing. For the reasons discussed below, the court
ADOPTS the F&R, DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims against Trane, and DENIES
Plaintiff’s Appeal.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A.
Objections to F&R
When a party objects to a magistrate judge’s findings or
recommendations, the district court must review de novo those portions to which
the objections are made and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the
findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673 (1980); United
States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“[T]he
district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de
novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.”).
B.
Appeal of Order
Any party may appeal to the district court any pretrial nondispositive
matter determined by a magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(a); LR 74.1. Such an order may be reversed by the district court judge only
when it is “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); LR
74.1. The threshold of the “clearly erroneous” test is high and significantly
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deferential. “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. U.S. Gypsum
Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948); Matthews v. Chevron Corp., 362 F.3d 1172, 1180
(9th Cir. 2004); Hasegawa v. Hawaii, 2011 WL 6258831, at *1 (D. Haw. Dec. 14,
2011).
III. BACKGROUND
A.
Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff initiated this action on August 9, 2016. ECF No. 1. The
F&R includes a recitation of the relevant events leading up to the recommendation
to impose terminating sanctions that this court need not repeat in detail here. See
F&R at 2-8. Rather, the court summarizes those events.
Trane sent Plaintiff its initial request for production of documents on
March 22, 2017. ECF No. 142. After Trane deemed Plaintiff’s initial response to
be inadequate, Magistrate Judge Mansfield held a discovery hearing, during which
“Plaintiff represented . . . that he had approximately 300 documents in his
possession in a box, at his residence, that were responsive to Trane’s Documents
Request.” F&R at 3. Magistrate Judge Mansfield ordered Plaintiff to produce
those documents by June 23, 2017. Id.; ECF No. 214. Additionally,
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Trane agreed to pay for copying charges based on
Plaintiff’s representation that his production consisted of
approximately 300 documents. The Court also informed
Plaintiff that any objections to Trane’s Documents
Request were waived. Thus, the Court informed the
parties this it anticipated that Plaintiff would produce all
documents responsive to Trane’s Documents Request,
and that the parties and the Court could move past the
discovery issue after June 23, 2017.
F&R at 3.
Thereafter, Plaintiff delivered nearly 9,000 pages of non-responsive
documents to a copying service, which charged Trane $2,698.02. See ECF No.
247 at 2-3. Trane sought expedited discovery assistance; a hearing was held, and
on August 14, 2017, Magistrate Judge Mansfield issued an Order addressing
discovery issues (the “August 14 Order”). ECF Nos. 246, 247, 250. The August
14 Order explained that Magistrate Judge Mansfield had “reviewed a sampling of
the documents” Plaintiff had submitted to the copying service and determined that
they “consist[ed] of instructions on personal hygiene, and indiscernible equations
and formulas that appear[ed] wholly unrelated to this action.” August 14 Order at
6, ECF No. 250; see also ECF No. 247 at 7-14. The August 14 Order found
Plaintiff’s production to be “a willful violation of [the] June 8, 2017 Order to
produce the documents in his possession that are responsive to Trane’s Documents
Request.” August 14 Order at 6. Thus, Plaintiff was ordered, in part, to:
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(1) produce all responsive documents by August 28, 2017; (2) pay Trane’s
reasonable expenses in making the expedited discovery request; and (3) reimburse
Trane the $2,698.02 it spent to copy the nearly 9,000 pages of unresponsive
documents Plaintiff submitted to the copying service. Id. at 9-10. The August 14
Order warned Plaintiff that the court would “entertain a motion for terminating
sanctions by Trane if [he] continues to circumvent his obligation to fully comply
with his discovery obligations and this Court’s orders.” Id. at 7.
Plaintiff again failed to produce responsive documents. Instead,
Plaintiff filed six meritless discovery motions, each of which was denied based on
Plaintiff’s (1) failure to meet the applicable legal standard, (2) misunderstanding of
the court’s prior orders, and/or (3) failure to meet and confer. F&R at 6 (citing
ECF Nos. 252, 254, 263, 264, 272, 295, 299, 300).
On October 2, 2017, Trane filed its Motion for Terminating Sanctions.
ECF No. 290. On December 12, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Response, in which he does
not dispute his non-compliance with discovery or Magistrate Judge Mansfield’s
orders, but moves for terminating sanctions against Trane. See ECF No. 308. On
January 5, 2018, Magistrate Judge Mansfield set the reasonable expenses related to
the denial of Plaintiff’s meritless discovery motions, ordering Plaintiff to pay
Trane a total of $8,096.00 in discovery sanctions. ECF No. 318. On appeal, this
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court affirmed the denial of Plaintiff’s motions and the January 5, 2018 Order. See
ECF No. 327.
B.
The F&R and Order
On February 28, 2018, Magistrate Judge Mansfield issued an:
(1) F&R to impose terminating sanctions against Plaintiff and dismiss Plaintiff’s
claims against Trane (“F&R”); and (2) Order denying Plaintiff’s Counter Motion
for terminating sanctions against Trane (“Order”). ECF No. 330.
The F&R recognized the five-part test courts consider when
determining whether to dismiss a case for failure to comply with court orders set
forth in In re Phenylpropanolamine (“PPA”) Products Liability Litigation, 460
F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006) and Connecticut General Life Insurance Company
v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 482 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2007):
“(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of
litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its dockets;
(3) the risk of prejudice to the party seeking sanctions;
(4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on
their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic
sanctions.” In considering the fifth part of the foregoing
test, the Ninth Circuit urges district courts to
[(1)] “explicitly discuss the feasibility of less drastic
sanctions and explain why alternative sanctions would be
inadequate”; (2) explain how it has “implemented
alternative methods of sanctioning or curing the
malfeasance before ordering dismissal”; and (3) “warn
the plaintiff of the possibility of dismissal before actually
ordering dismissal.”
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F&R at 9. The F&R also explained that “[t]he sub-parts of the fifth factor are
whether the court has considered lesser sanctions, whether it tried them, and
whether it warned the recalcitrant party about the possibility of case-dispositive
sanctions.” Id. (quoting Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 482 F.3d at 1096).
Applying the factual history of this case to the five-part test, the F&R
found that:
(1) “Plaintiff’s delay” of nearly one year in producing all responsive
documents requested by Trane and “refus[al] to cooperate” with the court’s
“numerous attempts” to get discovery moving “impedes the expeditious resolution
of this litigation.” F&R at 10;
(2) The court “has been inundated with wasteful pretrial activities, including
the need for expedited discovery assistance” due to “Plaintiff’s failure to
participate in discovery” and filing of “numerous pretrial motions, many of which
were frivolous and in violation of this district’s local rules. . . . Plaintiff’s delay in
producing the requested documents is unreasonable, and his actions . . . have
resulted in an unmanageable docket.” Id. at 11-12;
(3) The court provided Plaintiff “multiple extensions to produce” the
requested discovery and “ordered Plaintiff to produce responsive documents on
more than one occasion.” Id. at 12-13. Plaintiff’s refusal “prejudice[s] Trane . . .
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[and] interferes with the rightful decision of the case” because the court “is unable
to get to the merits.” Id.;
(4) The court’s prior “imposition of less drastic sanctions . . . was patently
ineffective.” Id. at 13. Despite the court’s warning that terminating sanctions
could result “if Plaintiff continued to circumvent his obligation to fully comply
with his discovery obligations and this Court’s orders . . . Plaintiff has not
produced the 300 responsive documents he represented to the Court that he had in
his possession . . . nor has he paid” previously imposed discovery sanctions of
$6,543.62. Id. at 13-14. Further, the court “recently awarded Trane $8,096.00 in
discovery sanctions.” Id. at 14. In short,
Plaintiff continues to ignore this Court’s orders to
provide Trane with the discovery requested in Trane’s
Documents Request, to meet and confer with Trane
before filing discovery motions, and to pay sanctions for
his denied discovery motions. . . . Plaintiff’s refusal to
participate in discovery and his over-all disruptive
discovery practice has clogged the Court’s docket,
protracted this litigation, and prevented Trane from
conducting meaningful discovery. . . . Plaintiff does not
dispute or attempt to excuse or justify his noncompliance. Plaintiff simply continues to willfully
disobey this Court’s orders and refuses to cooperate in
this action.
Id. at 14-15. Thus, additional “lesser sanctions in this action are not feasible. Id. at
15.
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Based on these findings, Magistrate Judge Mansfield recommended
that this court grant Trane’s Motion for terminating sanctions and dismiss
Plaintiff’s claims against Trane. Id. at 15. Magistrate Judge Mansfield then denied
Plaintiff’s Counter Motion, finding that Plaintiff had misread prior discovery
orders and news reports about the law firm representing Trane in other districts,
and had failed to provide any factual or legal basis for imposition of sanctions
against Trane. Id. Finally, Magistrate Judge Mansfield determined that even if the
court “were to apply the same five-factor test . . . each . . . factor[] militates against
imposing terminating sanctions on Trane.” Id. at 16.
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff “objects to all of the adverse findings . . . as set forth in ECF
#330,” contending that “they are clearly erroneous, and/or an abuse of the Court’s
discretion, that is the result of this Court’s incomplete/one sided analysis of facts,
it’s [(sic)] incomplete/one sided misapplication of the ‘controlling’ case law
precedents, and that these actions by the Court, do not comport with due process.”
Appeal at 2-3. Plaintiff does not explain why any particular finding is erroneous or
in what way the court misapplied controlling law.
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A.
Applying a De Novo Standard, Terminating Sanctions are Warranted
and Just
The Ninth Circuit applies a five-part test, with three subparts to the
fifth part, to determine whether a case-dispositive sanction under Rule 37(b)(2) is
just, weighing:
(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of
litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its dockets;
(3) the risk of prejudice to the party seeking sanctions;
(4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on
their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic
sanctions. The subparts of the fifth factor are whether the
court has considered lesser sanctions, whether it tried
them, and whether it warned the recalcitrant party about
the possibility of case-dispositive sanctions.
Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 482 F.3d at 1096 (footnote, citation, and quotation marks
omitted); see also Nascimento v. Dummer, 508 F.3d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 2007)
(applying factors for failure to participate in pretrial matters and sanctioning
pursuant to Rule 16 (including failure to obey a pretrial order)). “[T]he most
critical factor is not merely delay or docket management concerns, but truth, i.e.,
whether the discovery violations threaten to interfere with the rightful decision of
the case.” Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 482 F.3d at 1096 (quotation marks and
citation omitted). But see Wanderer v. Johnston, 910 F.2d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 1990)
(“Thus the key factors are prejudice and availability of lesser sanctions.”). The test
“provides the district court with a way to think about what to do, not a set of
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conditions precedent for sanctions or a script that the district court must follow.”
Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 482 F.3d at 1096. The court considers each of these
factors.
First, the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation
strongly favors imposition of terminating sanctions in this case. “[T]he public has
an overriding interest in securing ‘the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action’ [and the] [o]rderly and expeditious resolution of disputes is of
great importance to the rule of law.” In re PPA Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d at
1227 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1). Plaintiff was well aware of his discovery
obligations and his obligations to comply with court orders compelling him to
produce responsive documents. Rather than participate in discovery in good faith,
Plaintiff engaged in meritless motion practice that delayed forward progress of this
case for nearly a year and unreasonably prevented resolution of the merits of his
claims.
Second, the court must “manage cases so that disposition is expedited,
wasteful pretrial activities are discouraged, the quality of the trial is improved, and
settlement is facilitated.” Id. Magistrate Judge Mansfield entered several orders
requiring Plaintiff to produce discovery and participate in the discovery process in
accordance with applicable rules. Plaintiff’s willful refusal to follow these orders
and instead file numerous frivolous pretrial motions and appeals stalled disposition
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of this action and unreasonably wasted the court’s and the parties’ time. Thus, this
factor weighs strongly in favor of imposition of terminating sanctions.
Third, a defendant suffers prejudice when the “plaintiff’s actions
impair the defendant’s ability to go to trial or threaten to interfere with the rightful
decision of the case.” Adriana Int’l Corp. v. Thoeren, 913 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th
Cir. 1990) (citing Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 131 (9th Cir. 1987)).
“Unreasonable delay or a litigant’s failure to produce documents as ordered may
constitute prejudice.” Valvanis v. Milgroom, 2008 WL 5412420, at *11 (D. Haw.
Dec. 30, 2008) (citing In re PPA Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d at 1227). For nearly
a year, Trane has sought, and Magistrate Judge Mansfield has ordered Plaintiff to
produce responsive documents that Plaintiff represented were in his possession.
Plaintiff’s failure to produce such documents, coupled with his filing of numerous
meritless motions has unreasonably delayed resolution of his claims against Trane.
Absent imposition of terminating sanctions, Trane will remain in limbo, not
knowing when or even if claims against it will ever be resolved on the merits.
Thus, the court finds that Trane will suffer prejudice if the court does not impose
terminating sanctions.
Fourth, Plaintiff’s refusal to participate in the discovery process in
good faith severely interferes with the rightful decision of this case. Absent
Plaintiff’s production of responsive documents and participation in the discovery
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process in good faith, the court is simply unable to address the merits of his claims.
Thus, this factor weighs strongly in favor of imposing terminating sanctions.
Fifth, Magistrate Judge Mansfield tried imposing imposed lesser
sanctions — Plaintiff was ordered to reimburse Trane’s reasonable expenses and
copying costs — and warned Plaintiff that he would consider imposition of
terminating sanctions if Plaintiff continued to circumvent his obligation to fully
comply with discovery obligations and court orders. Nevertheless, Plaintiff has not
yet produced the 300 responsive documents he claims to possess, nor has he paid
the monetary sanctions imposed by Magistrate Judge Mansfield. In short, Plaintiff
continues to ignore the court’s orders and shirk his discovery obligations. This,
coupled with his penchant for filing meritless, disruptive pretrial motions, has
prevented the court from efficiently managing its docket, prevented Trane from
conducting meaningful discovery, delayed litigation unreasonably, and prevented
any possibility of resolving this case on the merits. In light of Magistrate Judge
Mansfield’s prior consideration and imposition of lesser sanctions, his warnings to
Plaintiff that continued refusal to cooperate in good faith could result in
terminating sanctions, and Plaintiff’s continued refusal to cooperate, the court finds
that imposition of additional lesser sanctions would be futile and therefore are not
feasible. Thus, this factor also weighs strongly in favor of imposition of
terminating sanctions.
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Accordingly, this court finds that imposition of terminating sanctions
against Plaintiff and dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against Trane is warranted and
just.
B.
Applying a Clearly Erroneous or Contrary to Law Standard, Plaintiff’s
Appeal is Denied
After careful review, the court agrees that Plaintiff’s Counter Motion
is “based on a misreading of [Judge Mansfield’s] previous discovery orders . . . and
news reports concerning the law firm representing Trane in other districts.” Order
at 15. The court further finds that Magistrate Judge Mansfield’s determination that
Plaintiff failed to provide any factual or legal basis for sanctions, let alone
terminating sanctions, against Trane is both factually and legally correct. That is,
his Order was neither “clearly erroneous” nor “contrary to law.”
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V. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the court ADOPTS the Findings and
Recommendation to grant Trane’s Motion for terminating sanctions, DISMISSES
Plaintiff’s claims against Trane, and DENIES Plaintiff’s Appeal of the Order
denying his Counter Motion for terminating sanctions against Trane. Plaintiff’s
claims against Adecco USA Inc. and Curtis L. Brunk remain.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, March 19, 2018.
/s/ J. Michael Seabright
J. Michael Seabright
Chief United States District Judge
McAllister v. Adecco Grp. N.A., et al., Civ. No. 16-00447 JMS-KJM, Order: (1) Adopting the
Findings and Recommendation to Grant Trane U.S. Inc.’s Motion for Entry of Terminating
Sanctions; and (2) Denying Plaintiff’s Appeal of the Order Denying Plaintiff’s Counter Motion,
ECF No. 330
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