Hermanns-Raymond v. Hawaii, State of et al

Filing 15

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND ACTION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b). Signed by JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI on 11/28/2016. (eps, )CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEParticipant s registered to receive electronic notifications received this document electronically at the e-mail address listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Participants not registered to receive electronic notifications served by first class mail on the date of this docket entry

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
ROCKY HERMANNS-RAYMOND,
#A6026839,

)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
MAUI COMMUNITY CORR.
)
CENTER, JOHN AND JANE DOES )
1-6,
)
)
Defendants.
)
__________________________ )

CIV. NO. 16-00502 LEK/KSC
ORDER DISMISSING FIRST
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND
ACTION PURSUANT TO 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) &
1915A(b)

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND ACTION
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)
Before the court is pro se Plaintiff
Rocky Hermanns-Raymond’s First Amended Complaint
(“FAC”) brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
14.

ECF No.

Plaintiff names the Maui Community Correctional

Center (MCCC), and unidentified MCCC prison officials
John and Jane Does 1-6 in their individual capacities,
as Defendants.
For the following reasons, the FAC is DISMISSED for
failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b).

Because Plaintiff was given

leave to correct the deficiencies in his claims and is
unable to do so, this dismissal is with prejudice.
I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff commenced this action on September 12,
2016.

Compl., ECF No. 1.

On October 14, 2016, the

court dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint and supplement
for Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim, with leave
granted to amend.

Order, ECF No. 10.

The court

determined that the Eleventh Amendment barred
Plaintiff’s claims against the State of Hawaii, and the
Director of the Department of Public Safety and MCCC
Warden in their official capacities.

The court further

found that Plaintiff’s facts were insufficient to state
a claim under the Eighth Amendment for his allegations
of (1) overcrowding, and (2) delay of medical care when
he was incarcerated at MCCC.1
In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges that between March
and October 2015, he was housed with three other
inmates in a two-man cell at MCCC.

1

Plaintiff says that

Plaintiff is now incarcerated at the Kulani Correctional
Facility (KCF).
2

he and his cellmates were confined in their cell “for
up to 10 hours,” and sometimes longer.
#62.

ECF 14, PageID

Plaintiff states that on one occasion he tripped

over a mattress on the cell’s floor, fell, cut his eye,
and required medical care.

Plaintiff acknowledges that

the mattress was “open and obvious,” but alleges that
Defendants are liable for this “foreseeable” obstacle
that caused his fall.

Id., PageID #62-63.

Plaintiff provides no details identifying
Defendants John and Jane Does 1-6, although he suggests
they are MCCC officials with responsibility for making
inmate housing assignments.

Plaintiff concludes that

Defendants, by housing him in a two-inmate cell with
three other inmates, violated his rights under the
Eighth Amendment.2

Plaintiff seeks damages only.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

The court must screen all civil actions brought by
prisoners challenging prison conditions or seeking
redress from a governmental entity, officer, or

2

Plaintiff has omitted his claims alleging the delay or
denial of medical care in the FAC.
3

employee.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

Complaints or claims

that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim on
which relief may be granted, or seek relief from a
defendant who is immune from suit must be dismissed.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e (c)(1).
A complaint that lacks a cognizable legal theory or
alleges insufficient facts under a cognizable legal
theory fails to state a claim.

Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

A

pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

This does not

demand detailed factual allegations, but requires “more
than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.”
(2009).

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’”

Id. (quoting Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
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action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.”

Id.

That is, “when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.”

Id.

Leave to amend should be granted if it appears the
plaintiff can correct the defects in the complaint.
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en
banc).

Dismissal without leave to amend is appropriate

when it is clear that amendment is futile.

Sylvia

Landfield Trust v. City of L.A., 729 F.3d 1189, 1196
(9th Cir. 2013).
III.

DISCUSSION

“To sustain an action under section 1983, a
plaintiff must show ‘(1) that the conduct complained of
was committed by a person acting under color of state
law; and (2) that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of
a federal constitutional or statutory right.’”

Hydrick

v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation
omitted), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 556

5

U.S. 1256 (2009); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,
48 (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Section 1983 also requires a connection between a
defendant’s actions and a plaintiff’s allegations.

See

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978);
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).

“A person

‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a
constitutional right, within the meaning of section
1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in
another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act
which he is legally required to do that causes the
deprivation of which complaint is made.”

Johnson v.

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
A.

MCCC is Dismissed
The FAC lists MCCC as a Defendant.

Claims under

§ 1983 must be directed at “persons,” and neither a
jail nor a prison facility is a “person” amenable to
suit under § 1983.

See Allison v. California Adult

Auth., 419 F.2d 822, 823 (9th Cir. 1969) (finding that
California Adult Authority and San Quentin Prison are
not “person[s]” subject to suit under § 1983); cf.
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Brown v. California Dep’t. of Corr., 554 F.3d 747, 752
(9th Cir. 2009) (“The district court correctly held
that the California Department of Corrections and the
California Board of Prison Terms were entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity.”).

MCCC is DISMISSED with

prejudice.
B.

Eighth Amendment: Overcrowding
To establish an Eighth Amendment violation based on

jail conditions: (1) the deprivation alleged must be
objectively “sufficiently serious,” such that a prison
official’s act or omission results in the denial of
“the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,”
and (2) the prison official must have had a
“sufficiently culpable state of mind,” exhibiting
“deliberate indifference” to the inmate’s health or
safety.

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

The

“deliberate indifference” standard requires a plaintiff
to show that the prison official “knows that inmates
face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards

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that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to
abate it.”

Id. at 847.

As explained to Plaintiff in the October 14, 2016
Order, allegations of prison overcrowding alone are
insufficient to state a claim under the Eighth
Amendment.

See Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 869

F.2d 461, 471 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348–49 (1981) (holding that
double-celling of inmates by itself does not inflict
unnecessary or wanton pain or constitute grossly
disproportionate punishment in violation of Eighth
Amendment).

To state a cognizable overcrowding claim,

an inmate must plausibly allege that the crowding
caused an increase in violence, reduced the provision
of other constitutionally required services, or reached
a level that rendered the institution unfit for human
habitation.

See Balla, 869 F.2d at 471; Hoptowit v.

Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1248–49 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting
that overcrowding by itself is not an Eighth Amendment
violation, but can lead to specific effects that might

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violate the Constitution), abrogated in part on other
grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
Plaintiff again fails to allege facts showing that
he was subjected to inhumane conditions of confinement
due to being housed in an 8’ by 11’ cell with three
other inmates for approximately seven months.
Plaintiff does not allege that there was an increase in
violence, he was denied any constitutionally required
services (such as food, water, sanitation, or
exercise), or that conditions in his cell (or at MCCC
generally) were unfit for human habitation.

Rather,

Plaintiff again simply asserts that housing him in a
cell with three other inmates is unconstitutional on
its face, because it represents a “natural safety and
fire hazard,” and it heightened the risk that violence
might ensue.

See FAC, ECF No. 14, PageID #64 (stating,

“it caused a[n] increase in tensions between inmate[s]
over personal space that causes more of a likelihood of
violence”).
The court notified Plaintiff of the applicable
legal standard and the deficiencies in this claim in
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the October 14, 2016 Order.

Despite this guidance, the

FAC fails to correct the identified deficiencies in
Plaintiff’s overcrowding claim.

Based on the

allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint, supplement, and
FAC, the court is persuaded that Plaintiff is unable to
allege any additional facts to support an Eighth
Amendment claim based on overcrowding, and that
granting further leave to amend is futile.

See

Hartmann v. California Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 707
F.3d 1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A district court may
deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile.”);
Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130.
The FAC is DISMISSED without leave to amend and
with prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to state a
constitutional claim on which relief may be granted.
This dismissal does not prevent Plaintiff from raising
his claims in the state court under a theory of
negligence.
IV.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

Plaintiff is notified that this dismissal may count
as a “strike” under the “3-strikes” provision of 28
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U.S.C. § 1915(g), unless this decision is overturned on
appeal.

Under the 3-strikes provision, a prisoner may

not bring a civil action or appeal a civil judgment in
forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915
if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior
occasions, while incarcerated or detained in
any facility, brought an action or appeal in a
court of the United States that was dismissed
on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious,
or fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, unless the prisoner is under
imminent danger of serious physical injury.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
V.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED
with prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b).

The Clerk is

directed to enter judgment and terminate this action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
//
//
//

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DATED: HONOLULU, HAWAII, November 28, 2016.

/s/ Leslie E. Kobayashi
Leslie E. Kobayashi
United States District Judge

Hermanns-Raymond v. Dir. Dep’t of Public Safety, 1:16-cv-00502 LEK/KSC; Scrn 2016
Hermanns-Raymond 16-502 lek (dsm 8A ovrcrwd’g)

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